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Future Direction, RN...

I think the drawback is there is no "National Strategy", and thus we can't cascade down a "Dark Blue Strategy". We've stated that we'll no longer do Land Ops on the same scale as Iraq, the concomitant Naval case could be made that we're not going to form a task group of the same size we sent down south in '82*. Given that statement, we could suppose that the largest STOM we intend to commit is in support of a COIN-esque operation, probably involving a Bn size Land Force or after a sustained build up, via a SPOD, probably effected by the US. Either way, a CV, LPH and LPD (plus 3 x LSD(A)) are probably about the the right level of FEs. Support that with 6 x T45, 6 x T23 (ASW) and the appropriate MCMV/FFGH/AOR/SSN force, and you've got the Fleet we've arrived at now.

The problem is that this Fleet isn't optimised for anything other than that full on "War" operations; an attitude that "if you can cope with a multi-direction, multi-threat war, you can cope with anything". This drives our FEs to be full spec, all the time, but not ideal for the enduring, low level operations we are doing at the moment. Indeed, the RFA have shown they can be the equal of a T23 on CP Ops given the "good news story" on the Royal Navy forum at the moment.

Add in the fact that we seem determined to "sweat" ourselves to death, and we're stuck in no man's land: not operating in sustained TG Ops, as our equipment load and force structure demands; not buying FEs that are well suited to the multiple low level constabulary operations we find ourselves on. If I had a choice (and I don't), I'd tell Centre they can poke a couple of tasks (ATP(N) and probably nearly everything EoS spring to mind) and form permanent TGs (a CSG and ESG) an exercise as much as we can in the S Atlantic and Indian Ocean**. That way we get to do some proper Defence Diplomacy with the Indian and US Navies, are well positioned for anything that might brew-up.

If Centre want these tasks covered, then the OGD (FCO and SOCA mainly) can stump up the cash. We don't send Army Bn's hanging around in Oman or Kuwait, just waiting to see if the Iranians kick off, why do we send FEs that can't achieve much by themselves to do exactly the same? The Bde is now the minimum sized unit that can be considered useful, in what ever format; why don't we adopt the same about a properly constituted TG - a CV (or LPD/LPH), plus 2/3 x AD, 2 x ASW, 2 x FFGH, a SSN and the appropriate AfSup assets. It's not new or magical (I'm describing the basic layout the USN deploy in) but something we don't seem to want to commit to.

The other choice (optimise for low level, mainly constabulary operations, that could be best described as Maritime COIN) involves a lot of pain and grief on the Equipment programme, and Training pipelines, but could be done, and might be equally as interesting to do as a professional. It would mean we have to swallow a lot of pride though......



*And lets not get into the good/bad aspect of this. There are plenty of other threads about that around!
** Can some-one more informed than me explain why we don't make greater use of Diego Garcia? Is it in the treaty or something? I know that some of our FEs use it, but why don't we send the EoS units there instead of places like Oman or Djibouti?
 
Totally agree with the points made on the forming up of TGs and deployments. The one reason to keep a deployment going IMHO is to provide presence as part of the defence diplomacy circuit. To my mind though, presence can be achieved with a few HMS CLYDE style ships - the local nations we want to influence don't care what we have there to exercise with, they just want to exercise with us.

Personally I'd create 2 or 3 OPV(H)'s and put them in the Windies, as a disaster relief, CN and flag flying capacity building squadron. This provides a low cost presence to reassure our OTs and allies that we are serious, and at the same time puts an appropriate level of capability in the region - no nation round there operates frigates, so ultimately lets put something in that is in the same league as the locals - the cost of building and manning 3 OPV(H)s (and the savings from deleting the FFG and RFA presence) would be considerable. We could also put them alongside in Bermuda (HMS MALABAR redux anyone?) and run a small 'West Indies Squadron' run by a Cdr, with 3 ships companies of 45 plus rotating crew (say 200 pax or a frigates company in total). Do all maintenance in commercial yards, and suddenly for a pittance, you have a permanent presence.

