EU 'ambassador' to speak for UK?

#1
#3
Non-story, the yanks will talk to the German ambassador if they want to know about Eurozone trade/economic policy, the French if they want to know about agricultural or EU FP...... and this chap if they want to know the latest legaleze from Brussels.

They have been wanting someone to chat to about the complete bollocks of the EU for decades. If they want something important which requires European help they will phone Dave as the UK represents the atlantacist bloc of the EU.

Also expect this man to represent the bottom teir of a two teir EU (unofficially) before long, as thats the entire point of the Lisbon agenda, to give small nations a voice. However what they don't seem to have realised is that the Yanks nor the rest of the world wanted to talk to them alone, they dont offer anything together except more pointless people. If that mattered the US would not be off the phone to Indonesia.

The EU will not usurp British or French Foreign Policy networks and ambassadorial staff in the long term. Because Britain and france run the common foreign and security policy (the bits that matter) of the EU. All this chap represents is the toddler like "LOOK AT ME!!!" cries of the Lisbon Agenda which is very much about establishing a 'Brand' for the EU and not an actual functioning foreign policy portfolio.

tl;dr this chap is the equivelant of Red Ken's London Embassy's he set up in various countries, just as powerless and unrepresentative and mainly there to be used as a glorified information kiosk.
 
#4
Exactly - he's going spend lots of time consulting the smaller EU states, probably Belgium - since they don't have a government - and those countries which that great IR theorist Al Murray described as 'the Womble nations', and spend a lot of time whinging about how the British simply won't consult him and must be brought to heel (having been warned by the French that if he moans about them doing the same thing in a similar way, he'll be out of his well-paid job before he can blink).
 
#5
Can anybody remember an official document - I think it originated from France in 1950's - stating how the EU shall be slowly made to take over, bit by bit without anyone noticing and without recourse? It used to be in an Arrser's sig block and I can't remember any of the words.

I'm giving my Cynical cap a rest, and donning my Optimist cap :

We should pull out. They need us far more than we need them and since we're a net benefactor of the EU we should save ourselves a tidy wad by downgrading membership to European Economic Area only, like Norway or Switzerland. That would trigger a great impetus to try and turn us into the 51st state. Oh hang on, I'm still wearing the Cynic cap . . .
 

the_boy_syrup

LE
Book Reviewer
#6
Can anybody remember an official document - I think it originated from France in 1950's - stating how the EU shall be slowly made to take over, bit by bit without anyone noticing and without recourse? It used to be in an Arrser's sig block and I can't remember any of the words.

. .

There was a document from a German in the 30's & 40's about a united Europe

Roughly tanslated it meant 1 People, I Leader, 1 Country
 
#7
No need to do that old chap, the whole thing will tumble down in the near term.

The lisbon conference in 2008, where everyone (including us) ratified or swore to ratify depending on parliamentary assent the EU Constitution contained some really really important information that the media overlooked.

The entire lisbon agenda started in 1999 had failed to make an impact. The EU had not increased in importance in the minds of the publics of Europes nor was it an increasing factor in member state national decision making, despite an increasing legislative portfolio and new institutions.

Infact they found (the 300 EU funded academics and the 1300 EU civil servants) that national politicians took LESS notice of the EU, the future of the EU and the role of the EU in national policy creation in 2008 than in 1998. The impact of the EU upon national policy formation started and stopped at the CAP, CFP and ECHR/ECJ. Nothing else mattered and governments were more keen on using the EU as a platform to upload unpopular national policy then download it as an EU directive (hence why we have so much bollocks nation specific stuff coming ourway which means nothing to us)_- The EU had become a tool to bypass unsupportive legislatives and publics.

So what was the rousing call that went out, the policy decided upon to reverse this and to make sure the EU was triumphant? To give the Lisbon Agenda another 10 years and hope it worked this time.

