CVF and Carrier Strike thread

IIRC Engadine influenced the course of Jutland quite a bit, but not in any way we wanted. The concept of ops for a seaplane carrier was built around having to stop the ship to launch or recover the seaplanes, plus the seaplanes' fairly short radius of action. In the initial deployment, she was positioned right up with the lead light cruiser squadron scouting ahead of the fleet, despite being a barely armed and wholly unarmoured Channel packet. She may have been the first ship to sight the Germans, but the idea was that the planes were meant to find the enemy, not the carrier.

Goodenough and Beatty were constrained early on by finding a way for her to stop, deploy the seaplanes, and then escape to the rear without either getting sunk in the light cruiser recce fight, run over by the battle cruisers, or into a blue-on-blue incident with the destroyer force.
 
An ideal aircraft carrier - with all the resources and funding - would have a mix of both V/STOL and CTOL aircraft operating of it. Just my personal opinion, so maybe completely talking out of my a$$.
So... how do you see the pointy end? Ski jump for the STOVL mob, or flat for the CATOBAR? And the blunt end with the wires across it - do the STOVL mob have to land at the front while the CATOBAR are playing tailhook?

One, or the other - I rather suspect that organising the deck to do both is just silly.
 
So... how do you see the pointy end? Ski jump for the STOVL mob, or flat for the CATOBAR? And the blunt end with the wires across it - do the STOVL mob have to land at the front while the CATOBAR are playing tailhook?

One, or the other - I rather suspect that organising the deck to do both is just silly.
Hydraulic ski jump & hooks on the B's.... :wink::mrgreen:
 
So... how do you see the pointy end? Ski jump for the STOVL mob, or flat for the CATOBAR? And the blunt end with the wires across it - do the STOVL mob have to land at the front while the CATOBAR are playing tailhook?

One, or the other - I rather suspect that organising the deck to do both is just silly.
Point taken. It maybe a bit of a logistics challenge. But not unworkable.

What my idiotic mind would envision is something like this - no ski jump - you don't need it for STOVL aircraft - the F35Bs in the U.S. won't be using them. Sure a few less payload lbs. I would try and position them exclusively towards the front of the carrier for landing and takeoffs.

And the back for CATOBAR aircraft for operations and all the tail hooking.

I really haven't fleshed out my thoughts yet, so it may seem like complete crap. Probably is.
 
An ideal aircraft carrier - with all the resources and funding - would have a mix of both V/STOL and CTOL aircraft operating of it. Just my personal opinion, so maybe completely talking out of my a$$.
The trouble is CTOL = Small length of deck used for launch, long length for recovery, but STOVL = long length of deck used for launch, very little for recovery. I have a picture of an RN Sea Harrier aboard the USS Eisenhower in 1983 taking off from the waist. It would have landed vertically, so as a one off it can happen but is not really practical as routine.

IIRC Engadine influenced the course of Jutland quite a bit, but not in any way we wanted. The concept of ops for a seaplane carrier was built around having to stop the ship to launch or recover the seaplanes, plus the seaplanes' fairly short radius of action. In the initial deployment, she was positioned right up with the lead light cruiser squadron scouting ahead of the fleet, despite being a barely armed and wholly unarmoured Channel packet. She may have been the first ship to sight the Germans, but the idea was that the planes were meant to find the enemy, not the carrier.

Goodenough and Beatty were constrained early on by finding a way for her to stop, deploy the seaplanes, and then escape to the rear without either getting sunk in the light cruiser recce fight, run over by the battle cruisers, or into a blue-on-blue incident with the destroyer force.
In other words - launching aircraft rapidly, and recovering them rapidly, meant deck launch and recovery, which is why the carrier got invented. You could even say Jutland influenced carrier development.

So... how do you see the pointy end? Ski jump for the STOVL mob, or flat for the CATOBAR? And the blunt end with the wires across it - do the STOVL mob have to land at the front while the CATOBAR are playing tailhook?

One, or the other - I rather suspect that organising the deck to do both is just silly.
Interestingly, on a page long ago on this thread I quoted Captain Eric Brown's comments about the planned CVA-01, taken from one of the appendices of Wings On My Sleeve. Whilst she was going to be a CTOL carrier, it was intended that in wartime RAF P1127/Kestrel/Harrier V/STOL aircraft could reinforce her air group.

There are parallels between CVA-01 and QEC. Eric Brown contributed to both.

Hydraulic ski jump & hooks on the B's.... :wink::mrgreen:
I think the FS Charles De Gaulle was built with some sort of ramp to lift the nose of the Super Eterndard up as it left the deck, but it was lowered for Rafale and Hawkeye.
 
Last edited:
The wreck of the USS Hornet, sunk in the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands on 27 October 1942 has been discovered at a depth of 17 000 ft.


The carrier famously launched the USAAC B-25s of the Doolittle Raiders.

