CGS:upgrading challenger and warrior.

Interesting - crap infrastructure didn't stop Matilda at 25 tons operating in SE Asia jungles or indeed the Sherman and Lee at between 5 and 10 tons heavier. I'm sure it was challenging though. (...)
The article is a follow up to this one from 2019:
Australia’s new armoured vehicles must operate from the north

Apparently the armoured forces may be moved from the Northern Territories down to the south.
However, recent discussions with Depfence Department officials indicate that the Australian Army 1st Brigade’s LAND 400 phase 3 vehicles are likely to skip Darwin for Adelaide so that they can be used year-round warrant a return to the issue.

The argument seems to be whether the vehicles chosen are the wrong ones because they can't operate all across Australia year round. One of the areas of concern is that the new vehicles may be too heavy for much of the infrastructure in the areas of Australia that are most exposed to external threat. There may be more factors involved than just weight, but weight is a major element. And we're not talking about 25, 30, or 35 ton vehicles as you suggested, rather it's 38, 42, and 44 tons.

The M113 armoured personnel carrier, in service since the 1970s, weighs 18 tonnes. Its shortlisted replacements, the Hanwha Redback and Rheinmetall KF41 Lynx, weigh more than double that, at 42 and 44 tonnes, respectively.

The Australian Army’s ASLAV, in service since the early 1990s, weighs 13.5 tonnes. The ASLAV’s planned replacement, the Rheinmetall Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicle, is almost three times heavier, weighing around 38 tonnes depending on its configuration.

The infrastructure in surrounding areas of concern is even less able to handle the vehicles of this size.

And before someone jumps in with "ah, but bridges and roads can be overloaded a few times if need be in an emergency", the author isn't talking about during war time. He is concerned about lack of training in the potential operational areas during peace time, when smashing up your own roads and bridges isn't acceptable.

The author's main concern is that basing and training is being driven by vehicle selection rather then operational conditions being used to determine vehicle selection. In other words, his concern is about the cart being put before the horse.

His arguments are about Australia's unique operating conditions, but it brings up some subjects which are perhaps food for thought in a much broader sense.
 
Presumably, if that was the same turret going onto warrior, how would they have got around the larger turret cage there? or were they relying on the emerging technologies to include a TARDIS package?
Different turret.
 

Bubbles_Barker

LE
Book Reviewer
The article is a follow up to this one from 2019:
Australia’s new armoured vehicles must operate from the north

Apparently the armoured forces may be moved from the Northern Territories down to the south.


The argument seems to be whether the vehicles chosen are the wrong ones because they can't operate all across Australia year round. One of the areas of concern is that the new vehicles may be too heavy for much of the infrastructure in the areas of Australia that are most exposed to external threat. There may be more factors involved than just weight, but weight is a major element. And we're not talking about 25, 30, or 35 ton vehicles as you suggested, rather it's 38, 42, and 44 tons.



The infrastructure in surrounding areas of concern is even less able to handle the vehicles of this size.

And before someone jumps in with "ah, but bridges and roads can be overloaded a few times if need be in an emergency", the author isn't talking about during war time. He is concerned about lack of training in the potential operational areas during peace time, when smashing up your own roads and bridges isn't acceptable.

The author's main concern is that basing and training is being driven by vehicle selection rather then operational conditions being used to determine vehicle selection. In other words, his concern is about the cart being put before the horse.

His arguments are about Australia's unique operating conditions, but it brings up some subjects which are perhaps food for thought in a much broader sense.
OK....but they have M1 now? And previously LEO AS1 or whatever we called it and before that Centurion...

All heavier than 40 tons no?
 
OK....but they have M1 now? And previously LEO AS1 or whatever we called it and before that Centurion...

All heavier than 40 tons no?
The story mentions M1s, so the author is apparently aware of their existence. He also discusses the structure of the Australian army.

He didn't say that all of Australia's armoured vehicles must be able to operate across all of Australia year round. What he appears to be concerned about is that Australia may find themselves in a situation where none of their new armoured vehicles will be suited to operating in the part of Australia most exposed to threat. Australia is a big country, and not all parts of it are the same.

At the very least, the IFVs need to be able to operate across the length and breadth of Australia regardless of the season and the weather. Without that ability they’ll be of neither tactical nor strategic value.

If the army is saying that its IFVs wouldn’t be able to operate in our region for large parts of the year if they were in Darwin, or that they will only be able to be deployed on sealed roads, it’s hard to justify the project’s price tag.

Whether or not the M1s find their mobility in the north limited by their size and weight during some seasons is a different issue from whether or not Australia's other vehicles do need to be able to operate there year round.
 

gafkiwi

War Hero
The author's main concern is that basing and training is being driven by vehicle selection rather then operational conditions being used to determine vehicle selection. In other words, his concern is about the cart being put before the horse.

His arguments are about Australia's unique operating conditions, but it brings up some subjects which are perhaps food for thought in a much broader sense.
I think this isn't a new issue for the ADF. Some Aussies I have talked to mentioned they have had issues in the past with vehicles getting from camps to training areas and locations due to weight, infrastructure and roading issues. On top of that there are parts of Aussie that you can only get seasonal vehicle access (tracked or wheeled) less short of strapping a boat to your roof.
 