Despite the EParliament becomming increasingly anti federalist, the rise of an anti federalist Right wing throughout Eastern Europe, the imminent election of an anti-federalist in the UK[1], the EU's 2nd largest contributor and the removal of the motor of federalism that Labour had been. Finally the ECB was starting to get cold feet about the pace of inclusion, expansion and extension of EMU - legislative federalisation was and is taking place. Just in areas which European nations are politically similar in, the big issues FP, economy etc. it is markedly less succesful.

Then the Greek Soverign Debt Crisis happened. Which just compounded these issues.

The Western EU survived its absolute **** ups with Bosnia and Kosovo because it was not viewed as a supranational actor (despite assuming institutions and limited powers to act, or compell to act in 1992, 1994, 1998). It however has been absolutly rocked at an insitutional, member state and international level by the soverign debt crisis. Federalisation might be continuing within EU insitutions as a branding exercise but as a supranational project it is very much on hold whilst the Germans re-appraise.

Merkel is shakey, the French confronted with a shakey Germany are lurching to the right and have turned their back, for the first time in 50 years, on D'Estang's policy of federalisation as a means of continental dominance paid for by the German tax payer. Our ability to move the EU towards its EUFTA roots is increasing, staying in for the next few years may see us running the thing, and then no one will be moaning about it (Hague's plan was overlooked by the media but it is a ****ing blinder).

Cup of tea, the chap and author you are thinking of is Giscard Valerie D'Estaing, the man who has masterminded the EU project for 40 odd years. It is no exaggeration to say that he is THE key man in pushing things forward in a federal direction - despite no population actually wanting it. The French refurrendum leading to the re-drafting of the constitution, the Irish 2nd running, I am sure the ink on the paper to withdraw EU funding from nations that were suggesting referenda was his.

He is the Peter Mandelson of Peter Mandelsons, the arch manipulator and he had quite the Gaulist Mandate, to preserve French continental superiority it achieved for a brief period in 1950-1960 where it had unique constitutional control of its nearest European competitor, Germany (no one viewed Britain as European at the time).

Anyway Europe's FP budget total spend taken at face value ( even though most of which is wasted) is about the same as our DfID spend, and even less well spent. And they have NO hard power without us. Soft Power without hard power is useless. No matter what a whole generation of EU funded IR academics will tell you (they spend €125 million on funding academics to push their agenda) - EU CFSP with its 'new forms of economic influence' is a complete myth. Total smoke and mirrors.

[1] Despite what we like to think about D. Cameron due to the referrundum issue, he did some rather important things in Europe in opposition, mainly the creation of an anti federalist, free market, centre right bloc in the EP. Which is on track to being the second biggest bloc within 10 years.
 
#9
Can anybody remember an official document - I think it originated from France in 1950's - stating how the EU shall be slowly made to take over, bit by bit without anyone noticing and without recourse? It used to be in an Arrser's sig block and I can't remember any of the words.

I'm giving my Cynical cap a rest, and donning my Optimist cap :

We should pull out. They need us far more than we need them and since we're a net benefactor of the EU we should save ourselves a tidy wad by downgrading membership to European Economic Area only, like Norway or Switzerland. That would trigger a great impetus to try and turn us into the 51st state. Oh hang on, I'm still wearing the Cynic cap . . .
umm....lets see....
 
#10
That the EU is recruiting constantly to fill its expanding institutions, we are the defacto head of a number of these (i.e. CFSP - Foreign Policy, H&S, SDSR) - so the idea is to stuff them to the brim with British people, especially patriotic bright young things - not ex-unionists that Labour sent over.

Basically the EU recruitment drive is ongoing, European higher education institutions turn out far less social scientists than we do and Labour had not pushed Britain into the breach, Hague intends too. One of the reasons we feel europe is 'evil' or biased is because it has had far too many left wing Europeans in the recruitment chain and the last UK gov has done NOTHING to push graduates towards EU jobs, unlike any of the old WEU states who offer scholarships and reduced fees for those planning to go into the EU machinery.

The city has done **** all recruitment for the last few years and the civil service is going to implode next year as such the vast number of Civil Service Fast Track applicants are being touted for an actual fast track into EU institutions.

