FRES 2: The Revenge aka MIV

Is it really though?

We see a lot of examples of UAV use in places like Syria and Ukraine, but in a major peer-on-peer, a Brigade still has more to worry about from a concerted attack by AH or fast jet.

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The Ukrainian crisis has been pretty close to peer on peer and UAV in swarms have been repeatedly used to seriously impressive effect. Some of the Youtube videos of pretty basic UAV footage are frightening.


This is claimed to be a bog standard, off the shelf "toy" drone...

Currently the Army gives the appearance of giving the whole problem a damn good stiff ignoring to the point of inventing an unworkable doctrine for the Strike Brigade whilst failing to supply about 9/10s of what the brigade desperately needs to even be functional
 

Cold_Collation

LE
Book Reviewer
In theory there's no problem with adding another vehicle to the mix, as long as that vehicle can go when Boxer can go and survive being hit by what Boxer can survive.

I'm not 100% convinced JLTV can do all that and JLTV did not do well in the test evaluation report released by DoD in 2018 with blind spots, maintenance issues and reliability issues being their main concern. The fix for the blind spots issue was to stick a camera to resolve one blind spot. What's wrong with making sure the driver and commander can actually f**king see what they need to be able to see by using their own eyes ?

I'm concerned JLTV is just too big and chunky, whilst not being capable of carrying a suitable load for actual real war, for it's intended role.
Constant upscaling. Look at how much bigger the Humvee is than the M151 MUTT it replaced.
 
The Ukrainian crisis has been pretty close to peer on peer and UAV in swarms have been repeatedly used to seriously impressive effect. Some of the Youtube videos of pretty basic UAV footage are frightening.


This is claimed to be a bog standard, off the shelf "toy" drone...

Currently the Army gives the appearance of giving the whole problem a damn good stiff ignoring to the point of inventing an unworkable doctrine for the Strike Brigade whilst failing to supply about 9/10s of what the brigade desperately needs to even be functional
There’s been some fairly sensational reporting of drone capabilities in Ukraine - including some of Rich Karber’s first-hand analysis, which talks about swarms and UAV-based targeting cycles measured in minutes. Most of the serious analysis I’ve seen has concluded that claims have been wildly exaggerated by both those on the ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ end - and that the most likely use of UAV technology has been either BDA, or to confirm the presence of a target already known.

The kind of commercial drones shown in the YouTube video have a very limited range - even in an ‘uncontested’ EM environment (which isn’t too hard to contest with existing equipment) - and whilst there have been some high-profile uses of weaponised versions by ISIL, compare this to the effects they’ve achieved through use of conventional ATGMs, trucks full of arty munitions, and plastic buckets of fertiliser in the ground.

That’s not to say UAVs aren’t a threat - they certainly are. But in the grand scheme of things, they’re not necessarily a game-changing threat that would make us go out and spend limited funds on another cannon system with bespoke ammunition.

Where I think we do need to be spending some serious attention is in the lost art of camouflage, concealment and deception in the full knowledge that these things will be out there. In some respects, buying a small number of niche counter-drone weapons may only help to confirm to the enemy that he’s found something really important worth defending!


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There’s been some fairly sensational reporting of drone capabilities in Ukraine - including some of Rich Karber’s first-hand analysis, which talks about swarms and UAV-based targeting cycles measured in minutes. Most of the serious analysis I’ve seen has concluded that claims have been wildly exaggerated by both those on the ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ end - and that the most likely use of UAV technology has been either BDA, or to confirm the presence of a target already known.

The kind of commercial drones shown in the YouTube video have a very limited range - even in an ‘uncontested’ EM environment (which isn’t too hard to contest with existing equipment) - and whilst there have been some high-profile uses of weaponised versions by ISIL, compare this to the effects they’ve achieved through use of conventional ATGMs, trucks full of arty munitions, and plastic buckets of fertiliser in the ground.

That’s not to say UAVs aren’t a threat - they certainly are. But in the grand scheme of things, they’re not necessarily a game-changing threat that would make us go out and spend limited funds on another cannon system with bespoke ammunition.

Where I think we do need to be spending some serious attention is in the lost art of camouflage, concealment and deception in the full knowledge that these things will be out there. In some respects, buying a small number of niche counter-drone weapons may only help to confirm to the enemy that he’s found something really important worth defending!


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Oh, there truly has been some damn poor, over excited "reporting" on the use of drones in that area.

My concern is that the Russian Army has effectively tested dozens, and potentially hundreds, of both drones and doctrine. They may now feel that having a sizeable number of relativity low tech drones to hand is worth the cost, even if the only benefit is either fix the enemy in place, hoping their cam & concealment is good enough or force that enemy to move to avoid the risk of destruction.
 
