Changing the army - how?

QRK2

LE
If you're referring to the Lt Cav, they are not serving.

Neither is a 'Gunner, Ceremonial' in the sense of having an operational role, but both ponce around In uniform on horses for their own and selected members of the public's amusement.

ETA

However you've more chance of seeing a 'campaign' medal on a member of the Lt Cav than KTRHA.
 
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Wee Hawken

War Hero
Neither is a 'Gunner, Ceremonial' in the sense of having an operational role, but both ponce around In uniform on horses for their own and selected members of the public's amusement.

ETA

However you've more chance of seeing a 'campaign' medal on a member of the Lt Cav than KTRHA.
They are pretty different. KT are serving soldiers (regardless of opinions on their role). Lt Cav are civilians.
 
Both. My point is simply that it's not only VSOs who're to blame.

We also need to remember that the RN and RAF positions have significant flaws, we're just less familiar with them on ARRSE so we tend to focus on the nice shiny bits ('we have F35 and two carriers') rather than the less fun details ('the loss of C130 is a huge problem and CSG has significant capability gaps, with no real plan to solve either of these')
It’s also worth acknowledging that the Army’s current state cannot be laid at the door of the current VVSOs. The nature of strategic planning is that it is long term and, in defence terms, that’s often 20-50 years.

@alfred_the_great’s point about the Navy only appointing carrier strike acolytes to Flag rank is spot on; the RAF has done similar. In reality, what the two blue services have done is implement SDR 1998 more or less in its envisaged tone frame. This connects with my point about seizing opportunity; SDR 1998 was a once in a generation opportunity. For a multitude of reasons, some justifiable, some understandable and quite the opposite, the Army singularly failed to do so.

However, I don’t think you can shy away from the fact that much of this is about poor governance. Sure, CGS has to herd cats, but, without strong strategic leadership, this isn’t going to change.

How to change the Army? Sort out the governance.
 
However you've more chance of seeing a 'campaign' medal on a member of the Lt Cav than KTRHA.
Wayyy back when, we got a PSI from King's Troop. He'd done all of his career courses, and had even been packed off to 3RHA as a BSM. IIRC had a campaign medal. Eventually went back to King's Troop as RSM, I think...
 

lextalionis

War Hero
Close, but no cigar...
It'd be interesting to pit some of the "regulars" against some of the private militias or state defence forces in the US.
 
Even when, in the late 1980s, ACSC pretended to be promoting understanding of The Operational Level Of War under arch-poseur Jeremy McKenzie, it was - in reality - merely drilling its students in Operational Staff Duties

Assessment for suitability for higher command?

FFS, that seemed to hinge on thinggs like "Played a key role staging the end-of-course Xmas Pantomime"

Which I never understood. To say that my co-students from other NATO nations were baffled, would be a comprehensive misunderstatement.
This

The Army pretends to professionally train people but in reality it's moved about 1 step forward from the cramming schools of pre WWI that force fed officers to pass a very simple but prolonged exam that tested their memory but not their capability.

The Army is and had always been fundamentally anti intellectual.
 

Cynical

LE
Book Reviewer
The Army is and had always been fundamentally anti intellectual.
Because for the most part, most of what it does (the essential up close and personal bit) is not intellectually challenging.

Arguably the whole tactical doctrine empire plus associated faffing demonstrates what happens if you try to be intellectual about the mechanics of combat.

And I don't regard it as a huge intellectual challenge to work out what orbat and equipment you need. The Army lacks clarity of vision because it lacks (and has lacked for some decades) VSO who are genuinely commanders and leaders.
 

bob231

War Hero
Because for the most part, most of what it does (the essential up close and personal bit) is not intellectually challenging.

Arguably the whole tactical doctrine empire plus associated faffing demonstrates what happens if you try to be intellectual about the mechanics of combat.

And I don't regard it as a huge intellectual challenge to work out what orbat and equipment you need. The Army lacks clarity of vision because it lacks (and has lacked for some decades) VSO who are genuinely commanders and leaders.
I echo and amplify this thought (and extend it beyond the up close and personal bit). War isn't typically a particularly intellectual problem: there is scope for genius in battlefield and strategic command, but a lot of it is doing often fairly routine things diligently and well. Too much intellectualism and overthinking the problem is likely to hinder you here.

From reading this thread, I wonder if the Army's problem is making an intellectual business out of what should be sensible, straightforward thought about processes?
 
I echo and amplify this thought (and extend it beyond the up close and personal bit). War isn't typically a particularly intellectual problem: there is scope for genius in battlefield and strategic command, but a lot of it is doing often fairly routine things diligently and well. Too much intellectualism and overthinking the problem is likely to hinder you here.

From reading this thread, I wonder if the Army's problem is making an intellectual business out of what should be sensible, straightforward thought about processes?
Like ordering and buying new tanks / recce veh/ IFV?
 

bob231

War Hero
Like ordering and buying new tanks / recce veh/ IFV?
It really should be a fairly straightforward process (note this does not imply simple). I suggest the problem is too much thinking around the requirement and a want of diligence in sticking to time and budget constraints, both of which should be defined early on (especially the time aspect).

Also, perhaps, confusion over whether the objective is to have the best possible example of whatever-it-was-you-wanted or a replacement that is somewhat better than what it replaces and on time.
 

QRK2

LE
Wayyy back when, we got a PSI from King's Troop. He'd done all of his career courses, and had even been packed off to 3RHA as a BSM. IIRC had a campaign medal. Eventually went back to King's Troop as RSM, I think...

That's the clue, it all changed around the turn of the millennium.
 

PhotEx

On ROPS
On ROPs
Because for the most part, most of what it does (the essential up close and personal bit) is not intellectually challenging.

Arguably the whole tactical doctrine empire plus associated faffing demonstrates what happens if you try to be intellectual about the mechanics of combat.

And I don't regard it as a huge intellectual challenge to work out what orbat and equipment you need. The Army lacks clarity of vision because it lacks (and has lacked for some decades) VSO who are genuinely commanders and leaders.

That’s because the Army fixates on wether a chap is ’good at sports’, not wether he’s good at coaching.
 

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