FRES 2: The Revenge aka MIV

TamH70

MIA
Except it's not really "fires at 1800rpm", it's more accurate to say "can fire two rounds, 30 milliseconds apart" - a very, very, fast double tap. As you say, the idea was to get the second round down the barrel and away, before the recoil takes the aim off target. The USA tried to achieve the same effect with Project SALVO; guess what weapon it lead to?

The limiting factor in all of this is human reaction time; about 200 to 250 milliseconds between "brain decides to pull trigger" and "finger moves on trigger" - you can't really improve on that.

Yup. It all boils down to you can squeeze the trigger fifteen times on that setting and if you're good enough, hit fifteen different targets *before your magazine goes empty. The thing that always struck me as stupid with the AN-94 (as there was absolutely no need for it) was giving the thing an automatic fire capability. Why?!? All it did was add to the working parts' complexity. It never got a Product Improvement Programme like wot the Yanks gave the M249 when that was being a bit of a sod, mainly because the designer died in the mid-2000s and he wasn't around to shepherd it past the guys at Izhmash, who were already making the AK-74M and AKS-74U and probably didn't need the competition from an upstart who wasn't a Kalashnikov.

If he had been, a lot of the problems with the rifle could have been fixed. As it is, it's a dead-end that instead could have been the starting point of a really nice rifle around its A2 version.

On the Yankee gat? M16?

eta

* With two bullets each.
 

FEASG

LE
Seriously? Struggling to credit that and in any case jump (due to working parts movement) is unavoidable.

Reality of most battle shooting is that a quick near miss (resulting in suppression) is a good outcome.
made that way to defeat Level four CBA plates, the two rounds hitting the plate in a very small group (ok two rounds is not a group) first round damages the plate second gets through.
 
2. In the assault is the role of a squad automatic weapon to kill or to suppress? The former is tricky, particularly at night against a well dug in enemy as fall of shot hard to observe and you're shooting at a heat target. The latter just needs rounds close (typically within 1 m) and lots of them... I have the utmost respect for Jim Storr's work, but he is not always correct.
Perhaps he isn't - but he's always able to back his work up with evidence or trials data; everyone else seems to rely on blanket assertion...

What exactly do you disagree with in this article (link)?

5. Basic skill at arms is putting holes in Fig 11 on a range. Arguably that's supremely unrealistic training for anyone other than a sniper.
No, basic skill-at-arms is about learning how to apply the principles of marksmanship under easy conditions.

Advanced skill-at-arms is about the transition from a lovingly-maintained flat firing point, to "whatever you can hide behind"; and from "all the time in the world" to "snap shooting while absolutely knackered, more stressed than Eric with a heart-rate through the roof, panting like a Para in a spelling test".

Here's the thing - if you haven't got the basics sorted out, you'll never be an effective battle shot. Speed comes from technique; technique never comes from speed... and all those old farts insisting that "the only real rangework is LFTT, the Gallery Range/ETR are only for recruits" are very probably the ones who fool themselves that they're actually hitting that stick-in target, rely on luck to knock down the DART target, can't actually hit a cow in the arse with a banjo, and hate having it made obvious to everyone...

...and breathe.
 
Except it's not really "fires at 1800rpm", it's more accurate to say "can fire two rounds, 30 milliseconds apart" - a very, very, fast double tap. As you say, the idea was to get the second round down the barrel and away, before the recoil takes the aim off target. The USA tried to achieve the same effect with Project SALVO; guess what weapon it lead to?

The limiting factor in all of this is human reaction time; about 200 to 250 milliseconds between "brain decides to pull trigger" and "finger moves on trigger" - you can't really improve on that.
Ignoring the myriad of jams and then the fact a ship could burn through its triple AAA ammunition pretty quickly in heavy combat.
 
Throw in that for most of the War, but particularly at the start, the RN was the only Navy that could conduct Nightime Operations, and we had better Fighter Control than the USN - they did catch up rapidly though, no slouching there.

In terms of the Carrier fleet, the RN had more Carriers in the Water or in Build than the either the USN or IJN, View attachment 610921

Aircraft development was behind the curve though, certainly looking at the Japanese (who were by far the most advanced in terms of training and aircraft [quality]). The common mistake that everyone makes is to compare the RN/FAA of 1939/40 to the USN of 1943/4. Things changed rapidly during those years and the Americans had the unhindered breathing space to develope and build, whereas we didn't. The technological gulf between Carrier Aircraft in the early years and the end of the war was huge.

