Does the RAF regiment have a future?

The Regt will survive ,if no other reason than the Regt tells the RAF its needed and no one else will do and no AM is going to risk signing it off.
May as well close the thread.
There will be another thread along the way if this one was shut down, more powerful than the last.
They are like Ben Kenobi in that regard.
Basically it's an ARRSE tradition at this point.
 
There was a real cock of a full screw RAF plod in the Falklands. Had a go at one of our full screws, admittedly another chopper, for having his hands in his pockets outside the bottom cookhouse. Our bloke then basically tells RAF chap to go and f*** himself. Snowdrop stutters and walks away.
From what you have written about your battalion and its quant ways, I am suprised that he wasn't asked if he would like to transfer.
 
From what you have written about your battalion and its quant ways, I am suprised that he wasn't asked if he would like to transfer.
Probably half a dozen or so of us watched the exchange, it literally stopped us in our tracks. The copper was generally disliked, even by the other cops. Our bloke was also a throbber, generally disliked by us. We had enough ar****les, there was no need to import them.
 

dan_brown

War Hero
you've done the distance now get your T shirt.....

5_MILER_TB_WHT_2048x.jpg


 
Is now a good time to remind the congregation that II Sqn RAF Regt eventually turned up at Pristina without sufficient ammo or rations? We (TCW) had to split our with them until the Logs chain from Thessaloniki caught up as we had brought loads of both.
they did same in Mali a few years back
 
To go back to the original post. The RAF Regiment will not exist in 10 years time. The exact point of its demise in the next ten years is worth a sweepstake.
 

Glad_its_all_over

ADC
Book Reviewer
Whatever. How the RAF's barrier mechanics and tarmac technicians are set up, trained and organised is, quite properly, a matter for CAS and his magic elves to determine. If they're needed and affordable, then crack on.

RAFP have played an absolute political blinder in recent years and as a result have pretty much cornered the cyber market; sensible move altogether and you now find nests of toxic ex-Snowdrops in Cyber Security functions all across industry - mainly defence-related, of course, commerce doesn't put up with a lot of the government, especially defence, bullshit around cyber but, you know, a job's a job.
 
I've often wondered this. Just WTF is the point of the RAF Regiment?
Granted I was RCAF not RAF, but we are light blue not brown, our job is putting aircraft in the air not ******* about playing silly buggers.
When we played war back in the good old days in Germany, all groundcrew were issued a SMG, with which we were supposed to defend our dispersals against infiltrators.
These were supposed to be repelled by the odds and sods from the rest of the base, before they got to us, but we were the last line.
We were all trained to act as a base defence force. Is this not the case in the RAF?
 
I've often wondered this. Just WTF is the point of the RAF Regiment?
Granted I was RCAF not RAF, but we are light blue not brown, our job is putting aircraft in the air not ******* about playing silly buggers.
When we played war back in the good old days in Germany, all groundcrew were issued a SMG, with which we were supposed to defend our dispersals against infiltrators.
These were supposed to be repelled by the odds and sods from the rest of the base, before they got to us, but we were the last line.
We were all trained to act as a base defence force. Is this not the case in the RAF?
And cue another dozen pages of debate.

TBH, I doubt that GSFG ever had the slightest urge to launch waves of speznatz and sundry fifth columnists at the Clutch Airfields. Merely one of those slightly bizarre exercise MEL serials that morphed from fiction to ‘fact’.
 
And cue another dozen pages of debate.

TBH, I doubt that GSFG ever had the slightest urge to launch waves of speznatz and sundry fifth columnists at the Clutch Airfields. Merely one of those slightly bizarre exercise MEL serials that morphed from fiction to ‘fact’.
The lot who set up the exercises did love to send them against us though. We were never actually given blanks so we just went bang, bang, or braaattt, depending if we were on semi or full auto mode, and of course we never ran out of ammo.

My favourite memory was when a pongo who was acting as Red Force threw a thunderflash over the revertment while we were refuelling a 104, and one of the guys went up over it and told him to **** right off, or he'd kick the everloving shit out of him...
 
The lot who set up the exercises did love to send them against us though. We were never actually given blanks so we just went bang, bang, or braaattt, depending if we were on semi or full auto mode, and of course we never ran out of ammo.

My favourite memory was when a pongo who was acting as Red Force threw a thunderflash over the revertment while we were refuelling a 104, and one of the guys went up over it and told him to **** right off, or he'd kick the everloving shit out of him...
Spetnaz probably thought that they didn't need to attack any airfields where F104's were based as they seemed to kill a large number of their aircrew without any imput from the Soviets.

Some operators lost a large proportion of their aircraft through accidents, although the accident rate varied widely depending on the user and operating conditions. The German Air Force and Federal German Navy, the largest combined user of the F-104 and operator of over 35% of all airframes built, lost approximately 32% of its Starfighters in accidents over the aircraft's 31-year career.[158] The Belgian Air Force, on the other hand, lost 41 of its 100 airframes between February 1963 and September 1983,[159] and Italy, the final Starfighter operator, lost 138 of 368 (37%) by 1992.[160] Canada's accident rate with the F-104 ultimately exceeded 46% (110 of 238) over its 25-year service history
 
Spetnaz probably thought that they didn't need to attack any airfields where F104's were based as they seemed to kill a large number of their aircrew without any imput from the Soviets.

