Future of the Corps

Discussion in 'Int Corps' started by Howayman, Aug 22, 2010.

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  1. Message from CR:

    a recruiting question has (amazingly) led to a fairly interesting discussion, so i'm opening this new thread to relocate some of the posts to here (because i know most people don't read the recruiting sticky). moved posts to follow.


    Howayman said:

    The quote function is bust...but REMFQuestions stated that the Corps is about to become mighty choosy with who they recruit and that 500+ OPMI's are about to be without a real role when we leave Herrick...I can't imagine recruitment will stay steady as it is at the moment.

    I would just like to point out that :

    A. The Corps is already choosy about who it takes. REMF even alludes to it when he says that he was 'shaded', which actually means taken at risk. It is not a technique. It's a gamble.

    B. 500+ OPMI's will still have a role when HERRICK folds. Just like they had a role before HERRICK even started.

    C. Recruitment is currently on a mild surge. In my humble opinion, the Corps may actually do well post SDSR and may grow again, possibly by a couple of hundred posts. That means that the throughput may have to increase again...meaning that recruitment within the Corps may remain steady, or even increase. But hey...what do I know.
     
  2. it's a funny attitude isn't it? some people seem to unconsciously believe that the world started when they joined, and forget that there is always something going on... and always has been.

    of course, old buggers like us remember when about one third of the Corps could be found down the Greenfly on a friday night!
     
  3. LOL I don't think that at all, but the Corps has expanded massively since 2001 (I was part of the biggest TDW training group photo ever to occur at Chicksands) and there is only so many fences to kick and so many PowerPoint briefings on Somalia to go around. I guess we will just need to see but I am not alone in my thoughts, not by a long shot.

    What exactly is it that you see everyone who is operationally focussed doing in 3 years? Apart from more time for AT, Career Courses etc. Not to mention half of our customers will prob dry up or require a much tighter product.

    Again to repeat, I don't think the Corps started when I joined, but I am curious as these 'jobs' you allude to. I am sure there always be something to be done but that does not mean it useful or relevant.

    If you think I am voicing a solo opinion, think again. Nobody has really considered how 5/600+ JNCO's are to remain competitive and motivated when presented with GENFORCE exercises and no prospect of going on tour which is why we all joined, really.

    I very doubt recruitment will increase Howayman, in fact, I would be willing to make a wager...
     
  4. on Herrick still.


    what are you basing that on? good job we've got you to do this strategic HR thinking for us, eh? :)
     
  5. that concludes the moved posts from the Recruiting sticky. to pick up from the last post:


    in all serious, i think REMFQ raises an interesting discussion point. what do people think the Corps will be doing in 5 years? what are our expectations regarding defence cuts and SDR Version 5.1? how long do people really think it will be before we begin to pull out of afghanistan? is dissident republican terrorism a cause for concern, or can it be contained / defeated by the PSNI et al? will we all be busy with Iran / North Korea / China / someone else? increased co-operation with the Royal Navy and an emphasis on amphibious / littoral operations? bolstering of int support for the likes of DSF and SFSG, to reflect a future downturn in mass deployments?

    what do we think?
     
  6. HAHA, you you truly are a blessed bunch. I will be honest, I have nothing to base that on but if you were a gambling man...I bet you would come down on the side that says it has not been considered really.

    A few other points drop out of the SDR, Liam Fox has dropped massive hints that the UK is to project power from a naval standpoint not land forces. If we start cutting Brigades (as we will, one has been confirmed) then we also have to cut the Int Support (1+15) that goes with that or relocate them.

    We all know that office space/terminals are at a premium so you will have (and I joke not) OPMI's literally sitting around doing nothing. The switch from CASH to DII(F) will compound the problem because only 1 terminal can access SECRET or RESTRICTED at any given time. So where as an OPMI could always while away a day or two immersed in reporting whilst waiting on a DII terminal to free up now they can't.

    They seem minor points when I write them but this is a problem that already plagues offices.

    What will be cut post Herrick?

    COIST
    Tactical EW will purely be a training scenario and some Spearhead stuff thrown in but what good is that if the Navy own the first 100 miles inland of an ISTAR/EW battlespace?
    1, maybe 2, OPINTEL Sections
    LIFC(A) will become LIFC (ROW) as they scramble for new areas to investigate.

    CI stays the same
    OPINTEL start scripting exercises and going on CAST/MRX 12 times a year
    Courses become massively oversubscribed and the Corps becomes flooded with PTI's :)

    That is without even thinking about what will happen should we pull out of Germany...Bulford will become a veritable sea of green berets.

    :-D Not saying we have the answers but surely if a couple of JNCO's sitting in the pub can think this stuff up someone up on the hill must have twigged as well.

    What good are OPMI's without a war? Really? :-D

    I knew I should have done the Imagery Course...
     
  7. Interesting question .... maybe we'll see a relocation of bodies from "tactical" to "strategic"; from HERRICK to JARIC if you like. (*) The derisory wages on offer to civil servants doing analyst jobs means they're always short. And IA is God's own job.

    Because REMFQ is quite right, GENFORCE is shit and of limited utility in the real world, all it does is allow you to cram the heavy metal part of the course into as short a period of time as possible by simplifying reality. Old farts like me remember just how complicated the Red Army could get and they made a virtue out of simplicity. That said, it's **** all use planning for such wars if the Army does not have the heavy kit to fight them, and that's hardly a given at the moment.