It should also be noted that the RN had to fight a far wider and diverse range of conflict types in a far more dispersed and larger Warzone than any of her opponents (or indeed Allies), the Italians/Germans/Japanese were essential fighting Regional Conflicts whilst the RN was fighting in essentially 7 or 8 different theatres, which each theatre necessitating a different blend of assests, response and tactics. Whereas the USN, and the Axis Powers were fighting specific limited types of warfare, although on a massive scale. The RN was doing all the Naval Things.

Best taken to another thread though
As said an unbalanced fleet is one that is asked to fight a war everywhere and tries to do it with great war ships. The idea the Prince of Wales could operate like the Bismarck only demonstrated the royal navy had more courage than sense.

Equally and my actual point ! the Infantry by itself works best concentrated and spreading them out creating leopard spots with limited numbers over a large geographic area and then give them rules of engagement which require them to wait until the enemy fires upon them is the army equivalent of fighting unbalanced and something many British Generals were taught that lesson by the wehrmacht and IJA (amazing how often the old rules are set aside, because we think were cleverer).
 

jrwlynch

LE
Book Reviewer
As for Coastal command Not sure I agree - It was in the process of modernising and had had a few false starts in aircraft types which compromised this. Im not sure moribund is a fair term

As for the 1st 2 years again the loss of france increases the pressure on the squadrons and its true that pressure may have been eased with additional aircraft diverted from bomber command* - but until the liberator comes on line there really is nothing that can loiter mid atlantic.

*But only if sent out as bombers to go looksee / frighten the U boats - If were going to actually equip them as MPA then thats going to take longer and realistically isnt going to happen until Wellingtons and stirlings are replaced by Lancs - which is pretty much what happenned

Coastal Command couldn't do much more than (if lucky) scare U-boats they caught on the surface, into diving for a while until probably 1942 at the earliest. To become effective, they needed radar (ideally, centimetric) to find submarines at greater ranges than trying to spot a conning tower by eye; enough payload for a decent stick of depth charges, rather than a couple of 100lb "bomb, anti-submarine"; and the skill and collective experience to know how to deliver those weapons with a chance of lethal effect.

And on top of that, the understanding of where the effective places to hunt submarines, and the value of harassing / forcing down versus sinking (which changed depending on where the U-boat and the convoy were) and there was a huge amount of learning to be done to make airborne ASW a useful contribution.

While there was wailing and gnashing of teeth about how "if only Coastal Command had been given some Liberators in 1942" there was a lot of learning to be done before the tactics that proved effective in 1943, were understood and available; and escort carriers and Merchant Aircraft Carriers were a better solution to closing the mid-Atlantic "Black Hole", than twenty-hour VLR Liberator sorties providing ninety minutes of convoy cover.

Where Coastal Command became seriously lethal, was in the Bay of Biscay against U-boats in transit... but that's a different story.
 

Cynical

LE
Book Reviewer
What exactly do you disagree with in this article (link)?
Nothing per se. Although (obviously) the trial was conducted on a one way range and the section involved was not in mortal peril, which as the paper notes, tends to reduce accuracy by order(s) of magnitude.

I entirely agree that until the infantryman closes to grenade range or less it's all about suppression. There are two sorts of suppression; physical and mental. Physical is most often achieved by HE blast over pressure casing concussion or, at lower pressures (= greater distance from the burst) disorientation and inability to serve a weapon. These effects are universal and can be calculated and (with some ethical issues) verified.

Mental suppression comes from the near miss bullet. It is typically modelled as a bubble round the target's head. Bullets in the bubble scare him/her into suppression.. The questions are (1) how big is the bubble (2) is that constant (3) how many bullets? There are no easy answers and experimentation is tricky.

I suspect (but can't prove) that a bullet thwacking into a sandbag 2 feet away is more suppressive that one that passes 2 feet over ones head, leaving a "crack"

I suspect that .50" hitting sandbag will be more suppressive than 5.56 hitting same sand bag.

I'm certain that if some HE has gone off nearby, recently the targets earls may be ringing and they won't hear the crack. Likewise id they have radio headset or ear defenders. So then the only non-HE thing that will suppress is visual stuff - bullet impacts and tracer.

Then of course we get into the fear/courage argument (again no easy measuring here). Perhaps some soldiers are braver. Perhaps some are better led. Perhaps some were braver but are now one burst from collapse?

