Foreign Affairs report slams Afg planning and mission creep

Discussion in 'Current Affairs, News and Analysis' started by nigegilb, Aug 2, 2009.

Welcome to the Army Rumour Service, ARRSE

The UK's largest and busiest UNofficial military website.

The heart of the site is the forum area, including:

  1. Published today, full report;

    Conclusions and recommendations;


    The UK's expanding mission in Afghanistan

    29. We conclude that the UK's mission in Afghanistan has taken on a significantly different, and considerably expanded, character since the first British troops were deployed there in 2001. The UK has moved from its initial goal of supporting the US in countering international terrorism, far into the realms of counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics, protection of human rights, and state-building. During our visit we were struck by the sheer magnitude of the task confronting the UK. We conclude that there has been significant 'mission creep' in the British deployment to Afghanistan, and that this has resulted in the British government being now committed to a wide range of objectives. We further conclude that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out, in unambiguous terms, its first and most important priority in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 225)

    The UK deployment to Helmand

    30. We conclude that the UK deployment to Helmand was undermined by unrealistic planning at senior levels, poor co-ordination between Whitehall departments and crucially, a failure to provide the military with clear direction. We further conclude that as the situation currently stands, the "comprehensive approach" is faltering, largely because the security situation is preventing any strengthening of governance and Afghan capacity. The very clear conclusion that we took from our visit to Helmand is that stabilisation need not be complicated or expensive, but it does require provision of security, good governance, and a belief within the local population that ISAF forces will outlast the insurgents. (Paragraph 236)

    The role of, and impact on, the British armed forces

    31. We conclude that the Government must ensure that our armed forces are provided with the appropriate resources to undertake the tasks requested of them, particularly in an environment as challenging as Helmand. We further conclude that in spite of well-documented difficulties, British armed forces are now gradually beginning to create and sustain the conditions that make it possible to extend good governance and the rule of law in the most heavily populated areas of Helmand. We conclude that the support provided by additional equipment and by the US 'surge' of troops in Helmand will be of considerable assistance, and is greatly to be welcomed. (Paragraph 248)
  2. Don't you think it is a bit funny that it has taken 6 years to come up with this little jem, or am I being a bit cynical in thinking that it may just be MPs trying to ensure they have a future after Cyclops and New Labour are sent down the swanny. Rats leaving ship,again
  3. Are the DFID people still refusing to leave Kabul?
  4. Can't find a reference to DfID, only oblique references to what they have failed to achieve;

    145. We conclude that the international effort in Afghanistan since 2001 has delivered much less than it promised and that its impact has been significantly diluted by the absence of a unified vision and strategy, grounded in the realities of Afghanistan's history, culture and politics. We recognise that although Afghanistan's current situation is not solely the legacy of the West's failures since 2001, avoidable mistakes, including knee-jerk responses, policy fragmentation and overlap, now make the task of stabilising the country considerably more difficult than might otherwise have been the case. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO sets out what lessons have been learned from the mistakes made by the international community over the last seven years. We further recommend that in its response the FCO sets out what it considers the most important priorities of the international community in Afghanistan to be.

    Also found this gem of a paragraph. questioning UK Armed Forces ability to do the job; (I do believe it was a political decision made at the very highest levels NOT to support US Ops in Basra).

    276. Professor Farrell also argues that the UK has an unstated aim of ensuring its reputation and relationship with the US. The FCO's written submission only refers to the fact that "Afghanistan is an enduring US political commitment, reinforced by the President-elect" and makes few other direct references to the UK's relationship with the US.[452] Echoing a number of recent press reports, Professor Farrell told us "the feedback that I have received from people in Washington is that the American view is that we were very good at counter-insurgency at one stage, and now we are not so good. All the operations surrounding the Charge of the Knights [in Iraq] - our failure to support that operation and the fact that we lost control of Basra - is evidence to them that we have lost the ability to conduct COIN [counter-insurgency]".[453] In Professor Farrell's view this is "really worrying because if […] one reason why we are in Afghanistan is to support our relationship with the United States, we are kind of wasting our time if they think that we are not performing. That is part of a misperception on their part".[454] Professor Farrell suggested that public opposition to the war in Iraq and distrust about the British Government's role in supporting the US in its mission there had made the Government wary of stating publicly that part of the reason for being in Afghanistan was to support the US.[455]

