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Future Force 2020 is a chocolate teapot, says HCDC

Quite. Something that has got lost. Nick Carter said he want the Army to become the 'Masters of human engagement' equally at home doing influence, providing aid, and war fighting at the same time.

My concern is that it's all too easy to become jack of all trades and the masters of none.

Could this be a UK version of the US's 3 Block war approach?

Still working my way through the vid of CGS's RMAS Keynote speech - some interesting bits and thoughts that could be great if his tenure is extended until they are completed
 
Still working my way through the vid of CGS's RMAS Keynote speech - some interesting bits and thoughts that could be great if his tenure is extended until they are completed

Out of Interest I've had a quick look and it seems that the average tour as CGS is 3 years, which seems to have remained consistent since the post was created, expect during WWII (1 a year) and the first in post who managed 5 years....
 
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Out of Interest I've had a quick look and it seems that the average tor as CGS is 3 years, which seems to have remained consistent since the post was created, expect during WWII (1 a year) and the first in post who managed 5 years....

Looked at Vandergriff's Officer Manning presentation again today
http://www.johnsmilitaryhistory.com/Vandergriff_Officers_Briefing.ppt

Though US in focus, the first 2 slides summarise objectively what could be taken as a rather scathing assessment of where the BA is/has been recently. Will the Levene reforms bear the fruit promised in time or will it all revert at the next "all change for promotion" point?
 
While I'm thinking about it. The Civilian Police Force recreation in both Iraq and Afghanistan needed 2 factors in place to even think that we could have a chance of coming close to succeeding
1) someone in place for at least 2 years or longer to led
2) A very complete and thorough understanding of the civilian world in the two countries, tribal make up, religious affiliation, political leanings, external influences...

1) will never happen as it's "damaging to people's careers"... ignoring that Sir Gerald Templer remained in charge in Malaya for 2 years and his career went on with no issues, making Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1955. He stuck to the plan Lt General Briggs started. Can anyone here image a senior officer on his 6 month tour sticking exactly to the same plan as his predecessor with no twists or add ons ?

2) Never happen as no-one listens to Green slime talking for longer than 30 seconds.....
It wasn't just the civilian police force side of things that needed that ..... but you have put your finger on the two main failures there.

The first was the "6 months and we're out" syndrome. No sooner have you learnt how to do something useful than you're handing over. Acceptable, possibly, at unit level - totally unacceptable for commanders and trainers if anything long term was to be achieved. Without time and experience (as well as training and the right mind-set) there's no chance of understanding the locals or them understanding you.

The second was that we simply didn't understand what the first priority of "reconstruction" was. It wasn't generators, hospitals, water or roads - it was law and order; we didn't make that the first priority when it should have been the only priority.
 
The second was that we simply didn't understand what the first priority of "reconstruction" was. It wasn't generators, hospitals, water or roads - it was law and order; we didn't make that the first priority when it should have been the only priority.

Surely it's obvious that if you ensure that Law & Order exists, then everything else would drop into place at the speed the locals can be bothered to act ?

Otherwise all you're doing is bribing the locals.....
 
Surely it's obvious that if you ensure that Law & Order exists, then everything else would drop into place at the speed the locals can be bothered to act ?

Otherwise all you're doing is bribing the locals.....
"Obvious" - yes.

Realised and actioned - no.
 
Surely it's obvious that if you ensure that Law & Order exists, then everything else would drop into place at the speed the locals can be bothered to act ?

Otherwise all you're doing is bribing the locals.....

I'm having a "this reconstruction dial goes up to 11" moment..
 
What are you basing that on?
What happened.


Are you seriously saying that law and order shouldn't have been the priority?

..... or that that wasn't obvious from day one?

..... or that it was the priority but some rather senior people ignored that and decided that entire bns would be better employed doing something else?
 
What happened.


Are you seriously saying that law and order shouldn't have been the priority?

..... or that that wasn't obvious from day one?

..... or that it was the priority but some rather senior people ignored that and decided that entire bns would be better employed doing something else?

No I'm just interested that you say that nobody realised that law and order was the priority.

I think that every brief, set of orders, presentation, FragO, etc from everyone from Gen Carter down to LCpl **** when I was a private soldier and at Section, Platoon, Company, BG, Bde and every other level that I worked at said that law and order, the rule of law, security, and building capacity in the ANP/ ALP/ NDS/ multiple other afghan agencies in order to provide law and order was the priority.
 