Even the US Army is unsure JLTV fits the requirement now, having been procured when Afghanistan was all the rage....
The age-old problem of “a war” vs “the war”...

Politicians can never really understand why militaries (and Land Forces in particular) can’t just buy one set of kit that’s good for all circumstances - the trouble is you always end up making compromises that eventually get exposed on operations.


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Cold_Collation

LE
Book Reviewer
Where I think we do need to be spending some serious attention is in the lost art of camouflage, concealment and deception in the full knowledge that these things will be out there. In some respects, buying a small number of niche counter-drone weapons may only help to confirm to the enemy that he’s found something really important worth defending!
This. An aspect of the last couple of decades has been an over-reliance on technology, not soldiering, as the solution.
 

Cold_Collation

LE
Book Reviewer
The age-old problem of “a war” vs “the war”...

Politicians can never really understand why militaries (and Land Forces in particular) can’t just buy one set of kit that’s good for all circumstances - the trouble is you always end up making compromises that eventually get exposed on operations.
The problem is that we've let everything slide. Arguably, it's easier to get some utility out of the heavy gear (such as using Warrior in Afghanistan) in a COIN/'light' conflict than it is to get utility out of light vehicles in a 'heavy' conflict (Jackal makes no sense as a recce vehicle in a peer conflict).
 
This. An aspect of the last couple of decades has been an over-reliance on technology, not soldiering, as the solution.
There’s probably room for a bit of technology too:

1) Designing in signature management like we mean it
2) Resourcing deception plans - eg multispectral decoys, specialists in div troops
3) Design C2 systems to provide the minimum of voice and data services necessary to fight the battle reliably and with minimum chance of loss/denial - instead of trying to design full-spectrum data-rich environments like we’re in ”Minority Report” or a high-end holiday resort with 24/7 broadband...
 

Cold_Collation

LE
Book Reviewer
There’s probably room for a bit of technology too:

1) Designing in signature management like we mean it
2) Resourcing deception plans - eg multispectral decoys, specialists in div troops
3) Design C2 systems to provide the minimum of voice and data services necessary to fight the battle reliably and with minimum chance of loss/denial - instead of trying to design full-spectrum data-rich environments like we’re in ”Minority Report” or a high-end holiday resort with 24/7 broadband...
I doubt that any of those three points would be unfamiliar to the British Army of the 1940s.
 

Bluenose2

Old-Salt
This made interesting reading, especially the stuff about relative performance of the tech deployed by the different parties.


I think mid-sized (i.e not armed, but not toy-grade) recce drones are a gamechanger in terms of doctrine vs someone with half decent direct fires, especially as cost-to-manufacture reduces and automation, AI and sensor fit improves.

I reckon we are moving towards a situation where they are more effective in terms of harrasment/disruption than they are as actual weapons, in the same way the loyal wingman concept will be used to swamp air defences. We need the capability to knock them out from many miles away, not line of sight with a Johnny Seven gun at sub-unit level. Or the ability to deny airspace to them completely through jamming,

I see the cousins are spending hundreds of millions on solutions.

 
There’s probably room for a bit of technology too:

1) Designing in signature management like we mean it
2) Resourcing deception plans - eg multispectral decoys, specialists in div troops
3) Design C2 systems to provide the minimum of voice and data services necessary to fight the battle reliably and with minimum chance of loss/denial - instead of trying to design full-spectrum data-rich environments like we’re in ”Minority Report” or a high-end holiday resort with 24/7 broadband...

I've been considering that we may have to look at this is a different light.

BAOR made a virtue out of not communicating, running BG level ops on a set of SOC with no comms at all for upwards of 48hrs. That may not be possible today with the urge to provide data networks.

So how about going the other way and having dozens, if not hundreds of transmitting stations flooding the airways. Without the correct encryption white noise is white noise so why not transmit recorded exercises over the air from dozens of decoy transmitters whilst the real stations pick out what they can decrypt ?
 
I've been considering that we may have to look at this is a different light.

BAOR made a virtue out of not communicating, running BG level ops on a set of SOC with no comms at all for upwards of 48hrs. That may not be possible today with the urge to provide data networks.

So how about going the other way and having dozens, if not hundreds of transmitting stations flooding the airways. Without the correct encryption white noise is white noise so why not transmit recorded exercises over the air from dozens of decoy transmitters whilst the real stations pick out what they can decrypt ?
My bold - bring back Don Rs.

On data networks I don't think it's the urge to provide (after all, in BAOR we simply chose to operate on EMCON) but the fact that some systems are inop without their use.
 
