Yeoman_dai
LE
I've been mildly inspired by the "realities of Herrick" thread, where much angst and soul searching has been performed. Now, surprisingly there are quite a few thinkers knocking around ARRSE, and as an answer to this question I think we do need to draw in all three services, because frankly the Navy isn't doing itself any favours right now anyway, may as well ask others as well
So, the question is this - how can the Royal Navy, hidebound by arguably 600 years of tradition and being the top dog in British Defence, readjust to the modern world. Frankly, currently, we aren't achieving this and are stuck with the Big carrier, FFG/DDG paradigm that we've had since... well, World War Two.
Much like the Army, in fact possibly even more so the RN has been at the forefront of technological and strategic thinking, embracing new tactics and weapons long before anyone else even saw them, so I ask again where did it go wrong, and if you can be so bold, what exactly can you suggest to take us forwards?
The SDSR is an excellent example of this, and you can see the infighting even within the service, let alone outside. It seems each branch wrote its own part, then they glued it together, then glued it onto the RAF's and Army's - NOT the way to conduct such an important document, which is why you get schizophrenic behaviour within it, such as claiming Carrier Strike as vital to a modern country (thanks FAA), then later on mentioning how land basing can cover most eventualities with long range TLAM and Storm Shadow (Submariners and RAF). It was ridiculous but that's what has happened.
So, the reason? I'd argue the same as with the Army of Stonkers generation - you progress not by being a free thinker, but by being safe and an able administrator. In peacetime these show up as good qualities - all MPAR's are in on time, the books balance, the Ratings are happy as they are being career managed, but by this kind of Officers very nature it precludes change, which is why the paradigm never shifts. I can see it in the quality of YO's - if the current crop carry on, then you will see the same happen - the rule makers (Regulators ) get positions of authority, and those who chafe at the bit simply get frustrated and leave, or just mess about because these is no room to progress intellectually for them.
So the future? Well i'm no expert in Maritime Operations but several aspects of the RN have proved, timelessly, to be essential. Without wanting to make this a CVF thread, one of those is Carrier Air - granted, maybe not right now at this point in the UK's existence but if we'd bought them when the call first went out then we wouldn't be having this problem. Larger does indeed = better - i've seen the theory that they are too big for fleet defence, too small for strike - but a surged airwing of 40 (in 2020) is more than enough to take on any state in the world, and bigger = better in regards to resistance to battle damage, sortie rate, C2 capabilities. One for one, its even cheaper than a land based airfield. Fleet carriers are, and continue to be a crucial aspect of blue and brown water capability around the world - in terms of layered air defence, and AEW.
What has also shown its worth is the ASW Helicopter, and that is why I believe that the Italians should be followed in this case - their excellent concept of the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_aircraft_carrier_Giuseppe_Garibaldi_(551) shows the way forwards as does the use of this kind of ship for other tasks - ideal for counter-narcotics and piracy as well, a small carrier with three Merlins and two RIBS makes a higher contribution than one T23. They come out at about the same cost as well, air assets aside and are not much bigger than a T45.
Another lead we can take from the Europeans is the German long range ocean goer Braunschweig class corvette - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. If nothing else why do we need a ship 3000 tons to do a job a ship this size could accomplish? There is a strong case for one hull form and size to carry out the roles of MCMV, Hydro/Met, and Patrol - of around 3000 tons, with a helo pad. Possibly working in conjunction with the above helo carrier as a 'Lillypad'... having 4 hull forms (more maybe) to do 3 jobs is ridiculous, especially with the MCMV role now altering to become more about a networked swarm of robots released from outside the minefield, rather than divers physically going down themselves.
One more thing that simply isn't given the priorities are Riverine, brown water operations - especially useful in todays COIN centric battle space (thank you Alfred_the_great for pointing this out in another thread). Whether they be RM or RN or mixed manned, there are significant numbers of states around the world where delta's and large rivers cut deep inland, and having small FIAC's of our own to work these shallow waters could pay dividends in the long run - think Iraq 2003 as an example for starters.
As with so many questions, you must ask what you want to achieve first, before you can begin to think of routes to get there - be it destroying the petty rivalries within, or outside the service, the roles you want to commit to, the constraints you are working to... so, considering that the RN will never be operating anywhere above a funding level of about 1/3's defence total (a ridiculous situation, thank you Labour) and needs to be Blue water capable to support the US and SLOC, and also needs to take the 'Brown Water' and "littoral' by the horns. I really believe that we have talked a good game in this regard for the past 20 years, and have even taken steps with the Amphibs but as a Service have never really bought into it, and it has shown. Blue Water capability is essential, but must take IMHO a back seat for the next decade at least, to Littoral conflicts - be it Horn of Africa or an as yet unspecified state. The fact that we currently have no actual real warfighting role to point to beyond the RM and FAA in Afghanistan (stand fast the 1000 or so RN in theatre, BZ to you) which as we all know is the be all and end all currently then we need to think of specific strategic goals that we, and only we, can accomplish.
