The article is a follow up to this one from 2019:Interesting - crap infrastructure didn't stop Matilda at 25 tons operating in SE Asia jungles or indeed the Sherman and Lee at between 5 and 10 tons heavier. I'm sure it was challenging though. (...)
Australia’s new armoured vehicles must operate from the north
Apparently the armoured forces may be moved from the Northern Territories down to the south.
However, recent discussions with Depfence Department officials indicate that the Australian Army 1st Brigade’s LAND 400 phase 3 vehicles are likely to skip Darwin for Adelaide so that they can be used year-round warrant a return to the issue.
The argument seems to be whether the vehicles chosen are the wrong ones because they can't operate all across Australia year round. One of the areas of concern is that the new vehicles may be too heavy for much of the infrastructure in the areas of Australia that are most exposed to external threat. There may be more factors involved than just weight, but weight is a major element. And we're not talking about 25, 30, or 35 ton vehicles as you suggested, rather it's 38, 42, and 44 tons.
The M113 armoured personnel carrier, in service since the 1970s, weighs 18 tonnes. Its shortlisted replacements, the Hanwha Redback and Rheinmetall KF41 Lynx, weigh more than double that, at 42 and 44 tonnes, respectively.
The Australian Army’s ASLAV, in service since the early 1990s, weighs 13.5 tonnes. The ASLAV’s planned replacement, the Rheinmetall Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicle, is almost three times heavier, weighing around 38 tonnes depending on its configuration.
The infrastructure in surrounding areas of concern is even less able to handle the vehicles of this size.
And before someone jumps in with "ah, but bridges and roads can be overloaded a few times if need be in an emergency", the author isn't talking about during war time. He is concerned about lack of training in the potential operational areas during peace time, when smashing up your own roads and bridges isn't acceptable.
The author's main concern is that basing and training is being driven by vehicle selection rather then operational conditions being used to determine vehicle selection. In other words, his concern is about the cart being put before the horse.
His arguments are about Australia's unique operating conditions, but it brings up some subjects which are perhaps food for thought in a much broader sense.