In other words, Heavy can cope against Heavy and see off anything Light. Light will struggle to cope against Heavy.And therein lies the problem.
Threat definition is a fundamental part of the cost benefit analysis. However both of these processes are, I suggest, somewhat over emphasised.
Firstly the threat - who / what it is will not remain constant through the life of any piece of major equipment. Worse, it can change very quickly. For example, if a strike brigade were deployed to Bongo-bongo land to prop up a pro-UK regime and at the time of deployment the insurgent armoured capability was a T55 that needed a base overhaul everything might be hunky dory. But if Vlad wakes up one day and decides that Russian interest is best served by supporting the insurgents he might deploy a T72/T90 equipped "training team" - bad news indeed for Boxer and Ajax crews.
As to the benefit of system X measured in terms of battlefield outcomes, those outcomes depend largely upon the scenario assumptions made. That asusmption list is likely to include:
If any of them change (and they will) the outcome changes. Which means that in the real world there is a better than average chance that System X will not meet the circumstances in which it excelled.
Best case, it can still cope.
Interim case - X is OK by Y would have been better.
Worst case - lots of body bags
I would argue that it would be more sensible to approach procurement from a capability base. As in:
Which might or might not bugger up your integrated review and/or your integrated operating concept
- You want to compete with peer/near peer?
- Better get some MBT and IFV
- You're going to need a MBT firepower upgrade at the least to win - or plan on destroying threat MBT at closer range - which needs you need more platforms
- So your choice now is allocate more budget or accept that you can't compete at this level
Didn't we buy an extra 345 40mm CTA for the warrior Upgrade?
AJAX is only around 200 with turrets.
Couldn't agree more with that, but still fail to see how a Army of 82,000 can only field 4 deployable brigades?
Just to add the Army fleet is to drop from 35 platforms to 15. Thats alot of platforms to cut. Not sure what but so far;
Panter (Although rumours it might stay)
CVRT family ( 5 or 6 platforms in that)
Thats what I can think of, you may possibly have;
MRLS (Highly doubt that though)
I’ve been thinking a lot about those comments - and I’m sure DCGS didn’t drop them in accidentally.
Firstly - moving to a larger square brigade makes a lot of sense in terms of concentrated mass.
Secondly - having a deployable division that only contains one AI Bde doesn’t necessarily mean you only have one AI Bde - it just means you can only deploy one at once...TELIC 1 was possibly an indication that this might be realistic.
Now, if we were to deploy a Division of one AI and two STRIKE Bdes - backed up by some serious mounted ATGM and deep fires missiles - then that might just be a serious proposition for deterrence.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
The Americans seem to think so...Personally, I think there’s a lot to be said for a basic ‘432 replacement’ (come back ABSV - all is forgiven), which can keep up with WCSP and deliver real infantry mass to an AI BG.
Problem with Light Inf is that if it does not have a vehicle, and a properly protected one with XC capability, it's just 600 bodies looking for a Commonwealth War Grave.I think in reality that we have more than 4 deployable Bdes when you consider all the Lt In Bdes in 1XX.
The trouble is that they are poorly equipped to work alongside 3XX in anything other than rear-area security and ground-holding roles (which, tbh, are going to be necessary).
What to do about it? I’m not sure - there seem to be plenty of ops on at the moment in which vehicles like Foxhound and Jackal are necessary (OP NEWCOMBE a prime example), but maybe we need to have a bit of a ‘year zero’ approach to make 1XX more widely deployable.
Personally, I think there’s a lot to be said for a basic ‘432 replacement’ (come back ABSV - all is forgiven), which can keep up with WCSP and deliver real infantry mass to an AI BG.
Problem with Light Inf is that if it does not have a vehicle, and a properly protected one with XC capability, it's just 600 bodies looking for a Commonwealth War Grave.
Reality of dismounted ops from Somme through Casino to Tumbledown, Afghan and Iraq is that if a grunt is neither protected nor mobile (speeds > 5 mph) he's cannon fodder. And modern cannons are hungry.
Aside from paras (separate debate) and a few jungle / arctic specialists what is the point of light role infantry? They are vulnerable when on trucks, vulnerable and slow when on feet and, as history shows, will suffer terrible casualties when assaulting. (And please don't tell me that it's a new paradigm and they'll be safe behind a creeping barrage etc. They won't - even if the RoE permit such aggressive use of firepower).
Anything on any battlefield (including much of the "rear area" now that battlefields are less dense and enemy may be endemic) needs protected mobility (NB - not a Saxon) particularly if it is in the rear are security role. Which in the current circumstances means Boxer.
Back in the day the Sovs (who learned the lessons of the 1941-45 FTX fought on their terrain) had 2 BTR60 regiments (brigades, not bns) in all their motor rifle divisions, along with one of BMP-1.
And no, I am not (sadly) on the KMW/Rheinmetal/BAe payroll.
Surprised he wasn’t condemned for ‘mansplaining’ by the palace of online righteous justice...