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CGS:upgrading challenger and warrior.

Jordan has received 70 of the UAE's 300+ Leclerc MBT as a gift.

Jordan now fields a nice MBT+IFV combination of Leclerc and Marder, all received free of charge...

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Jordan has received 70 of the UAE's 300+ Leclerc MBT as a gift.

Jordan now fields a nice MBT+IFV combination of Leclerc and Marder, all received free of charge...

Jordan is an interesting country. It seems to have some good engineers in the KADDB, which comes up with some really interesting ideas. It has a fleet of diverse tanks from all over the place. And its leader is interested in Tanks and AFV (he's reported to play a few of the well known games).

The KADDB stuff keeps on gong through different iterations as well of constant development. The development also aims at the same basic standard. I wouldn't be surprised to see those Leclerc's getting the usual treatment, such as being re-gunned to the RUAG 120mm CTG.

Here's some KADDB Porn:

The very well known Flacon Turret, that has been through at least three versions.



M60 Phoenix, new turret armour arrays, CTG, and a expanded bustle to mount the APS. This is sort of the standard for KADDB's designs. They even did it with the Al Hussein:


Again there seems to have been at least three versions of this MBT in an attempt to modernise the Cr1. The first one has the look of a Proof of concept, the second one looks very much like a tech development chassis, and the above is closest to the end product I've been able to find.
This version has a new FCS, CITV and a loading assist in the bustle.

Finally, we get on to modernisation of CVR(T), so we're about to get a load of Recce types getting very excited.

This is the most recent version of the Scimitar/Scorpion:

First version was a simple gun switch to a Russian 30mm. The next added a new engine, and then finally, the missiles.
However, KADDB also did something else with their CVR(T)'s:


The basic premise here is to drop the Kastet Combat Module from Ukraine onto the CVR(T).
 
For those that are interested interesting evidence to be heard at the Defence Committee in ten minutes time:

  • Subject: Progress in delivering the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability​

  • Witness(es): Jeremy Quin MP, Minister for Defence Procurement, Ministry of Defence; Air Marshal Richard Knighton CB, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Capability), Ministry of Defence; Lieutenant General Christopher Tickell CBE, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, British Army, Ministry of Defence; Mr Chris Bushell, Director General Land, Defence Equipment and Support, Ministry of Defence

To view Parliamentlive.tv
 

Cynical

LE
Book Reviewer
The problem is, it’s very easy to put on a show and tell at Copehill Down with some carefully-selected vignettes to make the gadgets look game changing - it’s less easy to demonstrate that you can actually turn the gadget into an integrated capability that can be used day after day on operations, at a cost that pulls its own weight...
Spot on

As part of FIST (Future Infantry Systems Technology) OA programme we looked at remote sensors. We postulated that their output was fed into weapon sights (i.e. giving an aiming point and not overloading the already busy Tommy Atkins). This gave a significant performance improvement in terms of more kills of red for fewer shots and fewer blue cas. However that was in a general war setting (no civpop, so anything you see that ain't blue must be red) and assumed seemless integration. (Also batteries were assumed charged).

Oh, that was in the 1990s.
 
For those that are interested interesting evidence to be heard at the Defence Committee in ten minutes time:

  • Subject: Progress in delivering the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability​

  • Witness(es): Jeremy Quin MP, Minister for Defence Procurement, Ministry of Defence; Air Marshal Richard Knighton CB, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Capability), Ministry of Defence; Lieutenant General Christopher Tickell CBE, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, British Army, Ministry of Defence; Mr Chris Bushell, Director General Land, Defence Equipment and Support, Ministry of Defence

To view Parliamentlive.tv

Progress?
 
Progress?
It's quite funny to watch Jeremy Quinn, Minister for Defence Procurement and Chris Bushell Director General Land Equipment and Support are hiding behind the Integrated Review but have pretty much confirmed they do not have a Scooby if or when Warrior and Challenger will be upgraded, how much it will cost or how many vehicles will be upgraded. Neither have gone beyond planning to create a business case.

 
It's quite funny to watch Jeremy Quinn, Minister for Defence Procurement and Chris Bushell Director General Land Equipment and Support are hiding behind the Integrated Review but have pretty much confirmed they do not have a Scooby if or when Warrior and Challenger will be upgraded, how much it will cost or how many vehicles will be upgraded. Neither have gone beyond planning to create a business case.