This frees up an escort task line of 3 front line escorts - either allowing further savings, or free up hulls for more important duties. Personally I am still a fan of overseas basing for escorts - we have berthing wharves in Singapore for up to 3 DDGs - why not make better use of this facility. Stick a composite squadron of 2-3 escorts, a tanker and an LPD in the region and use our pre-existing facilities. This provides a permanent EOS presence, reignites RN influence in a region where we have a lot of potential allies and also provides a retention mechanism. Singapore would love it as a sign that we take FPDA seriously, and it would enable the RN to meet its wider defence diplomacy tasks - the cost of permanently keeping assets out there over time is probably not much more than the transit costs for a TG to go that way anyway.

Personally my vision for the RN is similar to that of a century ago - maintain a small permanent presence in the FI, WI and Singapore using low tech ships and existing infrastructure. This provides the forward commitment of the UK to the region and a low cost means of exercising. This is backed up by the 'stick' - namely a standing ARG and CVBG maintained in UK waters with the ability to deploy (AKA the Home Fleet). The UK sends a clear symbol of commitment to a region, and reinforces this through regular deployments in areas of interest. It works for the French, so should work for us too!

"** Can some-one more informed than me explain why we don't make greater use of Diego Garcia? Is it in the treaty or something? I know that some of our FEs use it, but why don't we send the EoS units there instead of places like Oman or Djibouti"

Not that great mooring facilities (no real docks, just anchorage), and limited HNS. No direct flights (everything is staged through Singapore) and a lack of stores depots. Its easier and quicker to pull alongside in Oman and get a crab flight with spares in, or through the chandlery than it is to do it in DG.
 
Two superb posts there by alfie & jim30 both of which I agree with and mirror much of my thinking.

jim makes an excellent point regarding OPV (H) Squadrons, something I have argued for before, it makes sense to have such vessels being employed in the Maritime Policing roles which I suggested above.

I would add to his point that I think there should be a further Squadron for West Africa, operating out of Freetown SL, and one out of either Oman/Kenya or Berbera (for East Africa and the Gulf) - both major confluences of piracy, smuggling and other low level martime threats.

I would suggest an OPV (H) similar to a Shikishima class vessel as two extra embarked helos would expand the patrol area significantly aswell as reducing repsonse times to any emergencies, perhaps as the Flagship with 2 Clydes?
 
Very interesting recent posts. The argument in favour of maintaining a high-end TG, complimented by a number of low-end 'constabulary' type OPVs deployed globally in areas where presence is important makes a good deal of sense.

So much so that this sounds like the argument in favour of the Future Surface Combatant C1, C2, C3 mix. Hmm.

So, have we just reinvented the wheel and come to the same conclusion as those at the top? In which case we return to th question of what is preventing us remodelling / using the RN in this way. I.e. cost and a requirement from Government to deploy FEs wherever.
 
Very interesting recent posts. The argument in favour of maintaining a high-end TG, complimented by a number of low-end 'constabulary' type OPVs deployed globally in areas where presence is important makes a good deal of sense.

So much so that this sounds like the argument in favour of the Future Surface Combatant C1, C2, C3 mix. Hmm.

So, have we just reinvented the wheel and come to the same conclusion as those at the top? In which case we return to th question of what is preventing us remodelling / using the RN in this way. I.e. cost and a requirement from Government to deploy FEs wherever.

Similar yes, I would agree, though our musings would be better considered if we drew up a list of past, current and projected issues including extant defence agreements eg FPDA, Commonwealth, Arabian Peninsula, Brunei etc etc, further considered startegic assests and terrtory worldwide and the infratsructure, industry, trade partners and so on that goes with it.

jim30 observation of a return to the 19th Century praxis is pertinent, what we are suggesting is a more determined engagement with the issues and our repsonsibilites than it seems the politicos, media and public cannot make.
 
Very interesting recent posts. The argument in favour of maintaining a high-end TG, complimented by a number of low-end 'constabulary' type OPVs deployed globally in areas where presence is important makes a good deal of sense.

So much so that this sounds like the argument in favour of the Future Surface Combatant C1, C2, C3 mix. Hmm.

So, have we just reinvented the wheel and come to the same conclusion as those at the top? In which case we return to th question of what is preventing us remodelling / using the RN in this way. I.e. cost and a requirement from Government to deploy FEs wherever.

