China - and the dangerous drift to war in Asia

While I no longer follow the intelligent orange root vegetable’s posts as his slavish protection for the actions of the CCP got a bit too much, you seem to be another, if not apologist, for the behaviour of the CCP, at least seem to attempt to make out what they do seem acceptable reactions.

The CCP regime are ruthless, amoral by what are generally seen as norms in most societies around the world, and seem to presently be uniting many countries who are now taking a closer stock of exactly what the CCP has been quietly doing in their back yard. A belated realising of how subversive and dangerous their activities have been to their societies and way of life...which in nearly all cases is freer and more mindful of what have been generally considered basic human rights, than what the CCP believes in.

The CCP is not averse to lies, threats, ruthless brutality, and cyber theft of intellectual property on a global scale. They have catapulted themselves forward economically and militarily by means that are generally considered illegal, unacceptable and contrary to generally accepted norms that are followed by all but a few notable countries.

China is a world power. God help us all if it becomes the world’s most dominant superpower.
 
While I no longer follow the intelligent orange root vegetable’s posts as his slavish protection for the actions of the CCP got a bit too much, you seem to be another, if not apologist, for the behaviour of the CCP, at least seem to attempt to make out what they do seem acceptable reactions.

The CCP regime are ruthless, amoral by what are generally seen as norms in most societies around the world, and seem to presently be uniting many countries who are now taking a closer stock of exactly what the CCP has been quietly doing in their back yard. A belated realising of how subversive and dangerous their activities have been to their societies and way of life...which in nearly all cases is freer and more mindful of what have been generally considered basic human rights, than what the CCP believes in.

The CCP is not averse to lies, threats, ruthless brutality, and cyber theft of intellectual property on a global scale. They have catapulted themselves forward economically and militarily by means that are generally considered illegal, unacceptable and contrary to generally accepted norms that are followed by all but a few notable countries.

China is a world power. God help us all if it becomes the world’s most dominant superpower.
If anyone's looking for a book on this subject, try this:

silent-invasion-3.jpg


I may have recommended it before.
 
While I no longer follow the intelligent orange root vegetable’s posts
I can see why facts would be threatening to you. Far better to rely on 'The Truth Of The Heart' than stubborn reality, eh?
 
... choosing to cast Taiwan as a breakaway province rather than recognise and treat it as an independent country.
It is, though. Taiwan's own constitution recognises it as part of 'China'.

Anyway, since only a tiny number of countries recognise and treat Taiwan as an independent country, it's asking a bit much of the PRC. Does your own country have a "Republic of China embassy" or a "Taiwan Trade Representative Office"?
 
(...) The fundamental principles of Sun Yat-Sen's 'Three Principles of the People' are pretty darned social-democratic if not outright socialist; Civic Nationalism; powers of governance; and the rights to a livelihood. Both sides adopted these as canon for their national policies, as did the short-lived collaborationist government of Wang Jingwei.

The CCP follows pretty closely to Sun Yat-Sen's original conception of the national economy as being a market under the direction of the state, exploited and arranged for the benefit of 'the people' (as opposed to individuals). You're bang on about the political and diplomatic positions not differing much. These are driven by the needs of governing China, not from ideological positions, and wouldn't be significantly different if someone else was in charge unless they were prepared to subordinate those needs to likes and dislikes of foreigners.
Given the importance that the KMT placed on "land reform" of one form or another, if they had eventually gained a firm enough grip on the country (i.e. assuming the Japanese hadn't poked their noses in and the other colonial powers were limited to their port colonies) to force it through, do you think that would that have been enough to secure the support of the rural masses and so head off the Communists, or were there too many other issues which would have doomed the KMT?

There's a lot of "what ifs" that could have descended from that development. I suspect though that they wouldn't have leaped over the economic dead end that the Mao era represented, but rather would have followed a similar line of unsuccessful economic development as India, and only abandoning it when it was discredited enough, as India are doing. The intellectual climate of the era simply didn't favour all out capitalism.

Given that, and assuming the KMT kept a grip on power, the ultimate time line of economic development, and the political and diplomatic independence from the West all stay pretty much the same, with just the names of the leaders and the colour of the flag being different.
 
Given the importance that the KMT placed on "land reform" of one form or another, if they had eventually gained a firm enough grip on the country (i.e. assuming the Japanese hadn't poked their noses in and the other colonial powers were limited to their port colonies) to force it through, do you think that would that have been enough to secure the support of the rural masses and so head off the Communists, or were there too many other issues which would have doomed the KMT?
That's a wonderful alternate-history question. For my money, I think it would have taken far longer than they had, even in the absence of an aggressive Japan. The KMT were fundamentally a party of intellectuals, and drew a great deal of their support from the landed gentry - precisely the sort of people who supported rejuvenating the nation and provided the educated officialdom essential to governance but who steadfastly opposed land reform.