I understand that is the thinking. I would be interested to hear from Alfred but would be interested in what the training requirement would be based on a 'lite version' of what the RM do. (I.e. No opposed landings etc.)

For the blokes - cock all.

For the supporting arms that plan the landing, plan the embarkation/re-load/load/dis-embarkation, get the blokes from their pits to the assembly areas to the loading area and onto the LCU/LCVPs,get the LCU/LCVPs from the Ships to shore, and do all this whilst trying to work out where exactly to do all of this on a 500nm+ long coast line in co-ordination with a Maritime Task Group - lifetimes of experiences, at every level.

Granted. Probably none of them will. Still current planning is looking at areas such as the Baltic States and Iraq inevitably. The Army's work on its involvement in Littoral Ops is still being done at horizon scanning level I believe.

Erm, you do know that the Baltic States and Iraq are all Littoral states don't you? I appreciate it may not fit a timeline drawn up to ensure a *.ppt slide looks complete, but reality may well come quicker than theory.

And yes, it's patently obvious that it's at horizon scanning level - the Urban Warrior exercises/experiments would have been blown open if there was a RM or RN Officer on the Red Cell. I live there, and I could have run rings around the "Blue Forces" using the rivers and creeks of Southampton.
 
For the blokes - cock all.

For the supporting arms that plan the landing, plan the embarkation/re-load/load/dis-embarkation, get the blokes from their pits to the assembly areas to the loading area and onto the LCU/LCVPs,get the LCU/LCVPs from the Ships to shore, and do all this whilst trying to work out where exactly to do all of this on a 500nm+ long coast line in co-ordination with a Maritime Task Group - lifetimes of experiences, at every level.



Erm, you do know that the Baltic States and Iraq are all Littoral states don't you? I appreciate it may not fit a timeline drawn up to ensure a *.ppt slide looks complete, but reality may well come quicker than theory.

And yes, it's patently obvious that it's at horizon scanning level - the Urban Warrior exercises/experiments would have been blown open if there was a RM or RN Officer on the Red Cell. I live there, and I could have run rings around the "Blue Forces" using the rivers and creeks of Southampton.


Seems someone is so eager to show how clever they are that they miss the point. Again
 
Seems someone is so eager to show how clever they are that they miss the point. Again

So, tell me, what was the point?
 
No I'm just interested that you say that nobody realised that law and order was the priority.

I think that every brief, set of orders, presentation, FragO, etc from everyone from Gen Carter down to LCpl **** when I was a private soldier and at Section, Platoon, Company, BG, Bde and every other level that I worked at said that law and order, the rule of law, security, and building capacity in the ANP/ ALP/ NDS/ multiple other afghan agencies in order to provide law and order was the priority.
Leaves me wondering to what extent that espoused goal was reflected in the actions that followed on from those orders.

That is not a veiled accusation that the Army talked about law'n'order while acting like crooks, it's simply that I'm a long way from being convinced that (irrespective of issues of under-resourcing) the Army was sufficiently tuned-in to the local cultural / tribal/ social/ political complexities of its last two dusty deployments to have even the slightest hope of facilitating the establishing of widespread Order and respect for The Law.

I'm left with a strong sense that a succession of One-Stars were happy to talk Law'n'Order while doing War - because the latter looks better on the OJAR . . . . . many of our recent VSOs have shown themselves to be more than ready willing and able to say one thing, yet do another - the vexed issue of personal integrity springs immediately to mind.
 
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jrwlynch

LE
Book Reviewer
And yes, it's patently obvious that it's at horizon scanning level - the Urban Warrior exercises/experiments would have been blown open if there was a RM or RN Officer on the Red Cell. I live there, and I could have run rings around the "Blue Forces" using the rivers and creeks of Southampton.

I may have said it before, but one of the most spectacularly effective deception ops I've seen (on exercise) was at HCSC during HABILE CORMORANT, where Red were winning the land war, although taking a bit of a pasting at sea.

One of the students was a USMC colonel, and he was a great guy anyway but he looked *exactly* like the stereotype of a senior USMC officer sent from Central Casting: tanned, square-jawed, white hair cut short and flat-topped, Southern drawl... and he had an amphibious task group, and he was running it straight into Beaufort (capital of Verdatia, the main Bad Guys).