Some operators lost a large proportion of their aircraft through accidents, although the accident rate varied widely depending on the user and operating conditions. The German Air Force and Federal German Navy, the largest combined user of the F-104 and operator of over 35% of all airframes built, lost approximately 32% of its Starfighters in accidents over the aircraft's 31-year career.[158] The Belgian Air Force, on the other hand, lost 41 of its 100 airframes between February 1963 and September 1983,[159] and Italy, the final Starfighter operator, lost 138 of 368 (37%) by 1992.[160] Canada's accident rate with the F-104 ultimately exceeded 46% (110 of 238) over its 25-year service history

That’s just clumsy.
 
To go back to the original post. The RAF Regiment will not exist in 10 years time. The exact point of its demise in the next ten years is worth a sweepstake.

Some form of force protection for the RAF will exist. It may even be called the RAF Regiment. The current delusional form of the organisation that thinks it is "big 3" only to collide with reality whenever there is real work to be done however will not survive.
 
Spetnaz probably thought that they didn't need to attack any airfields where F104's were based as they seemed to kill a large number of their aircrew without any imput from the Soviets.

Some operators lost a large proportion of their aircraft through accidents, although the accident rate varied widely depending on the user and operating conditions. The German Air Force and Federal German Navy, the largest combined user of the F-104 and operator of over 35% of all airframes built, lost approximately 32% of its Starfighters in accidents over the aircraft's 31-year career.[158] The Belgian Air Force, on the other hand, lost 41 of its 100 airframes between February 1963 and September 1983,[159] and Italy, the final Starfighter operator, lost 138 of 368 (37%) by 1992.[160] Canada's accident rate with the F-104 ultimately exceeded 46% (110 of 238) over its 25-year service history
Scooting along at just under the mach, 50ft AGL in the Central European clag wasn't a very forgiving environment.
 

Kefi

Old-Salt
Some form of force protection for the RAF will exist. It may even be called the RAF Regiment. The current delusional form of the organisation that thinks it is "big 3" only to collide with reality whenever there is real work to be done however will not survive.


