I'm perfectly willing to accept that the Naval Service has a grip on its own requirements, as regards the information and data support its platforms require and the necessary infrastructure to knit it all together, ditto the RAF and the tri-Service ISTAR community; all jolly good and all fine and dandy. I expect the Army does its bit as well in terms of enabling the operational support and coordination that information systems supply - all good. As far as I'm aware, defence of all that good stuff is pretty much OK as well - money has been spent sensibly and the defence networks are protected to an OK standard, say around where the banks were five years ago, which isn't that bad. By their nature, defence systems tend to be a touch more resilient, given the redundancy which is built in - and should be built in, it's a feature, not a mistake, at least in resilience terms.
Where my doubts start to creep in is once the conversation turns from the 6 space with hints of 2 (Sy) and starts to move into the 3 and 2 (collect) spaces. This is where I see a true capability gap in terms of what the Services can deliver - and where I suspect this is deliberate. Offensive cyber, whether reconnaissance or attack, is a hugely, hugely dodgy issue for a nation state nowadays and, while I'm confident that the UK has a highly sophisticated capability and can generate a number of interesting effects from that capability, I'm highly dubious that it would entrust any operational initiative in this field to the Services.