More to the point:

have we got to where we are because of C1 - C3/FSC, or because that's where we want to go and we were astute enough to think of the 2010 SDSR when we ordered them (or not, as the case is)? A significant case of post hoc ergo proptor hoc; to suggest the counter-factual, I suspect Jock Slater in 1998 would've hoped for 2 x CSG, 2 x ESG, 12 T45 and the T23 ASW to match them, working hand in glove with the USN across the globe, when he forecast the future of the Fleet in 2010. We are in a classic Defence place of twisting the strategic reality to fit the financial cloth. Politically, and on a National level, this makes perfect sense, yet we seem to be surprised by it every Defence Review.

As I've said previously, I doubt we'll get anything near the headlines for C1 - C3, probably no more than 6 ASW Frigates (at huge expense) and a mixyblob of lo-end ships that won't replace the HM/MCMV fleets at anything approximating 1:1. This is leaves us with even less FEs to cover potentially the same tasking, and no sign that we will operate as a permanent CSG/ESGs or forward basing.

We're already being assured that ACNS and the Naval Staff are working hard on 2015, which frankly I couldn't care less about. I'd been assured by AD/SO1s that the RN were going to come out well of SDSR 2010, and we lost ARK ROYAL the night before, just to squeeze under a newly constituted budget agreement. We can "sell the naval case" as much as we want, but I would suggest we've been trying that since 1979, and we've come up with nothing new - the politicians know what we're capable of and a) don't really care and b) are sick of us spunking money up the wall.

What am I trying to say? That hoping for C1 - C3 to come through for us, and only tweaking the way in which we deploy our force elements, is redolent of the way we've tried to procure equipment since Options for Change. It opens us to massive salami slicing during the ordering process, and we seem institutionally unable to turn a task down. Perhaps it is time to accept that we can't do most things, collapse into a defensible position and fight hard for an assured part of the budget, instead of trying to over-reach and risk further losses leaving us even less balanced.
 
Durango class patrol vessel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia - as a suggestion for the OPV? Largish gun and decent deck...

I don't think it's fair to level the 'spunking money up the wall' accusation at the RN alone, the RAF also have the same issues, as do the Army - EF2000 program or BOWMAN anyone? I think that particular issue is an MoD and Procurement issue with the collective fault of all three services trying to 'Gold plate' everything. F35/FA18 classic example without wanting to go down that particular rabbit hole...

No, the problem with our repeated poor performances at defence reviews is that we haven't changed the RN's 'line' since...well, forever. It's always been '90% of trade', 'SLOC', 'amphibiosity' and the biggest problem is that I don't really think that even we are really convinced - I always get the feeling that the reason the FAA wants jets is because their good rather than because we need them, that PWO's really just want to hunt ships (alfred excepted of course ;) ) etc etc. If we aren't totally convinced/fully get what we can offer, how can we 'sell' it to a politician who will be at best mildly interested with 80% of his/her eye on the cost/electoral implications.

Bit chicken and egg, really - we can't decided what to 'sell', until we're told what we need to do...
 
Well, in that case, lets make a coherent, reasonable argument that doesn't involve the words "Falklands", "Sea-Blindness", "SLOC" or "CVF" and take it from there.......
 
Can't avoid "SLOC" but add in "littoral", "Maritime counter terrorism", "defence diplomacy" and "conflict prevention" as our bywords.


I swear, if anyone mentions the Falklands again i'm going to scream, or cry. It seems to be the only for us having any kind of high-end warfighting capability in the modern 'era' but it simply isn't any kind of reason any more. We need to be able to deal with sea skimming anti ship missiles due to their proliferation in world, and the ease of use/acquisition - NOT because 30 years ago, the RN had to deal with Exocet.

Another point is that a carrier is cheaper to make, cheaper to run, better defended and more flexible than an airbase - not a word about host nation support, but I reckon that you can make a case that 800NAS (for example) operating off a carrier is cheaper than 1Sqn (for example) operating out of..oh I don't know, say Oman. In terms of general operating costs - I don't have access to full figures but this (using Lossie as an example of just the airbase, let alone the Squadron) seems to back it up? House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 26 Jan 2010 (pt 0021)

I can't seem to find the comparative operating costs of a Naval Sqn compared to an RAF equivalent taking into account different manpower levels etc - anyone with any knowledge on this be able to comment on if this is a possible angle? Or is on the flip side, an RAF squadron less expensive than an RN one? Or is the difference too small to make any difference? (Magic_mushroom about?)