THE ROYAL AIR FORCE REGIMENT: THE FORMATIVE YEARS TO 1946
AIR VICE-MARSHAL D A POCOCK
When Lord Trenchard dined with his officers in the early 1950s he said that the formation of the Royal Air Force Regiment had been a logical extension to his philosophy in the 1920s that, to support light bombers in their policing of large areas in the Middle East, Armoured Car Companies should be formed, manned by RAF officers and airmen and under Royal Air Force control.
Between the wars, with the exception of commitments in the Middle East, there had been little incentive to develop a general defence policy for the RAF as a whole until German re-armament forced an examination of the problem. World War II, however, was the first war in which air power was to play a decisive role. The rear, which historically had always been protected by the front, would be wide open to the enemy’s air and deep penetration forces on the ground unless these could be countered on equal terms. And so emerged the classic counter-air war which our enemies were quick to exploit.
In 1933 it had been agreed that the RAF would organise its own defence against low-flying air attacks. Subsequently the Home Defence Committee included airfield defence among its deliberations and another committee began to examine alternatives to the machine-gun for the defence of airfields against air attack. I have not been able to discover what they had in mind at that time. They may have considered the use of balloons, which were too restrictive for airfields, or possibly the parachute and cable system which was introduced for a very short time in 1940; this fired a parachute from which a multitude of thin wires were released, the theory being that the wires would wrap round the attacking aircraft. But no other new system appeared to emerge from their studies, and the machine-gun remained in being into the 1940s.
The Army were reluctant to accept responsibility against the threat of local ground attack on airfields, as they considered that RAF stations should – in common with Army units – undertake their own local defence. The Air Staff were equally reluctant to apply pressure on the Army to provide defence for airfields in case this gave the General Staff the opportunity to exercise influence on the conduct of air operations. In 1937 the Air Council therefore told Commanders-in-Chief that they were to be
8
responsible for the local defence of their airfields and installations against both low-flying and ground attack. Unfortunately, as ever, there were difficulties in implementing this policy as the rifle had been phased out of RAF service before a decision had been taken on its replacement, and when the emergency periods of 1938 and 1939 arose the RAF had to be armed very much on an ad hoc basis with whatever could be found.
I recall being taken in 1941 to see the Station Armoury at Jurby in the Isle of Man, which was stacked not with rifles but with pikes made out of gas piping. Pikes appeared at a number of other RAF stations. I never was able to discover whether they called in the Honourable Artillery Company to teach us pike drill! However, in 1939 light machine-guns were scaled to reinforce the perimeter defences at RAF stations and rifles were reintroduced on a limited scale. Despite this, the general shortage of weapons at this critical time meant that there were serious deficiencies in the ability of the RAF to defend itself. There was therefore no alternative but to turn to the Army for assistance in both Local Ground Defence and Low Level Air Defence.
The Advanced Air Striking Force which went to France in September 1939 was accompanied by a hastily cobbled force of Lewis guns, to be handled by airmen with the trade of ACH/GD. These were the chaps who used to operate under the direct control of the SWO. Some of them were qualified to be ground gunners and these formed the bulk of the men who went with Lewis guns to France. A few Army anti-aircraft guns were available but the total defences provided little impediment to the Luftwaffe, who destroyed many aircraft on the ground and all too effectively confirmed a Bomber Command prophecy on airfield defence made in 1937, when it said:
‘No works or equipment not provided in Peace and no measures of defence and protection not practised in Peace will be found of any effect in the opening stages of an Emergency, when the need for them will be at its height.’
In the British Isles RAF stations were provided with additional machine- guns – these were mostly Lewis guns mounted on posts – and the Army provided some troops for both ground and anti-aircraft defence. One complication was the fragmentation of command and control, as the RAF’s ground gunners were under RAF control, the Army’s anti-aircraft defences were under one Army commander, and the Army’s ground forces under another.
9
Moreover, as the threat of airborne or seaborne attack which existed after the Battle of France forced a redeployment of Army units, many RAF stations found that their defences were withdrawn. Yet airfields were if anything more likely to be attacked than before. So the RAF had to develop its own defence organisation as a matter of urgency. Station Commanders were made responsible for the co-ordination of all resources which were available to their stations for local defence and, to assist them, Army officers were provided with the title of ‘Local Defence Adviser’.
A joint Army/RAF investigation, undertaken by Air Commodore Saunders who had been Commandant at the Staff College and the Army’s Director of Fortifications (which savours of pill-boxes) advised that a single organisation should be provided for airfield defence either by the Army or by the RAF. The compromise upshot was that the Air Ministry agreed how best to form an Airfield Defence Force based upon the 35,000 ground gunners who had by then been recruited, while the Army agreed to strengthen their forces available for airfield defence by raising Young Soldier Battalions. However, by January 1941 the Army was still unable to meet its requirements for airfield defence and it was decided that existing ground gunners and their officers should be formed into Station Defence Squadrons and plans were made for their numbers to be increased to 72,000.
After the Allied evacuation from Greece, some 22,000 Commonwealth and Greek soldiers were moved to the island of Crete, which had assumed great importance to our Middle East strategy. This garrison, coming out of Greece, were tired; they had been fighting hard and had had to leave a lot of their heavy weapons behind. Against them, on the 20th May, the Germans launched an airborne assault supported by waves of Stukas and Heinkels. Despite enormous casualties, by sundown they had landed 25,000 men on the island – 10,000 by parachute, 750 by glider, 5,000 by transport aircraft and the balance by sea. On 24th May 1941 the London Evening Standard in its Leader said:
‘If Hitler takes Crete, one thing alone is certain. The next island to be assaulted is our own. This Empire Day is the gravest and the greatest hour for Britain since Trafalgar.’
The early seizure of airfields on Crete was critical to the German plan. By the second day they had secured the toehold they needed at Maleme, and they were able to fly in reinforcements and supplies. Despite some bitter fighting, the overwhelming weight of the assault and the loss of
 
I recall being taken in 1941 to see the Station Armoury at Jurby in the Isle of Man, which was stacked not with rifles but with pikes made out of gas piping. Pikes appeared at a number of other RAF stations. I never was able to discover whether they called in the Honourable Artillery Company to teach us pike drill!

I think the men of those days would struggle to recognise the petulant open-letter-writers of the present!
 

Glad_its_all_over

ADC
Book Reviewer
On Soviet war plans, it seems to me that there were far easier ways to destroy the platforms and decommission the facilities on NATO airfields than running expensive and complicated SF operations against them, LRDG stylee. If the major installations weren't, simply, treated to an unexpected and unwelcome dose of instant sunshine at STARTEX, treating them to a good drenching of persistent agents would have rendered them sufficiently incapable as to meet the need. One SCUD is a lot cheaper than an entire Spetsnaz company, after all.

Of course, there is also the old joke about the two Guards Motor Rife Colonels sitting outside Les Deux Magots, after the war, enjoying a fine with their coffee, chatting, when one idly asks "by the way, who won the air war, do you remember?".
 
I think the men of those days would struggle to recognise the petulant open-letter-writers of the present!

Bob, the men of these days are struggling to recognise the petulant open letter writers of the present! Yes, I was a Cold War warrior (81-93) and the modern day Regiment is an animal I do not recognise. I wrote earlier I thought the Regiment had lost its way in this modern world and I have no reason to change my thoughts. I avoid reunions and the many Regiment social media pages. I served in an era when we really had a sole purpose and that was to work in close harmony with the Harrier Force in Germany. We would locate, clear and hold an area for the Harriers to be re fuelled, rearmed and sent on their way. We would then move to the next location. Life was simpler then and I wish I could return to those heady days.
 
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