Could Republican and Loyalist terrorism be contained, if Sinn Fein pushed for unification?

The DHLA run the area now.. Divis Hoods Liberation Army. A bunch of gas sniffing, drugged up, car thieving scumbag wee bastards and the Provo's are shit scared of them.
Bastards nicked her car about 9 years ago and left it wrecked, up around Ross Rd way.. they need crucified Seymour Hill style.
Introduce them to Mr Browning and his 1947 cloth belt!
 
Loyalists kick off?
only in a game of football - non GAA of course.

The loyalist paramilitaries were reliant on complicity and covert support of the RUC in particular.
The RUC isn’t the Ulster Uninionsts private Liebstandart no more.
Your still talking shit. How did Republicans get intel on Loyalists, I suppose they were telepathic or reliant on Gardai intel?

Do you seriously think Loyalists weren't capable of reading newspapers of Republicans up for trial?
Or the comings and goings in Long Kesh/HMP Maze.
Or the guy they were working beside spouting his mouth off or people talking in pubs?
 
Are you sure about that? I would like to see some polls.
My – many - friends in the Free State are notably apathetic about embracing us to their prison.
Speaking to a couple of friends from Mayo
And they said don't worry about the sinn fein results as it was a protest vote ..nothing more as people are sick of the two major parties doing eff all except devising ways of taxing.
 
There are some extraordinary facets of information like that which are probably only apparent with some local knowledge. Serving on four month tours and periodically returning in a different role only led to sporadic knowledge and missed the finer details.

Another example of this concerned the killing of the first soldier to die KIA, Gnr Robert Curtis. The guy who shot him was killed not long afterwards during a gun battle in 'Curtis Street, Belfst.


Or that other occassion where God is asked to explain why Scotland was given beautiful mountains, soft clear water, plush green valleys, white sandy beaches and salmon filled rivers. God responded "Wait to you see who they have for neighbors."
Gnr R Curtis
His wife was pregnant at the time.
So I suppose the child would be approaching 50 years old now.
Ffs where's the time gone?
 
Your still talking shit. How did Republicans get intel on Loyalists, I suppose they were telepathic or reliant on Gardai intel?

Do you seriously think Loyalists weren't capable of reading newspapers of Republicans up for trial?
Or the comings and goings in Long Kesh/HMP Maze.
Or the guy they were working beside spouting his mouth off or people talking in pubs?
the Boys Brigade were a more formidable para military that the Orange eejits.
 
Speaking to a couple of friends from Mayo
And they said don't worry about the sinn fein results as it was a protest vote ..nothing more as people are sick of the two major parties doing eff all except devising ways of taxing.
while devising ways of not taxing multi nationals.
 
Ok, these are fascinating stories and illustrate a depth of knowledge and understanding of the complexity of the problem. Bearing that in mind, do you think that the British Army of today (in particular) has the corporate memory and knowledge to be effective on the streets of Northern Ireland, if there is widespread unrest and the PSNI call for support? Recall that GFA was signed 23 years ago, so there won't be too many NCOs around with live experience (except as LEs); Other officers will now be quite senior and unlikely to be in regimental billets.
 
Gnr R Curtis
His wife was pregnant at the time.
So I suppose the child would be approaching 50 years old now.
Ffs where's the time gone?
The child, wore his wedding ring when she married. She named her son Robert after his grandfather....who was just 20 years old when he died serving with 156 Bty on the New Lodge Road. The gunman, Billy Reid hit four other soldiers during the incident. He was killed on 15 May 71 after being shot by a soldier on Academy Street near the junction with Curtis Street. Reid died just 11 weeks after Robert Curtis.
 
Ok, these are fascinating stories and illustrate a depth of knowledge and understanding of the complexity of the problem. Bearing that in mind, do you think that the British Army of today (in particular) has the corporate memory and knowledge to be effective on the streets of Northern Ireland, if there is widespread unrest and the PSNI call for support? Recall that GFA was signed 23 years ago, so there won't be too many NCOs around with live experience (except as LEs); Other officers will now be quite senior and unlikely to be in regimental billets.
I recall the Bishop of Derry once saying that the officers he spoke to in the early part of Op Banner knew more about India than they did about Ireland. I suspect that today that would be very different........they would know more about Afghanistan.
 
I recall the Bishop of Derry once saying that the officers he spoke to in the early part of Op Banner knew more about India than they did about Ireland. I suspect that today that would be very different........they would know more about Afghanistan.
I don't know about India, but early COIN doctrine in NI had been developed for Malaya (1950s) and Kenya (1960s).
 
Would Loyalist (or what ever you wish to call them)terrorists, get considerable support from the XRW now established in Europe, N America and elsewhere (shooting yesterday in Boxhead land for instance)? Money, safe houses, supply weapons? XLW (Corbyn and Co) have always supported the Shiners.
 

skid2

LE
Book Reviewer
You have to first deal with the political conceit that the GFA brought an end to terrorist activities.
it certainly removed any necessity or justification for it. Sunningdale would have given us largely the same thing, although letting people out of jail would have been a tough sale.
There’s no generational support, a serious lack of interest in the armed struggle. All there is is a group of disaffected dissidents. Which I suspect could be speedily dealt with by the shinners, if they look to be impeding their big chance at a United Ireland.

