british vehicles in Soviet service.

NSP

LE
In my electricians tool box, issued from stores, along with the un-insulated screwdrivers, was a pair of un-insulated pliers, stamped on the side was "USSR" I still have them.

Track pins made in Poland were issued back in the late 70's.
Surely you mean CCCP?
 
Fords and Studebakers. Many, many of them.
433,967 Jeeps
104,430 Ford GPW amphib Jeeps
24,902 Weapons carriers WC52
87,000 1-1/2 ton cargo
60,475 1-1/2 ton cargo with winch
79,915 2-1/2 ton 6X6 cargo
104,485 2-1/2 ton 6X6 Cargo Studebaker
 

Cold_Collation

LE
Book Reviewer
433,967 Jeeps
104,430 Ford GPW amphib Jeeps
24,902 Weapons carriers WC52
87,000 1-1/2 ton cargo
60,475 1-1/2 ton cargo with winch
79,915 2-1/2 ton 6X6 cargo
104,485 2-1/2 ton 6X6 Cargo Studebaker
Thank you, most informative.

It must have cut Stalin to the bone to have to accept such levels of help from the capitalists. No wonder there was such a level of airbrushing post-WWII.

And shame on me for not mentioning Dodge. :)
 
And the Germans , incredibly , did absolutely nothing to impede that production of Soviet materiel . you'd almost think they wanted to lose the war .
Not exactly easy to do that given they'd have to be at war to do it, or have been acting clandestinely and there's nothing to show they did. Unfortunately our convoys being attacked didn't go down too well with us. Unfortunately I've never been a great believer in the Soviet miracle as such.
 

4(T)

LE
And the Germans , incredibly , did absolutely nothing to impede that production of Soviet materiel . you'd almost think they wanted to lose the war .

Too late for them to develop the necessary strategic bomber force.

If they had developed a strategic bomber force, they'd probably not have had the resources to spare for much of the ground operations they carried out. (ditto the soviets)

Mind you, its my considered opinion that the Germans did actually come within a hairs breadth of total victory over the Soviet Union, and so their (or Hitler's) overall concept of the war was fairly sound.

On the Lend Lease side, if the allies hadn't sent the 1/5 million "B" vehicles, the soviets would have been quite incapable of mounting their own campaign of manoeuvre - their logistic transport resource would barely support a static defence.

The British LL contribution makes you aware of the true strategic sacrifice we made: just imagine what a difference all that extra materiel could have made if allocated to British and Commonwealth forces, especially in the Middle and Far East, or - in the case of the raw materials - if translated into additional naval or air assets.
 
And the Germans , incredibly , did absolutely nothing to impede that production of Soviet materiel . you'd almost think they wanted to lose the war .
The Germans were severely hampered by not having a viable Large 4 engined bomber with the range and firepower to reach those factories - that and the fact that their battlefield doctrine/eqpt tended to be tactical in nature rather than Strategic
 
Mind you, its my considered opinion that the Germans did actually come within a hairs breadth of total victory over the Soviet Union, and so their (or Hitler's) overall concept of the war was fairly sound.
If They'd simply either bypassed or chosen to contain Stalingrad rather than a ful scale assault they would have taken Moscow with the freed up resources but whether the Russians would have conceded or not is another question!
 

Zhopa

War Hero
It must have cut Stalin to the bone to have to accept such levels of help from the capitalists. No wonder there was such a level of airbrushing post-WWII.
And some things never change. The current campaign to convince everybody that Russia was "humiliated", "exploited", "excluded" at the end of the Cold War means that the massive amounts of food and technical and financial aid that were sent to the USSR from 1988 through the early 90s have now vanished from official commentary just as completely as Lend-Lease did after the war.
 

skeetstar

Old-Salt
Too late for them to develop the necessary strategic bomber force.

