Krautman
LE

Don't know. The old and fat, lard-assed fucks from the Bundeswehr obstruct the view to the Isles.Like the British Army of today?
Don't know. The old and fat, lard-assed fucks from the Bundeswehr obstruct the view to the Isles.Like the British Army of today?
"This study was prepared for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by a group of former German generals and general staff officers."The Wehrmacht emphasised manoeuvre warfare and decisive battles correct, but they could defend also.
Pack tactics were first used in 1940 so no back to the future required for that oneChurchill was a master of the propaganda war
If he's announced to the public in 1943, 'Things are a bit tough in the North Atlantic but no worries, we're licking them', the public would not have knuckled down to working harder and economising more.
Winston in 1943 had his eye on the main prize, maximising the build up for May 1944 when we took the war back to Europe.
The problem with this U boats scenario is it requires a couple of Back to the Futures
The Germans invent out of the blue Wolfpack tactics in 1939
It assumes losses are directly scalable - double the U boats = double the convoy losses.
As was shown, more U boats came to equal more U boats in a given area and easier to find and sink as the Germans insisted on keeping in radio contact with them.
The largest convoy battle of WWII was SC122/HX229 in March 1943
90 ships and 16 escorts vs 38 U boats
22 ships lost vs 1 U boat
Total allied merchant ship losses for March 1943, all areas, was 120 ships
The Americans alone delivered 1,800 merchant ships in 1943
And by May 1943, we were winning… 43 U boats (25% of the U Boat arm) sunk in the Atlantic for just 34 ships (58 all areas)
Yes the Japanese had the same brainless fanatism like the Germans and it cost them dearly too.Yes, I would say they could. Just as well as the Japanese.
But wouldn’t you think the SS were the fanatics and the Wehrmacht the more professional grounded service ?Yes the Japanese had the same brainless fanatism like the Germans and it cost them dearly too.
Yes... If the UK signed a peace treaty between June 1940 and July 1941.No.
Regards,
MM
How much effect would the additional 300 convoy escorts have had on U Boat operations.The point I'm trying to make is that with six times the number of subs available as Donitz wanted the results in the first year or so of the war could have been quite different.
The Germans started out well but all their innovations were neutralised. I suspect the same would have happened even if they'd started with 300 rather than 56 boats. What the political effects would have been is unknowable how would higher losses have effected US public opinion? Would there be a knock on effect with the arctic convoys?
All interesting stuff but the bottom line is the allies won and I think would win in any and all circumstances.
It is just how long it would take.
Only if they didn't have the Germans undivided attention, otherwise I think not. As it was they took horrendous casualties even with the Germans occupied on two other fronts, France and Germany itself. The air war tied up more resources than is commonly supposed. What difference would an extra couple of thousand 88's and the men to man them have made at Kursk for example?Stalin would probably have attacked Hitler somewhere anyway and the Soviets were probably the only nation which could’ve defeated Hitler on their own.
Perhaps I was stretching it a bit to call him a General when he was in reality a lowly two-striper.Who?
early in the war we used Ultra to avoid U boats.Pack tactics were first used in 1940 so no back to the future required for that one
From Wiki but illuminating nonetheless:
Pack tactics were first used successfully in September and October 1940 to devastating effect, in a series of convoy battles. On September 21, convoy HX 72 of 42 merchantmen was attacked by a pack of four U-boats, which sank eleven ships and damaged two over the course of two nights. In October, the slow convoy SC 7, with an escort of two sloops and two corvettes, was overwhelmed, losing 59% of its ships. The battle for HX 79 in the following days was in many ways worse for the escorts than for SC 7. The loss of a quarter of the convoy without any loss to the U-boats, despite very strong escort (two destroyers, four corvettes, three trawlers, and a minesweeper) demonstrated the effectiveness of the German tactics against the inadequate British anti-submarine methods. On 1 December, seven German and three Italian submarines caught HX 90, sinking 10 ships and damaging three others. The success of pack tactics against these convoys encouraged Admiral Dönitz to adopt the wolf pack as his primary tactic.
So at this stage of the war, Battle of Britain just ending, the US over a year away and the invasion of Russia some months in the future the war at sea is quite important politically as well as logistically.
The point I'm trying to make is that with six times the number of subs available as Donitz wanted the results in the first year or so of the war could have been quite different.
The convoy system was in its infancy, technical means likewise. Captain Johnny Walker is also a year away.
As I've said it doesn't require any back to the future stuff. The nearest I can liken it to is the German blitzkrieg tactics, which was counteracted eventually. We had the advantage of an island to lick our wounds on and the desert war for practical experience.
The Germans started out well but all their innovations were neutralised. I suspect the same would have happened even if they'd started with 300 rather than 56 boats. What the political effects would have been is unknowable how would higher losses have effected US public opinion? Would there be a knock on effect with the arctic convoys?
All interesting stuff but the bottom line is the allies won and I think would win in any and all circumstances.
It is just how long it would take.
What difference would the men and associated material have made had it not been used to attack TunisiaOnly if they didn't have the Germans undivided attention, otherwise I think not. As it was they took horrendous casualties even with the Germans occupied on two other fronts, France and Germany itself. The air war tied up more resources than is commonly supposed. What difference would an extra couple of thousand 88's and the men to man them have made at Kursk for example?
