British defence planning and Britain's NATO commitment 1979 - 1985

AlienFTM

MIA
Book Reviewer
1 (BR) Corps couldn't do it. Chieftain was a superb tank when it broke down in a good fire position. Built to keep 3 Shock Army out. A defensive tank like the Tiger. At the end of the Second Unpleasantness, Monty asserted that Hitler might have got to Antwerp in Dec 44 if he'd had Cromwells and Shermans, but XXX Corps would never have got to Antwerp in Sep 44 if they'd had Tigers and Panthers.

Too soon to see a quorum of CR1s.

During your time frame, with Reagan in charge the Americans might have been bellicose enough to give it a go. I don't remember when they started getting Abrams, but M60 could probably have made a good shout of it. But USSR was well equipped with cheap ATGMs etc, so I doubt it.

Bundeswehr's GDP was "Panzer marsch nach Moskau!" They definitely had the will. Did they have the numbers?
 

LD17

MIA
Just like @AlienFTM said .....the Bundeswehr, on the pretext the best defense is a good offense, would begin motoring East. The plan was to get in the Soviets rear and interrupt the flow of echelons if they could. The U.S.Army Airland doctrine, by the mid/late 80’s was similar but couldn’t be specifically spelled out for political reasons both inside and outside NATO. That being said vague statements were made that counter attacks to regain territory or disrupt Soviet attacks MAY take formations over the IGB.
As for 1 Br Corps in the late ‘80s everything was predicated on luring the Soviets into a killing zone (again look at Alma Halfa) then a counter stroke utilizing 3 AD/7 PzD or the whole of III US Corps which I believe Farndale once stated MAY take those formations over the IGB.
Finally, I think you can Google this, but one of my Canadian Army Cold War books has a pic of a Canadian M113 on exercise in 1980 with a sign that said “Poland or Bust”
 

AlienFTM

MIA
Book Reviewer
Just like @AlienFTM said .....the Bundeswehr, on the pretext the best defense is a good offense, would begin motoring East. The plan was to get in the Soviets rear and interrupt the flow of echelons if they could. The U.S.Army Airland doctrine, by the mid/late 80’s was similar but couldn’t be specifically spelled out for political reasons both inside and outside NATO. That being said vague statements were made that counter attacks to regain territory or disrupt Soviet attacks MAY take formations over the IGB.
As for 1 Br Corps in the late ‘80s everything was predicated on luring the Soviets into a killing zone (again look at Alma Halfa) then a counter stroke utilizing 3 AD/7 PzD or the whole of III US Corps which I believe Farndale once stated MAY take those formations over the IGB.
Finally, I think you can Google this, but one of my Canadian Army Cold War books has a pic of a Canadian M113 on exercise in 1980 with a sign that said “Poland or Bust”
Wrt the IGB. West Germany never recognised it and insisted on one Germany. Hands were tied when Osties came swarming.

I see the IGB as a purely strategic barrier to the Bundeswehr, and they would only hesitate long enough to clear the minefields.
 

Yokel

LE
This might interest some:

Statement on the Defence Estimates 1983

Recognising the primacy of NATO in our defence policy , in Cmnd 8288 "The Way Forward" we identified the four main role s in which the Armed Forces contribute to the collective deterrent : the provision of independent strategic and theatre nuclear forces committed to the Alliance ; the direct defence of the United Kingdom homeland; a major land and air contribution on the European our mainland; and the deployment of a major maritime capability in the Eastern fur Atlantic and the Channel.

Page 1-8
 
Does this documents exist in pdf:

D/MIN/JG/7/11, Annex A, Memorandum to the Minister of State for Defence from the Private Secretary, 21st December 1977, Ministry of Defence, ‘War Reserve Stocks’, n.d., DEFE 13/1059, TNA.

VCDS(P&L) 203, Draft of Memorandum to the Secretary of State for Defence from VCDS(P&L), 1981, Holding of War Reserves, ‘NATO Logistics Policy General UK Logistics Assumptions’, n.d., para. 4, DEFE 25/432, TNA.
 

LD17

MIA
Does this documents exist in pdf:

D/MIN/JG/7/11, Annex A, Memorandum to the Minister of State for Defence from the Private Secretary, 21st December 1977, Ministry of Defence, ‘War Reserve Stocks’, n.d., DEFE 13/1059, TNA.

VCDS(P&L) 203, Draft of Memorandum to the Secretary of State for Defence from VCDS(P&L), 1981, Holding of War Reserves, ‘NATO Logistics Policy General UK Logistics Assumptions’, n.d., para. 4, DEFE 25/432, TNA.
Nope, TNA re-opens April 27. You will have to book a time slot in advance, bring a digital camera or your mobile phone to take pics of every page.
 
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