From the latter 19th century, a lot of these families had been absentee landlords as they moved to the great centres of commerce and as was common with the breakdown of many feudal systems the counterbalancing noblesse oblige went out the window in favour of extracting maximum revenue from land and tenants. That's how the KMT came to be tarred by the peasantry with the same brush as the worst parasites amongst landowners.

An interesting exception was in Guangxi and Guangdong Province. The mid-19th century Taiping Rebellion had devastated these areas and landlords had to offer exceptionally generous terms to attract tenants at all. As a result, there wasn't the same antipathy between the classes and the Communists found it hard to gain traction there since the farmers were generally quite satisfied with things as they were.

This was in stark contrast to the difficulties they faced elsewhere, which were in keeping up with the speed and violence of peasant revolutions - this was where Mao's comment on revolution not being a dinner party came from, an admonition that the peasants were overthrowing and exterminating their exploiters and the CCP needed to be seen to be on their side if it were to retain any relevance.

If the KMT had been able to throw national resources and political capital into lightening the load in the countryside, there's a chance they could have pulled it off. They certainly had a sound plan and the talent to implement it at their disposal, but they faced an uphill struggle in balancing the competing interests of their own members/supporters and the general population.
 
That's a wonderful alternate-history question. For my money, I think it would have taken far longer than they had, even in the absence of an aggressive Japan. The KMT were fundamentally a party of intellectuals, and drew a great deal of their support from the landed gentry - precisely the sort of people who supported rejuvenating the nation and provided the educated officialdom essential to governance but who steadfastly opposed land reform.

From the latter 19th century, a lot of these families had been absentee landlords as they moved to the great centres of commerce and as was common with the breakdown of many feudal systems the counterbalancing noblesse oblige went out the window in favour of extracting maximum revenue from land and tenants. That's how the KMT came to be tarred by the peasantry with the same brush as the worst parasites amongst landowners.

An interesting exception was in Guangxi and Guangdong Province. The mid-19th century Taiping Rebellion had devastated these areas and landlords had to offer exceptionally generous terms to attract tenants at all. As a result, there wasn't the same antipathy between the classes and the Communists found it hard to gain traction there since the farmers were generally quite satisfied with things as they were.

This was in stark contrast to the difficulties they faced elsewhere, which were in keeping up with the speed and violence of peasant revolutions - this was where Mao's comment on revolution not being a dinner party came from, an admonition that the peasants were overthrowing and exterminating their exploiters and the CCP needed to be seen to be on their side if it were to retain any relevance.

If the KMT had been able to throw national resources and political capital into lightening the load in the countryside, there's a chance they could have pulled it off. They certainly had a sound plan and the talent to implement it at their disposal, but they faced an uphill struggle in balancing the competing interests of their own members/supporters and the general population.
I don't know if your area of study extends to this, but what do you see as being the reason the Japanese were able to pull off the Meiji Restoration which ended the power of the landholding classes including the downfall of the samurai, while the Chinese were not able to pull off a similar transformation. This is a bit earlier than the period we have been talking about so far.

A lot has been mentioned in various histories about how the paths of China and Japan diverged from similar starting points and how the Japanese were then able to take advantage of their temporary regional ascendency to conquer Korea and then parts of China, but I've never seen a good explanation of why Japan were able to succeed where China failed.

The one explanation that I've seen that sounds remotely convincing was that Japan was small enough that a few determined individuals could take control of the country and change its direction, while China was simply too big, both in size and population, for the same to happen there, so the country as a whole was more prone to political inertia. I don't know if that is a satisfactory explanation however.
 
Interesting tactic by both above posters smart carrot and Terminal. Don’t respond to the subject on the thread, start an esoteric and completely different subject both can pontificate about while ignoring the subject in hand.

Good one guys, and just how does the drift to the land in Japan in the Meiji Restorationneffect the wholesale cyber robbery by China of intellectual property around the world, and the possible drift to war in Asia??

Or does it help sooth your embarrassment at the behaviour of the CCP in China at the present time? A party you both seem duty bound to make excuses for, and which at the present time is certainly exhibiting a behaviour, attitude and comments that indicate that they are prepared to go to war, if pushed by inconvenient enquiries about their questionable behaviour in this global pandemic!
 
I thought you had me on ignore, knobcheese?
 