Just to say I did one of my Masters on European Union Politics and Policy and that thesis on CFSP so that was basically a condensed double lecture I give on the Lisbon treaty and the failed lisbon agenda, if you want any reading or expansion on points feel free to ask.
 
#11
No need to do that old chap, the whole thing will tumble down in the near term.

The lisbon conference in 2008, where everyone (including us) ratified or swore to ratify depending on parliamentary assent the EU Constitution contained some really really important information that the media overlooked.

The entire lisbon agenda started in 1999 had failed to make an impact. The EU had not increased in importance in the minds of the publics of Europes nor was it an increasing factor in member state national decision making, despite an increasing legislative portfolio and new institutions.

Infact they found (the 300 EU funded academics and the 1300 EU civil servants) that national politicians took LESS notice of the EU, the future of the EU and the role of the EU in national policy creation in 2008 than in 1998. The impact of the EU upon national policy formation started and stopped at the CAP, CFP and ECHR/ECJ. Nothing else mattered and governments were more keen on using the EU as a platform to upload unpopular national policy then download it as an EU directive (hence why we have so much bollocks nation specific stuff coming ourway which means nothing to us)_- The EU had become a tool to bypass unsupportive legislatives and publics.

So what was the rousing call that went out, the policy decided upon to reverse this and to make sure the EU was triumphant? To give the Lisbon Agenda another 10 years and hope it worked this time.
True in many way's, even as the arch Eurofederalist around these part's I have been saying this...No Eurofed, for atleast a few decades if ever
Despite the EParliament becomming increasingly anti federalist, the rise of an anti federalist Right wing throughout Eastern Europe, the imminent election of an anti-federalist in the UK[1], the EU's 2nd largest contributor and the removal of the motor of federalism that Labour had been. Finally the ECB was starting to get cold feet about the pace of inclusion, expansion and extension of EMU - legislative federalisation was and is taking place. Just in areas which European nations are politically similar in, the big issues FP, economy etc. it is markedly less succesful. Were labour really "federalist's"....their hard left side was always pretty anti that sort of thing, thinking the EEC/EC/EU was a plot by the "corporate interest's". The rest of Labour don't seem to be much for it either. People always said GB was a Europhile, never saw it myself.

Then the Greek Soverign Debt Crisis happened. Which just compounded these issues.

The Western EU survived its absolute **** ups with Bosnia and Kosovo because it was not viewed as a supranational actor (despite assuming institutions and limited powers to act, or compell to act in 1992, 1994, 1998). It however has been absolutly rocked at an insitutional, member state and international level by the soverign debt crisis. Federalisation might be continuing within EU insitutions as a branding exercise but as a supranational project it is very much on hold whilst the Germans re-appraise.
It's on hold untill the German's and the French find out they kind of need each other and the rest of us find out we need each other too....it'll be a big cold World in the future for little old Europe.
Merkel is shakey, the French confronted with a shakey Germany are lurching to the right and have turned their back, for the first time in 50 years, on D'Estang's policy of federalisation as a means of continental dominance paid for by the German tax payer. Our ability to move the EU towards its EUFTA roots is increasing, staying in for the next few years may see us running the thing, and then no one will be moaning about it (Hague's plan was overlooked by the media but it is a ****ing blinder).
Merkel is shaky a bit, but there is no one really to challenge her, not in her own party yet and the opposition is almost in a complete shambles right now. France's idea of Europe being France on a big scale died a while back when Poland ect joined they were not going to sit around being lectured...which IMHO was a good thing.

France should be like the crazy old uncle at familiy reunions, we sit around listening and having a laugh at his wacky notions and idea's and then everyone ignore's them and get's down to practical business.

"EUFTA", was it really just about a FTA?, "ever closer union" if only a catchy phrase seem's to hint against just the limited idea of that, you could well see a cental core of more intergrated nations in the future, with an out FTA area, but to say it's not ever going to happen seem's to be tempting fate IMHO....

