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And that's apparently 'going rogue'?
As introduced.
Both sensationalist and alarmist ...
And that's apparently 'going rogue'?
Both sensationalist and alarmist ...
I don't know the Australian press that well, but I was under the impression that news.com.au was a tabloid of the most melodramatic sort.According to Mr Seidel, the facts are:
He seems to be asserting that their development of weapons to rival their potential opponents' is a bet-hedging in the event their main strategy of developing neighbouring nations' infrastructure fails. The reason he ascribes for them doing this is to prevent their opponents choking their resource supplies off should things go pear-shaped.
And that's apparently 'going rogue'?
I don't know the Australian press that well, but I was under the impression that news.com.au was a tabloid of the most melodramatic sort.
I don't know the Australian press that well, but I was under the impression that news.com.au was a tabloid of the most melodramatic sort.
Fairfax own the SMH.tldr; the largest circulated papers in OZ press are owned by Murdoch/ News corp., with a few indies here and there.
And the current gov't seems to be hell bent on cutting funding for the ABC News....just like the BBC news in the UK.
The American discussion of how COVID-19 fits into their foreign policy is just a continuation of their existing struggle for global power. As the bit that I've quoted above states, the US has to either try to somehow maintain dominance, or else resign themselves to managing their decline.(...) 'TH: Looking to the long term, you are skeptical that the U.S. can maintain its “hard power” edge globally against China and Russia. If so, what is the best approach for Washington and its allies to push for their interests and values globally?
'DK: I sketch three options in the book. One is “doubling down,” which as you note I don’t think will work. If our adversaries have already evolved to invalidate our current approach, doing the same thing harder won’t help. The second option, to use military slang, is “embracing the suck” — accepting our inevitable decline and shooting for a soft landing by transitioning away from the current U.S.-led world order to something more sustainable and affordable for us. I suggest (and I’m sure both presidents would hate me saying this) that Barack Obama and Donald Trump pursued a version of this strategy, albeit with extremely different rhetoric! I suggest this isn’t going to work either: China is not interested in assuming our global burden, Russia isn’t capable of doing so, and neither is friendly enough that we would find them acceptable.
'In the end I go with a third way — what I call the “Byzantine approach” in reference to Byzantium, which survived more than a millennium after the fall of Rome by selectively copying adversaries, getting out of the business of occupying and trying to govern whole provinces as the Romans had done, mastering certain niche technologies, and (most importantly) focusing on resilience and sustainability at home. To be clear, I say that this too might not work, but I suggest it’s the best bet to buy time.'
Coronavirus Response Is a Weapon in China’s Brand of War
A Q&A with David Kilcullen on how the U.S. should manage its diminishing clout in the global great-power rivalry.www.bloomberg.com
@terminal
"The danger for Europe, Britain, and other parts of the world which exist outside of this trio is getting drawn into a war in which they have no interest, or indeed is contrary to their interests. The Americans would likely see any reluctance on the part of others as a "betrayal", and react in ways which further isolated themselves."
Is how I see it. It will even extend to what we buy.
The American discussion of how COVID-19 fits into their foreign policy is just a continuation of their existing struggle for global power. As the bit that I've quoted above states, the US has to either try to somehow maintain dominance, or else resign themselves to managing their decline.
The brief period of time, a few decades, in which the US held unchallenged global dominance was based on transitory historical events and trends. They now face the same future that Britain and France did during the 20th century, which is decline from being a global power to being just another power.
I have have to disagree with several of his points though. One is that I don't see Russia as a rising power. They recovered somewhat from total collapse in the 1990s, but in their present form they will not become a first rank power again in the foreseeable future. They will be an important power, but mainly in their immediate neighbourhood and their influence further afield will be mainly among countries who are diplomatically isolated from the world system in general. Or to put the latter another way, they'll be friends to countries who don't have any other friends.
Another is his characterisation of Obama as accepting US decline. Obama's original strategy was to try to pull much of their available resources out of Europe and the Middle East and focus on confronting China. That he failed to put his plans into practice due to the inherent difficulty combined with events going against him doesn't detract from what he wanted to do - his "pivot to Asia".
Trump on the other hand has no real long term strategy and vacillates between isolationism and confronting China. He's fundamentally an opportunist. His attempts to buy Greenland from Denmark are a classic example of this, and make Chinese property investments abroad look like small change in comparison. On the other hand his "America first" line plays to an isolationist and mercantilist attitude which isn't compatible with maintaining the global network of alliances required for the US to maintain global dominance.