If theres truly a compelling case (and i assume it would revolve around small RPS rather than Attack aircraft** wouldnt a high angle mount utilising the 40mm CTA be more logical

Im not convinced I would be using boxer for support vehicles - its rather expensive - Command / Sigs vehicles Mortar vehicles, AA Teams even AT teams - I would perhaps be considering MRVP (JLTV) and the not yet chosen MRVP bigger brother as more affordable options for those tasks


**Im no Clausewitz but even i can see the flaw in trying to defeat aircraft using stand off weapons with a circa 10km range with a gun system whose range is half that.
bearing in mind that Strike will operate dispersed widely in Coy sized groups and will already be operating Ajax and MIV. The more vehicle types you add the higher the admin & logs burden.

also remembering that the more vehicle types the less overall that will be purchased due to the support costs and then the less forces that can be deployed in order to pay for same.
 
bearing in mind that Strike will operate dispersed widely in Coy sized groups and will already be operating Ajax and MIV. The more vehicle types you add the higher the admin & logs burden.

also remembering that the more vehicle types the less overall that will be purchased due to the support costs and then the less forces that can be deployed in order to pay for same.
Not every vehicle in a Coy Gp will be an ‘A’ vehicle like AJAX or MIV - there will be plenty of MRV-P knocking about in supporting roles - just like you’ll find Humvees etc in Stryker Bns.

Also, there simply aren’t going to be enough air defence assets to go around everywhere. If a Strike Bde is lucky enough to be assigned VSHORAD capability, it will almost certainly be grouped to protected HVTs like the Bde C2 nodes, bridge sites, and any arty assets assigned.


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bearing in mind that Strike will operate dispersed widely in Coy sized groups and will already be operating Ajax and MIV. The more vehicle types you add the higher the admin & logs burden.

also remembering that the more vehicle types the less overall that will be purchased due to the support costs and then the less forces that can be deployed in order to pay for same.
1) MRVP is already planned so its in the projected kit Lands buying and associated support packages - were not talking a new vehicle here just an increase in a planned purchase


2) The Brigade will already include a small number of MRVP - yes increasing them will increase support for them - but you can offset that with reduced support for the heavies others add to that the fuel burden for an ATGM team transported in MRVP / Bushmaster / similar is going to be lower than for an ATGM team mounted in boxer.

Edit to add

Didnt someone comment earlier that the Germans were issuing Boxer to the rifle coys and everyone else (out of direct fire) was mounted on something less expensive
 

Cold_Collation

LE
Book Reviewer
I've been considering that we may have to look at this is a different light.

BAOR made a virtue out of not communicating, running BG level ops on a set of SOC with no comms at all for upwards of 48hrs. That may not be possible today with the urge to provide data networks.

So how about going the other way and having dozens, if not hundreds of transmitting stations flooding the airways. Without the correct encryption white noise is white noise so why not transmit recorded exercises over the air from dozens of decoy transmitters whilst the real stations pick out what they can decrypt ?
Hence my comment about the 1940s.

Whole ghost regiments were created in southern England using signals traffic prior to D-Day.

You're right, though. Emcon used to be the order of the day.
 
Not every vehicle in a Coy Gp will be an ‘A’ vehicle like AJAX or MIV - there will be plenty of MRV-P knocking about in supporting roles - just like you’ll find Humvees etc in Stryker Bns.

Also, there simply aren’t going to be enough air defence assets to go around everywhere. If a Strike Bde is lucky enough to be assigned VSHORAD capability, it will almost certainly be grouped to protected HVTs like the Bde C2 nodes, bridge sites, and any arty assets assigned.


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Strike Brigade without VSHORAD is a selection of coffins and deeply regrets telegrams.

And that's the deeply angering bit about the whole fake Strike Brigade doctrine. It's utterly fantasy bollocks. Yet red striped morons fall over themselves extolling the virtues of a naked fat, ugly Emperor.
 
Strike Brigade without VSHORAD is a selection of coffins and deeply regrets telegrams.

And that's the deeply angering bit about the whole fake Strike Brigade doctrine. It's utterly fantasy bollocks. Yet red striped morons fall over themselves extolling the virtues of a naked fat, ugly Emperor.
Such fantasy b0llocks that this pretty sensible analysis of the challenge (plus an in-depth look as dispersal in the Suwalki gap) from RUSI apparently barely made an impression, most likely because it was off script.

 
Strike Brigade without VSHORAD is a selection of coffins and deeply regrets telegrams.

And that's the deeply angering bit about the whole fake Strike Brigade doctrine. It's utterly fantasy bollocks. Yet red striped morons fall over themselves extolling the virtues of a naked fat, ugly Emperor.
Strike Bdes will probably receive VSHORAD on Ops - especially if operating alone - but like every other Bde, it’s not organic, but assigned from 7ADG in Force Troops Command.

The issue is, the Army probably doesn’t have enough resources to create bespoke VSHORAD batteries for each different type of Bde - hence my cynicism that we’d see some bespoke Boxer variant.

Who know though - the IR may through up some surprises...


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