I don't see the UK "running" anything, or resting some sort of dominant control, as you said your self soft power without hard power is a bit weak, but the UK will be severaly weakened itself in that area....it'll almost by default (whic I don't like BTW) have to go with coalitions...it'll be either with Europe, notwithstanding the UK's ...dislike let's say....of that side or the US, but the US might not like the idea of an emasculated UK, if there is let's say a crisis in the Pacific Asia region in 20/30 year's time will the US pres send a phoncall to Downing street to help?, Will Bejing or New Delhi phone the UKPM to help sort out a problem?

You make a point that the UK's current move's to "dominate" certain EU FP aspect's ect while keeping everyone pretty devided and in a small weaker state(which sound's suspiciously like an episode of Yes Prime minister :) )(anti federalism/intergrationist) means in essence the UK will be the tallest midget in short town.....that seems kind of silly and small minded to me
Please feel free to correct me, or whatever :)
 
#12
Its not silly and small minded at all, the EU left to its own devices has a continentalist mindset, the French and British, the two primary FP nations in Europe do not share that mindset, keeping dominance in that realm pinning it down and weak is in our national interest.

Secondly, France and Britain are the only two European nations with a significant power projection capability, I forsee greater ties with the French but we two will remain the sole providers of European hard power (and use it) whether within a CFSP or without it. The two of us run via our domestic policy portfolios the actionable aspects of EU CFSP and EU defence and security policy. Be it hard or soft power. The Germans in the ECB fully admit their failings in attempting to do the CFSP job themselves for the last 15 years. And now there is no more money for EU brand Soft Power (read DfID level of failing).

France's political hold on the EU is still strong, what has changed is the divide within France between old guard civil servants like D'Estang and the executive. Just because EU policy re; ascension states has gone against 20 years or so of french presidential desires it plays right into D'Estang's idea of an expansive continental suprastate.

We tried to maneuver the new states into joining and through our efforts they would become vassals of the Atlantacist Northern European Bloc we represent. They however have been absolutly cretinous, either becomming new belgiums in terms of wallowing in a veritable bukkake shower of EU beaurocracy through their decisision to ratify Lisbon to boost their qualified majority powers or in the case of Poland France mk2. in being utterly stubborn and self serving.

As for Merkel its not so much about her going, its about the coalition she is going to have to form due to rather silly electoral system Germany have, she is going to have to rely on the idiots on the Federal list (read femenists, animal rights chaps, the people who cant get elected by constituency) whilst niche parties clear up on a region by region basis. She is going to be beholden to the ECB, which is basically the Bundesbank with a different hat on, and they have the breaks firmly slammed on.


New Labour were euro-federalist as far as Blair wanted them to be with his break from primeministerial behaviour, with sofa government he essentially wielded the legislature as a tool of his executive and despite grumblings managed to achieve what ever he wanted up until his last couple of years in office. Brown despite being anti-EMU was pro Europe for similar reasons for Blair, it allowed labour to upload and download un-popular policy, this is best represented by the 1998 ECHR and the prominent role for trade unionists in the British run Health and Safety Executive.

Obviously everything was not too their tastes but Blair was more than happy to sign away British interests for his personal gain (and then ****ing it all up the wall in 2003 because I think he felt there was probably more cache on the American lecture circuit than as the first EU president). this is best represented by the last round of CAP negotiations in 2002 which Britain signed away rebate, fisheries and other soverign powers in return for no movement of the French position. Blair himself left the most influential man in Europe behind D'Estaing... for a very short period of time.

There is nothing wrong with needing each other, intergrated economic relations prevent armed conflict because it drives up oppurtunity costs. The EU will provide a useful platform for tackling supranational projects like Global Warming (if its real) and energy security but again the French and British diplomatic and military networks are going to be relied upon for that. Supranational federal state is not necessary, or beneficial, flexable small government, neo-liberal economic policy with a strong financial sector is still the dominant model internationally.

Finally the great deception of the EUFTA, or the common market in 80s speak is a matter of fierce debate. An Italian cliometrician actually threw a teacup at Stiglitz at a conference for suggesting that most of the politicans of the time were not sure what it was, or what they were singing up for.