Yet another important point that the author misses is India's rise in the world. Most long term economic projections see India surpassing the US late in this century, where upon the US will find themselves in third place. Given India's attitudes and self image, I don't see India as being willing to accept playing second fiddle to the US any longer than necessary (or more likely, not even that long). India will celebrate their surpassing of the US and seek to rub everyone's nose in it as they see it as the final shedding of the past and their resumption (as they see it) of their rightful place in the world.
The US falling to third place in the world will probably be a bigger blow to their self image than falling behind China, as it would take away any hope of somehow achieving the lead again.
Britain adjusted well to the loss of empire and fall in world power, but the self-image that most British had of themselves extended well beyond that of empire and world power. Britain also had a long history of being just another world power among many in a multi-polar world, and the post-WWII fall in power was in many ways a resumption of a previous pattern which many people were comfortable with.
The US have a foundational ideology and mythology which are still driving forces in their politics today, although usually operating at the subconscious level. This is their ideology of "Manifest Destiny", in which the US are destined, some would say ordained by God, to be world leaders. In the early days of their post independence history this led them to conflict with Britain. Today it leads them to see any potential rival in any sphere of endeavour as something which challenges their self image.
The author's “Byzantine approach” is not something that will likely meet with much acceptance in the US, at least in the near term, as it implies jettisoning the ideology of Manifest Destiny. That will be too much of a conceptual change for most Americans to accept. Many will find it easier to accept a drift to war with either China or India (or both) than to change their world view and self image.
The danger for Europe, Britain, and other parts of the world which exist outside of this trio is getting drawn into a war in which they have no interest, or indeed is contrary to their interests. The Americans would likely see any reluctance on the part of others as a "betrayal", and react in ways which further isolated themselves.
The above dystopian sequence isn't inevitable. It is possible that the US may gain a far-seeing political leadership who can persuade their public to accept America's place in a multi-polar world and avoid wasting resources on futile efforts to prevent the inevitable. Far-seeing political leadership however is not something the US seems particularly endowed with at this time, so I am not optimistic about their future.
The proportion of trade which Canada conducted with the US peaked around the year 2000 and has declined significantly since. Policy for all major parties is to place a high priority on diversifying trade further to high growth areas such as China, southeast Asia, and India. The way to faster economic growth at home is to trade more with regions which are currently growing faster.But your future is also linked with ours. Canada is attached to our hip so to say. I do see the decoupling with China leading to the building up of North America to be a more self sufficient entity.
The proportion of trade which Canada conducted with the US peaked around the year 2000 and has declined significantly since. Policy for all major parties is to place a high priority on diversifying trade further to high growth areas such as China, southeast Asia, and India. The way to faster economic growth at home is to trade more with regions which are currently growing faster.
Relations between Canada and the US overall have been deteriorating over the past couple of decades. They're not bad in absolute terms, but governments of all stripes in Canada want to diversify relations more in response to a long series of problems with the US, ranging from softwood lumber, to pipelines, to the more decent US action declaring major Canadian companies to be "threats to national security". It's not just Trump either, although he's ramped things up a few notches. The problems are with governments under all US parties over a span of decades.
That doesn't mean becoming dependent on trade with another single country either though. It means becoming less dependent on any one single country or market. For example Canada is the only G7 country to have free trade deals with every other G7 country, and that trend will continue. The more that the US tries to pull up the drawbridge in a sort of "Fortress America", the more determined that Canada will be to be on the outside of the moat.
Actually, you mean the CUSMA Treaty, as it is known in Canada.The USMCA is also a guideline for future relations,
On November 30, 2018, Canada, the United States and Mexico signed the new Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), on the margins of the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Buenos Aires.
Yes, the US can now pull out of the CUSMA treaty on six months notice for any reason or no reason if they don't like it. Just like they could with NAFTA right from the start. And Canada can do the same. There's nothing new in that regards. Trump wanted a symbolic "victory" after making so much noise about renegotiating so he rephrased that clause, but it's effectively the same as it has been for decades. He can have his symbolic victory, because it means nothing in real terms.and the United States has managed to bind your hands with China so to speak.
And 2 decades ago that 75 percent of trade with the US was 90 percent, and that trend will continue.The US is your countries largest trading partner by far, and 75 percent of your exports go to the United States.
You may have heard of this thing called globalisation. The US may be saying "stop the world I want to get off", but Canada isn't.Who else post COVID-19 is going to be able to fill that market share?
I am afraid you are stuck with us Terminal.