The 'Taiwan' constitution is still that of the Republic of China, adapted slightly for the practicalities of governing the 'Free Area'. It still provides for the representatives of Tibet and Mongolia to take up their quota seats, should they ever manage to be elected in line with the constitutional provisions.



It's more the case that the senior members of Taiwanese society at Retrocession were heavily Japan-oriented, often didn't speak Mandarin and were of the traditional land-holding classes that had undermined the KMT cause on the Mainland by retaining what was essentially feudal control of their tenants. Their professional expertise was also heavily restricted by the Japanese colonial government to teaching and medicine, so they were ill-equipped to run a modern economy and couldn't compete with the highly-educated and experienced ranks that eventually landed on Taiwan following the KMT defeat.



The initial welcome was positive and many Taiwanese felt a sense of pride at being reunited with a strong and victorious motherland but that quickly changed when the quality of KMT cadre became apparent. Taiwan was still a backwater and the best talent the KMT had was being bent to recovery on the mainland, particularly the areas recently devastated by Japanese offensives in the later years ot the war. Nanjing basically scraped the barrel, wiped up what was left under the scrapings and sent that to Taiwan. Not an impressive bunch in general.

A combination of resentments - being excluded from government, losing power over Taiwanese society, shoddy treatment by Mainlanders and the milking of Taiwan's relative wealth to feed national recovery - boiled over and led to a combination of social protests and outright rebellion, which Nanjing quickly moved to crush.

It was interesting to see the responses of the unemployed former soldiers on Taiwan: being former IJA, they might be expected to be as heavily-Japanese oriented as the upper reaches of Taiwanese society but they seemed to hold them in utter contempt instead. Many of them even acknowledged that the KMT might offer the likes of them a better chance in life, but still rallied to the cause because... well, because they were soldiers and what else do soldiers do when the bugles blow?

One of the big ironies of the 228 Movement was that it focussed Nanjing's mind on social reform in Taiwan - not only were the Japanese-facing elites marginalised, but it gave the government a wonderful excuse to conduct the kind of land reform they'd been keen to see on the Mainland but lacked the political capital to achieve. As a result, the livelihoods of ordinary Taiwanese farmers rocketed overnight while the party and government organisations were able to penetrate the lowest levels of society in a way they hadn't while being moderated by the elites.



The fundamental principles of Sun Yat-Sen's 'Three Principles of the People' are pretty darned social-democratic if not outright socialist; Civic Nationalism; powers of governance; and the rights to a livelihood. Both sides adopted these as canon for their national policies, as did the short-lived collaborationist government of Wang Jingwei.

The CCP follows pretty closely to Sun Yat-Sen's original conception of the national economy as being a market under the direction of the state, exploited and arranged for the benefit of 'the people' (as opposed to individuals). You're bang on about the political and diplomatic positions not differing much. These are driven by the needs of governing China, not from ideological positions, and wouldn't be significantly different if someone else was in charge unless they were prepared to subordinate those needs to likes and dislikes of foreigners.
How do the Taiwanese look back on the Japanese occupation from 1895-1945? I have heard that they were more positive about it than some countries. The Koreans still look back with intense anger at the 35 year Japanese occupation especially with the comfort women. The Japanese stripped Korea of anything they could. Its the only thing that unit's the two Koreas. I still daren't say anything positive about Japan without inviting the wrath of Mrs Par Avion.
 
I don't know if your area of study extends to this, but what do you see as being the reason the Japanese were able to pull off the Meiji Restoration which ended the power of the landholding classes including the downfall of the samurai, while the Chinese were not able to pull off a similar transformation. This is a bit earlier than the period we have been talking about so far.
It's not really my area but quite a few scholars have tried to address this question. The consensus seems to be that the Japanese elites were relatively unified and met the challenge of modernisation with a fairly intact country.

In contrast, China had been tearing itself apart since the early 19th century and had become increasingly decentralised, with a corresponding impact on state finances, state capability and the coordination of effort. Add in the repeated muggings of the imperial Treasury by foreign invaders and there wasn't a great deal of cash to go round. Trying to put Humpty Dumpty together again was a big enough task, let alone trying to upgrade him, and one which beat the early Republic governments too.
 
It is, though. Taiwan's own constitution recognises it as part of 'China'.

Anyway, since only a tiny number of countries recognise and treat Taiwan as an independent country, it's asking a bit much of the PRC. Does your own country have a "Republic of China embassy" or a "Taiwan Trade Representative Office"?
More tensions around 'the island' while most are pre-occupied with the squirrels of COVID, Ladakh and unrest in the USA. The headline is a great bit of misinformation if you read no further.