All that is known is that 1/3rd of the members of the WEU thought it was a free trade area and the other 2/3rds saw that neo-liberal reforms taking root in the US and UK were markedly succesful and some element of free market reform was needed.... but they saw the Common Market as a way of countering American neo-liberalism by tempering inevitable increasing market forces with social responsibility and other social aspects. Which as they were the most bureaucratic and institution based were used to leverage federalist demands in.

Heath had a clue that was going on, Thatcher really didn't, the Germans still flip flop over it constantly now they have full constitutional reform freedom post unification.
 
#13
As for whether Jeb Bush will be calling up whatever true blue Etonian is occupying No 10 in 20 years is up in the air at the moment, but given the way things are going, if its maratime then we will probably still be no. 2 globally.

Have to go see Liam Fox in 4 hours for that one, so going to catch a 3 hours kip.
 
#14
That the EU is recruiting constantly to fill its expanding institutions, we are the defacto head of a number of these (i.e. CFSP - Foreign Policy, H&S, SDSR) - so the idea is to stuff them to the brim with British people, especially patriotic bright young things - not ex-unionists that Labour sent over.

Basically the EU recruitment drive is ongoing, European higher education institutions turn out far less social scientists than we do and Labour had not pushed Britain into the breach, Hague intends too. One of the reasons we feel europe is 'evil' or biased is because it has had far too many left wing Europeans in the recruitment chain and the last UK gov has done NOTHING to push graduates towards EU jobs, unlike any of the old WEU states who offer scholarships and reduced fees for those planning to go into the EU machinery.

The city has done **** all recruitment for the last few years and the civil service is going to implode next year as such the vast number of Civil Service Fast Track applicants are being touted for an actual fast track into EU institutions.

Just to say I did one of my Masters on European Union Politics and Policy and that thesis on CFSP so that was basically a condensed double lecture I give on the Lisbon treaty and the failed lisbon agenda, if you want any reading or expansion on points feel free to ask.
How about killing the EUSSR stone dead?. Do you agree with that?.
 
#15
Its not silly and small minded at all, the EU left to its own devices has a continentalist mindset, the French and British, the two primary FP nations in Europe do not share that mindset, keeping dominance in that realm pinning it down and weak is in our national interest.

Secondly, France and Britain are the only two European nations with a significant power projection capability, I forsee greater ties with the French but we two will remain the sole providers of European hard power (and use it) whether within a CFSP or without it. The two of us run via our domestic policy portfolios the actionable aspects of EU CFSP and EU defence and security policy. Be it hard or soft power. The Germans in the ECB fully admit their failings in attempting to do the CFSP job themselves for the last 15 years. And now there is no more money for EU brand Soft Power (read DfID level of failing).

France's political hold on the EU is still strong, what has changed is the divide within France between old guard civil servants like D'Estang and the executive. Just because EU policy re; ascension states has gone against 20 years or so of french presidential desires it plays right into D'Estang's idea of an expansive continental suprastate.

We tried to maneuver the new states into joining and through our efforts they would become vassals of the Atlantacist Northern European Bloc we represent. They however have been absolutly cretinous, either becomming new belgiums in terms of wallowing in a veritable bukkake shower of EU beaurocracy through their decisision to ratify Lisbon to boost their qualified majority powers or in the case of Poland France mk2. in being utterly stubborn and self serving.

As for Merkel its not so much about her going, its about the coalition she is going to have to form due to rather silly electoral system Germany have, she is going to have to rely on the idiots on the Federal list (read femenists, animal rights chaps, the people who cant get elected by constituency) whilst niche parties clear up on a region by region basis. She is going to be beholden to the ECB, which is basically the Bundesbank with a different hat on, and they have the breaks firmly slammed on.


