Army Rumour Service

Register a free account today to become a member! Once signed in, you'll be able to participate on this site by adding your own topics and posts, as well as connect with other members through your own private inbox!

CAA bans Boeing 737 max 8

Although it appears to be nothing to do with the problem which grounded the fleet, the media are going to report every incident that affects them, and it isn't going to do confidence in the model any good at all:

 

Le_addeur_noir

On ROPS
On ROPs
Last edited:

Le_addeur_noir

On ROPS
On ROPs
Seems all is not rosy in Seattle.
There's issues with build quality across the board with Boeing's airliner production. The USAF not accepting KC-46s and alleged dope consumption by 787 production workers at Charleston being two areas of concern highlighted recently.
 
Too big to fail? It's amazing that Boeing can continue to be a commercially-viable entity with these corporate behaviours.

'A lawsuit filed by Boeing shareholders has claimed the aircraft manufacturer lied about overlooking safety features for its 737 MAX 8 airliner.

'The lawsuit also accused the company of participating in a misleading public relations campaign after two fatal 737 crashes in 2018 and 2019.

'Boeing’s fleet of 737 MAX aircraft was forced to be grounded as a result of the tragic events. The lawsuit claims Boeing’s board ignored red flags surrounding the 737 MAX 8 and didn’t develop tools to evaluate the safety of the aircraft model.

“Prior to the grounding of the 737 Max, the board failed to undertake its own evaluation of the safety of keeping the 737 Max aloft,” investors told Delaware Chancery Court in a complaint that was made public on February 5. The board was then accused that it “compounded its lack of oversight by publicly lying about it”.

'Despite the negative attention and record-long stint on the ground, use of the 737 MAX has resumed with US airline United Air confirming 566 flights this month.

'The new development came after Boeing was fined $US244 million ($A316 million) by the US government in January for “criminal misconduct” involving two senior employees.

'The charges involved the company’s chief technical pilot and their deputy, who were found to have deceived the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on details regarding a new flight control system in the 737 MAX 8’s.'


 
Last edited:
The following is an interesting editorial in Aviation Week on the future of Boeing. The author suggests that Boeing may get gradually squeezed out of the civilian market due to lack of investment in R&D and cut backs in engineering. Their commercial aircraft line is ageing, it's been 17 years since they launched a truly new model (as opposed to a derivative), and they have serious product weaknesses in certain ranges. The author compares it to how Douglas gradually faded away in the commercial aircraft market for similar reasons.

Opinion: Will Boeing Become The Next McDonnell Douglas?

I found it an interesting article and worth reading.
 
The following is an interesting editorial in Aviation Week on the future of Boeing. The author suggests that Boeing may get gradually squeezed out of the civilian market due to lack of investment in R&D and cut backs in engineering. Their commercial aircraft line is ageing, it's been 17 years since they launched a truly new model (as opposed to a derivative), and they have serious product weaknesses in certain ranges. The author compares it to how Douglas gradually faded away in the commercial aircraft market for similar reasons.

Opinion: Will Boeing Become The Next McDonnell Douglas?

I found it an interesting article and worth reading.
Excellent article and probably not far off. The only bit I’d disagree with is the Airbus comparison. Airbus might look good compared to Boeing but they have problems of their own, many of which are not dissimilar to Boeing’s. Principally that is competition from emerging nations; Embraer in Brazil and China. Aerospace technology is a saleable commodity and the process of designing a new aeroplane hasn’t changed much in 80 years; build a tube, stick wings on it and stick engines on them. The technological advances in that simple formula are the clever bit and as I say, that is pretty much available to whomever wants to pay for it.

It‘s very similar to car design. A car still has a wheel at each corner, one to hold on to to change direction, pedals to control going and stopping, an internal combustion engine providing power and a gearbox / transmission system to transfer that power to the road. The basic formula hasn’t changed in over a century, the technological advances are no more than variations on a theme.

Both Boeing and Airbus are capitalist ventures with significant state financial input, no matter how much either would argue otherwise. Such business models survive or die on the altar of shareholder / state funding sentiment, no different from any other shareholder backed enterprise. The staggering thing in this saga is that it is the shareholders taking the company to court which to my simple mind is a suicidal act?

Finally, statistical analysis of order books is fraught with potential error as they are by their very nature no more than a snapshot in time. The A321 neo is basically the 757 replacement that Boeing offer the MAX to cover. The neo got a clear run which I’d expect to wash out when the MAX gets back on its feet not least because airlines like Southwest and Ryanair are such big customers with huge, single type (737) fleets. This is also one of the reasons that Boeing are wedded to derivatives rather than new design (as are Airbus, the A32x neo family is just an A32x derivative). Airlines want derivatives not new designs because the cost of retraining crew and engineers is minimal when compared to a new type. The only new designs Airbus have come up with in the quoted 17 years were the A380 which was a disaster and the A350 which is the 787 competitor but crucially way behind in the quantum leap reduction in operating costs the 787 offers and also behind in terms of when it became available by a good few years.