During the inter war years submarine warfare and countermeasures were not career enhancers. I also think the Navy was more focused on shiny battleships and a little bit on naval aviation.How much effect would the additional 300 convoy escorts have had on U Boat operations.
Its implausible that as U Boat numbers increased that British rearmament would be directed against this.
Hitler was probably right when it came to France and UK - taking the time to rearm Germany (As Doenitz and others wanted) benefited UK France** more as they were behind the curve the longer he waited the more they could close the gap and indeed surpass German programmes
**Both had left their forces in a state of decline until 38ish
We have to remember that Germany back then was a totalitarian state.The Nazis were really good in using the carrot and stick method. If you followed and obeyed you were golden if you resisted, well good luck with that. After the "Machtübernahme" one of the first things the Nazis did was to secure the support of the Reichswehr, he first did that with simple promises like increasing the strength of the Reichswehr and giving Germany back it's honour and might.But wouldn’t you think the SS were the fanatics and the Wehrmacht the more professional grounded service ?
Why should EUCOM accept a sugarcoated study? Or why took it after the war in 1943 was definitely lost so long to conquer Germany?"This study was prepared for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by a group of former German generals and general staff officers."
Hardly going to come to the conclusion that the Germans were weak in defence, I reckon.
Fighting in the forests was about how well both you and your opponent fought in the forest. Every environment has its specific hazards and means of mitigating them (including dealing with exploding trees). In this case, the Germans had a thorough knowledge of the Hurtgen and had pretty well pre-registered everything. The Americans were, at the beginning, not prepared for forest fighting at all.Fighting in the forests was all about the environment. Everything was obscured, the trees were not conducive to letting anything dry - meaning that the ground was a sea of mud - blah, blah, blah, but the worst thing of all was that the forest cover was being shattered to produce secondary projectiles on the troops below, as well as diverting the shrapnel from air-bursts downward. Everything to do with the environment.
Movement on decent roads can create killing zones for the opposition if there is no friendly air cover - when the area around the border between Holland / Belgium and Germany was being fought over, the Allies had all the first class ground attack aircraft they needed. Yet another reason why the US should have circled the Hurtgen Forest, which is very hilly to the point of being mountainous, in the first place.
Edited to add: beat me to it LJ!
Now, I'm guessing at least some of this is armchair, hindsight-driven generalling with an element of backside covering, but there are probably some underlying truths in here (I don't doubt Cota's personal bravery or integrity; his actions at Omaha do, however, show what a difference it can make when the command staff know what's going on close up and personal). I've highlighted the bit about tank accessibility as an example of both not having sufficient information and tactical knowledge to fight this battle well, and of looking at events with post facto information.The northern and southern thrusts achieved little. The center regiment, the 112th Infantry, captured two villages and a town, but was eventually driven back by German counterattacks. In an article written for the U.S. Army Combined Center, Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Thomas Bradbeer identified "three crucial mistakes" that Cota made. First, neither he nor his staff ordered reconnaissance patrols. Second, he selected, sight unseen, an extremely narrow trail as the division's main supply route. Finally, he chose not to employ the extra armor units he was given in support of his infantry, believing the terrain and road system to be unsuitable for their use, whereas much of the forest was in fact accessible. Instead, the tanks were used as supplementary artillery. Furthermore, Lieutenant General Bradley criticized Cota for remaining in his command post, visiting the front only once late in the fighting, by which time he had already lost control of the situation.
Actually, the Sherman with the US 76mm and appropriate ammo was, imho, a cracking all rounder. Decent armour and mobility, reliable as yer like, and the HVAP could make the oppo suck their teeth.Whilst the Sherman was mass produced as an infantry support tank, I wouldn’t feel thrilled to fight German Armour in it come 1944 and beyond.
I would have preferred to be in the Tank Destroyer Corps if that was an option. The M18 Hellcat would have been my ride of choice. But Field Artillery would be even better! Being an infantryman would just suck.
The Germans had Gucci kit, but not enough of it.
the Russians had planning in place for an attack West in 1941. The Germans simply got their punch in first.Only if they didn't have the Germans undivided attention, otherwise I think not. As it was they took horrendous casualties even with the Germans occupied on two other fronts, France and Germany itself. The air war tied up more resources than is commonly supposed. What difference would an extra couple of thousand 88's and the men to man them have made at Kursk for example?
Because the only other primary sources on German defence against Soviet attack were out of reach behind the Iron Curtain.Why should EUCOM accept a sugarcoated study?
A wide range of issues, ranging from political disagreements between the allies, build-up and training of the required forces, logistics constraints from fighting on two (later three) fronts and through terrain mostly favouring the defence.Or why took it after the war in 1943 was definitely lost so long to conquer Germany?
It's certainly succinct.I think thats the shortest answer you've ever given!
I have read the same, trouble is hubris. The Russians have always had manpower but being in Command was a death sentence for far too many competent regimental Officers for the red Army to have been effective enough at that time.the Russians had planning in place for an attack West in 1941. The Germans simply got their punch in first.
Zukhov has been banging the table from March 1941 demanding a preemptive Russian attack.
indeed, the rather strange far too forward Disposition of Soviet forces in June 1941 are more consistent with an army adopting an offensive posture rather than a defensive one.
some sources suggest the Russians planned to attack @ 12 July.
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