If they had developed a strategic bomber force, they'd probably not have had the resources to spare for much of the ground operations they carried out. (ditto the soviets)

I read somewhere that ten percent of the UKs war effort went into 4 engine bombers.. If that is right and the germans had to make a similar sacrifice of resources, then they couldn't have done as much on the ground as they did .. though of course there are swings and roundabouts.. strategic bombing would degrade Soviet capability and in that sense it may @have paid for itself@.
 
You'd have to ask "with what"?

The entire Barbarossa campaign was predicated on knocking Russia out of the war rapidly with a Blitzkrieg type attack. When the Russians survived it, Germany was in deep smeg.

They lacked to bomber force to carry out a true strategic bombing attack (the He 177 being one of the war's bigger fuster clucks) and when Speer persuaded Hitler to gather enough aircraft for an attack against the factories in range, they had be be diverted back to close air support as the Heer was struggling to hold back the Russian hordes. In any event they lacked the weight of attack to make much of a dent on Soviet production - and much of the Russian industry was out of range anyway.

Some U-boats were operating out of Japan, but attacking US freighters delivering goods to Vladivostok would not have gone down well with the Japanese - who didn't want a fight with the Russians as well as the Americans.

Not a lot the Germans could do about Soviet industry when the Russian war effort kicked up into gear.

Wordsmith
Did the Germans ever aim V2 at Moscow , or was it out of range by then ?
 

Wordsmith

LE
Book Reviewer
Did the Germans ever aim V2 at Moscow , or was it out of range by then ?
Long way out of range. Although Adolf was working on an atmosphere skipping version of the V2 in the hopes of hitting the US.

Although why the US would surrender from a few dozen tons of explosive hitting them escapes me, particularly when the 8th and 15th air forces were dumping a couple of thousand tons onto Germany every week.

Ditto Russia. I very much doubt Stalin would have been worried by a few thousand civilian casualties in Moscow when several million men (and assorted tanks and Stalin organs) were rolling over the German border to say 'hello' to the Fuhrer.

Wordsmith
 
Too late for them to develop the necessary strategic bomber force.

If they had developed a strategic bomber force, they'd probably not have had the resources to spare for much of the ground operations they carried out. (ditto the soviets)
The Germans could only win through a series of quick tactical victories. If it ever came down to a war of attrition being conducted through strategic bombing, then the war was lost for them at that point anyway.

Mind you, its my considered opinion that the Germans did actually come within a hairs breadth of total victory over the Soviet Union, and so their (or Hitler's) overall concept of the war was fairly sound.
Hitler's concept for the war was to achieve a quick victory over the Soviet Union, capture their resources (especially the oil and food), and then eliminate the Slavs as a race within the new German territory and settle it with "Aryans" who would then live in an impregnable self-sufficient bastion. The problem of course was getting to that point.

He did grasp the importance of oil to strategy though, which was why he emphasised capturing the Caucasus oil fields when so many of his generals were fixated on Moscow instead.

On the Lend Lease side, if the allies hadn't sent the 1/5 million "B" vehicles, the soviets would have been quite incapable of mounting their own campaign of manoeuvre - their logistic transport resource would barely support a static defence.
I have seen it very convincingly argued that the German logistical system could not have sustained an advance further than they reached. They simply didn't have either the rail equipment or the experience to conduct an operation on that scale over that long a distance. While the Western Allies built their own long distance logistics on sea transport, on the steppes of eastern Europe it was rail that mattered. Let's put it another way, how well would Britain have been able to fight WWII if it didn't have a huge merchant fleet?

The Soviets on the other hand did have that experience, dating back to the days of the Russian Empire and later the Civil War, both of which were based heavily on rail transport. They also took their rolling stock, and equally important, their depot equipment, with them as they retreated. The Germans didn't have a stockpile of depot equipment to build out new rail infrastructure, and in the days of steam a rail network couldn't operate very far from a depot, and there was a limit to how much the Germans could strip out from their own rail network without crippling domestic transport.

