CVF and Carrier Strike thread

Yokel

LE
The Navy is 20 heavy helicopters short of where it needs to be, yet merrily took a Sawzall to 8 Merlins for spares parts.

Happily or because at the time money was short and the ministers who make the decisions had not got the memo about ASW being needed. Were these the same ministers who tried to kill off the RN's carriers full stop?

Why is it inherently complicated, especially compared to a twin rotor aircraft? Curious.

Maybe being full of radar, sonar, Electro-optical systems, having a folding tail and a folding rotor....
 
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Yarra

War Hero
Are you sure that the NATO theatre will not continue to be the main operating area for the RN -along with the Gulf? (snips, various)

As to today, and an American view of where we would contribute most, try this:

New British carriers can transform Europe's NATO naval Capabilities

It is entirely understandable that the first mission for Britain’s first ever carrier strike group be a wholly sovereign endeavor, but going forward pride should take a back seat to capability and effectiveness in NATO. Indeed it must, since the Royal Navy does not have enough billets, ships, or fighter aircraft to continually operate a carrier strike group. Naval cooperation between the United States and UK is a step in the right direction, not just because the RN faces budget constraints, but also because the US Navy’s own plan for 435 ships is a pipe dream, .. Cooperation with Europe is also necessary and it is here that the UK can resume its highly valuable role as a bridge between the continent and the United States. Using the British carriers as the center of a British-led, but European-supported, task force would add a serious pillar of capability to NATO. Such a move should be compatible with the (HM's) Government’s strategic goals in the coming decade as outlined by Prime Minister Boris Johnson.

The UK has also stated repeatedly, over many decades, that NATO is the preferred forum for European security Establishing a carrier strike group that is truly European would be a major leap forward for the Alliance. It would allow the United States to reposition forces and would give Britain and her European NATO allies truly global reach.

Creating a UK-led NATO-Europe Strike Group would be functionally relatively easy
.. The naval side of Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is a model for cooperation.

.. most likely, no European naval campaign would be launched without the blessing (and most likely support, —C4ISR from the United States. Forming a European carrier strike group deployed globally, therefore, is a major way to advance collective action within NATO, demonstrate solidarity on defense capabilities to Washington, and to utilize resources most effectively. Such solidarity is necessary in a world where China will outstrip the US Navy in coming decades. Europe allies cannot simpl(y) depend on the United States—they must contribute actively to global security.


The final paragraph is noteworthy:

The reality of NATO in the 21st century is that the United States will not be able to match emergent peer competitors alone. Strong European capabilities are necessary both to ensure stability, but also to stave off isolationist tendencies in the Washington where a sentiment reigns that the United States carries too much of the burden of European defense..., a UK-led NATO Europe carrier strike group .. would also deal a serious blow to those that say that Europe fails to substantially contribute to NATO capabilities. The UK-led NATO European carrier strike group would serve as an example that could also be applied carrier strike groups built around the French carrier Charles de Gaulle and the Italian carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi. Such integration would be a serious step forward for allied defense integration in NATO.
Although not wishing to get into a slogging match over your post, I do have a counter perspective;

The Atlantic Council (AC) article paints a VERY narrow US-centric and rather patronising view on where the Brits should park their carrier -that is optimised on US Interests.
Their argument is predicated on the assumption we will blithely continue to play their 'Bridge' role now we have left the EU and that UKPLC should obediently fill the gap created by US Naval over-stretch, in the N Atlantic. It also incorrectly conflates PMBJ's intent of a Global UK, with US need for the UK to be at the heart of NATO. This we can do, without fixing a Carrier in the N Atlantic.​
The UK NATO Led 'strike group' can be provided by the JEF (-QE). Although correctly assuming that the UK will remain committed to European NATO defence (as well as bi-lateral stuff; France in Africa), it incorrectly conflates European reluctance to commit to credible defence spending, with that of their the neighbour over the North Sea. The article also makes the mistake of assuming that the UK would obediently offer key national strategic assets as a resource to be 'utili(z)ed most effectively' to meet Washington's strategic interest above that of London's. They also wrongly conflate solidarity (in the face of China) with compliance.​