Now it may well be, as the author suggests, that a high rate of fire means a high number of missed (remember, this was range data, the section in question were not under fire) and that better fire discipline delivers more suppression for fewer rounds fired. However if, as he suggests, weapon handling skills tail off so massively in combat (which seems to accord with most studies) at some point the concept of an "aimed shot" becomes "aq shot in the dark". At which point it's a numbers game and the more duinds that get fired the greater the chance of a suppression (and yes, it may be that this is ineffective and it all goes a bit pete tong).

The corollary is that IF infantry are required to close with an enemy position of foot they need HE. (This was certainly proven time after time in FIST studies, and indeed in WW1 where keeping up to the barrage was fundamental). So (and @Gravelbelly will hate this) marksmanship is irrelevant, what the infantry need to focus on is how they close with the enemy and using bullets as the primary suppression is not the way. But, of course, that's heresy.

Why do will still pretend that light role infantry are useful or can survive on a modern battlefield?

Why are the infantry so reluctant to travel to the enemy position in a protected box?

Why is there no laser guided 81mm mortar round? OR a better M203? Or a stabilised gun on WR. or an HE system on Boxer (if that's to be an IFV)

I would suggest it is because the Army lacks the capacity for understanding it's own job - hiding in a welter of jargon and option when fact, is available but unpalatable. The demise of courses such as the Long Armour course. the lack of exposure of people to operational analysis etc. etc. and over deference to the opinion of the senior officer present all contribute to this. The tragedy of the Army is not that it can't purchase stuff, it is that it can't work our what it wants because most soldiers simply do not understand how combat works.
 
The corollary is that IF infantry are required to close with an enemy position of foot they need HE. (This was certainly proven time after time in FIST studies, and indeed in WW1 where keeping up to the barrage was fundamental).
Absolutely. Listen to the comments of Coy Comds in WW2 North-West Europe, who made jokes about their Rifle Company being a rather large bodyguard for the FOO Party.

The ideal was to arrive on the enemy position just in time to bayonet the twitching remnants of the enemy. Second-best was to have to shoot the last few of them. Firefight? B*gger that, sounds a bit too much like hard work.

Now consider Op CORPORATE. Was marksmanship a factor? AIUI, in the case of Goose Green, A Company's battle came down to Corporal Abols' marksmanship with a 66mm LAW. But if you're suggesting that the Paras' lack of fire support was unrepresentative, look at the later battles - say Tumbledown. Effectively, a regiment of artillery, troop of CVR(T), and several mortar platoons of 81mm in direct support of 2SG, and it still came down to the ability of riflemen to kill the enemy, not suppress them. Remember the claims about the effectiveness of Argentinian sharpshooters with Gen.2 night sights?

So (and @Gravelbelly will hate this) marksmanship is irrelevant, what the infantry need to focus on is how they close with the enemy and using bullets as the primary suppression is not the way. But, of course, that's heresy.
No, you're arguing that marksmanship is irrelevant if assaulting an identified enemy position, with adequate indirect and direct fire support. Not quite the same thing... otherwise we'd just give everyone a rattly old SMG; because 9mm is so much lighter than 5.56, and you can spray it around a bit. You know, like the Soviets and the AKM. Don't bother zeroing the weapon, just boresight it and teach the Jocks what their aiming points are.

Like it or not, bullets are the primary suppression mechanism once you're inside the beaten zone of the artillery/mortars, and they've switched fire to depth positions. If you're in luck, the Guns platoon are now taking over, but there are all sorts of reasons why that might not always work; a position that was hidden / in dead ground to your SF positions on the flank.

You might also want to consider the suppressive effects that you can achieve on a loophole firing point in OBUA - marksmanship means you're more likely to be able to put rounds through that six-inch hole, 100m away (or at least be smacking them off the lips of that hole). Or what happens for the time gap between "previously-unidentified and unsuppressed supporting position opens up on the assaulting troops" and "FOO/MFC is able to correct some fire onto them". That's a couple of minutes where marksmanship within the rifle platoon matters. Or the point where your rifle company is no longer on BG Main Effort, and all that fire support is being massed elsewhere as some dashed-uncooperative enemy decides that a counter-attack is just the ticket...

Finally, consider that most future conflicts are less likely to be heavy-metal, open rolling countryside, don't worry about any pesky civvies, fire all the Arty/Mors you want, wars. They're more likely to be counter-insurgency, hybrid, please-identify-it-before-you-shoot-it, mixed-urban operations where the average target is just as it was for BANNER - a three-second exposure of the head-and-shoulders of the terrorist, spotted from the standing-alert position, by the most cack-handed muppet in the section...
 
