Changing the army - how?

jrwlynch

LE
Book Reviewer
No, which is why I referenced the need for armed forces.

Cyber can shut down your economy, it can make you power and fuel plants explode. It can make your armament depots make tiny, but critical changes to undermine your weapons or armour. It can make your C4 work for us and not you. You might win the battle, but we win the war.

Again, though... you may be turning out the lights and messing with supermarket distribution in the enemy's homeland, but if a thousand peasants with AKMs (bayonets fixed) with a week's worth of rice in their bergens, supported by obsolete T-55s and BM-21s and D-30s, just rousted you out of your HQ, you done lost the war, Jack; they'll win first and sort out the domestics later.

And, as someone involved on the periphery... cyber is not a "insert money, collect victory" option. One major problem is that when we say "okay, we can shut down Nastyland's power grid-" the immediate response is "but their children won't be able to do their homework! Think of the human rights!"

It's an addition we need to deal with and defend against, it's important, it's paying (part of) my salary - but while it's necessary, it's not sufficient.

The problem is that while we're at least making some efforts towards "cyber"... we've let many of the actual warfighting capabilities slip from our grasp in the Land domain. Cyber doesn't help when your adversary outguns and outnumbers you, and is falling back to simple VHF voice radio when we mess with their more modern comms.
 
HERRICK and TELIC were strategic failures. I’m not sure any amount of turd polishing will change that, but it created a generation of the Army that had been hardened in a battle.
Err, no.

You are, with all due respect, contributing to a myth, akin to the myth that Op BANNER (and prior Ops) institutionalised in the Brit Army an unequalled level of competence in OOTW (or wotever label you prefer)

At any one time, a small proportion of the Army's total strength was deployed on HERRICK and/or TELIC

I'll wager - based on previous Ops in my soldiering lifetime - that the vast majority who took part in any Tour were civvies within a year or two, and that precious few (commissioned or OR) who took part in those tours, are still serving.

I'd go further: it seems unlikely (all things considered) that more than a small proportion of TELIC/HERRICK warriors had/have multiple tours under their belt.

My point is not to denigrate those who did the business during those tours, but simply to give the lie to the notion that their experience made any fundamental difference to the Army's collective, corporate understanding of conflict, and how to engage successfully in it, in the 21st Century,
 
Then we disagree from the get-go.

Not least because:



doesn't begin to resemble my understanding of the finer points of Deming's world-view..
Oh come on. Deming developed his ideas in the 40s and 50s. The world has moved on; the problems of quality control and wastage that Deming identified and focused on eliminating have long been eradicated in the modern industrial world. Those that didn’t or don’t embrace Total Quality Management have long gone bust or don’t last long. And that’s before we start to consider the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Deming’s last book was written just before his death in 1993, pre digitisation. The quality issues he documented simply don’t exist in modern manufacturing, not because businesses have implemented Deming but because technology has eradicated them. Deming simply wouldn’t recognise most modern industrial workplaces (notwithstanding General Dynamics!).

There are any number of more modern leadership and management studies and theories that are more relevant given that they account for the profound changes that have occurred since Deming died.

And there are historical alternatives to Deming; Cosby, Juran, Ishikawa, Taguchi, Herzberg and Miles to name but a few.
 
Er, no.

You are, with all due respect, contributing to a myth, akin to the myth that Op BANNER (and prior Ops) institutionalised in the Brit Army an unequalled level of competence in OOTW (or wotever label you prefer)

At any one time, a small proportion of the Army's total strength was deployed on HERRICK and/or TELIC

I'll wager - based on previous Ops in my soldiering lifetime - that the vast majority who took part in any Tour were civvies within a year or two, and that precious few (commissioned or OR) who took part in those tours, are still serving.

I'd go further: it seems unlikely (all things considered) that more than a small proportion of TELIC/HERRICK warriors had/have multiple tours under their belt.

My point is not to denigrate those who did the business during those tours, but simply to give the lie to the notion that their experience made any fundamental difference to the Army's collective, corporate understanding of conflict, and how to engage successfully in it, in the 21st Century,
I recommended this book earlier, and mentioned the culture section.
This page seems appropriate re the successes of the British Army
IMG_20211127_065949208.jpg
 

Cyberhacker

War Hero
Rory Stewart did a Ted Talk(?) with this in, quoted about 6 or 7 general "this is the decisive year, yada, yada"

E2a: this one I think?


Mind you, made his "madness to withdraw from AFG" chat in Aug/Sep a bit hypocritical
"It is extremely unlikely that the Taliban can come back... it is extremely unlikely they could take Kabul"

Ummm... that doesn't stand the test of time :(
 
Oh come on. Deming developed his ideas in the 40s and 50s.
And Clausewitz developed his in the 1800s.

Yet, while Charlie's advice on fortifications has dated badly, much (most?) of his thoughts on war are considered to have stood the test of time even now.

I'm no suggesting that every last morsel of Demiing's work is of eternal value, but rather that his observations on organisational culture, and channelling the talent of people in the workplace are as valid now as ever, and likely to remain so for a long while, irrespective of the fact that every year throws up another clutch of management theories, some of which become fads, and few of which are long-lived (has anybody in this century got excited about Business Process Re-Engineering, possibly the biggest fad of the 1990s?)
 
"It is extremely unlikely that the Taliban can come back... it is extremely unlikely they could take Kabul"

Ummm... that doesn't stand the test of time :(
There is a lot about "Woarwee" that is of a different time...
 
