I think the drawback is there is no "National Strategy", and thus we can't cascade down a "Dark Blue Strategy". We've stated that we'll no longer do Land Ops on the same scale as Iraq, the concomitant Naval case could be made that we're not going to form a task group of the same size we sent down south in '82*. Given that statement, we could suppose that the largest STOM we intend to commit is in support of a COIN-esque operation, probably involving a Bn size Land Force or after a sustained build up, via a SPOD, probably effected by the US. Either way, a CV, LPH and LPD (plus 3 x LSD(A)) are probably about the the right level of FEs. Support that with 6 x T45, 6 x T23 (ASW) and the appropriate MCMV/FFGH/AOR/SSN force, and you've got the Fleet we've arrived at now.
The problem is that this Fleet isn't optimised for anything other than that full on "War" operations; an attitude that "if you can cope with a multi-direction, multi-threat war, you can cope with anything". This drives our FEs to be full spec, all the time, but not ideal for the enduring, low level operations we are doing at the moment. Indeed, the RFA have shown they can be the equal of a T23 on CP Ops given the "good news story" on the Royal Navy forum at the moment.
Add in the fact that we seem determined to "sweat" ourselves to death, and we're stuck in no man's land: not operating in sustained TG Ops, as our equipment load and force structure demands; not buying FEs that are well suited to the multiple low level constabulary operations we find ourselves on. If I had a choice (and I don't), I'd tell Centre they can poke a couple of tasks (ATP(N) and probably nearly everything EoS spring to mind) and form permanent TGs (a CSG and ESG) an exercise as much as we can in the S Atlantic and Indian Ocean**. That way we get to do some proper Defence Diplomacy with the Indian and US Navies, are well positioned for anything that might brew-up.
If Centre want these tasks covered, then the OGD (FCO and SOCA mainly) can stump up the cash. We don't send Army Bn's hanging around in Oman or Kuwait, just waiting to see if the Iranians kick off, why do we send FEs that can't achieve much by themselves to do exactly the same? The Bde is now the minimum sized unit that can be considered useful, in what ever format; why don't we adopt the same about a properly constituted TG - a CV (or LPD/LPH), plus 2/3 x AD, 2 x ASW, 2 x FFGH, a SSN and the appropriate AfSup assets. It's not new or magical (I'm describing the basic layout the USN deploy in) but something we don't seem to want to commit to.
The other choice (optimise for low level, mainly constabulary operations, that could be best described as Maritime COIN) involves a lot of pain and grief on the Equipment programme, and Training pipelines, but could be done, and might be equally as interesting to do as a professional. It would mean we have to swallow a lot of pride though......
*And lets not get into the good/bad aspect of this. There are plenty of other threads about that around!
** Can some-one more informed than me explain why we don't make greater use of Diego Garcia? Is it in the treaty or something? I know that some of our FEs use it, but why don't we send the EoS units there instead of places like Oman or Djibouti?
The problem is that this Fleet isn't optimised for anything other than that full on "War" operations; an attitude that "if you can cope with a multi-direction, multi-threat war, you can cope with anything". This drives our FEs to be full spec, all the time, but not ideal for the enduring, low level operations we are doing at the moment. Indeed, the RFA have shown they can be the equal of a T23 on CP Ops given the "good news story" on the Royal Navy forum at the moment.
Add in the fact that we seem determined to "sweat" ourselves to death, and we're stuck in no man's land: not operating in sustained TG Ops, as our equipment load and force structure demands; not buying FEs that are well suited to the multiple low level constabulary operations we find ourselves on. If I had a choice (and I don't), I'd tell Centre they can poke a couple of tasks (ATP(N) and probably nearly everything EoS spring to mind) and form permanent TGs (a CSG and ESG) an exercise as much as we can in the S Atlantic and Indian Ocean**. That way we get to do some proper Defence Diplomacy with the Indian and US Navies, are well positioned for anything that might brew-up.
If Centre want these tasks covered, then the OGD (FCO and SOCA mainly) can stump up the cash. We don't send Army Bn's hanging around in Oman or Kuwait, just waiting to see if the Iranians kick off, why do we send FEs that can't achieve much by themselves to do exactly the same? The Bde is now the minimum sized unit that can be considered useful, in what ever format; why don't we adopt the same about a properly constituted TG - a CV (or LPD/LPH), plus 2/3 x AD, 2 x ASW, 2 x FFGH, a SSN and the appropriate AfSup assets. It's not new or magical (I'm describing the basic layout the USN deploy in) but something we don't seem to want to commit to.
The other choice (optimise for low level, mainly constabulary operations, that could be best described as Maritime COIN) involves a lot of pain and grief on the Equipment programme, and Training pipelines, but could be done, and might be equally as interesting to do as a professional. It would mean we have to swallow a lot of pride though......
*And lets not get into the good/bad aspect of this. There are plenty of other threads about that around!
** Can some-one more informed than me explain why we don't make greater use of Diego Garcia? Is it in the treaty or something? I know that some of our FEs use it, but why don't we send the EoS units there instead of places like Oman or Djibouti?