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"Boris Johnson to take aim at MoD over wasted cash..."

Come on now. You have been here long enough to know that all Army procurement issues are the fault of the Army and the Army alone, whilst all Navy procurement issues are the fault of someone else entirely.

i read it on one of Jim’s blogs.
That’s probably very true.
 
Please excuse the Iranian source, but it does at least get around The Times' pay wall, on a subject that has otherwise gone dark in the MSM.

'Prime Minister, Boris Johnson’s much-vaunted defence and security review is descending into chaos, in large measure because of the incoherence at the heart of government.

'According to the Times newspaper, the chaos has intensified since the departure of Christopher Brannigan, the defence lead at Downing Street’s policy unit. Brannigan left last week, in large measure because of the lobbying of the PM’s highly controversial chief strategist, Dominic Cummings. The foreign policy, defence and security review under consideration is part of Jonson’s plan to conduct the most sweeping review of the UK’s defence capabilities since the conclusion of the Cold War three decades ago.

'The PM first announced the intention to conduct the review during campaigning for last December’s general election. The Times reports that since the Tories’ election victory, “disagreements” have erupted over appointments to key panels and timetables. The news paper quotes a source as claiming: “There are a series of rows and some nasty internal politics that have raged over the forthcoming integrated review”. Another source told the newspaper that there is uproar about a series of “has-beens” who have been appointed to the review.

'Meanwhile, the Times defence editor, Lucy Fisher (the author of the report), has tweeted that a “Whitehall source” is complaining about the possibility of the review not being sufficiently focused on foreign policy. In another tweet, Fisher quotes Lord Alan West, the former chief of the Royal Navy, who has hawkish views on defence and foreign policy, complaining about a “nasty atmosphere” at Number 10 Downing Street. Lord West’s complaint is presumably a thinly veiled reference to the maverick and disruptive Cummings.'


 
Please excuse the Iranian source, but it does at least get around The Times' pay wall, on a subject that has otherwise gone dark in the MSM.

'Prime Minister, Boris Johnson’s much-vaunted defence and security review is descending into chaos, in large measure because of the incoherence at the heart of government.

'According to the Times newspaper, the chaos has intensified since the departure of Christopher Brannigan, the defence lead at Downing Street’s policy unit. Brannigan left last week, in large measure because of the lobbying of the PM’s highly controversial chief strategist, Dominic Cummings. The foreign policy, defence and security review under consideration is part of Jonson’s plan to conduct the most sweeping review of the UK’s defence capabilities since the conclusion of the Cold War three decades ago.

'The PM first announced the intention to conduct the review during campaigning for last December’s general election. The Times reports that since the Tories’ election victory, “disagreements” have erupted over appointments to key panels and timetables. The news paper quotes a source as claiming: “There are a series of rows and some nasty internal politics that have raged over the forthcoming integrated review”. Another source told the newspaper that there is uproar about a series of “has-beens” who have been appointed to the review.

'Meanwhile, the Times defence editor, Lucy Fisher (the author of the report), has tweeted that a “Whitehall source” is complaining about the possibility of the review not being sufficiently focused on foreign policy. In another tweet, Fisher quotes Lord Alan West, the former chief of the Royal Navy, who has hawkish views on defence and foreign policy, complaining about a “nasty atmosphere” at Number 10 Downing Street. Lord West’s complaint is presumably a thinly veiled reference to the maverick and disruptive Cummings.'




In fairness to Lord West, who generally strikes me as questionable, Cummings is clearly a total ****
 
Defence is unlikely to win out of this review. The facts that our domestic security services would be swamped if 20 or so convicted terrorists are release early versus Defence's alleged ability to deploy an armoured division globally...who is going to win the funding argument?
 
Defence is unlikely to win out of this review. The facts that our domestic security services would be swamped if 20 or so convicted terrorists are release early versus Defence's alleged ability to deploy an armoured division globally...who is going to win the funding argument?

there are VSO’s determined to sieze this opportunity to make proper and long overdue changes to the structure and organisation of HM armed forces, but they are fighting an establishment fighting a furious action to preserve the status quo.
 
What fundamental changes would you propose?
Here's a bit of Sunday morning heresy...

no-one will notice one more division in Central Europe but losing the Atlantic would sever NATO in two and lead to rapid defeat.....
This is not original. It is just a partial return to the UK’s historic posture of having balance between land and sea power. It was only our decision in the First World War to commit to a debilitating continental commitment which shifted the balance towards the land. And while land power gets us involved in messy stalemates in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, sea power can enable true global reach and influence.

Of course the change would see the loss of some important capabilities. In particular we would no longer be able to conduct a major land intervention without a multi-year lead time. That would be a loss, but not a vital one, and certainly not one that threatens our safety. In wartime so long as our sea power holds the ring we can build an army, but if we lose the sea then no army, of any size, can be of use.

This is not an argument against land power in general. For Poland, for example, with long and vulnerable land borders, the vital requirement is land power.

But Britain is an island. Our vital interests require sea power above all else. That is where our resources should be focused.
 
Here's a bit of Sunday morning heresy...

no-one will notice one more division in Central Europe but losing the Atlantic would sever NATO in two and lead to rapid defeat.....
This is not original. It is just a partial return to the UK’s historic posture of having balance between land and sea power. It was only our decision in the First World War to commit to a debilitating continental commitment which shifted the balance towards the land. And while land power gets us involved in messy stalemates in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, sea power can enable true global reach and influence.