    Indie's take;
  5. It will be very interesting to see what background to Charge of the Knights becomes public in the Iraq Inquiry. The lack of substantial BRITFOR involvement in the operation needs serious questioning. Political involvement or direction in order to save bad news from breaking?
  6. We could always go for route one and post it here on arrse first!

    Fairly obvious that Brown was desperate to stop the flow of bad news and British fatalities in Iraq. Army Chiefs colluded in the pretence that we won in Basra. But from what I can garner most British troops were just happy to get out in the end. We are still the most dependable ally to the US, hampered by a socialist government totally unwilling to provide the support necessary to achieve progress in Afg.

    What I found interesting about this report is the criticism of the planning that went into the Helmand deployment. Brass hats were involved in that planning process, God only knows what they were thinking. Were they political puppy dogs or just barking mad?

    Having just read Doug Beattie's book about Afg I am favouring barking mad at the moment......
  7. Jackson is supossed to be answering that question today on the Andrew Marr program, which today has Stepheny Flowers in the chair, and quite likly to ask him some real questions instead of Marr's usual following of the New Labour script
  8. This is understated to the point of being timid. It reads like it was re-drafted from a text written four years ago. Much has changed.

    The situation in Pakistan should be now be the major strategic concern. The Pashtun wars core is now South of the Durand line and the survival of the nuclear armed Pakistani state itself is at risk.

    The Pak military has always fostered transnational terrorists. The ISI had intimate relationships with AQ long before 9-11. Evidence of operational collaboration is plentiful. Often just before major US visit they show a suspicious ability to produce yet another 3rd level AQ commander as tribute. DC lavishing them with aid in response may have produced a moral hazard. Most AQ basing is now in FATA. Elements in the Pakistani Taliban have adopted far enemy rhetoric and threaten attacks on the West. Nearly every Takfiri terrorist scooped up in Europe recently has received basic training in FATA.

    If the disastrous muddle that we used to call GWOT should focus anywhere its Pakistan. This was obvious to regional experts in 02 by now it should have sunk in in Whitehall.

    Interestingly diplomatic wording. We have "Iran's direct and indirect assistance to the Taliban" as apposed to "possible collusion between Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, and Al Qaeda" and "allegations of Saudi Arabian funding of radical madrassahs". Our "allies" do not merit such mealy mouthed language.

    Iranian meddling with their old enemies the Afghan Taliban has been relatively modest. It amounts to keeping a hand in the game. They still mostly focus on their Hazara allies.

    In contrast large parts of the Afghan Taliban are viewed as a strategic asset by the ISI. It has received not just rear basing but arms, training, logistical and even occasionally artillery support from the Pak military. The Pak military has with great reluctance tackled the Pakistani Taliban it still seems to regard the Afghan Taliban as a ward of state. The Afghan Taliban Shura currently sits in unmolested in Quetta. The ISI has been directly implicated in substantial terrorist actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Openly displeased by Obama's escalation of the war the braided chaps in Lahore still plan to take Kabul back once we are gone.

    The Saudis and other Gulf Kingships have a well documented policy of lavish missionary aid to the Deobandi sect which is the ideological spine of the Taliban. It's a relationship that goes back more than a century. They also have an intimate relationship with the ISI and are almost certainly are the major source of funding for the Taliban. From Kosovo to Chechnya and Indonesia bearded Jihadist loons run on Gulf Kingship funds.

    DC has been slowly reversing its policy of appeasement with Pakistan. American officials stopped being tight lipped about ISI involvement a year and a half ago. Clearly British MPs have yet to grow a pair.