I make these observations, as the presumptions made by the AC run counter to the evidence presented to them (if they did their research). The first clue is in the 'Global' bit of Global Britain, HMG's intent is to work toward a significant pivot back to East of Suez. The work toward CPTPP membership, where significant UK interests already lay and where UK's reputation has suffered less over recent decades. The UK as a leading player in a emerging 'middle power consensus' - where we work more effectively with like minded nations (call it CANZUK +++). For those of us interested in RUSI, IISS et al, these are themes that have been emerging/been discussed openly.

Now that we are a 'independent sovereign nation' - I really don't believe we will revert to some pos-war, pre-Thatcher version of ourselves; under-confident, declinist, and supplicant. We might get it spectacularly wrong, but I don't think it's in our DNA to do so. If Bojo only lasts one term, then all bets are off. But we are starting from a position where we remain a soft-power leader, where we are (now) once again proving that in a global crisis, our science is top tier and where we have a unique opportunity to leverage our reputation in the wider World, in support of those we see as like-minded partners.

Why would we throw that opportunity away, to comply with the national strategic interest of a nation that played us like a fiddle from 1940 onwards? The ME for the QE & PoW will be East, not back-filling the USN in the N Atlantic.

Y
 
Why is it inherently complicated, especially compared to a twin rotor aircraft? Curious.

The three engine configuration for a start. Also, the hydraulics. It is a thing of beauty but not at all rugged. Having been on the receiving end of poor Merlin reliability more than once and tearing my hair out with the Avn planners to try and get taskings done, I have little faith in it.
 

PhotEx

On ROPS
On ROPs
Merlins are typically Italian, just like my Vespa PX, (that was made by an Italian aircraft company too, Piaggio), looks beautiful, handles like a dream, but allergic to water, bits keep dropping off and always breaking down.
 

Yokel

LE
Although not wishing to get into a slogging match over your post, I do have a counter perspective;

The Atlantic Council (AC) article paints a VERY narrow US-centric and rather patronising view on where the Brits should park their carrier -that is optimised on US Interests.
Their argument is predicated on the assumption we will blithely continue to play their 'Bridge' role now we have left the EU and that UKPLC should obediently fill the gap created by US Naval over-stretch, in the N Atlantic. It also incorrectly conflates PMBJ's intent of a Global UK, with US need for the UK to be at the heart of NATO. This we can do, without fixing a Carrier in the N Atlantic.​
The UK NATO Led 'strike group' can be provided by the JEF (-QE). Although correctly assuming that the UK will remain committed to European NATO defence (as well as bi-lateral stuff; France in Africa), it incorrectly conflates European reluctance to commit to credible defence spending, with that of their the neighbour over the North Sea. The article also makes the mistake of assuming that the UK would obediently offer key national strategic assets as a resource to be 'utili(z)ed most effectively' to meet Washington's strategic interest above that of London's. They also wrongly conflate solidarity (in the face of China) with compliance.​

I make these observations, as the presumptions made by the AC run counter to the evidence presented to them (if they did their research). The first clue is in the 'Global' bit of Global Britain, HMG's intent is to work toward a significant pivot back to East of Suez. The work toward CPTPP membership, where significant UK interests already lay and where UK's reputation has suffered less over recent decades. The UK as a leading player in a emerging 'middle power consensus' - where we work more effectively with like minded nations (call it CANZUK +++). For those of us interested in RUSI, IISS et al, these are themes that have been emerging/been discussed openly.

Now that we are a 'independent sovereign nation' - I really don't believe we will revert to some pos-war, pre-Thatcher version of ourselves; under-confident, declinist, and supplicant. We might get it spectacularly wrong, but I don't think it's in our DNA to do so. If Bojo only lasts one term, then all bets are off. But we are starting from a position where we remain a soft-power leader, where we are (now) once again proving that in a global crisis, our science is top tier and where we have a unique opportunity to leverage our reputation in the wider World, in support of those we see as like-minded partners.