Carter in the Telegraph

These changes, moreover, have had to take into account the rapidly changing nature of modern warfare, where committed adversaries like Russia are more likely to resort to non-conventional means of attack, such as launching cyber attacks or creating a migrant crisis on Europe’s borders, as is currently happening in Poland.


I think the Russians currently massing on the Ukrainian border might just disagree you.
 
I was sent a link to this yesterday. I spent half an hour trying to read it last night.


thumbnail_Future_Soldier_guide.pdf.png

Future Solder Guide

While some of it is self explanatory, large portions of it seem (to my old and bold brain anyway) to have some vague resemblance to English but doesn't appear to mean anything in particular. It's like something produced by the managers of HR dept from the Dilbert cartoon strip...

The 77th Brigade – a combined Regular and Army Reserve unit – challenges the difficulties
of modern warfare using non-lethal engagement and legitimate non-military levers as a
means to adapt behaviours of the opposing forces and adversaries. Their outputs are a
fundamental part of the Army’s Integrated Action model.

The Army will increase its ability to deliver effect in the deep; physically and virtually.

11th Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). The new SFAB will be persistently
engaged across the globe. It will commission, design, deliver and assess security force
assistance activity to inform regional Defence strategies

The Defence Battlelab will be a physical and virtual network, providing space for
companies to rent desks, co-located with each other in a diverse environment, with
access to collaborative events focused on solving our soldier’s problem sets. This
diversity and collaboration will drive the innovation we need to transform.

The Digital Estate. The Army intends to deliver estate-wide internet access that will
accelerate modernisation, support UK prosperity, improve the lived experience for our
people (both for work and recreation)
 
I was sent a link to this yesterday. I spent half an hour trying to read it last night.


thumbnail_Future_Soldier_guide.pdf.png

Future Solder Guide

While some of it is self explanatory, large portions of it seem (to my old and bold brain anyway) to have some vague resemblance to English but doesn't appear to mean anything in particular. It's like something produced by the managers of HR dept from the Dilbert cartoon strip...

The 77th Brigade – a combined Regular and Army Reserve unit – challenges the difficulties
of modern warfare using non-lethal engagement and legitimate non-military levers as a
means to adapt behaviours of the opposing forces and adversaries. Their outputs are a
fundamental part of the Army’s Integrated Action model.

The Army will increase its ability to deliver effect in the deep; physically and virtually.

11th Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). The new SFAB will be persistently
engaged across the globe. It will commission, design, deliver and assess security force
assistance activity to inform regional Defence strategies

The Defence Battlelab will be a physical and virtual network, providing space for
companies to rent desks, co-located with each other in a diverse environment, with
access to collaborative events focused on solving our soldier’s problem sets. This
diversity and collaboration will drive the innovation we need to transform.

The Digital Estate. The Army intends to deliver estate-wide internet access that will
accelerate modernisation, support UK prosperity, improve the lived experience for our
people (both for work and recreation)
Should I be embarrassed to say that I think I understand what it's trying to say?

And would it help me to say that I don't believe it's any kind of credible?
 

Cold_Collation

LE
Book Reviewer
Meanwhile, on YouTube... does this (the RPV) take us any further forward than the Universal Carrier of the 1940s? It only moves at walking pace. Operating it takes an individual's eyes off the job.

And is it really 'revolutionary'? It's no more than an off-road version of stuff that been used to move pallets around factories and warehouses for donkeys years.
 
@jim30 in his Sir Humphrey alter ego has put some thoughts out on Future Soldier TL: Dr not much future showing ...
 
@jim30 in his Sir Humphrey alter ego has put some thoughts out on Future Soldier TL: Dr not much future showing ...
In next year's defence review, SAS, SRR, Paras and Rangers will merge into a single regiment.
Line infantry will be cut, light cav will rebadge as Recce Corps, and the remaining tank equipped units merged into 2 battalions and a training squadron.
 
Err, no.
You are, with all due respect, contributing to a myth, akin to the myth that Op BANNER (and prior Ops) institutionalised in the Brit Army an unequalled level of competence in OOTW (or wotever label you prefer)

At any one time, a small proportion of the Army's total strength was deployed on HERRICK and/or TELIC

I'll wager - based on previous Ops in my soldiering lifetime - that the vast majority who took part in any Tour were civvies within a year or two, and that precious few (commissioned or OR) who took part in those tours, are still serving.

A case in point is the Falklands. Within a decade of the conflict, 2 and 3 Para had a tiny number of Falklands veterans serving in the battalions - literally an handful.

The lessons of the war were passed on (to an extent) by the Officers and NCOs who took depot postings in the years immediately after the fighting. This probably took the form of the 'cultural conditioning' of recruits as much as tactical and doctrinal innovation.

I suspect it also resulted in recruits completing additional horrendous bergan marches across Brecon :threaten:
 
In next year's defence review, SAS, SRR, Paras and Rangers will merge into a single regiment.
Line infantry will be cut, light cav will rebadge as Recce Corps, and the remaining tank equipped units merged into 2 battalions and a training squadron.

A party of politicians, civil servants and VSOs is travelling to Eire to study the Irish Defense Forces (generous expense accounts and Business Class flights home every weekend).

Apparently, the future British Army has much to learn from the Irish Army.
 
Don't fight anyone then claim excellence in UN peacekeeping?

The Irish Army lads I've met were high quality and more than capable of having a fight. But they were serving in the equivalent of a Hobbit army. They also complained that a generation of enforced political correctness had undermined morale, pride and unit standards.

There are plenty of people in positions of influence in the UK who'd be happy to see the British armed forces reduced to a similar size and role (and meeting their requirements for radical social engineering to boot). It could very easily happen.
 

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