And EXCON absolutely freaked out that he was (a) going to smash a brigade-plus ashore into Beaufort and (b) that they'd left virtually nothing to stop him and _this might actually work_ - and so Red stalled their advance on the critical oil infrastructure, pulled a couple of armoured units back to defend the capital, and basically lost the war.

Especially when it turned out to be a feint, the ships were empty, and the Marine brigade were gainfully employed elsewhere in smashing the now-disorganised Red horde. Beautifully done - a combination of knowing the value of littoral manoeuvre, and also playing to preconceptions.


In other iterations of the Theatre War Game, being able to easily move a significant force with its support and supply, 500 miles a day around the blue bits of the map[1] often had a serious (if less directly game-winning) impact: comparing what one of the Red partners could notionally do with their half-squadron of transport aircraft, with what they achieved when discreetly loaned a decent LPD, was an eyeopener even for the OA staff let alone the players.



Or, short version - fear exposed flanks especially when they're rivers or coastline, Bad Guys who do LitM can arrive there in strength remarkably quickly.




[1] I took a sadistic joy, during navigation lessons, in referring to the printed material that represented geographical/hydrographic realities as "the map" just to see steam come out of my instructor's ears - he was a nice bloke but a hardcore navigator.
 
Leaves me wondering to what extent that espoused goal was reflected in the actions that followed on from those orders.

That is not a veiled accusation that the Army talked about law'n'order while acting like crooks, it's simply that I'm a long way from being convinced that (irrespective of issues of under-resourcing) the Army was sufficiently tuned-in to the local cultural / tribal/ social/ political complexities of its last two dusty deployments to have even the slightest hope of facilitating the establishing of widespread Order and respect for The Law.

Well it wasn't tuned into the local cultural/tribal social political complexities. That much is clear.


I'm left with a strong sense that a succession of One-Stars were happy to talk Law'n'Order while doing War - because the latter looks better on the OJAR . . . . . many of our recent VSOs have shown themselves to more than ready willing and able to say one thing, yet do another - the vexed issue of personal integrity springs immediately to mind.

I'm not convinced it was personal integrity just an complete absence of a conceptual framework and intellectual basis which meant that they thought they were doing law and order BY doing war.
 
Well it wasn't tuned into the local cultural/tribal social political complexities. That much is clear.
Yup

I'm not convinced it was personal integrity just an complete absence of a conceptual framework and intellectual basis which meant that they thought they were doing law and order BY doing war.
I agree.

But I think the absence of solid conceptual and intellectual foundations shows itself in many ways:

John Kiszely is a good example of how we have bred our Generals to date: propelled to stardom on the basis of [heroically] bayonetting an Argentinian in '82, he wound up as a 3[?] Star with a reputation for being something of an intellectual (the written evidence for this is pretty thin: his view on Mission Command [expressed in BAR] was that it was best developed by more adventure training, ferchrissakes), then in his graceful retirement he was pulled up by the press for peddling his position at the head of the RBL for grubby backhanders.

Physically tough, but shallow, narrow, dim, dull, self-interested and - ultimately - unwittingly dishonest IMHO. You'd be pushed to find a better example of what happens when you grow senior officers in the absence of clear and rigorous intellectual and moral frameworks.
 
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No I'm just interested that you say that nobody realised that law and order was the priority.

I didn't say "nobody realised that law and order was the priority" (my bold).

What I said was that it wasn't "Realised and actioned" and then suggested that maybe " ... it was the priority but some rather senior people ignored that and decided that entire bns would be better employed doing something else".

A number of people both on the ground and who were consulted realised that law and order was the only priority and I know full well they voiced that opinion very strongly indeed; unfortunately their opinion wasn't heeded and it wasn't actioned.
 
Yup


I agree.

But I think the absence of solid conceptual and intellectual foundations shows itself in many ways:

John Kiszely is a good example of how we have bred our Generals to date: propelled to stardom on the basis of [heroically] bayonetting an Argentinian in '82, he wound up as a 3[?] Star with a reputation for being something of an intellectual (the written evidence for this is pretty thin: his view on Mission Command [expressed in BAR] was that it was best developed by more adventure training, ferchrissakes), then in his graceful retirement he was pulled up by the press for peddling his position at the head of the RBL for grubby backhanders.

Physically tough, but shallow, narrow, dim, dull, self-interested and - ultimately - unwittingly dishonest IMHO. You'd be pushed to find a better example of what happens when you grow senior officers in the absence of clear and rigorous intellectual and moral frameworks.
You don't take prisoners, do you?
 

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