Creating a full business case requires a shit-tonne of work to establish the costs of a programme, as well as the likely benefits against key threats - but until a contract is signed, that information on cost is strictly controlled.

I’m sure they absolutely do have a fully costed plan up their sleeve - but no-one can commit to anything unless the Government can commit to delegating the money required.


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Creating a full business case requires a shit-tonne of work to establish the costs of a programme, as well as the likely benefits against key threats - but until a contract is signed, that information on cost is strictly controlled.

I’m sure they absolutely do have a fully costed plan up their sleeve - but no-one can commit to anything unless the Government can commit to delegating the money required.


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I think you are missing the point, the progress to date is pretty much as it was 4, 6 and 10 years ago.

The fundamentals of any business case is to work out what you want to do, why you want to do it (ie the benefit) and the cost of doing it. The MOD is nowhere near establishing any of those. These people should be able to give top level costs, they simply can not.
 

Cynical

LE
Book Reviewer
as well as the likely benefits against key threats
And therein lies the problem.

Threat definition is a fundamental part of the cost benefit analysis. However both of these processes are, I suggest, somewhat over emphasised.

Firstly the threat - who / what it is will not remain constant through the life of any piece of major equipment. Worse, it can change very quickly. For example, if a strike brigade were deployed to Bongo-bongo land to prop up a pro-UK regime and at the time of deployment the insurgent armoured capability was a T55 that needed a base overhaul everything might be hunky dory. But if Vlad wakes up one day and decides that Russian interest is best served by supporting the insurgents he might deploy a T72/T90 equipped "training team" - bad news indeed for Boxer and Ajax crews.

As to the benefit of system X measured in terms of battlefield outcomes, those outcomes depend largely upon the scenario assumptions made. That asusmption list is likely to include:
  • Mission
  • Threat
  • ROE
  • Logistics
  • etc

If any of them change (and they will) the outcome changes. Which means that in the real world there is a better than average chance that System X will not meet the circumstances in which it excelled.
Best case, it can still cope.
Interim case - X is OK by Y would have been better.
Worst case - lots of body bags

I would argue that it would be more sensible to approach procurement from a capability base. As in:
  • You want to compete with peer/near peer?
  • Better get some MBT and IFV
  • You're going to need a MBT firepower upgrade at the least to win - or plan on destroying threat MBT at closer range - which needs you need more platforms
  • So your choice now is allocate more budget or accept that you can't compete at this level
Which might or might not bugger up your integrated review and/or your integrated operating concept

Enjoy
 
I think you are missing the point, the progress to date is pretty much as it was 4, 6 and 10 years ago.

The fundamentals of any business case is to work out what you want to do, why you want to do it (ie the benefit) and the cost of doing it. The MOD is nowhere near establishing any of those. These people should be able to give top level costs, they simply can not.

I’m sorry, but I have to disagree on that.

The programme will have a budget profile assigned to it over its life - however the way procurement currently works, we only award bits of that budget in penny packets, staged by a number of business case gates (Initial Gate has already established what we want, and how we intend to get it). Therefore LM are on contract to deliver a WCSP demonstration phase (but not a production run), which has delivered a small number of production standard vehicles, which are making their way through some very successful trials at ATDU. That in itself certainly isn’t cheap.

Until they’ve conducted production contract negotiations however, they simply won’t have an exact cost to deliver an FOC - but both sides probably have a very good idea how much is likely to be available, and how much it will really cost. I suspect that number will be different to one that might have been estimated 10 years ago before the design was frozen.


In terms of CR2, we’ve been through this many times. The 2010 SDSR cut the legs off the ‘upgrade’, and the programme limped on with the limited funds left after Planning Round 11 assuming only obsolescence management - if we’d carried on with that assumption, we’d probably be almost complete with demonstration by now - and well within expected budget.
Thankfully, common sense - and a sudden about turn by the 2015 SDSR - prevailed, but it meant that the scope of the assessment phase had to be changed, which included development of the new turret. I suspect DE&S have very good idea of what the new costs are likely to be (which also includes the cost of a whole new stock of ammunition - and possibly an APS), but they cannot proceed any further until the IR gives them the green light.