Cold_Collation

LE
Book Reviewer
I think this isn't a new issue for the ADF. Some Aussies I have talked to mentioned they have had issues in the past with vehicles getting from camps to training areas and locations due to weight, infrastructure and roading issues. On top of that there are parts of Aussie that you can only get seasonal vehicle access (tracked or wheeled) less short of strapping a boat to your roof.
Australia is unusual in not really having a motorway system. Yes, there are motorway-grade roads in and around cities, and there are some strategic routes here and there, but cross-continent travel tends to be by air because of the distances.

Drive across such as the Nullabor and it's pretty much on two-lane roads. The same with north-south travel.

From a strategic mobility point of view, weight is an issue.
 

Bubbles_Barker

LE
Book Reviewer
Australia is unusual in not really having a motorway system. Yes, there are motorway-grade roads in and around cities, and there are some strategic routes here and there, but cross-continent travel tends to be by air because of the distances.

Drive across such as the Nullabor and it's pretty much on two-lane roads. The same with north-south travel.

From a strategic mobility point of view, weight is an issue.
They call it the 'tyranny of distance'...
 

Cromarty

War Hero
Australia is unusual in not really having a motorway system. Yes, there are motorway-grade roads in and around cities, and there are some strategic routes here and there, but cross-continent travel tends to be by air because of the distances.

Drive across such as the Nullabor and it's pretty much on two-lane roads. The same with north-south travel.

From a strategic mobility point of view, weight is an issue.

Any invader has to get here undetected, find somewhere to land and cover miles/kms of unfamiliar harsh terrain just to find something worth the effort. As noted not easy at the best of times, let alone dealing with an angry ADF that has had its breakfast interrupted along the way.
 
Any invader has to get here undetected, find somewhere to land and cover miles/kms of unfamiliar harsh terrain just to find something worth the effort. As noted not easy at the best of times, let alone dealing with an angry ADF that has had its breakfast interrupted along the way.
If I recall correctly an awful lot of the Northern Coast as best be described as hostile nature ?
Being full of things that find Humans a nice snack or react to be perturbed by stinging with a variety of unpleasant, if not fatal results?
 
If I recall correctly an awful lot of the Northern Coast as best be described as hostile nature ?
Being full of things that find Humans a nice snack or react to be perturbed by stinging with a variety of unpleasant, if not fatal results?
I think the potential adversary can change most of them into 8 course meals.
 

Bubbles_Barker

LE
Book Reviewer
If I recall correctly an awful lot of the Northern Coast as best be described as hostile nature ?
Being full of things that find Humans a nice snack or react to be perturbed by stinging with a variety of unpleasant, if not fatal results?
See RFSUs (Regional Force Surveillance Units) such as NORFORCE, The Pilbara Regt and 51 FNQR for details.
 

quadrapiper

Old-Salt
If I recall correctly an awful lot of the Northern Coast as best be described as hostile nature ?
Being full of things that find Humans a nice snack or react to be perturbed by stinging with a variety of unpleasant, if not fatal results?
How far south does the Burma-esque "everything rots now, including you" situation extend?
 

gafkiwi

War Hero
I think the potential adversary can change most of them into 8 course meals.
Problem is once they get away from the northern coast and the bountiful crawling smorgasbord they will soon find that most the next few thousand kilometers of country was pre 'Scorched' a couple thousand years ago.
 
Australia is unusual in not really having a motorway system. Yes, there are motorway-grade roads in and around cities, and there are some strategic routes here and there, but cross-continent travel tends to be by air because of the distances.

Drive across such as the Nullabor and it's pretty much on two-lane roads. The same with north-south travel.

From a strategic mobility point of view, weight is an issue.
Whether the highways are two lane or four lane isn't the issue. I'll point out by the way that much of the Trans Canada highway across northern Ontario is also two lane. It's built to an high standard and two lanes are enough to handle the amount of traffic involved.

According to the article in question the issue for Australia isn't the main roads. The issue is how well vehicles can operate on the smaller roads and bridges away from the main highways. The concern is that mobility will be limited by the size and weight of the vehicles, and this is not an issue of wheels versus tracks.

I don't know a lot about Australian defence policy or strategy, I'm just commenting on an article which someone else posted as being relevant to this thread. It does raise the points though that a) there is more to mobility than just "will the vehicle make it around the test track", and b) vehicle choice should be determined by defence strategy rather than the other way around.
 
Any invader has to get here undetected, find somewhere to land and cover miles/kms of unfamiliar harsh terrain just to find something worth the effort. As noted not easy at the best of times, let alone dealing with an angry ADF that has had its breakfast interrupted along the way.
As I've said before, I don't know what Australia's defence strategy is. Looking at the geography however, I suspect that the Australians would be concerned about an enemy gaining a foothold on the northern coast and then using that as a base from which to expand either around the periphery or overland. From an Australian perspective it would be important to prevent the enemy from gaining that foothold in the first place. The same goes for places like PNG by the way.

Inaccessibility works both ways.
 

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