'Taiwanese fighter jets reportedly "drove off" Chinese Su-30 Flankers after the latter briefly entered the island's air defense identification zone earlier today. That incident came after a U.S. Navy C-40A Clipper passenger transport aircraft flew an extremely unusual route over Taiwan's western coast, a flight that was almost sure to draw some form of rebuke from authorities in Beijing, who consider the island part the country's sovereign territory.

'Taiwan's Ministry of Defense announced that the aerial altercation had occurred to the southwest of the island on June 9, 2020. The Ministry's statement said that unspecified Taiwanese Air Force fighter jets had intercepted the Chinese Flankers and issued verbal warnings for them to leave the area before more forcefully driving them out of the area.

'Following an increase in Chinese military flights around the island in recent years, Taiwan's President Tsai Ing Wen, who won a second term in a landslide in January, has previously said that Taiwanese jets would conduct a "forceful expulsion" of any Chinese combat aircraft that crossed the so-called "Median Line" in the Taiwan Strait. The Median Line is the de facto boundary between the island and the People’s Republic of China on the mainland, the latter of which sees Taiwan as an integral part of its national territory.'


 
It does raise an interesting point about ADIZs: are they now considered de facto parts of a country's airspace, granting that country the right to expel aircraft at will?

That would be a horrible, horrible precedent given a) that ADIZs are established at the discretion of individual governments according to their perception of need and b) every ADIZ in East Asia overlaps at least one other ADIZ and often another country's sovereign airspace.

Of course, since nobody who matters recognises Taipei as a sovereign government, the issue can be ignored until it becomes a handy club for someone or other to wield and then abandon.
 
It does raise an interesting point about ADIZs: are they now considered de facto parts of a country's airspace, granting that country the right to expel aircraft at will?

That would be a horrible, horrible precedent given a) that ADIZs are established at the discretion of individual governments according to their perception of need and b) every ADIZ in East Asia overlaps at least one other ADIZ and often another country's sovereign airspace.

Of course, since nobody who matters recognises Taipei as a sovereign government, the issue can be ignored until it becomes a handy club for someone or other to wield and then abandon.
No, in international law an ADIZ is just that, for Identification. China's attempts in recent years to enforce a more robust ADIZ in the SCS has been a failure; good news, as you've identified, it would set a horrible precedent.
 
No, in international law an ADIZ is just that, for Identification.
Indeed, yet according to the article, "Taiwanese fighter jets reportedly "drove off" Chinese Su-30 Flankers after the latter briefly entered the island's air defense identification zone earlier today.

Getting to decide who can fly where is the sort of action that's usually reserved for sovereign airspace, yet this isn't being protested by the usual suspects. I wonder why?

China's attempts in recent years to enforce a more robust ADIZ in the SCS has been a failure; good news, as you've identified, it would set a horrible precedent.
The PRC hasn't enforced anything other than identification from aircraft on courses towards PRC airspace transiting its ADIZ. In fact, it asks for considerably less than the US asks for in its southern ADIZ - which extends over sovereign Mexican territory.
 
The PRC hasn't enforced anything other than identification from aircraft on courses towards PRC airspace transiting its ADIZ.
Only if you accept PRC's sovereignty over the disputed island chains in the SCS, which the PRC has effectively seized by a coup de main by placing military facilities on them.

E2A; senior moment; amended.
 
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Only if you accept PRC's sovereignty over the disputed island chains in the SCS, which the PRC has effectively seized by force majeure by placing military facilities on them.
Don't you mean 'annexation' or 'colonisation'. I though 'force majeure' meant something lie 'Act of God' - unless Xi Jingping now considers himself to be a sky pixie .
 
Only if you accept PRC's sovereignty over the disputed island chains in the SCS, which the PRC has effectively seized by force majeure by placing military facilities on them.
Part of the problem is that they were late to the party in doing so, with Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines (possibly others) insisting on maritime rights from their own definitions of territory - and, indeed, habitability.

What's made the PRCs recent attempts so hard to grapple with is that they've taken from existing precedent and done the same on a larger scale, making life difficult for others who've set the precedent or who want to establish a consensus against the precedent.

Even the Philippines have scrupulously ignored the UNCLOS tribunal ruling when it suited them, since a strict application would invalidate some of their own claims. It's a right bugger's muddle and no mistake.
 
Don't you mean 'annexation' or 'colonisation'. I though 'force majeure' meant something lie 'Act of God' - unless Xi Jingping now considers himself to be a sky pixie .
He is the new emperor of the Celestial Kingdom, but you are quite right and I was mixing my French expressions.
 

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