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Family sues MoD over Red Cap's death

#1
An interesting development from a recent ruling on human rights. Particularly for those who see human rights in a negative light

http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23518564
 
#4
We're those the six who were put in a volatile situation, without backup, inadequate comms and insufficient ammo ?

We were very quick to secure the oil fields, but seemed unable to correctly equip our troops.

Best of luck with this legal action.
You mean the ones that put themselves in that position?
 
#7
We're those the six who were put in a volatile situation, without backup, inadequate comms and insufficient ammo ?

We were very quick to secure the oil fields, but seemed unable to correctly equip our troops.

Best of luck with this legal action.
Unfortunately this shit happens all the time. Where is the line though, that someone fucked up by not providing the equipment and that the equipment was just not available at the time.
 
#12

A BoI which doesn't attempt to address the main CoC failing, that there had been a grossly premature transition to peace support operations, despite a growing body of evidence (including fire at British units) that armed insurrection was well under way. Thus no attempt had been made to maintain adequate force protection, or try to make up the glaring equipment deficiencies from the war-fighting phase.
 
#13
Or that there was bugger all co-ordination of movement. That detachments from what might best be termed Div Tps were swanning around in Battle Group AOs without much, if any, co-ordination and with agendas that were outside of either the Battle Group CO's or even the Brigade Commander's ken. The sad fact is that an incident like this one was going to happen somewhere; basic, tactical level movement discipline had been thrown out of the window in the euphoria of "winning" the war. You only had to look at the white fleet park at the Div HQ at what was then Basra APOD to see what I mean.

Anyone who thinks that securing and restoring the oilfields was well planned needs to think again; the whole focus was on the refineries, ignoring the need for power and water to produce water. Plenty of funds fed into big US contractors, but not much restoration of oil was achieved.
 
#14
ignoring the need for power and water to produce water. Plenty of funds fed into big US contractors, but not much restoration of oil was achieved.
Bechtel spent the first nine months in-country rebuilding the schools in Basrah and clearing the port at Um Qasar before they moved onto sorting out the power and water problems down south.
 
#15
Why shouldn't someone pay for such failings ? Six men never came home because of them.
Because if the UK's rampant compensation culture is allowed to creep into the Army's front line it will be detrimental to operational effectiveness. There is already a real concern that BritMil is too risk adverse to get the job done.
 
#17
I doubt very much that you can back up that assertion.
I was under the impression that the enquiry found they did not book out of camp, tell anyone where they were going and did not bother to find out what other units were working in the same area. That's quite the situation to put yourself in.
 

The_Duke

LE
Moderator
#18
I was under the impression that the enquiry found they did not book out of camp, tell anyone where they were going and did not bother to find out what other units were working in the same area. That's quite the situation to put yourself in.
Not quite.

They booked out but only gave bare details and failed to complete a detailed flap sheet, giving only a vague indication of locations to be visited without estimated times in or out of each location.

They failed to take one of the number of sat phones that were available, fully charged, and mandatory for any patrol leaving Abu Naji.

The RMP chain of command failed to adhere to the BG order that all soldiers were to carry 150 rounds.

A degree of complacency had certainly set in, and patrols were regularly doing things that would seem impossible only a few month later. However, the main issue on that day was a mob determined to have blood, and lots of basic errors many of which were made by the RMP patrol themselves.
 
#19
Not quite.

They booked out but only gave bare details and failed to complete a detailed flap sheet, giving only a vague indication of locations to be visited without estimated times in or out of each location.

They failed to take one of the number of sat phones that were available, fully charged, and mandatory for any patrol leaving Abu Naji.

The RMP chain of command failed to adhere to the BG order that all soldiers were to carry 150 rounds.

A degree of complacency had certainly set in, and patrols were regularly doing things that would seem impossible only a few month later. However, the main issue on that day was a mob determined to have blood, and lots of basic errors many of which were made by the RMP patrol themselves.
Thank you for the clarification.

Even from that you can see it not all the "Big bad armies fault". There were systems in place that were not adhered too. It was as you say a list of events that ended up in an utter tragedy.
 

FORMER_FYRDMAN

LE
Book Reviewer
#20
I was under the impression that the enquiry found they did not book out of camp, tell anyone where they were going and did not bother to find out what other units were working in the same area. That's quite the situation to put yourself in.

Given that, one fine day in the fortnight preceeding the incident, there were three different booking out systems tried in the space of four hours at Basra Airport, I'd wouldn't be surprised to hear that the whole booking in and out system elsewhere was a cluster and nor would I be surprised if ranks closed for the purposes of an enquiry. Outside of the battlegroups, no-one knew where anyone was or what they were doing, and trying to introduce any form of co-ordination was next to impossible with all the little turf wars going on. It was quite possible to report something in good faith and then discover that you'd reported to an idle cul de sac who hadn't passed the information on. As for apportioning blame, the Div HQ I knew wouldn't have thought twice about blaming the dead, covering for colleagues who'd failed to pass on information and generally lying the truth out of church if they felt it would save their hide.

The reality is that we didn't go to Iraq with enough kit or enough soldiers and sub-standard operational methods were adopted as a result. While I'm not in favour of this sort of legal action, it may at least finally lead to a more accurate picture of how unprepared we were being put into the public domain and in such a way that those responsible - politicians, civil servants and the CoC - can't influence, Tony and Gordon particularly.
 

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