New Labour were euro-federalist as far as Blair wanted them to be with his break from primeministerial behaviour, with sofa government he essentially wielded the legislature as a tool of his executive and despite grumblings managed to achieve what ever he wanted up until his last couple of years in office. Brown despite being anti-EMU was pro Europe for similar reasons for Blair, it allowed labour to upload and download un-popular policy, this is best represented by the 1998 ECHR and the prominent role for trade unionists in the British run Health and Safety Executive.

Obviously everything was not too their tastes but Blair was more than happy to sign away British interests for his personal gain (and then ****ing it all up the wall in 2003 because I think he felt there was probably more cache on the American lecture circuit than as the first EU president). this is best represented by the last round of CAP negotiations in 2002 which Britain signed away rebate, fisheries and other soverign powers in return for no movement of the French position. Blair himself left the most influential man in Europe behind D'Estaing... for a very short period of time.

There is nothing wrong with needing each other, intergrated economic relations prevent armed conflict because it drives up oppurtunity costs. The EU will provide a useful platform for tackling supranational projects like Global Warming (if its real) and energy security but again the French and British diplomatic and military networks are going to be relied upon for that. Supranational federal state is not necessary, or beneficial, flexable small government, neo-liberal economic policy with a strong financial sector is still the dominant model internationally.

Finally the great deception of the EUFTA, or the common market in 80s speak is a matter of fierce debate. An Italian cliometrician actually threw a teacup at Stiglitz at a conference for suggesting that most of the politicans of the time were not sure what it was, or what they were singing up for.

All that is known is that 1/3rd of the members of the WEU thought it was a free trade area and the other 2/3rds saw that neo-liberal reforms taking root in the US and UK were markedly succesful and some element of free market reform was needed.... but they saw the Common Market as a way of countering American neo-liberalism by tempering inevitable increasing market forces with social responsibility and other social aspects. Which as they were the most bureaucratic and institution based were used to leverage federalist demands in.

Heath had a clue that was going on, Thatcher really didn't, the Germans still flip flop over it constantly now they have full constitutional reform freedom post unification.
Interesting, I agree with some of it, and kind of disagree with other part's...but it's coming up on 5AM, so anything I post will probably be nonsense.

veritable bukkake shower
That certainly paints a picture......
 
#16
We are going to have to cope with enormous financial restraints for some years to come. Can the usual suspects tell us whether the European Soviet Union (ESU) is also going to subject itself to swingeing financial cuts?

We could go a considerable distance toward solving our financial problems by stopping ALL payments to the ESU with immediate effect.
 
#17
Just to say I did one of my Masters on European Union Politics and Policy and that thesis on CFSP so that was basically a condensed double lecture I give on the Lisbon treaty and the failed lisbon agenda, if you want any reading or expansion on points feel free to ask.
If they exist as links I shall be grateful. =)
 
#18
Um here is the reading for the two and some notes, as this is a masters course I tend to do them in a kind of back and forth with the students regarding the literature (whcih I tried to condense above). The files are too big to attach so have fun with this:



THE EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICS AND POLICY MAKING

POLI 70381


Seminar 5+6. Common Foreign and Security Policy (9 November 2009: Angelos Sepos, Nicholas Garrott)

Topics to be discussed
 Why has the EU found it so difficult to speak with one voice on foreign and defence policy matters?
 What are the main institutions and policy objectives of the CSFP?
 What is the European Security and Defence Policy?
 Is there a conflict between the CSFP and NATO?

Required Reading
K. Smith, The Making of EU’s Foreign Policy, 2004
C. Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31/3, 1993, pp. 305-28 (also in S. Bulmer and A. Scott, eds., Economic and Political Integration in Europe, 1994,.
S. Hoffmann, ‘Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38/2, 2000, pp. 189-98.
S. Nuttall, European Foreign Policy, Oxford, OUP, 2000 (SLC)
H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M. Pollack (eds.), Policy-Making in the EU, 2005, Ch. 17
M. Cowles and D Dinan, Developments in European Union 2, 2004 (chapter by Menon)

