My understanding is that there was only enough pre-positioned ammo for around 7 days of full-scale operations. This without taking into account destruction of storage facilities and degradation of supply lines (even before NBC conditions).
The Chiefs of Staff advised the Government in 1981 that, “… BAOR did not have the capability to sustain conventional warfare in the Central Region for more than four days …”[lxv] The indications were that vital stock such as anti-tank missiles and tank rounds would be used up within three days.
It seems I may have been ovewrlty optimistic
“Among the most serious shortfalls are Army air defence and anti-tank missiles (Blowpipe, Rapier, Swingfire, Milan, Tow) and [RAF] air-to-air missiles (Sidewinder, Sparrow, MRAAM). [Based on the latest plans] stocks of Blowpipe by 1980 will be sufficient for less than 5 days at intensive rates and stocks of Rapier, only 2 days. [Similarly] 5 days’ stocks of Milan will not be accumulated until 1987/88 and of Swingfire until 1984/85. Heavy ammunition is also in short supply, for example Chieftain APDS (3 days’ stocks by 1980) [Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot], 155mm shells for FM70 [Artillery piece] (2½ days’ in 1980) and 51mm Mortar ammunition (3½ days by 1980).”[lxiv]
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I would also assume that if NATO did not achieve air superiority quickly then the WP would take full advantage of having shorter supply lines to, literally, outgun us.