For both sides it was rail transport which carried the bulk of the logistical load. Advances proceeded in fits and starts as each offensive eventually outran their logistical capability from their latest rail head. What trucks did for the Soviets was to allow them to advance further from their rail head, keeping the pressure on the retreating Germans longer, breaking up the German forces and not giving them time to organise a counter attack, before the Soviet offensive had to stop and begin a new logistical build-up cycle.

The British LL contribution makes you aware of the true strategic sacrifice we made: just imagine what a difference all that extra materiel could have made if allocated to British and Commonwealth forces, especially in the Middle and Far East, or - in the case of the raw materials - if translated into additional naval or air assets.
Based on the above, I have also seen it convincingly argued that what providing the Soviets with additional trucks and other war material did was to shorten the war significantly, and preventing the war in the east from bogging down in another stalemate somewhere in Poland.

I'm not sure what the case was for Britain, but for Canada by the end of the war we were severely short of manpower and were having to close coal mines and metal smelters due to lack of labour. I'm not sure just where the manpower to use extra weaponry would have come from, as it was we stopped production of some weapons (e.g. Bren Guns) before the end of the war as we had already made more than Canada and Commonwealth forces had the men to use.

The Germans meanwhile were conscripting labour from all the occupied territories to do their work for them in their mines and factories while they sent their own German manpower off to fight. That wasn't really an option for the Western Allies.

Given the above, it probably made a lot of sense to send equipment to the Soviets to allow them to field and support a bigger army to oppose the Germans.

To take the subject away from war strategy and back to vehicles in particular, Canada produced more vehicles than Germany, Italy, and Japan combined. Indeed, according to the figures that I recall seeing, Canada produced more vehicles than we had men in the army, navy, and air force combined. Many of these vehicles obviously weren't used by Canada, but instead were used to equip British and Commonwealth forces. These included tanks, Bren Gun Carriers, and of course lots and lots of trucks. A lot of the tanks and Bren Gun Carriers went to the Soviet Union (via the UK), but I've never seen an accounting of where the many, many, trucks ended up.
 
The Germans could only win through a series of quick tactical victories. If it ever came down to a war of attrition being conducted through strategic bombing, then the war was lost for them at that point anyway.


Hitler's concept for the war was to achieve a quick victory over the Soviet Union, capture their resources (especially the oil and food), and then eliminate the Slavs as a race within the new German territory and settle it with "Aryans" who would then live in an impregnable self-sufficient bastion. The problem of course was getting to that point.

He did grasp the importance of oil to strategy though, which was why he emphasised capturing the Caucasus oil fields when so many of his generals were fixated on Moscow instead.


I have seen it very convincingly argued that the German logistical system could not have sustained an advance further than they reached. They simply didn't have either the rail equipment or the experience to conduct an operation on that scale over that long a distance. While the Western Allies built their own long distance logistics on sea transport, on the steppes of eastern Europe it was rail that mattered. Let's put it another way, how well would Britain have been able to fight WWII if it didn't have a huge merchant fleet?

The Soviets on the other hand did have that experience, dating back to the days of the Russian Empire and later the Civil War, both of which were based heavily on rail transport. They also took their rolling stock, and equally important, their depot equipment, with them as they retreated. The Germans didn't have a stockpile of depot equipment to build out new rail infrastructure, and in the days of steam a rail network couldn't operate very far from a depot, and there was a limit to how much the Germans could strip out from their own rail network without crippling domestic transport.

For both sides it was rail transport which carried the bulk of the logistical load. Advances proceeded in fits and starts as each offensive eventually outran their logistical capability from their latest rail head. What trucks did for the Soviets was to allow them to advance further from their rail head, keeping the pressure on the retreating Germans longer, breaking up the German forces and not giving them time to organise a counter attack, before the Soviet offensive had to stop and begin a new logistical build-up cycle.


Based on the above, I have also seen it convincingly argued that what providing the Soviets with additional trucks and other war material did was to shorten the war significantly, and preventing the war in the east from bogging down in another stalemate somewhere in Poland.