They’ve done it before with the Officials and the INLA. They’d have little or no compunction dealing with their old friends in the dissidents.

The loyalist terrorist organisations, dealt with by the forces of law and order.
Rabble rousing and street protests will look impressive until some nut job does something which immediately loses them any form of community support.

Sinn Féin’s win in the south was so unexpected they were unable to capitalise on it. The two main southern parties won’t want to be railroaded into a UI by the Shinners, so here’s not the support you would think.

Just another unintended consequence of Brexit. GFA solved the Irish question.
That’s why it’s so important.
 

skid2

LE
Book Reviewer
Would Loyalist (or what ever you wish to call them)terrorists, get considerable support from the XRW now established in Europe, N America and elsewhere (shooting yesterday in Boxhead land for instance)? Money, safe houses, supply weapons? XLW (Corbyn and Co) have always supported the Shiners.
There’s the problem as always of getting the stuff over the wet bit. Permanent VCP on Boris’s bridge. The main worry would be the amount of cheap weaponry still running around the Balkans.

Edit. That stuffs probably being bought up by MI6

And the minor problem of the local sea of support for the loyalist terrorists to swim in. It’s not a very big place and the safe areas would be somewhat limited. Geographically and socially.
 

DaManBugs

LE
Book Reviewer
Ok, these are fascinating stories and illustrate a depth of knowledge and understanding of the complexity of the problem. Bearing that in mind, do you think that the British Army of today (in particular) has the corporate memory and knowledge to be effective on the streets of Northern Ireland, if there is widespread unrest and the PSNI call for support? Recall that GFA was signed 23 years ago, so there won't be too many NCOs around with live experience (except as LEs); Other officers will now be quite senior and unlikely to be in regimental billets.
I'm not sure that lack of experience would be that much of a problem. Don't forget that the NCOs (and squaddies) originally sent to the Six Counties also had practically no relevant experience.

What has improved across the board is a much deeper basic understanding and awareness of the geopolitical situation. I joined up over three years before things even kicked off in the Six Counties. Of course, everyone was immediately interested in the subject and I (along with other Micks in the unit) was hard put to explain things to our comrades. First off, that the RoI was NOT a part of the UK and that a small section in the north-east was actually partitioned off. That the Six Counties were NOT a part of the RoI and as such the Irish Defence Force couldn't intervene there. There was a dire lack of information from the official side and a lot of ignorance (as in not knowing) on the part of the comrades.

On the other hand, I found out that the 800-year history between the UK and Ireland was hardly touched upon in history classes in the UK. Hopefully, that's changed a bit in the meantime.

MsG
 
I don't know about India, but early COIN doctrine in NI had been developed for Malaya (1950s) and Kenya (1960s).
Absolutely, but in the early days the problem was understood to be a peacekeeping job rather than an insurgency. I think the good Bishop was thinking more in geo-cultural terms.

Frank Kitson is often cited as the architect of NI COIN doctrine, but there was nothing new about his thesis. David Galula was one of the first coin-centric advocates when he wrote 'Pacicification in Algeria' based on his practical experience. It was published by Rand in 1963. Interestingly, Frank Kitson probably met him at a Rand COIN conference held in 1962 in the USA at which both Kitson and Galula presented papers. Galula had much previous military service and had witnessed the Phillipimes COIN campaign from 1952-58 without actually participating. He ended up as a lecturer at Harvard.

Kitson on the other hand may have benefited fron the work of Robert Thompson which was, as you point out, a central element of the Malayan emergency. Covert elements of COIN were pioneered earlier by Orde Wingate in pre-war Palestine and in the post-war mandate period. Cyprus added more to Kitsons experience, but it was Kenya that he quoted mostly about his COIN methods - though as I said, these were neither as new or as unique as was often assumed.

Probably the most influential however, at least in terms of longevity of reference, is the work of Maj Gen Charles Gwynn whose 'Imperial Policing' 1936, I am reliably informed, remains on a recommended reading list at Sandhurst. The first actual Doctrine written specifically for NI did not materialise until Lt General Alistair Irwin asked for it when he assummed command of HQNI in 2000......he was flabergasted to be told there wasn't one. So he set about producing it.......probably gathering dust on some shelf marked 'closed for 100 years'.
 
Absolutely, but in the early days the problem was understood to be a peacekeeping job rather than an insurgency. I think the good Bishop was thinking more in geo-cultural terms.