Why would we throw that opportunity away, to comply with the national strategic interest of a nation that played us like a fiddle from 1940 onwards? The ME for the QE & PoW will be East, not back-filling the USN in the N Atlantic.

Y

I largely agree - however @PhotEx believe the main role of the QEC will be to backfill for the Americans in the Middle East. Being ships, the carriers can go anywhere, and the NATO commitment does not mean we cannot deploy them elsewhere. I am guessing that being more than thirty days' steaming time from the NATO theatre will be rare.

Merlins are typically Italian, just like my Vespa PX, (that was made by an Italian aircraft company too, Piaggio), looks beautiful, handles like a dream, but allergic to water, bits keep dropping off and always breaking down.

@jrwlynch and @alfred_the_great can reply to that.
 
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PhotEx

On ROPS
On ROPs
Maybe being full of radar, sonar, Electro-optical systems, having a folding tail and a folding rotor....

Compared to an Osprey, its nothing special, but it is a perfect example of what happens when a manufacturer with no track record designing aircraft fancies it can out design someone who's been a market leader for 40 year, and then compounds it by merging two sets of mutually contradictory national requirements.

And its not the electronic and sonars that are the problems with Merlin, it's the mechanics, they were very badly designed and hugely under specified.
Starting with a fixed rotor disc diameter, then increasing the airframe size and weight outside its 'ya canna change the laws of physics' parameters - well, you can, by grafting on an extra engine to a transmission designed for two engines, and running the main rotor way faster than is ideal. Merlin basically lives its life in Maximum overdrive thrashing itself to death.
- and stay out of the porta-loos when its coming in to land - the rather awesome prop wash results in hilarity!
 
FRA MoD has announced that the CdG will support the anti Daesh campaign during the first semester of 2021

Florence Parly (@florence_parly) a tweeté : Devant la commission @AN_Defense, je donne aux députés de premières indications sur la prochaine mission du porte-avions Charles de Gaulle #DirectAN https://t.co/PIFO01hvKV
 

Yokel

LE
Compared to an Osprey, its nothing special, but it is a perfect example of what happens when a manufacturer with no track record designing aircraft fancies it can out design someone who's been a market leader for 40 year, and then compounds it by merging two sets of mutually contradictory national requirements.

And its not the electronic and sonars that are the problems with Merlin, it's the mechanics, they were very badly designed and hugely under specified.
Starting with a fixed rotor disc diameter, then increasing the airframe size and weight outside its 'ya canna change the laws of physics' parameters - well, you can, by grafting on an extra engine to a transmission designed for two engines, and running the main rotor way faster than is ideal. Merlin basically lives its life in Maximum overdrive thrashing itself to death.
- and stay out of the porta-loos when its coming in to land - the rather awesome prop wash results in hilarity!

Has anyone designed an ASW version of Osprey? I hope you will not mind me waiting for the opinion of someone will operational ASW experience will you?

Although not wishing to get into a slogging match over your post, I do have a counter perspective;

The Atlantic Council (AC) article paints a VERY narrow US-centric and rather patronising view on where the Brits should park their carrier -that is optimised on US Interests.
Their argument is predicated on the assumption we will blithely continue to play their 'Bridge' role now we have left the EU and that UKPLC should obediently fill the gap created by US Naval over-stretch, in the N Atlantic. It also incorrectly conflates PMBJ's intent of a Global UK, with US need for the UK to be at the heart of NATO. This we can do, without fixing a Carrier in the N Atlantic.​
The UK NATO Led 'strike group' can be provided by the JEF (-QE). Although correctly assuming that the UK will remain committed to European NATO defence (as well as bi-lateral stuff; France in Africa), it incorrectly conflates European reluctance to commit to credible defence spending, with that of their the neighbour over the North Sea. The article also makes the mistake of assuming that the UK would obediently offer key national strategic assets as a resource to be 'utili(z)ed most effectively' to meet Washington's strategic interest above that of London's. They also wrongly conflate solidarity (in the face of China) with compliance.​