That drive for derivative based products is in turn a part causal factor in the MAXs woes. To produce an aircraft that demands only a day or two training for crews to qualify from a previous derivative to the new requires a great deal of change that is not readily apparent to crew; switches in the same place, function outwardly similar etc*. That hides a lot of behind the scenes architectural change that crew won’t be made familiar with because it’s deemed unnecessary to keep within the desired limited training requirement that‘s part of the sales pitch to airlines. The airlines are also largely answering to shareholders who want money spent in dividends, not training, and round goes the wheel. The MAX crews simply didn’t know enough / anything about MCAS, the system behind the crashes.

*If you’ve not lost the will to live and are still reading, here’s an example of customer lead “Luddite Design” where not changing architecture to remove the need to train a new procedure triumphed over installing new, readily available technology / ethos:

Engine Anti Ice (EAI) is designed to stop ice forming on the engine intake and chunks of it then breaking off and being ingested by the engine. It is a requirement for it to be used (on every Boeing type I’ve flown) when the temperature is between +10 and -40 deg C and visible moisture is present (cloud, fog, rain etc). The time when this is arguably most critical and also most likely to be forgotten is during take off and landing because you are close to the ground and crew workload is high. The 737 Jurassic (-100/200) is a 1950s design, updated in the 70s to the 737 Classic (-300/400/500) derivative and back then the procedure was to turn the EAI on whenever flaps were out as flap is only used for take off and landing. It was a manual procedure.

In the early 80s the 757/767 came along (incidentally, designed from the outset to be a common type training wise so airlines had access to a family of aircraft that the same crew could operate across the full spectrum of range etc). The 756 family still has manually selectable EAI but some clever clogs designed in an automatic function that put it on whenever the flap lever was out of the UP position. On the 737 policy is to manually select EAI when flaps are out (and select OFF when you bring the flaps up), on the 756 policy is to leave it alone, the automatics will take care of it (the manual function is still needed if you are in Icing Conditions without flap which is common). A step forward using available technology and thinking on increased automation.

In the 90s along came the next derivative of the 737, the NG (-700/800/900). It still required manual selection of EAI when the flaps were selected despite the fact that both technology and ethos had moved on to the automated system of the earlier 756. This was done purely as part of a package of commonality with the earlier Classic to allow crew to undergo minimal training and actually fly both Classic and NG (ditto now with the MAX where you can fly all 3 derivatives!). The story goes that this was demanded by Southwest “design it like this, we’ll buy a thousand”.

In the 00s, along came the 787 where EAI is fully automatic in all Flight regimes (although interestingly, we’ve gone full semi circle and you need to manually select it on for take off as a belt and braces back up to the fully automatic function).

In the 10’s here’s the MAX, don’t forget to switch the EAI on! What you get to read about in the tech manual is very different to what’s actually designed in and you’re doing stuff this way because that’s the way it was done in the 50s because back then there was no other way of doing it.
 
Last edited:
Both Boeing and Airbus are capitalist ventures with significant state financial input, no matter how much either would argue otherwise. Such business models survive or die on the altar of shareholder / state funding sentiment, no different from any other shareholder backed enterprise.
Boeings key commercial advantage is its huge military order book, a market AIRBUS hoped to break open with its A400M which it thought would sell in the thousands.
 
Boeing's 777 is the latest to be grounded after having the engine fall to bits in mid air. Apparently the same thing happened in December.
Boeing recommends grounding 777 aircraft after plane makes emergency landing in Denver

Boeing has recommended that airlines ground all of its 777s with the type of engine that suffered a catastrophic failure over Denver on the weekend.

A United Airlines plane's right engine blew apart just after takeoff. Pieces of the casing of the engine, a Pratt & Whitney PW4000, rained down on suburban neighbourhoods.

The plane made an emergency landing at Denver International Airport. None of the 231 passengers or 10 crew on board was reported hurt, authorities said.

This must be reassuring to see when you look out the window.
 

endure

GCM
Boeing's 777 is the latest to be grounded after having the engine fall to bits in mid air. Apparently the same thing happened in December.
Boeing recommends grounding 777 aircraft after plane makes emergency landing in Denver



This must be reassuring to see when you look out the window.
Pratt and Whitney

s-l300.jpg
 

Blogg

LE

endure

GCM
It is remarkable that the plane could actually land safely given the condition of that engine.
 
Good Airmanship by the bods in the front and an otherwise conservative design.
Wonder how close it got to fuel tanks, flying controls etc.
 
Just had a thought. Two engines, same each side, possibly the same hours TBO , I'd be the wrong side of terrified.
 
Just had a thought. Two engines, same each side, possibly the same hours TBO , I'd be the wrong side of terrified.
It will fly happily on just one engine.

However, I'm with you: the engines may have gone through the same maintenance and test regime, and may also have done a similar number of hours...

Systematic fault in a bad batch of spares, anyone?

Tick, tick, tick...
 

Blogg

LE
Suggestions of P&W 4000 series engines having problems with fan blades

Unhappy words concerning a similar 2018 incident:

"...inadequate inspections of fan blades and said inspectors were not properly trained.

Inspections of the fan blade that failed had shown evidence of weakening titanium in 2010 and 2015, but an inspector attributed them to the way they were painted, the NTSB concluded. Bloomberg reported that the engine was a Pratt & Whitney PW4077. The NTSB concluded that Raytheon Technologies Corp.’s Pratt & Whitney division didn’t create adequate test standards."

 

New Posts

Top