It later took part in the Battle of Midway and the Solomon’s Campaign before being disabled by Japanese Val dive bombers (seen in the photo below) and Kate torpedo bombers. After a period under tow, it was later abandoned by the USN as Japanese surface forces approached and was dispatched by Japanese Long-Lance torpedoes.

I always find it fascinating seeing vessels at such depth and the Hornet appears particularly well preserved. The fact that they also allowed a veteran of the ship to see his former AAAposition is particularly moving.
Regards.
MM
 
Not sure if this has been posted before, but I read it earlier today and found it fascinating:

https://master.elementdev.io

And another one one:

https://master.elementdev.io
The author’s account mirrors many of my own experience (including stopping a USAF AWACS engaging friendlies) of flying an unglamorous and largely unsung role, albeit one utterly critical to air, land and maritime ops.

I’ve flown on E-2Cs many times (including off carriers) and an E-2D once, as well as operating alongside them during the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. One thing I would challenge is that ‘...the new E-2D Advanced Hawkeye can do everything its larger cousin, the E-3 Sentry AWACS, can do, but with a whopping 20 fewer people onboard.’ That is complete and utter hoop!

A controller can only speak on so many frequencies and monitor so many radios, even if the control is being conducted digitally (ie via data link). An E-2D has a maximum of 2 controllers whereas an E-3 (or E-7) has up to 4 times that number. Likewise, an E-3 or E-7 has about 4 times as many radios; if the ATO requires the C2 agency to monitor 18 radios and a platform only has 8, it can only do part of the job!

As a result, the E-2s only tended to be assigned secondary tasks on ops such as AAR control, check-in admin (eg the IFF checks mentioned in the article), or ‘gap-filling’ when the AWACS went to tank. In fact, to be brutally honest, E-2s were normlly a right royal pain in the arse on ops and it was easier when they weren’t around!

The low point of my relationship with E-2s was during ALLIED FORCE when the USN managed to launch an entire strike package on their local time (in the Southern Adriatic) rather than ZULU (which everyone else in the entire civilised world always uses)! That resulted in the entire package being on the wrong IFF, using the wrong freqs and busting numerous active Kill Boxes. Then the E-2 started to declare every friendly in the Northern Hemisphere as BOGEY (because they were wearing different - if actually the correct - IFF!) and tagging airliners in Romania as HOSTILE!

The CAOC ended up recalling the entire package back to the boat!

Great guys, but an AWACS they ain’t!

Regards,
MM
 
Last edited:
Be honest. One once refused your advances, didn’t it. :-D
No.

They were just to Air C2 what the Catholic priesthood is to child welfare.

Regards,
MM
 
An interesting - if in my view somewhat odd - ministerial statement linking the Tempest Programme indirectly to the QECs. The UK Defence Journal also mention the statement, although placing a slightly different interpretation against it.

This appears to suggest that the unmanned 'loyal-wingman' being considered for Tempest will be carrier based rather than developing a dedicated carrier capable Tempest variant. While the latter appears sensible due to the cost, it will be interesting to see what the implications are for the deck-configuration of the QECs; will the 'loyal wingmen' be capable of using the ski-jump for instance, or will they require cats/traps?

Alternatively, the 'loyal-wingmen' may be smaller (as several similar programmes envisage) in which case this would require them to be launched by embarked F-35B to overcome range limitations imposed by a small airframe. However, that would incur some implications for F-35 payload.

Either-way, semi-autonomous 'loyal-wingmen' and the associated architecture will probably be an emerging trend in current and future platforms, particularly when conducting ops in contested airspace.

Regards,
MM
 
The author’s account mirrors many of my own experience (including stopping a USAF AWACS engaging friendlies) of flying an unglamorous and largely unsung role, albeit one utterly critical to air, land and maritime ops.

I’ve flown on E-2Cs many times (including off carriers) and an E-2D once, as well as operating alongside them during the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. One thing I would challenge is that ‘...the new E-2D Advanced Hawkeye can do everything its larger cousin, the E-3 Sentry AWACS, can do, but with a whopping 20 fewer people onboard.’ That is complete and utter hoop!

A controller can only speak on so many frequencies and monitor so many radios, even if the control is being conducted digitally (ie via data link). An E-2D has a maximum of 2 controllers whereas an E-3 (or E-7) has up to 4 times that number. Likewise, an E-3 or E-7 has about 4 times as many radios; if the ATO requires the C2 agency to monitor 18 radios and a platform only has 8, it can only do part of the job!

As a result, the E-2s only tended to be assigned secondary tasks on ops such as AAR control, check-in admin (eg the IFF checks mentioned in the article), or ‘gap-filling’ when the AWACS went to tank. In fact, to be brutally honest, E-2s were normlly a right royal pain in the arse on ops and it was easier when they weren’t around!

The low point of my relationship with E-2s was during ALLIED FORCE when the USN managed to launch an entire strike package on their local time (in the Southern Adriatic) rather than ZULU (which everyone else in the entire civilised world always uses)! That resulted in the entire package being on the wrong IFF, using the wrong freqs and busting numerous active Kill Boxes. Then the E-2 started to declare every friendly in the Northern Hemisphere as BOGEY (because they were wearing different - if actually the correct - IFF!) and tagging airliners in Romania as HOSTILE!