Of course the change would see the loss of some important capabilities. In particular we would no longer be able to conduct a major land intervention without a multi-year lead time. That would be a loss, but not a vital one, and certainly not one that threatens our safety. In wartime so long as our sea power holds the ring we can build an army, but if we lose the sea then no army, of any size, can be of use.

This is not an argument against land power in general. For Poland, for example, with long and vulnerable land borders, the vital requirement is land power.

But Britain is an island. Our vital interests require sea power above all else. That is where our resources should be focused.
Ah yes, the naval lobby's fallacy that building an army is relatively simple.

Using manpower levels to determine our levels of investment in the vital and important is farcical, as the return from manpower is different in each domain (50 blokes gives you the ability to man a minehunter at sea - which is a noticeable return . On the land it gives you a platoon plus which can fortify a farm complex - which is not). Just because 83000 is a large slice of current UK defence manpower does not make 83000 a big army - it is historically the smallest standing army the UK has had since the 17th century

The article sweeps aside the requirement for a Divisional capability by stating that no-one would miss another Div in Central Europe. However it fails to understand that there are currently very few capable Divs in NATO. This article relegates the UK to the periphery of NATO, to an enabling organisation expecting other nations to do the heavy lifting.
 
What fundamental changes would you propose?

1st step?

slash Army to 50,000, scrap all the ‘tradition’ that actually doesn’t date back more than a century, turn it into a proper military force, not a glorified boys club with huge numbers of troops dressed as the Ruritarian Palace Guard.
the 7th Loamshires will work just as well as the 7th Infantry Regiment, they will function just as well with a standard Army dress uniform sans ostrich feathers and scarlet tunics. The RAF and RN function perfectly well with that model.

RAF and Navy get the lions share of the budget - we’re an island, WWII ended 75 years ago - enough with the planning to fight wars on mainland Europe, leave that to the EUropeans.
 
1st step?

slash Army to 50,000, scrap all the ‘tradition’ that actually doesn’t date back more than a century, turn it into a proper military force, not a glorified boys club with huge numbers of troops dressed as the Ruritarian Palace Guard.
the 7th Loamshires will work just as well as the 7th Infantry Regiment, they will function just as well with a standard Army dress uniform sans ostrich feathers and scarlet tunics. The RAF and RN function perfectly well with that model.

RAF and Navy get the lions share of the budget - we’re an island, WWII ended 75 years ago - enough with the planning to fight wars on mainland Europe, leave that to the EUropeans.
Agree with navy, and getting everyone into same uniform, get rid of paras, keep SBS,
Get rid of things like Swords, Admirals and brigadiers you only need two of each (one spare). Have an internal army for border controls.
 
Here's a bit of Sunday morning heresy...

no-one will notice one more division in Central Europe but losing the Atlantic would sever NATO in two and lead to rapid defeat.....
This is not original. It is just a partial return to the UK’s historic posture of having balance between land and sea power. It was only our decision in the First World War to commit to a debilitating continental commitment which shifted the balance towards the land. And while land power gets us involved in messy stalemates in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, sea power can enable true global reach and influence.

Of course the change would see the loss of some important capabilities. In particular we would no longer be able to conduct a major land intervention without a multi-year lead time. That would be a loss, but not a vital one, and certainly not one that threatens our safety. In wartime so long as our sea power holds the ring we can build an army, but if we lose the sea then no army, of any size, can be of use.

This is not an argument against land power in general. For Poland, for example, with long and vulnerable land borders, the vital requirement is land power.

But Britain is an island. Our vital interests require sea power above all else. That is where our resources should be focused.
Interesting, and certainly true of times past.

They seem to have forgotten Air power though, arguably (and at the risk of heresy from the RN chaps) air power is in many cases the obvious progression from sea power now we have mastered powered flight in a way rather better than in the first world war era...
 
Ah yes, the naval lobby's fallacy that building an army is relatively simple.

Using manpower levels to determine our levels of investment in the vital and important is farcical, as the return from manpower is different in each domain (50 blokes gives you the ability to man a minehunter at sea - which is a noticeable return . On the land it gives you a platoon plus which can fortify a farm complex - which is not). Just because 83000 is a large slice of current UK defence manpower does not make 83000 a big army - it is historically the smallest standing army the UK has had since the 17th century

The article sweeps aside the requirement for a Divisional capability by stating that no-one would miss another Div in Central Europe. However it fails to understand that there are currently very few capable Divs in NATO. This article relegates the UK to the periphery of NATO, to an enabling organisation expecting other nations to do the heavy lifting.
Not sure I've ever seen anything institutionally that said building an army is relatively simple, but you miss the complexity behind even some of your own statements.

That article just highlights that with a limited resource you have to make strategic choice and in his analysis a model to follow could be that of the Australians. Which if we decided that we didn't want/need to be world policeman #2 then maybe that would be sensible.

After all right now we've an Army with Inf Bn's at ridiculous manning levels and the RAF and RN aren't far behind that - so we really do need to examine what we really need our military to do and how best we do that - IR20!

A final point in terms of complexity of organisation and capability I'd definitely agree that in relative terms the Army falls well behind the RN and RAF, in capability complexity.
 
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