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CVF and Carrier Strike thread

We stopped buying Merlins because their unit cost was more than the Type 23 Frigates they were going on.

Rubbish - I am sure that I read that the price of a Type 23 circa 1990 was in the order of £200 million per ship, in the early 2000s the cost of an ASW Merlin, fully fitted with dipping sonar, radar, etc was $57 million per aircraft. Merlin has approx 50% more range and endurance than either MH-60 or NH-90, meaning a smaller number of aircraft can deliver the same level of coverage for a task group.

I suspect the availability would improve if the spares were provided.

Now - are you going to reply to my comments about the UK committing a carrier capability to NATO and this years STDE21 exercise?
 
UK target number of F-35s is in the high double figures at least (even if it does keep changing), so not comparable in the slightest.

Given that you like looking up things on the internet, would you like to tell us how many countries operate (a) AW-101 and (b) V-22?

It really really is.

We can operate a small flight of Ospreys as a subset of a USMC Squadron. it’s not as if the two services don’t work very closely and talk to each other.

in your own time, how many Navy’s have bought the ASW of the Merlin in even distant history?
I’m save you the effort, Leonardo’s given up trying after decades of being snubbed and customers laughing at the price and its dismal performance record.
 
Rubbish - I am sure that I read that the price of a Type 23 circa 1990 was in the order of £200 million per ship, in the early 2000s the cost of an ASW Merlin, fully fitted with dipping sonar, radar, etc was $57 million per aircraft. Merlin has approx 50% more range and endurance than either MH-60 or NH-90, meaning a smaller number of aircraft can deliver the same level of coverage for a task group.

I suspect the availability would imptove if the spares were provided.

Hansard......


Type 23 Frigates​

5 Jul 2001 : Column: 246W

Mr. Quentin Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the cost was of each of the Royal Navy's type 23 frigates.

Mr. Ingram: The cost of HMS Norfolk, the first of the type 23 class frigates, was £135.449 million. The following 16 vessels have cost, or are estimated to cost where final payments are not yet due, between £60 million and £96 million depending on when the vessel was ordered and the scope of shipbuilder supplied equipment.

We were paying £100 million a pop for a Merlin and people said WTF! Don’t order none more.


we can buy all the spares in the universe, it won’t ever change the fact it’s over complex, its a maintenance nightmare, it’s fragile, and it has an inherently weak gearbox that can’t be fixed.

Get over it, Merlin is a pile of w@nk no one wants - and it’s main user would dump tomorrow if it could.

 
Hansard......


Type 23 Frigates​

5 Jul 2001 : Column: 246W

Mr. Quentin Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the cost was of each of the Royal Navy's type 23 frigates.

Mr. Ingram: The cost of HMS Norfolk, the first of the type 23 class frigates, was £135.449 million. The following 16 vessels have cost, or are estimated to cost where final payments are not yet due, between £60 million and £96 million depending on when the vessel was ordered and the scope of shipbuilder supplied equipment.

We were paying £100 million a pop for a Merlin and people said WTF! Don’t order none more.


we can buy all the spares in the universe, it won’t ever change the fact it’s over complex, its a maintenance nightmare, it’s fragile, and it has an inherently weak gearbox that can’t be fixed.

Get over it, Merlin is a pile of w@nk no one wants - and it’s main user would dump tomorrow if it could.


Main user - when I spoke to someone from 824 NAS a few years back they seemed happy with it. As did the old and bold PWO(U) who I asked about ASW, and he started drawing a diagram of a task group with a T23 (with 2087) working with Merlins flying from the carrier and being on station 24/7 - taking advantage of it having a longer range than the old Sea King...

I wonder if @alfred_the_great (who understands a thing or two about ASW) thinks it is capable or not?

As to my other point, would you agree, or disagree, that HM Government has committed to commit a carrier to NATO, as announced by Ministers), and that NATO considers that transatlantic reinforcements would need to be protected during any crisis in the NATO theatre?
 
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Rubbish - I am sure that I read that the price of a Type 23 circa 1990 was in the order of £200 million per ship, in the early 2000s the cost of an ASW Merlin, fully fitted with dipping sonar, radar, etc was $57 million per aircraft. Merlin has approx 50% more range and endurance than either MH-60 or NH-90, meaning a smaller number of aircraft can deliver the same level of coverage for a task group.

I suspect the availability would improve if the spares were provided.

Now - are you going to reply to my comments about the UK committing a carrier capability to NATO and this years STDE21 exercise?

If only it were that simple; it is an inherently complicated aircraft, far more so than the Chinook. The RAF were not sorry to see the back of their Merlins and neither were the Army.
 
Merlin has approx 50% more range and endurance than either MH-60 or NH-90, meaning a smaller number of aircraft can deliver the same level of coverage for a task group.


Let me help you with a fundamental error in your working out.