    I'm not convinced NI will stay calm but without the extra Inf Bns to man the streets (all now gone) and the locally raised forces (ditto) there's very little the Army can do - force multipliers like MI need a force to multiply.

    I wish I shared RTFQs faith in the ability of the Corps to do strategic HR planning, maybe they do it in the regulars but I've not seen much in the "casual labour" branch. In fact, I'd settle for some management that realises the TA aren't the same as they are and chucking in extra weekends at short notice isn't the way to get high attendance. And while I'm on the subject, for anyone who leaves in the near future, please consider joining and passing your skills along. I know it would be a first if the Army actually learnt anything that lasted beyond the end of a particular operation but I am an eternal optimist.

    More likely I think is a surge of home grown terrorism as the inevitable result of the Herrick pullout (hint: it's not just us who leave). Just how does the Army fit into that ? And as a question for any Sy Sects out there, have you realised the implications of using the TA on operations ? They are now targets in a way they never were during NI. No need to answer here of course.

    (*) Please feel free to borrow that as a title for your memoirs.
     
  8. I think you chaps will find you're massively out of date. GENFORCE is gone. There is a similar version that we're now working on. It's more of a "contemporary" enemy. Perhaps you cunts gobbing off about training should get involved?
     
  9. Even of you do have a new theoretical enemy, what has that got to do with the Future of the Corps? I didn't hear anyone gobbing off about training.

    Your new enemy in place at TDW means, in the grand scheme of thing, absolutely nothing. The Brigades and Divs will still fight a GENFORCE type enemy because that is what they want to fight.

    Tacking on a 'hybrid' enemy in the last 2 days before ENDEX is not revolutionising training. Whilst we still have tanks, the Bde Commander is still going to want to use them on the plain. Even more so if we don't have Herrick to prepare for.

    Don't believe me? Check out the new MRX for 7X. When they got stood down for Herrick the CO took them aside and said "excellent, the rest of the year will be training with Armour, MI - write up some scenarios".

    2 months ago 1 UK Armoured Div did a river crossing with AS90's and a Chally. You may give OPMI's the skills to fight COIN but when Herrick ends the Div Staff will be right back to thundering across the training area in a cloud of dust.
     
  10. [SATSO hat= On]
    Bdes. Divs and TDW are probably still working to GENFOR / Contemporary enemy because:

    1. That is what the training sponsor has told them to adopt ( see SOTR) .
    2. There remains a view that if you can train and fight for high-intensity warfare then you can do COIN as well
    [/ Hat=off]

    There is a school of thought that big procurment programmes carry disproportionate influence in the CoC. That is why the high-intensity stuff still breaks through.

    IMHO only once low-intensity / COIN gets some serious, long term procurement attention, will the sphere of influence start to shift.

    Pity there is nothing important to do when 500 folks come back from HERRICK, after all this is the only time ever in history that the Corps will need to deploy folks down to FOB / PB level............

    BTW is a Vulnerable Point a bend in ther road, or a wadi crossing.... or is it

    A vital or unique facility, the loss or compromise of which would deny the function of a Key Point.
    ( includes Remote VP, Linear VP, Hazard VP......)



    Log off that BOGRAT terminal for me will you and fire up the Montego?

    Thats my Beechcraft just coming on to on the ramp.
     
  11. Send Key. Over.

    Regarding the sarcasm about 500 blokes going down to FOB's again...exactly when do you envisage us deploying 9000 troops into a conflict zone again?

    I doubt it will be before my 40th birthday so what are your 500 FOB boys to do until then?

    Not to mention that all those FOB's only exist because of the security that the US provide for us in Helmand.
     
  12. Stick with the bend in the road and the wadi crossing then?
    [/irony]

    So unlike you not to have the correct answer for once.. I'm well past my 40th birthday and my bedtime, but Int Corps soldiers widely deployed down to FOB level in the 1960s, 1970s 1990s and now in this decade.

    Throughout the 1980s there were 4 Joint sub units were Int Corps deployed to FOB level, ask CRAP spy.
     
  13. What on earth are you blathering about wadi's? You are beginning to sound like AdAstra. Were you not taught the ABC's..

    Accuracy
    Brevity
    Clarity

    So..what exactly is it that you are trying to say because you appear to be rambling.

    Sorry, did you just say they deployed widely down to FOB level? Well that is an outright lie. The Corps has never manned Coy Int Cells in this number whilst maintaining the normal operational setup in tandem.

    Even if I am incorrect though, please provide numbers to prove me wrong, what on EARTH does this have to do with the Future of the Corps when Herrick ends?
     
  14. REMF, Why is it that you think that you know everything? You just have no time for anyone else but yourself. I really give up.
     
  15. I'd love to get involved but with current MTD limits it's a bit of a non-starter, and the PSIs tend to bridle a little when they get told they're doing it wrong - but of course nowadays they're all youngsters who don't remember 3 Shock Army. Which is kind of the point. We endlessly re-invent the wheel every few years as our institutional memory is shocking.

    Besides, the best enemy is a real one. The inter-relationships between ground, tactics and equipment all vary subtly from nation to theatre to unit and it's difficult to tease them out without examining reality. I re-read Glantz's online paper about the Red Army in Manchuria recently and the way the various operational groupings were tailored to suit the ground and mission was quite profound and subtle. A generated enemy can't address such issues.