I know it all sounds very frustrating - but it’s just a consequence of the way in which it has been decided that MoD spends HMT’s money. The other way of doing would be simply to write a cheque to your favourite vehicle prime at the beginning of a programme, and tell them to get on with it. I suspect costs would end up increasing that way, but would probably accelerate the programme significantly without all the hiatus around procurement gates - although I doubt HMT would ever agree to it...


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
And therein lies the problem.

Threat definition is a fundamental part of the cost benefit analysis. However both of these processes are, I suggest, somewhat over emphasised.

Firstly the threat - who / what it is will not remain constant through the life of any piece of major equipment. Worse, it can change very quickly. For example, if a strike brigade were deployed to Bongo-bongo land to prop up a pro-UK regime and at the time of deployment the insurgent armoured capability was a T55 that needed a base overhaul everything might be hunky dory. But if Vlad wakes up one day and decides that Russian interest is best served by supporting the insurgents he might deploy a T72/T90 equipped "training team" - bad news indeed for Boxer and Ajax crews.

As to the benefit of system X measured in terms of battlefield outcomes, those outcomes depend largely upon the scenario assumptions made. That asusmption list is likely to include:
  • Mission
  • Threat
  • ROE
  • Logistics
  • etc

If any of them change (and they will) the outcome changes. Which means that in the real world there is a better than average chance that System X will not meet the circumstances in which it excelled.
Best case, it can still cope.
Interim case - X is OK by Y would have been better.
Worst case - lots of body bags

I would argue that it would be more sensible to approach procurement from a capability base. As in:
  • You want to compete with peer/near peer?
  • Better get some MBT and IFV
  • You're going to need a MBT firepower upgrade at the least to win - or plan on destroying threat MBT at closer range - which needs you need more platforms
  • So your choice now is allocate more budget or accept that you can't compete at this level
Which might or might not bugger up your integrated review and/or your integrated operating concept

Enjoy

Can’t disagree with any of that - the problem is that the assumed threats are driven by defence policy, which in turn is driven by the vague aspirations of political strategy...and the money that follows.

The 2010 SDSR was clearly an austerity-driven nonsense, which has caused us no end of harm. The 2015 review was better - but it didn’t provide MoD with what it needed to plug the gaps created in 2010.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 

Cynical

LE
Book Reviewer
The 2010 SDSR was clearly an austerity-driven nonsense, which has caused us no end of harm. The 2015 review was better - but it didn’t provide MoD with what it needed to plug the gaps created in 2010.
It may be that CDS's IOC is an attempt to move away from this. However the track record of fisitcuffs between MOD and Treasury is consistently won by Treasury (unless you want a couple of aircraft carriers). CDS and Rishi are both Wykehamists - at least this time it's a fight between intellectual peers.
 
I’m sorry, but I have to disagree on that.

The programme will have a budget profile assigned to it over its life - however the way procurement currently works, we only award bits of that budget in penny packets, staged by a number of business case gates (Initial Gate has already established what we want, and how we intend to get it). Therefore LM are on contract to deliver a WCSP demonstration phase (but not a production run), which has delivered a small number of production standard vehicles, which are making their way through some very successful trials at ATDU. That in itself certainly isn’t cheap.

Until they’ve conducted production contract negotiations however, they simply won’t have an exact cost to deliver an FOC - but both sides probably have a very good idea how much is likely to be available, and how much it will really cost. I suspect that number will be different to one that might have been estimated 10 years ago before the design was frozen.


In terms of CR2, we’ve been through this many times. The 2010 SDSR cut the legs off the ‘upgrade’, and the programme limped on with the limited funds left after Planning Round 11 assuming only obsolescence management - if we’d carried on with that assumption, we’d probably be almost complete with demonstration by now - and well within expected budget.
Thankfully, common sense - and a sudden about turn by the 2015 SDSR - prevailed, but it meant that the scope of the assessment phase had to be changed, which included development of the new turret. I suspect DE&S have very good idea of what the new costs are likely to be (which also includes the cost of a whole new stock of ammunition - and possibly an APS), but they cannot proceed any further until the IR gives them the green light.


I know it all sounds very frustrating - but it’s just a consequence of the way in which it has been decided that MoD spends HMT’s money. The other way of doing would be simply to write a cheque to your favourite vehicle prime at the beginning of a programme, and tell them to get on with it. I suspect costs would end up increasing that way, but would probably accelerate the programme significantly without all the hiatus around procurement gates - although I doubt HMT would ever agree to it...