Frank Kitson is often cited as the architect of NI COIN doctrine, but there was nothing new about his thesis. David Galula was one of the first coin-centric advocates when he wrote 'Pacicification in Algeria' based on his practical experience. It was published by Rand in 1963. Interestingly, Frank Kitson probably met him at a Rand COIN conference held in 1962 in the USA at which both Kitson and Galula presented papers. Galula had much previous military service and had witnessed the Phillipimes COIN campaign from 1952-58 without actually participating. He ended up as a lecturer at Harvard.

Kitson on the other hand may have benefited fron the work of Robert Thompson which was, as you point out, a central element of the Malayan emergency. Covert elements of COIN were pioneered earlier by Orde Wingate in pre-war Palestine and in the post-war mandate period. Cyprus added more to Kitsons experience, but it was Kenya that he quoted mostly about his COIN methods - though as I said, these were neither as new or as unique as was often assumed.

Probably the most influential however, at least in terms of longevity of reference, is the work of Maj Gen Charles Gwynn whose 'Imperial Policing' 1936, I am reliably informed, remains on a recommended reading list at Sandhurst. The first actual Doctrine written specifically for NI did not materialise until Lt General Alistair Irwin asked for it when he assummed command of HQNI in 2000......he was flabergasted to be told there wasn't one. So he set about producing it.......probably gathering dust on some shelf marked 'closed for 100 years'.
Has an Official History of Banner been published? I did see a draft copy about 14 years ago in Bogota, Colombia, of all places.
 
Would Loyalist (or what ever you wish to call them)terrorists, get considerable support from the XRW now established in Europe, N America and elsewhere (shooting yesterday in Boxhead land for instance)? Money, safe houses, supply weapons? XLW (Corbyn and Co) have always supported the Shiners.
In 1970 I drove field Marshall sir Gerald Templer from aldergrove to Hqni and on the way drove into a dip at speed and he hit his head on the side window...I think I shit myself. But he was ok about it and just told me to slow down a bit.
The point to that ramble is just that I think he was big in malaya so maybe his coin knowledge was being put to use over here in the early days?
 
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Has an Official History of Banner been published? I did see a draft copy about 14 years ago in Bogota, Colombia, of all places.
Yes I have it somewhere. I believe it was more of a 'report' produced on behalf of the MOD by a group of selected officers. I haven't looked at it for a long time mainly bcause I dont think it fit's the bill as 'history', though it does provide a bare bones framework to start from.

The number of books written about the troubles is truely astronomical - with many never reaching UK bookshelves. One major problem is the age old philosphical issue of 'what you see from my side of the road is very different than the view from the other side'. And that is so very true.

I honestly think that until we address the issues of contention we will never get the opportunity to write about the extraordinery effort of the mass of those who served in NI. It isn't just a matter of taking a look from the other side nor even u derstanding the perceptions thus obtained, it will need some understanding of the impact these had on individuals and communities. Maybe then those communities and individuals will reciprocate to try to understand the impact that taking a Brigade and a half of casualties had on us and our families and communities.

All history is revisionist....can't be any other way. Op Banner history? My view is that it remains to be written.
 
In 1970 I drove field Marshall sir Gerald Templar from alder grove to Hqni and on the way drove into a dip at speed and he hit his head on the side window...I think I shit myself. But he was ok about it and just told me to slow down a bit.
The point to that ramble is just that I think he was big in malaya so maybe his coin knowledge was being put to use over here in the early days?
Templer was appointed by Churchill on the advice of DSACEUR - Montgomery, and had the unusual role in Malaya as jointly High Commissioner and Director of Operations (to which he self-appointed, much to the anguish of the Colonial Office), and was the driving force of implementing the General Harold Briggs Plan, bringing civil, police and military activities under one roof. He went on to be CIGS (=CDS). His predecessor, Sir Henry Gurney, was assassinated in his official car by Communist 'bandits'. He was travelling with his wife and an escort of two armoured cars and on a bend in the road the CTs attacked, riddling his car with bullets. To save his wife, he calmly got out of the car and drew fire away from his wife (and ADC - who died very recently) and walked to his death. Gurney's predecessor, Sir Edward Gent DSO MC, also died in office, in a plane crash at Northolt in 1948. He had been recalled to London to face questioning about his handling of the civil unrest in Malaya, as well as an investigation into his alleged communist leanings (Special Branch were investigating him). Templer was very much an 'Action This Day' sort of chap and the IRA injured him when they bombed the (old) In and Out Club on 11 October 1974. They also attacked the Victory Services Club the same day. He was quite shaken by this, and after this hardly stepped out of his home and sat with a revolver in his lap for months afterwards, apparently.
 
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In 1970 I drove field Marshall sir Gerald Templar from alder grove to Hqni and on the way drove into a dip at speed and he hit his head on the side window...I think I shit myself. But he was ok about it and just told me to slow down a bit.
The point to that ramble is just that I think he was big in malaya so maybe his coin knowledge was being put to use over here in the early days?
That is astonishing. Never heard anything about that. But you also,have the basis for a monograph 'The day I dunted Templars Heed'
 

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