CAA bans Boeing 737 max 8

One thing which jumped out at me was that the simulator didn't replicate real life. Simulators only do what they're programmed to do. In this case once the 'problem' was active and the speed got high it was simply physically impossible to turn the trim wheel enough but that never made it into the sim.
See my vids below about sims.
 
More on the cheap outsourced labour, poor quality software and a dodgy chip:

Bloomberg - Are you a robot?

Boeing Outsourced Its 737 MAX Software To $9 Per Hour Engineers | Zero Hedge | Zero Hedge

ETA the Zero Hedge version is shorter but misses some important details.
Outsourcing. What could possibly go wrong?

The thankfully limited experience I've had with that "clever" business practise was having UK highways schemes designed in offices overseas. They allegedly worked to the UK design standards. EVERYTHING that came back from them was so bad that it worked out quicker for us to redo the lot from scratch than try to list everything that needed fixing for Gupta and his mates to have another go at.

But but but, it was soooooo much cheaper to do it aboard. Yes. Right. OK.
 
Outsourcing. What could possibly go wrong?

The thankfully limited experience I've had with that "clever" business practise was having UK highways schemes designed in offices overseas. They allegedly worked to the UK design standards. EVERYTHING that came back from them was so bad that it worked out quicker for us to redo the lot from scratch than try to list everything that needed fixing for Gupta and his mates to have another go at.

But but but, it was soooooo much cheaper to do it aboard. Yes. Right. OK.
To be fair, outsourcing within the country can be risky too. Cheapest bidder etc
 
Boeing have history on this sort of thing.

A number of 737s were lost usually after a rapid and uncontainable roll on final approach. Flight Data indicated a problem with the rudder and uncommanded inputs but nobody could work out why. By chance and some pretty nifty flying one such event was just recovered by the crew.

Some great sideways thinking by investigators eventually revealed that the hydraulic actuators were freezing at low in flight temperatures and masking unpredictable behaviours in the control system for the rudder.

As the aircraft descended into warmer air the actuators thawed out and the unpredictable behaviours suddenly manifested themselves hence why the events happened on approach and why they couldn’t reproduce the fault in the lab (until they hit on the idea of freezing it first).

Boeing went to great expense and effort to redesign the rudder actuator system (Force Fight Monitor if you’re taking notes) and retrofitting it but for a lot of people it was too late. They adamantly maintain there is and never was an issue.

Boeing have never really explained why they went to all that trouble if there was no issue.
 
Boeing have just lost an order for 30 Boeing 737 Max planes for Flyadeal, a subsidiary of Saudi Arabian Airlines. Airbus is picking up the order instead. The deal was originally valued at $6 billion.
www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing-saudi-aircraft-sale-1.5203742?cmp=rss
A Saudi budget airline is ordering 30 Airbus planes in a deal that replaces a $6-billion US agreement it had with Boeing for its troubled 737 Max jets, which have been grounded after two deadly crashes.
The story doesn't give details as to why the order to Boeing made last December was cancelled.
In December 2018, Boeing had struck an agreement with flayadeal for 30 of the 737 Max jets with the option to purchase 20 more in a deal valued up to $5.9 billion at list price. At the time, Boeing said flyadeal had conducted an evaluation for 50 narrow-body airplanes and had selected the 737 Max for the future.
 
The more I read of the software woes, the more I wonder if a simple bit of string to pull (direct linkage conrol rather than suggestions to a computer with poorly assembled software) would have allowed the crew to sort out the problem by returning to basics and just flying the aircraft.

Abrogating responsibility to a team of IT hotshots who don't actually have their arses up there with you hanging out over the abyss doesn't seem a very bright idea to me.

Blame the software/crew blokes as much as you like, but IMO the real problem is management and bean counters trying to do away with crews and attempting to substitute experience and knowledge with technology.
 
The more I read of the software woes, the more I wonder if a simple bit of string to pull (direct linkage conrol rather than suggestions to a computer with poorly assembled software) would have allowed the crew to sort out the problem by returning to basics and just flying the aircraft.
As I understand it the 737 is one of the very few modern aircraft which still uses real cables (hence the crew not being strong enough to be able to overcome the physical forces acting on the flight control surfaces and trim the aircraft) rather than the modern fly by wire (electronic controls to motors which activate the flying control surfaces).
 
Thing is, you're trimming a servo tab rather than the entire surface and in most instances on larger aircraft they're geared/reduced to remove the larger forces. Was there any evidence of in flight break up to indicate Vne being exceeded resulting in flutter? Can't see any other reason why those forces would be difficult to overcome.
 
Thing is, you're trimming a servo tab rather than the entire surface and in most instances on larger aircraft they're geared/reduced to remove the larger forces. Was there any evidence of in flight break up to indicate Vne being exceeded resulting in flutter? Can't see any other reason why those forces would be difficult to overcome.
I'm not a pilot but there is a lot of info about this issue on the web. Perhaps the simplest is from a pilot:
In fact the 737 is unique in still having real cables.
 
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Didn't watch the whole thing but it appears they're fighting the auto trim in the first few seconds. Once again, crew inputs seen as secondary to the weally, weally important electronic stuff.

Once again, bean counters and management leaving the important stuff to IT types on the ground while the crew sit there watching das blinkenlighten und parpenfartenhorns.

Effective override may have given the bit of string a chance.
 
The more I read of the software woes, the more I wonder if a simple bit of string to pull (direct linkage conrol rather than suggestions to a computer with poorly assembled software) would have allowed the crew to sort out the problem by returning to basics and just flying the aircraft.

Abrogating responsibility to a team of IT hotshots who don't actually have their arses up there with you hanging out over the abyss doesn't seem a very bright idea to me.

Blame the software/crew blokes as much as you like, but IMO the real problem is management and bean counters trying to do away with crews and attempting to substitute experience and knowledge with technology.
There's a special problem in this case in that for Boeing what mattered most was to skirt around anything which would have triggered the rules which would have said that the crews needed any additional hands on or simulator training to be qualified to fly the 737 Max. This made it easier to sell to airlines who were already flying older models of 737.

Hence, there was no mention of the MCAS system in any of the information which was available to the pilots, as that might have raised questions about whether any training was required to deal with malfunctions in this entirely new system.
 
The more I read of the software woes, the more I wonder if a simple bit of string to pull (direct linkage conrol rather than suggestions to a computer with poorly assembled software) would have allowed the crew to sort out the problem by returning to basics and just flying the aircraft.
In my previous life I used to make a monthly trip to the Eurocopter (now Airbus) simulator training centre in Marseille where the AS332L2 and EC225LP simulators were. They then built an NH90 sim in the same building and one day we were invited to have a look around and a quick “cabby” by one of the test pilots.

When we were finished the TP asked what we thought about flying a fly-by-wire machine and my colleague said “I’d be OK with operating a fly-by-wire machine as long as the wires ran down the middle of a fücking great steel control rod”
 
Yup, there's just something about software with the ability to write you out of the equation that makes my teeth itch.
 

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