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Beirut Explosion, so what was it?

Goatman

ADC
Book Reviewer
Some local action : Egypt airlifts aid to Lebanon in wake of Beirut blast



...and this is interesting:

US contractor told Lebanese port official of chemicals risk

Skim: In 2016, an American security consultant under contract to State Dept, did a review of Beirut port security issues. One of the things his report contained was a warning on the storage of potentially dangerous amounts of ammonium nitrate alongside in the port area.


The US story can be found in New York Times here:
US Contractor Told Lebanese Port Official of Chemicals Risk
 
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Some local action : Egypt airlifts aid to Lebanon in wake of Beirut blast



...and this is interesting:

US contractor told Lebanese port official of chemicals risk

Skim: In 2016, an American security consultant under contract to State Dept, did a review of Beirut port security issues. One of the things his report contained was a warning on the storage of potentially dangerous amounts of ammonium nitrate alongside in the port area.


The US story can be found in New York Times here:
US Contractor Told Lebanese Port Official of Chemicals Risk
Cheers.
A few of us mentioned in the first few pages of the thread that there may have been some sort of ISPS inspection of the facility and that it would have picked up on the risk.
@Oyibo
 

Goatman

ADC
Book Reviewer
Yup....lot of evidence Lebanese Govt were warned of the risks and chose to ignore.

Welcome to the Ford Pinto Paradigm.


Before producing the Pinto, Ford crash-tested various prototypes, in part to learn whether they met a safety standard proposed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to reduce fires from traffic collisions. This standard would have required that by 1972 all new autos be able to withstand a rear-end impact of 20mph without fuel loss, and that by 1973 they be able to withstand an impact of 30 mph. The prototypes all failed the 20-mph test. In 1970 Ford crash-tested the Pinto itself, and the result was the same: ruptured gas tanks and dangerous leaks. The only Pintos to pass the test had been modified in some way–for example, with a rubber bladder in the gas tank or a piece of steel between the tank and the rear bumper.

Thus, Ford knew that the Pinto represented a serious fire hazard when struck from the rear, even in low-speed collisions. Ford officials faced a decision. Should they go ahead with the existing design, thereby meeting the production timetable but possibly jeopardizing consumer safety? Or should they delay production of the Pinto by redesigning the gas tank to make it safer and thus concede another year of subcompact dominance to foreign companies? Ford not only pushed ahead with the original design but stuck to it for the next six years.




In Beirut the 'Do Nothing' option was poorly evaluated for ' downside risk impacts ' - aka sh1t happens.
 
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Yup....lot of evidence Lebanese Govt were warned of the risks and chose to ignore.
It will be OK habibi, come for a ride in my bintley, nothing to see here.
 
Yup....lot of evidence Lebanese Govt were warned of the risks and chose to ignore.

Welcome to the Ford Pinto Paradigm.


Before producing the Pinto, Ford crash-tested various prototypes, in part to learn whether they met a safety standard proposed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to reduce fires from traffic collisions. This standard would have required that by 1972 all new autos be able to withstand a rear-end impact of 20mph without fuel loss, and that by 1973 they be able to withstand an impact of 30 mph. The prototypes all failed the 20-mph test. In 1970 Ford crash-tested the Pinto itself, and the result was the same: ruptured gas tanks and dangerous leaks. The only Pintos to pass the test had been modified in some way–for example, with a rubber bladder in the gas tank or a piece of steel between the tank and the rear bumper.

Thus, Ford knew that the Pinto represented a serious fire hazard when struck from the rear, even in low-speed collisions. Ford officials faced a decision. Should they go ahead with the existing design, thereby meeting the production timetable but possibly jeopardizing consumer safety? Or should they delay production of the Pinto by redesigning the gas tank to make it safer and thus concede another year of subcompact dominance to foreign companies? Ford not only pushed ahead with the original design but stuck to it for the next six years.




In Beirut the 'Do Nothing' option was poorly evaluated for downside risk impacts.

The Pinto came up in a business management course once.

The primary question for discussion was the ethical one - knowing the car failed should Ford make a minor change or do a CBA to estimate the additional cost against likely payouts (given the extra cost would apply to every Pinto but any payouts might only apply to a small percentage of them).

My friend cracked me up when he said the even bigger question was "what c*nt would buy such a piece of f*cking s*it".
 
The Pinto came up in a business management course once.

The primary question for discussion was the ethical financial one - knowing the car failed should Ford make a minor change or do a CBA to estimate the additional cost against likely payouts (given the extra cost would apply to every Pinto but any payouts might only apply to a small percentage of them).

My friend cracked me up when he said the even bigger question was "what c*nt would buy such a piece of f*cking s*it".
There's only reason for doing something (or not doing something) at Ford
 
Speaking of accidents waiting to happen ...

'Almost 26,000 tons of ammonium nitrate are stored in Constanta Port, southeastern Romania, the national Sea Port Administration has announced on Thursday, warning that all operators of dangerous substances must have a security plan approved by the Inspectorate for Emergency Situations.

'26,000 tons means a quantity tens time higher than the one stored in the port in Beirut, of around 2,750 ammonium nitrate, which exploded on August 5 and claimed hundreds of lives and leaving thousands injured and homeless.

'The Constanta Sea Port Administration has announced that there are currently 25,952 tons of ammonium nitrate stored in the Port of Constanta and that “this type of merchandise is stored in special warehouses certified by the Inspectorate for Emergency Situations.”


 
Speaking of accidents waiting to happen ...

'Almost 26,000 tons of ammonium nitrate are stored in Constanta Port, southeastern Romania, the national Sea Port Administration has announced on Thursday, warning that all operators of dangerous substances must have a security plan approved by the Inspectorate for Emergency Situations.

'26,000 tons means a quantity tens time higher than the one stored in the port in Beirut, of around 2,750 ammonium nitrate, which exploded on August 5 and claimed hundreds of lives and leaving thousands injured and homeless.

'The Constanta Sea Port Administration has announced that there are currently 25,952 tons of ammonium nitrate stored in the Port of Constanta and that “this type of merchandise is stored in special warehouses certified by the Inspectorate for Emergency Situations.”



Someone weld that door shut before anyone goes in there with a light.
 
Someone weld that door shut before anyone goes in there with a light.
I wondered WTF a special warehouse is “this type of merchandise is stored in special warehouses certified by the Inspectorate for Emergency Situations.” One contained lalloons and ice cream?
 

HE117

LE
I like the basic idea of denying entrance, but a source of extreme heat near ammonium nitrate? There have been enough accidents and fires due to welding over the years. That might not end well.
Can we just clarify this one...

1. AN is not inflammable in the normal sense. It is an oxidiser, It is widely held in approved bulk storage locations around the world with minimal risk.

2. Whatever set the AN off was not a welding torch.

3. A welding torch may very well have set off something else, which in turn triggered a high order detonation of the AN..

If properly stored according to well defined quantity distances, hazard divisions and mixing rules, the risks involved in storing hazardous materials can be minimised.

Break the rules and anything can happen!
 

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