I make these observations, as the presumptions made by the AC run counter to the evidence presented to them (if they did their research). The first clue is in the 'Global' bit of Global Britain, HMG's intent is to work toward a significant pivot back to East of Suez. The work toward CPTPP membership, where significant UK interests already lay and where UK's reputation has suffered less over recent decades. The UK as a leading player in a emerging 'middle power consensus' - where we work more effectively with like minded nations (call it CANZUK +++). For those of us interested in RUSI, IISS et al, these are themes that have been emerging/been discussed openly.

Now that we are a 'independent sovereign nation' - I really don't believe we will revert to some pos-war, pre-Thatcher version of ourselves; under-confident, declinist, and supplicant. We might get it spectacularly wrong, but I don't think it's in our DNA to do so. If Bojo only lasts one term, then all bets are off. But we are starting from a position where we remain a soft-power leader, where we are (now) once again proving that in a global crisis, our science is top tier and where we have a unique opportunity to leverage our reputation in the wider World, in support of those we see as like-minded partners.

Why would we throw that opportunity away, to comply with the national strategic interest of a nation that played us like a fiddle from 1940 onwards? The ME for the QE & PoW will be East, not back-filling the USN in the N Atlantic.

Y

Thinking about it on a number of occasions the old Invincible class frequently redeployed in a hurry - a carrier can sustain high speeds. Therefore being committed to the NATO Atlantic theatre in the event of conflict with Russia does not [preclude being East of Suez. Think of how fact the task group moved in 1982.

FRA MoD has announced that the CdG will support the anti Daesh campaign during the first semester of 2021

Florence Parly (@florence_parly) a tweeté : Devant la commission @AN_Defense, je donne aux députés de premières indications sur la prochaine mission du porte-avions Charles de Gaulle #DirectAN https://t.co/PIFO01hvKV

CdG has spent a large amount of her life on operations that were part of France's main defence effort. I am sure that the same would apply if she was called on to protect a task group or an amphibious force, or perhaps logistic shipping.
 
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Mattb

LE
in your own time, how many Navy’s have bought the ASW of the Merlin in even distant history?
One more country than has bought the Osprey, by my reckoning.

Also, given that most of your criticisms seem to revolve around the airframe, that over a dozen countries operate non-ASW variants also needs to be taken into account.
 
Merlins are fine for reliability; we just didn't buy enough spares to suppprt them in 3rd line maintenance. That it turn just extends the timelines to get anything done.

Like most helicopters, they work best when they're flown pretty intensively.
 

Yokel

LE
I think some people confuse availability and reliability. Also Merlin has a full ninety minutes of extra duration than MH-60R or NH-90 - five hours instead of three and a half.

We have also established that the carrier in the Mediterranean or Middle East can redeploy to the Atlantic in the event of a major crisis, so being part of the four thirties NATO force and deploying globally are not mutually exclusive.
 
I think some people confuse availability and reliability. Also Merlin has a full ninety minutes of extra duration than MH-60R or NH-90 - five hours instead of three and a half.

We have also established that the carrier in the Mediterranean or Middle East can redeploy to the Atlantic in the event of a major crisis, so being part of the four thirties NATO force and deploying globally are not mutually exclusive.

Oh, there's no confusion on my part - it is frequently unavailable and when it is available, it is unreliable. :-D
 
Oh, there's no confusion on my part - it is frequently unavailable and when it is available, it is unreliable. :-D

Again, I’ve very first hand knowledge to dispute that second clause.
 
Now you've lost me...

Ah - it is a song ostensibly about listening to a baseball announcer whilst a boy and his girl get "hot and heavy" in the back of his car.

It took me far, far too long to realise it's about his attempt to get in her knickers (3rd base as our cousins would call it...)
 

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