The point being, is if cost is the main driver, then cost is what we should be looking at driving towards. Cheaper to park an FFG, or pre-base OPV's than land a force... the basic driving forces of world politics haven't changed IMHO since the turn of the 19th Century - why re-invent the wheel, Jim30's idea of forward basing has much to recommend.


Edit: Damn, I mentioned CVF
 
Do we really think we can defend our SLOCs? Precisely how big do you think the RN is?!

30 FF/DD sized Warships are currently working in the Somali Basin, and can't protect every ship going through against pirates armed with pop-guns and harsh language - how do we defend against a determined adversary who could hit us in 2 or 3 different theatres?
 
How do we defend against a determined adversary who could hit us in 2 or 3 different theatres?

Unless you're seriously thinking of going up against the US Navy/The Russians there would be very few Navies which could actually pull this off.

Personally I think that there is a lot to be said for a serious re-investment in the RN, and the forces as a whole. I believe that what the RN's hard power warfighting capability should be is a combination of mid-spec amphibiosity and small-scale but potent carrier strike. Fully supported by 12DD and 12 ASuW Frigates as well as submarines.
The Navy would be divided into two rough branches, of "hard" serious warfighting forces and "soft" (but still formidable to less developed countries) flag flyers/anti-piracy vessels/something that can show up to promote UK interests. A rough outline is shown below.


So the "hard" RN would consist of:

2 CVF-The heart of the hard power element. With a CAG of roughly 20 F35C each, to be expanded with UAVs in the future.

1 LPH-To fully support amphibious operations and also ensure that the UK is able to maintain a costant 24/7/365 deterrant in the form of a CVF carrier or a potent amphibious assault group.

2 LPDs-Providing Command and control for amphibious operations as well as transporting a small but potent RM landing force.

4 LSDs-To complement the amphibious transport capacity of a UK fleet and carry heavier warfighting elements such as light armour or additionnal helicopters.

12 T45-To provide a formidable level of air defence for the carriers, Equipped with TLAM for additional strike/independant action potential.

12 T23/T26-high-end ASuW vessels also capable of contributing to protecting a fleet against air attack.

8 Astute class SSN-For fleet defence against the growing proliferation of modern diesel/electric submarines in the hands of nations such as China. Also perform an important non-nuclear deterrance role during peacetime.


And the "Soft" Branch of the RN:

15 "Shikishima" style vessels- Fully capable of blue-water cruising and with an balanced "middle of the road" armament and an advanced helicopter which make it a cheap jack of all trades (able to perform basic air defence for itself and attack using gunfire). These could be moved around to suit our international needs as well as anti-piracy and "flying the flag". This would also have the effect of filling many of the roles that the high-end T23s are currently performing at a greater expense and little extra value. These vessels would also include advanced surveilance equipment.

4 "Vanguard equivalent" class SSBN-The ultimate political tool to scare the bejeesus out of a potential enemy. These should also be "modernised" with the ability to launch TLAM and conduct advanced surveillance activities. The aim here is to get as much out of the platforms as possible, because without a nuclear war occouring the current vessels are not particularly useful when it comes to conventional (or unconventional) warfighting activities.

16 MCMV-To continue the RN's excellent Mine Countermeasures record. The aim would be to see these deployed to areas where mines are still a problem and in dealing with them (helping local populations) promote the UK as the "nice guy" to developing nations and thus foster favourable relations/trade.

X River patrol vessels-Aim to gradually take over this role from the RE and provide a more visible force for use in COIN/International relief operations.

I fully expect many to destroy this concept on the basis of affordability, which I completely understand. However, on the basis of Jobs created in the production of the vessels and the continued maintainance of an effective 2nd tier blue-water Navy; which not only does the warry things but also has the capability to promote UK interests and values as well as make the RN more publically visible (doing various duties helping developing countries, to satisfy the hemp vest brigade) as well as making the UK a more secure place this plan definitely has merit.

Accross the next 50 years the world will become an increasingly different and unfamiliar place. In investing in a Royal Navy which promotes the UK as a nation which is desirable to be afilliated with, as well as being fully capable to conduct operations against a rogue state or deal with an international crisis and provide disaster relief the country will begin to see a marked change in its staus as a world player and once again we will be fully deserving of our permenent place on the UN security council.
 