The CAOC ended up recalling the entire package back to the boat!

Great guys, but an AWACS they ain’t!

Regards,
MM
I have, believe it or not, heard RN SKASaC operators trot out the line that "we can do everything with 3 men in a Sea King that it takes 30 Crabs and an AWACS to do.....", I s**t thee not.

Up till you point out endurance, comms, availability etc etc etc
 
Last edited:
An interesting - if in my view somewhat odd - ministerial statement linking the Tempest Programme indirectly to the QECs. The UK Defence Journal also mention the statement, although placing a slightly different interpretation against it.

This appears to suggest that the unmanned 'loyal-wingman' being considered for Tempest will be carrier based rather than developing a dedicated carrier capable Tempest variant. While the latter appears sensible due to the cost, it will be interesting to see what the implications are for the deck-configuration of the QECs; will the 'loyal wingmen' be capable of using the ski-jump for instance, or will they require cats/traps?

Alternatively, the 'loyal-wingmen' may be smaller (as several similar programmes envisage) in which case this would require them to be launched by embarked F-35B to overcome range limitations imposed by a small airframe. However, that would incur some implications for F-35 payload.

Either-way, semi-autonomous 'loyal-wingmen' and the associated architecture will probably be an emerging trend in current and future platforms, particularly when conducting ops in contested airspace.

Regards,
MM
From what was actually said, at the concept stage they are "considering" carrier basing for the UAV component. I take this as meaning they are looking into how it could be done and how much it would cost. These considerations would then be fed back into the design concepts to see what effect that would have on cost.
"The combat air acquisition programme is looking at the replacement of Typhoon's capabilities [through development of the Tempest], and any new combat air system will need to be interoperable with the Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) programme. The concept phase of the acquisition programme will consider Queen Elizabeth carrier basing for any unmanned force multipliers which may form part of the future combat air system," Howe said.
The problem that I see is that there are two concepts which may be leading in two different directions. One is the "swarm" of small UAVs which can be carried like a missile and air dropped somewhere near the area of interest. The following quote is from the second article.
A key talking point surrounding the Tempest programme has been the ability to deploy and manage air launched ‘swarming’ Unmanned Air Vehicles through a flexible payload bay allows the system to address dangerous Anti-Access Area Denial environments.
The other concept is operations from carriers, possibly in conjunction with F35s. Note however that the operating with F35s is the author's conjecture.
With whatever results from Tempest being able to use swarming technology to control drones and the F-35 becoming capable of doing so, it is only logical that capability will come into use.
The problem which I haven't seen addressed in either case is recovery. Do the UAVs re-attach themselves to the fighter? Do they have long range to fly back to base? If so, what are the implications for where the carrier has to be located? Is there to be some provision for refuelling on the return flight?

As an alternative, the UAVs could be not all that different from current larger UAVs, and so have long range. In this case they may be subsonic and capable of STOL operation, which case they may be able to take off from and land on carriers on their own, which would solve a whole host of problems.

Of course perhaps they would be expendable, in which case they're really just a sort of missile.

So are they to be small and carried by a fighter, and possibly expendable, or are they to be large and operate like current large UAVs? Perhaps what is really needed is two different UAVs.
 
Not sure if this has been posted before, but I read it earlier today and found it fascinating:

https://master.elementdev.io

And another one one:

https://master.elementdev.io
Great finds - thank you. It is not all about the jets, and I found it interesting the way the Hawkeye guy referred to sending information to ships other than the carrier as part of a task group.

I wonder if there will be a similar one by a Viking or Sea Hawk flier talking about the carrier's ASW role? On that note, I think on another forum someone (@Archimedes?) suggested someone may be writing a book about British ASW during the Falklands Conflict, with ASW Sea Kings based aboard Hermes and Invincible (and some RFAs) playing a major role.

It would be interesting to read of the Pingers acting in conjunction with the Type 22s and getting HIFR refueling from ships they could not land on.
 
Interesting to see HMS Queen Elizabeth being fitted retrospectively with phalanx. I remember the same system being retrospectively - and hurredly - fitted to her predessors prior to the Falklands. Someone must have remembered warships sometimes get shot at.
 
I wonder if there will be a similar one by a Viking or Sea Hawk flier talking about the carrier's ASW role? On that note, I think on another forum someone (@Archimedes?) suggested someone may be writing a book about British ASW during the Falklands Conflict, with ASW Sea Kings based aboard Hermes and Invincible (and some RFAs) playing a major role.
I was obliquely suggesting to the Argentine author of the latest book on 1982 that I am aware of some research that has been undertaken and some additional research that will be done over the next few years where the subject will get some coverage, but didn't wish to compromise the respective research projects by giving anything more away. It'll be some time before a book emerges, I think.
 
Last edited:

Latest Threads

Top