Further Reading
D. Allen, ‘Who speaks for Europe? The search for an effective and coherent foreign policy’, in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, London, Routledge, 1998.
D. Allen and M. Smith, ‘The European Union’s security presence: barrier, facilitator, or manager?’, in C. Rhodes (ed.), The European Union in the World Community, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998.
C. Bretherton and Vogler, J., The European Union as a Global Actor, London, Routledge, 1999.
A. Cafruny (ed.), The Union and the World: The Political Economy of a Common European Foreign Policy, Kluwer Law International, 1998.
F. Cameron, European Foreign and Security Policy: Past Present and Future, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1999.
W. Carlsnaes and S. Smith (eds), European Foreign Policy: The European Community and Changing Perspectives in Europe, London, Sage, 1994.
J. de Vree et al. (eds) , Towards a European Foreign Policy, Nijhoff, 1987.
D. Dinan, Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to European Integration, 2nd ed., London, Macmillan, 1999 (SLC).
A. Duff et al., Maastricht and Beyond, London, Routledge, 1994, ch. 6.
S. Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security, London, Macmillan.
K. Eliassen (ed.), Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union, London, Sage, 1998.
K. Featherstone and R. Ginsberg, The United States and the European Union in the 1990s: Partners in Transition, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1996.
A. Forster and W. Wallace, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’, ch.16 in H. Wallace and W. Wallace, 1996
R. Ginsberg, ‘Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37/3, 1999, pp. 429-54.
Gegout, Catherine, ‘The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US Directoire at the Heart of the European Union’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002.
Gomez, Ricardo and John Peterson, ‘The EU’s Impossibly Busy Foreign Ministers: ‘No One is in Control’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 6, no. 1, Spring 2001.
C. Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31/3, 1993, pp. 305-28 (also in S. Bulmer and A. Scott, eds., Economic and Political Integration in Europe, 1994).
C. Hill, ‘Closing the Capability-Expectations Gap?’, in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, London, Routledge, 1998.
C. Hill (ed.), The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy, London, Routledge, 1996.
C. Hill and D. Allen (eds), The Changing Context of European Foreign Policy, London, Routledge, 1996.
C. Hill, “The EU’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention”, European Foreign Affairs Review,
6: 315-333, 2001
S. Hoffmann, ‘Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38/2, 2000, pp. 189-98.
M. Holland, ‘Creating a common foreign policy’, ch.5 in European Community Integration, 1993.
M. Holland (ed.), Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Record and Reform, London, Pinter, 1997.
J, Howorth, European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately? Journal of Common Market Studies, 2001, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 765-789(25)
J. Jupille, ‘The European Union and international outcomes’, International Organization, 53/2, 1999, pp. 409-25.
B. Laffan, Integration and Co-operation in Europe, ch.6, 1992 (SLC).
J. Lodge, The EC and the Challenge of the Future, 1993 chapters 12-16, (SLC).
I. MacLeod, Hendry, I. and Hyett, S., The External Relations of the European Communities, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996.
R. McAllister and R. Dannreuther, The EU and NATO Enlargement. Routledge, 2002.
S. Nuttall, European Political Co-operation, 1992.
S. Nuttall, ‘The EC and Yugoslavia’, in N. Nugent (ed.), The European Union 1993: Annual Review of Activities, 1994 (also as special issue of 1994 JCMS).
S. Nuttall, European Foreign Policy, Oxford, OUP, 2000.
N. Petersen and T. Pedersen (eds.), The European Community in World Politics, London, Pinter, 1993.
J. Peterson, Europe and America: The Prospects for Partnership, 2nd ed., London, Routledge.
J. Peterson and E. Bomberg, Decision-Making in the European Union, Macmillan, 1999, ch. 9.
J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds.), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, London, Routledge, 1998.
C. Piening, Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1997.
E. Reglesberger, de Schoutheete de Tervarent, P. and Wessels, W. (eds), Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1997.
M.E. Smith, ‘Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy co-operation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7/4 , 2000, pp. 613-31.
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#19
notes

European Security and Defence Policy

Definitions:
“The European Security and Defence Policy or ESDP is a major element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar of the European Union (EU) and is the domain of EU policy covering defence and military aspects” (Council of the European Union website -Europea)
General Bailey (rtd.) Commander UK Forces LAND 2002-2005 referring to European defence policy – “A mess, a muddle, a fudge and a fiddle. Thanks to this EUFOR will continue to make even the most exasperatingly cack handed central African UN deployment look professional and competent for the foreseeable future.”