You are comparing a helicopter with ≤50% availability with a helicopter with ≥90% availability.
 
If only it were that simple; it is an inherently complicated aircraft, far more so than the Chinook. The RAF were not sorry to see the back of their Merlins and neither were the Army.


The Navy is 20 heavy helicopters short of where it needs to be, yet merrily took a Sawzall to 8 Merlins for spares parts.
 
Let me help you with a fundamental error in your working out.

You are comparing a helicopter with ≤50% availability with a helicopter with ≥90% availability.

Is that availability figure for the whole fleet, or for a deployed flight or a squadron aboard the carrier?

How did they get nine Merlins aboard HMS illustrious (plus another one aboard Westminster) - Exercise Deep Blue in 2014 - high tempo ASW? Hopefully @jrwlynch will jump in with a brain bending analysis of sortie length, range, coverage, etc.

Without wishing to repeat myself, has the UK committed to make a carrier available for NATO operations?
 
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The Navy is 20 heavy helicopters short of where it needs to be, yet merrily took a Sawzall to 8 Merlins for spares parts.

Happily or because at the time money was short and the ministers who make the decisions had not got the memo about ASW being needed. Were these the same ministers who tried to kill off the RN's carriers full stop?

Why is it inherently complicated, especially compared to a twin rotor aircraft? Curious.

Maybe being full of radar, sonar, Electro-optical systems, having a folding tail and a folding rotor....
 
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Are you sure that the NATO theatre will not continue to be the main operating area for the RN -along with the Gulf? (snips, various)

As to today, and an American view of where we would contribute most, try this:

New British carriers can transform Europe's NATO naval Capabilities

It is entirely understandable that the first mission for Britain’s first ever carrier strike group be a wholly sovereign endeavor, but going forward pride should take a back seat to capability and effectiveness in NATO. Indeed it must, since the Royal Navy does not have enough billets, ships, or fighter aircraft to continually operate a carrier strike group. Naval cooperation between the United States and UK is a step in the right direction, not just because the RN faces budget constraints, but also because the US Navy’s own plan for 435 ships is a pipe dream, .. Cooperation with Europe is also necessary and it is here that the UK can resume its highly valuable role as a bridge between the continent and the United States. Using the British carriers as the center of a British-led, but European-supported, task force would add a serious pillar of capability to NATO. Such a move should be compatible with the (HM's) Government’s strategic goals in the coming decade as outlined by Prime Minister Boris Johnson.

The UK has also stated repeatedly, over many decades, that NATO is the preferred forum for European security Establishing a carrier strike group that is truly European would be a major leap forward for the Alliance. It would allow the United States to reposition forces and would give Britain and her European NATO allies truly global reach.

Creating a UK-led NATO-Europe Strike Group would be functionally relatively easy
.. The naval side of Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is a model for cooperation.

.. most likely, no European naval campaign would be launched without the blessing (and most likely support, —C4ISR from the United States. Forming a European carrier strike group deployed globally, therefore, is a major way to advance collective action within NATO, demonstrate solidarity on defense capabilities to Washington, and to utilize resources most effectively. Such solidarity is necessary in a world where China will outstrip the US Navy in coming decades. Europe allies cannot simpl(y) depend on the United States—they must contribute actively to global security.


The final paragraph is noteworthy:

The reality of NATO in the 21st century is that the United States will not be able to match emergent peer competitors alone. Strong European capabilities are necessary both to ensure stability, but also to stave off isolationist tendencies in the Washington where a sentiment reigns that the United States carries too much of the burden of European defense..., a UK-led NATO Europe carrier strike group .. would also deal a serious blow to those that say that Europe fails to substantially contribute to NATO capabilities. The UK-led NATO European carrier strike group would serve as an example that could also be applied carrier strike groups built around the French carrier Charles de Gaulle and the Italian carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi. Such integration would be a serious step forward for allied defense integration in NATO.
Although not wishing to get into a slogging match over your post, I do have a counter perspective;

The Atlantic Council (AC) article paints a VERY narrow US-centric and rather patronising view on where the Brits should park their carrier -that is optimised on US Interests.
Their argument is predicated on the assumption we will blithely continue to play their 'Bridge' role now we have left the EU and that UKPLC should obediently fill the gap created by US Naval over-stretch, in the N Atlantic. It also incorrectly conflates PMBJ's intent of a Global UK, with US need for the UK to be at the heart of NATO. This we can do, without fixing a Carrier in the N Atlantic.​
The UK NATO Led 'strike group' can be provided by the JEF (-QE). Although correctly assuming that the UK will remain committed to European NATO defence (as well as bi-lateral stuff; France in Africa), it incorrectly conflates European reluctance to commit to credible defence spending, with that of their the neighbour over the North Sea. The article also makes the mistake of assuming that the UK would obediently offer key national strategic assets as a resource to be 'utili(z)ed most effectively' to meet Washington's strategic interest above that of London's. They also wrongly conflate solidarity (in the face of China) with compliance.​

I make these observations, as the presumptions made by the AC run counter to the evidence presented to them (if they did their research). The first clue is in the 'Global' bit of Global Britain, HMG's intent is to work toward a significant pivot back to East of Suez. The work toward CPTPP membership, where significant UK interests already lay and where UK's reputation has suffered less over recent decades. The UK as a leading player in a emerging 'middle power consensus' - where we work more effectively with like minded nations (call it CANZUK +++). For those of us interested in RUSI, IISS et al, these are themes that have been emerging/been discussed openly.