Do we really think we can defend our SLOCs? Precisely how big do you think the RN is?!

30 FF/DD sized Warships are currently working in the Somali Basin, and can't protect every ship going through against pirates armed with pop-guns and harsh language - how do we defend against a determined adversary who could hit us in 2 or 3 different theatres?

Short answer is that we can't. Sad fact, really - but there are, beyond a massive and well coordinated terrorist attack, few states that could hit us like that - USA, China possibly. Maybe Russia and France. Whichever, by the skin of or teeth we're still one of the worlds more capable Navy's. You are the expert here of course in maritime warfare based on the course I'm aware you are on/have just completed, but i'd imagine that it is harder to prevent pirate attacks than it is to find, fix and destroy anti ship missiles and hostile FF/DD in much the same way as the Army find it easier to mallet Iraqi Armour than target insurgents?

But point taken, I suppose the view that has to be taken is that global trade is now so inter-dependant that an attack on SLOC would just be unconceivable apart from mistake in targeting.
 
More to the point, why bother hitting the SLOCs? If you are China you just refuse to trade, if you are Russia you refuse to sell your gas to Western Europe and watch them fold in a matter of (cold) weeks, if you are the US, then frankly you probably care more about your sovereign debt held by the Chinese. We're falling slightly into the trap of thinking everything looks like a nail when all you've got is a hammer.

Commissar, your fantasy fleet has much to commend it, however, given that we can at best expect a flat-lining defence budget until at least 2020, we'll never be able to afford it without destroying the other 2 Services, and that ain't going to happen! As I keep on banging on about, we need to have a strategy, both internally (i.e. RN) and wider (UK Plc), before we can start doing these types of things. And that strategy must reflect fiscal reality and the our current (post SDSR 2010) force make-up. We can tweak around the margins, but I don't think we'll have a particularly large buy for FSC as a starter for 10.

How do we cut our cloth to reflect that reality? What do we really, really want to keep, and what are we willing to loose to defend it? I don't think the RN is in a unique position, merely at the cusp of a series of decisions that have been taken by other navies that have resulted in their current capabilities. Is being a "frigate navy" such a bad thing? In fact, do we want to say, just 1 QE, plus a decent number of FF/DD (25ish) plus the OPVs and make like the French are currently doing (and as outlined by Jim30 above). If we've lashed ourselves to the mast of Carrier Strike, will we sacrifice all amphib's (and associated capabilities such 3 Cdo Bde, LSD(A)s, the LPDs and LPH) to ensure we can put together a CS Battle Group with the appropriate support?

Moreover, what do we do if we don't withdraw from Afg in 2015? What happens if we stay there? What happens if we decide that the Gulf is a distraction we can do without (as the USN are considering), and actually we want to concentrate on being an Atlantic navy, concentrating on British Dependencies in the West Indies, South Atlantic and possibly West Africa/Gulf of Guinea? Indeed, if we looked far enough ahead, could we use West African oil as a replacement for our dependence on ME Oil?

The National Security Council (or what ever it's called) offers a unique opportunity for us to shape some of these questions (and answers), as does CDS' Strategy think-tank. What we don't want to do is keep this all in-house (like we have done) and/or believe that Strategy is something to be done solely by 1SL. This offers several paradigms up for sacrifice - the concept of the Silent Service that the SM Community have spread through-out the RN, the fact we are loath to expose of junior Officers (and I include some SO1s in that) to the wider Joint and OGD Community, a belief that being at sea is the be all and end all of being a Naval Officer - but frankly we haven't had a good track record thus far, and we need to do something to change it....
 
What happens if we decide that the Gulf is a distraction we can do without (as the USN are considering), and actually we want to concentrate on being an Atlantic navy, concentrating on British Dependencies in the West Indies, South Atlantic and possibly West Africa/Gulf of Guinea? Indeed, if we looked far enough ahead, could we use West African oil as a replacement for our dependence on ME Oil?

The problem there is that Europe is far more dependant on the Suez canal than the US is. European navies have to ensure that it and its approaches remain relatively safe. And there is still BIOT to consider. The RN has to, at the very least, be an Atlantic, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Navy.
 
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