One ground rule - anyone is welcome, regardless of service or state (or age ) to comment, but please can we not use the Falklands as an example for everything and anything? It is a great moment in British history but it ISN'T the answer to everything when we need to justify our 1/3 of £38bn
So, the question is this - how can the Royal Navy, hidebound by arguably 600 years of tradition and being the top dog in British Defence, readjust to the modern world. Frankly, currently, we aren't achieving this and are stuck with the Big carrier, FFG/DDG paradigm that we've had since... well, World War Two.
Much like the Army, in fact possibly even more so the RN has been at the forefront of technological and strategic thinking, embracing new tactics and weapons long before anyone else even saw them, so I ask again where did it go wrong, and if you can be so bold, what exactly can you suggest to take us forwards?
The SDSR is an excellent example of this, and you can see the infighting even within the service, let alone outside. It seems each branch wrote its own part, then they glued it together, then glued it onto the RAF's and Army's - NOT the way to conduct such an important document, which is why you get schizophrenic behaviour within it, such as claiming Carrier Strike as vital to a modern country (thanks FAA), then later on mentioning how land basing can cover most eventualities with long range TLAM and Storm Shadow (Submariners and RAF). It was ridiculous but that's what has happened.
So, the reason? I'd argue the same as with the Army of Stonkers generation - you progress not by being a free thinker, but by being safe and an able administrator. In peacetime these show up as good qualities - all MPAR's are in on time, the books balance, the Ratings are happy as they are being career managed, but by this kind of Officers very nature it precludes change, which is why the paradigm never shifts. I can see it in the quality of YO's - if the current crop carry on, then you will see the same happen - the rule makers (Regulators ) get positions of authority, and those who chafe at the bit simply get frustrated and leave, or just mess about because these is no room to progress intellectually for them.
So the future? Well i'm no expert in Maritime Operations but several aspects of the RN have proved, timelessly, to be essential. Without wanting to make this a CVF thread, one of those is Carrier Air - granted, maybe not right now at this point in the UK's existence but if we'd bought them when the call first went out then we wouldn't be having this problem. Larger does indeed = better - i've seen the theory that they are too big for fleet defence, too small for strike - but a surged airwing of 40 (in 2020) is more than enough to take on any state in the world, and bigger = better in regards to resistance to battle damage, sortie rate, C2 capabilities. One for one, its even cheaper than a land based airfield. Fleet carriers are, and continue to be a crucial aspect of blue and brown water capability around the world - in terms of layered air defence, and AEW.
What has also shown its worth is the ASW Helicopter, and that is why I believe that the Italians should be followed in this case - their excellent concept of the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_aircraft_carrier_Giuseppe_Garibaldi_(551) shows the way forwards as does the use of this kind of ship for other tasks - ideal for counter-narcotics and piracy as well, a small carrier with three Merlins and two RIBS makes a higher contribution than one T23. They come out at about the same cost as well, air assets aside and are not much bigger than a T45.
Another lead we can take from the Europeans is the German long range ocean goer Braunschweig class corvette - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. If nothing else why do we need a ship 3000 tons to do a job a ship this size could accomplish? There is a strong case for one hull form and size to carry out the roles of MCMV, Hydro/Met, and Patrol - of around 3000 tons, with a helo pad. Possibly working in conjunction with the above helo carrier as a 'Lillypad'... having 4 hull forms (more maybe) to do 3 jobs is ridiculous, especially with the MCMV role now altering to become more about a networked swarm of robots released from outside the minefield, rather than divers physically going down themselves.
One more thing that simply isn't given the priorities are Riverine, brown water operations - especially useful in todays COIN centric battle space (thank you Alfred_the_great for pointing this out in another thread). Whether they be RM or RN or mixed manned, there are significant numbers of states around the world where delta's and large rivers cut deep inland, and having small FIAC's of our own to work these shallow waters could pay dividends in the long run - think Iraq 2003 as an example for starters.
As with so many questions, you must ask what you want to achieve first, before you can begin to think of routes to get there - be it destroying the petty rivalries within, or outside the service, the roles you want to commit to, the constraints you are working to... so, considering that the RN will never be operating anywhere above a funding level of about 1/3's defence total (a ridiculous situation, thank you Labour) and needs to be Blue water capable to support the US and SLOC, and also needs to take the 'Brown Water' and "littoral' by the horns. I really believe that we have talked a good game in this regard for the past 20 years, and have even taken steps with the Amphibs but as a Service have never really bought into it, and it has shown. Blue Water capability is essential, but must take IMHO a back seat for the next decade at least, to Littoral conflicts - be it Horn of Africa or an as yet unspecified state. The fact that we currently have no actual real warfighting role to point to beyond the RM and FAA in Afghanistan (stand fast the 1000 or so RN in theatre, BZ to you) which as we all know is the be all and end all currently then we need to think of specific strategic goals that we, and only we, can accomplish.
One ground rule - anyone is welcome, regardless of service or state (or age ) to comment, but please can we not use the Falklands as an example for everything and anything? It is a great moment in British history but it ISN'T the answer to everything when we need to justify our 1/3 of £38bn