History:
1948 Treaty of Brussels > 1950 European Defence Community > 1992 Petersburg Tasks > 1999 ESDP > 2003 Berlin Plus and Helsinki Headline Goal > European Defence Agency > Post Lisbon? –High Representative to have decisions on ‘defence options’ in CFSP.

Summary of ESDP capability objectives:
In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, no new threats are purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, and judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government.
As the Helsinki Headline Goal commitments outline significant national expenditure to provide the necessary equipment and assets for any possible EUFOR. This has created the politically expedient method of getting conflict adverse nations such as Germany engaged with the project in the form of procuring expensive non combat assets for reaction forces from other nations. As such the ESDP has impact in several areas of both EU and member state policy creation outside of just CFSP, which is why it is such a popular entity for EU supporters and critics alike.

Part 4: Conflict between NFSP and NATO

“Traditional security analysis arguably underplays the radical nature of the EU’s project. The expansion of the Union’s activities into the security sphere may in the medium term have only a limited impact on global security and on the future of NATO. In the longer term, the project has the potential to dramatically transform Europe’s ability to respond to crises anywhere on the globe, and thereby strengthen its ability to advance its own interests. There is little danger of Europe becoming a military giant on the scale of the United States, which in 2004 will spend as much on defence as the rest of the planet. Even when it has strengthened
Its military capabilities further, the EU’s military effort will typically be part of a broader foreign policy and security approach, including aid, trade and diplomatic initiatives. Moreover, even when the project is well established, it seems likely that there will remain a commonality of interest between the US and Europe across a range of issues. However The stark divisions produced by Iraq and Afghanistan represent an extreme in which co-operation on a nation by nation basis on a range of security, intelligence and military issues remains the norm.” (NATO response to the question of increased remit of EU CSFP 2003)

Two types of conflict between CSFP and NATO, force structure and policy.
Examples of emerging force structure conflicts:
- Spending issues – European nations barring Britain and France fall well below the NATO advised 2.5% of GDP for defence (Germany spends 1.1%).
- European project and a lack of theatre focus have led to major shortfalls in things such as NATO minimum levels of strategic lift capability. Necessitating the use of NATO assets in EUFOR operations (e.g. KFOR).
Examples of Policy overlap/conflict:
- The failure of The Petersburg Tasks/ESDI to perform adequately in Bosnia and Kosovo. Despite the geographical closeness. Forced NATO/US responses there was ideological and policy friction without any significant physical force. It took over 10 years for any ESDP force to move from anything other than an oversized HQ unit to a deployable force.
However these points are largely mitigated in reality by two major issues:
1. The post Cold War draw down of US forces in Europe, largely in response to minimising costs of maintaining bases and deployed forces. This has led to a local regional defence gap that the ESDI/ESDP can step into without overlapping too much with the NATO remit. Especially as NATO has been repositioning since 2001 as a global expeditionary organisation. As such ESDP is in liaison with NATO at every level of SHAPE and has treaty bound access to NATO assets via Berlin Plus (which alleviates the procurement shortfalls which became obvious in the 1990s).

2. Europe is completely committed in terms of policy at a strategic level to NATO remaining the defacto strategic defence for the future (2009 Strasburg/Khel Summit). To this extent even France is rejoining NATO’s Core integrated military command, possibly with its strategic nuclear deterrent joining the NATO strategic nuclear forces, ending four decades of arms length relations.

Short conclusion: Balkans instability, 9/11 and Russian rearmament and ‘aggression’ in Eastern Europe have essentially presented a release valve for potential NATO/ESDP institutional conflict. By both re-legitimising NATO’s strategic deterrent role and giving ESDP a local minimum US involvement operational remit.
 
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