I'm not sure what the case was for Britain, but for Canada by the end of the war we were severely short of manpower and were having to close coal mines and metal smelters due to lack of labour. I'm not sure just where the manpower to use extra weaponry would have come from, as it was we stopped production of some weapons (e.g. Bren Guns) before the end of the war as we had already made more than Canada and Commonwealth forces had the men to use.

The Germans meanwhile were conscripting labour from all the occupied territories to do their work for them in their mines and factories while they sent their own German manpower off to fight. That wasn't really an option for the Western Allies.

Given the above, it probably made a lot of sense to send equipment to the Soviets to allow them to field and support a bigger army to oppose the Germans.

To take the subject away from war strategy and back to vehicles in particular, Canada produced more vehicles than Germany, Italy, and Japan combined. Indeed, according to the figures that I recall seeing, Canada produced more vehicles than we had men in the army, navy, and air force combined. Many of these vehicles obviously weren't used by Canada, but instead were used to equip British and Commonwealth forces. These included tanks, Bren Gun Carriers, and of course lots and lots of trucks. A lot of the tanks and Bren Gun Carriers went to the Soviet Union (via the UK), but I've never seen an accounting of where the many, many, trucks ended up.
Of course , another another the Soviets had over the Germans was that whereas up to 200,000 partisans were constantly blowing trains behind the German lines , the Soviets didn't have this problem , at least to the same extent because let us not forget that nationalist partisans DID operate in the satellite countries , in some cases not being wiped out 'till the 1960's .
 
Of course , another another the Soviets had over the Germans was that whereas up to 200,000 partisans were constantly blowing trains behind the German lines , the Soviets didn't have this problem , at least to the same extent because let us not forget that nationalist partisans DID operate in the satellite countries , in some cases not being wiped out 'till the 1960's .
Partisans were active behind German lines, but I haven't seen an analysis of the scale of the effect they had on German logistics.
 

Cold_Collation

LE
Book Reviewer
Based on the above, I have also seen it convincingly argued that what providing the Soviets with additional trucks and other war material did was to shorten the war significantly, and preventing the war in the east from bogging down in another stalemate somewhere in Poland.

I'm not sure what the case was for Britain, but for Canada by the end of the war we were severely short of manpower and were having to close coal mines and metal smelters due to lack of labour. I'm not sure just where the manpower to use extra weaponry would have come from, as it was we stopped production of some weapons (e.g. Bren Guns) before the end of the war as we had already made more than Canada and Commonwealth forces had the men to use.

The Germans meanwhile were conscripting labour from all the occupied territories to do their work for them in their mines and factories while they sent their own German manpower off to fight. That wasn't really an option for the Western Allies.

Given the above, it probably made a lot of sense to send equipment to the Soviets to allow them to field and support a bigger army to oppose the Germans.

To take the subject away from war strategy and back to vehicles in particular, Canada produced more vehicles than Germany, Italy, and Japan combined. Indeed, according to the figures that I recall seeing, Canada produced more vehicles than we had men in the army, navy, and air force combined. Many of these vehicles obviously weren't used by Canada, but instead were used to equip British and Commonwealth forces. These included tanks, Bren Gun Carriers, and of course lots and lots of trucks. A lot of the tanks and Bren Gun Carriers went to the Soviet Union (via the UK), but I've never seen an accounting of where the many, many, trucks ended up.
Interesting post, thank you. Most people see a country's war effort in terms of its contribution of (at that point in history) fighting men, not the contribution made by its manufacturing sector to the militaries of allied nations. It's an aspect I hadn't considered from that perspective before even while being aware of the need for industrial output - by that I mean that we almost take for granted the US's economic contribution*.

By that I mean that Canada made a big contribution to the Commonwealth military effort. I just hadn't realised the relative proportion of its industrial contribution.


*Qualifier: it's by no means taken for granted, I just can't find another form of words right now.
 
Partisans were active behind German lines, but I haven't seen an analysis of the scale of the effect they had on German logistics.
They were particularly effective on the eve of Bagration , but throughout the conflict tied up over 100,000 anti partisan troops simply to keep the trains running .
 

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