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Cynical

LE
Book Reviewer
otherwise we'd just give everyone a rattly old SMG; because 9mm is so much lighter than 5.56, and you can spray it around a bit.
FFS delete that bit, I can see a massive cost, weight and training saving being identified here... all while maintaining capability, obvs
 

Cynical

LE
Book Reviewer
Finally, consider that most future conflicts are less likely to be heavy-metal, open rolling countryside, don't worry about any pesky civvies, fire all the Arty/Mors you want, wars. They're more likely to be counter-insurgency, hybrid, please-identify-it-before-you-shoot-it, mixed-urban operations where the average target is just as it was for BANNER - a three-second exposure of the head-and-shoulders of the terrorist, spotted from the standing-alert position, by the most cack-handed muppet in the section...
I agree with the drift of this argument, although I would caveat by saying the the Op Banner ROE are unlikely to be repeated, not least because if we're fighting on someone else's real estate we may give our soldiers slightly more strength in law.

One of the things failings that the Army needs to address is ensuring that RoE are workable and don't inhibit the mission. If our (hypothetical) highly trained intervention force is honed to working with armoured IFV, replacing IFV with unarmored for political perception reasons might end badly, as it did with Snatch.

It's going to come down to the acceptability of collateral damage and (possibly seemingly) non-combatant casualties. There is also a wider question of what is the point of patrolling if you can't kill the enemy if they come out to play. Heroic restraint is one thing, but plodding about the area in multiple strength to "dominate" makes no sense if what you are actually doing is moving from ambush to ambush with little hope of being able to fight your way out of it. Effectively you have just become an agile moving target for the enemy to hone their combat skills on.

Basing one's response on an ability to snap shoot against a Fig 12 at up to 300m is a recipe for body bags.

Drones, sensors etc may or may not help, but in any firefight at some stage killing / incapacitating the target is essential to avoid repeated casevac training. While a squirt of GMPG/cannon is no way to win hearts and minds it is probably more likely to achieve the kill. Notwithstanding its impressive mobility, if Boxer can't fit down the street then anyone patrolling down it is a sitting duck (and that's before we've got into the whole EW/IED thing).

We tend to forget that Op Banner was a relatively benign environment (I suspect more rounds were fired in a month in Iraq/Afghan than in the 3+ decades of Banner) where all soldiers spoke the same languages as the indigenous inhabitants and more or less shared a culture.

For the scenario you envisage, or ones close to it - which I think are more probably (cf Mali) there may be some intermediate RoE possible.

ETA - of course, no doubt someone will be able to produce some wonder weapon - perhaps a future rapid effects system....
 
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but in any firefight at some stage killing / incapacitating the target is essential to avoid repeated casevac training.
When you say incapacitate, is that purely a physical measure or do you include anything that makes the man on the other end decide that it is not worth fighting any more?
 

Cynical

LE
Book Reviewer
When you say incapacitate, is that purely a physical measure or do you include anything that makes the man on the other end decide that it is not worth fighting any more?
This is in the context of a fire fight.
The incapacity requirement would therefore be dead, seriously wounded or surrendering. Suppressed is a transitory phase, which needs to end in one of the above.

Running away is a less than ideal outcome; while it gets the blue forces off the hook in the short term that's just a prelude to a repeat performance.
 

Cold_Collation

LE
Book Reviewer
This is in the context of a fire fight.
The incapacity requirement would therefore be dead, seriously wounded or surrendering. Suppressed is a transitory phase, which needs to end in one of the above.

Running away is a less than ideal outcome; while it gets the blue forces off the hook in the short term that's just a prelude to a repeat performance.
That horrible, indelicate, modern worry that you might actually have to kill people.
 
It's not a delusion in a firefight.
IIRC from another thread, the discovery in WW1 was that as soon as defenders started to hear a firefight behind them, not just in front of them, the white flag went up.

Remember the long-dead Chinese bloke: "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."
 

Cynical

LE
Book Reviewer
IIRC from another thread, the discovery in WW1 was that as soon as defenders started to hear a firefight behind them, not just in front of them, the white flag went up.

Remember the long-dead Chinese bloke: "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."
Re the firefight behind. don't recall the thread but it makes sense. There you are, faousands of somwehat peeved Tommys closing in with fixed bayonets and evil intent when you work out that your depth position is in a similar state, meaning no depth fire, no counter attack to save you and nowhere to run.

OF coruse, that means that some other attacker has had a really good day, and I think this discussion is how tp ensure that any attacker has the best chance of a good day.

Re the Chinaman, I fear that is the justification for cyber spend.
 

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