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You are missing the point entirely and a lot of your post is the usual platitudes and excuses that are trotted out by VSOs and SCC on a regular basis. I suggest you watch the evidence briefing I linked to. Toby asked some very simple questions to which he received no answer whatsoever, you could see his frustration.

It is not 2010 or 2015 and he wanted the facts of the here and now in 2020 and going forward in broad brush high level figures, as he is entitled to do so as the Chairman of the Defence Committee.

Q. "How many Challenger will you upgrade?"
A "Dunno"
Q. "How long will it take?"
A "Dunno"
Q. "How much will it cost?"
A. "The turret is a thing of beauty but the design isn't finalised"
Q. A polite version of "FFS! that is not what I asked"
A. "It is all the fault of the Integrated Review and when that reports we will go right the way back to the start"
 
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Cynical

LE
Book Reviewer
Toby asked some very simple questions to which he received no answer whatsoever, you could see his frustration.
You and Mr Ellwood need to consider the possibility that, within the current MOD procurement methodology exacerbated by review after review, there are no simple questions. Ellwood should bloody well know that.

TBH, attempted detailed scrutiny of a specific MOD procurement by the Select Committee is a pointless exercise. What they should be asking is why the feck we have a procurement process that is not fit for purpose. OF course, that's a Treasury matter for another Select Committee.

The separation and stove piping of responsibility across government is the root cause of many of this country's woes (including the Covid disaster), but there is no-one in government (political or CS) who has an interest in changing it.
 
You are missing the point entirely and a lot of your post is the usual platitudes and excuses that are trtted out by VSOs an SCC on a regular basis. I suggest you watch the evidence briefing I linked to. Toby asked some very simple questions to which he received no answer whatsoever, you could see his frustration.

It is not 2010 or 2015 and he wanted the facts of the here and now in 2020 and going forward in broad brush high level figures, as he is entitled to do so as the chairman of the Defence Committee.

Q. "How many Challenger will you upgrade?"
A "Dunno"
Q. "How long will it take?"
A "Dunno"
Q. "How much will it cost?"
A. "The turret is a thing of beauty but the design isn't finalised"
Q. A polite version of "FFS! that is not what I asked"
A. "t is all the fault of the Integrated Review and when that reports we will go right the way back to the start"

If you were actually listening to the meeting, you’d realise he didn’t say “dunno” to the questions at all.

What he actually asked for was information to which he is certainly not entitled - which he and his colleagues would understand if they knew their brief correctly.

To take CR2 specifically, a new turret has been designed to meet a new requirement - but how on Earth is he expected to give a cost or time for something that hasn’t been approved yet, because the entire department is under review?

Giving out even broad brush numbers in a public forum is a very quick way to get yourself hauled in front of a senior minister - and potentially facing industry legal action.


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You and Mr Ellwood need to consider the possibility that, within the current MOD procurement methodology exacerbated by review after review, there are no simple questions. Ellwood should bloody well know that.

TBH, attempted detailed scrutiny of a specific MOD procurement by the Select Committee is a pointless exercise. What they should be asking is why the feck we have a procurement process that is not fit for purpose. OF course, that's a Treasury matter for another Select Committee.

The separation and stove piping of responsibility across government is the root cause of many of this country's woes (including the Covid disaster), but there is no-one in government (political or CS) who has an interest in changing it.

Boom - target stop!


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Bubbles_Barker

LE
Book Reviewer
You are missing the point entirely and a lot of your post is the usual platitudes and excuses that are trotted out by VSOs and SCC on a regular basis. I suggest you watch the evidence briefing I linked to. Toby asked some very simple questions to which he received no answer whatsoever, you could see his frustration.

It is not 2010 or 2015 and he wanted the facts of the here and now in 2020 and going forward in broad brush high level figures, as he is entitled to do so as the Chairman of the Defence Committee.

Q. "How many Challenger will you upgrade?"
A "Dunno"
Q. "How long will it take?"
A "Dunno"
Q. "How much will it cost?"
A. "The turret is a thing of beauty but the design isn't finalised"
Q. A polite version of "FFS! that is not what I asked"
A. "It is all the fault of the Integrated Review and when that reports we will go right the way back to the start"
Go on then - submit some 'evidence' to the committee given that you are clearly an equipment procurement expert!
 

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