Now that we are a 'independent sovereign nation' - I really don't believe we will revert to some pos-war, pre-Thatcher version of ourselves; under-confident, declinist, and supplicant. We might get it spectacularly wrong, but I don't think it's in our DNA to do so. If Bojo only lasts one term, then all bets are off. But we are starting from a position where we remain a soft-power leader, where we are (now) once again proving that in a global crisis, our science is top tier and where we have a unique opportunity to leverage our reputation in the wider World, in support of those we see as like-minded partners.

Why would we throw that opportunity away, to comply with the national strategic interest of a nation that played us like a fiddle from 1940 onwards? The ME for the QE & PoW will be East, not back-filling the USN in the N Atlantic.

Y
 
Why is it inherently complicated, especially compared to a twin rotor aircraft? Curious.

The three engine configuration for a start. Also, the hydraulics. It is a thing of beauty but not at all rugged. Having been on the receiving end of poor Merlin reliability more than once and tearing my hair out with the Avn planners to try and get taskings done, I have little faith in it.
 
Merlins are typically Italian, just like my Vespa PX, (that was made by an Italian aircraft company too, Piaggio), looks beautiful, handles like a dream, but allergic to water, bits keep dropping off and always breaking down.
 
Although not wishing to get into a slogging match over your post, I do have a counter perspective;

The Atlantic Council (AC) article paints a VERY narrow US-centric and rather patronising view on where the Brits should park their carrier -that is optimised on US Interests.
Their argument is predicated on the assumption we will blithely continue to play their 'Bridge' role now we have left the EU and that UKPLC should obediently fill the gap created by US Naval over-stretch, in the N Atlantic. It also incorrectly conflates PMBJ's intent of a Global UK, with US need for the UK to be at the heart of NATO. This we can do, without fixing a Carrier in the N Atlantic.​
The UK NATO Led 'strike group' can be provided by the JEF (-QE). Although correctly assuming that the UK will remain committed to European NATO defence (as well as bi-lateral stuff; France in Africa), it incorrectly conflates European reluctance to commit to credible defence spending, with that of their the neighbour over the North Sea. The article also makes the mistake of assuming that the UK would obediently offer key national strategic assets as a resource to be 'utili(z)ed most effectively' to meet Washington's strategic interest above that of London's. They also wrongly conflate solidarity (in the face of China) with compliance.​

I make these observations, as the presumptions made by the AC run counter to the evidence presented to them (if they did their research). The first clue is in the 'Global' bit of Global Britain, HMG's intent is to work toward a significant pivot back to East of Suez. The work toward CPTPP membership, where significant UK interests already lay and where UK's reputation has suffered less over recent decades. The UK as a leading player in a emerging 'middle power consensus' - where we work more effectively with like minded nations (call it CANZUK +++). For those of us interested in RUSI, IISS et al, these are themes that have been emerging/been discussed openly.

Now that we are a 'independent sovereign nation' - I really don't believe we will revert to some pos-war, pre-Thatcher version of ourselves; under-confident, declinist, and supplicant. We might get it spectacularly wrong, but I don't think it's in our DNA to do so. If Bojo only lasts one term, then all bets are off. But we are starting from a position where we remain a soft-power leader, where we are (now) once again proving that in a global crisis, our science is top tier and where we have a unique opportunity to leverage our reputation in the wider World, in support of those we see as like-minded partners.

Why would we throw that opportunity away, to comply with the national strategic interest of a nation that played us like a fiddle from 1940 onwards? The ME for the QE & PoW will be East, not back-filling the USN in the N Atlantic.

Y

I largely agree - however @PhotEx believe the main role of the QEC will be to backfill for the Americans in the Middle East. Being ships, the carriers can go anywhere, and the NATO commitment does not mean we cannot deploy them elsewhere. I am guessing that being more than thirty days' steaming time from the NATO theatre will be rare.

Merlins are typically Italian, just like my Vespa PX, (that was made by an Italian aircraft company too, Piaggio), looks beautiful, handles like a dream, but allergic to water, bits keep dropping off and always breaking down.

@jrwlynch and @alfred_the_great can reply to that.
 
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