Sent from a mate in the Aussie army. It seems they are frustrated with getting the "soft" roles in contemporary theatres. Start fighting for real Paul Kelly, Editor-at-large | July 23, 2008 THE most highly placed Australian to serve in Iraq has offered a lethal critique of the Australian way of war in its diplomatic, strategic and military dimensions, challenging the orthodoxy of the Howard and Rudd governments. Major General Jim Molan's perspective is unique. In 2004 he served as chief of operations to the US commander of the multinational force in Iraq, General George Casey, seeing virtually nothing of Australian forces but at the headquarters' epicentre. In his new book Running the War in Iraq, Molan has much to say about the war but the sting is his critique of Australia, its war culture and its diplomatic and alliance strategy. Molan is a champion of the Australian Defence Forces and deeply aware of its recent successes. But at the end of his book he makes a frontal assault on Australia's strategic orthodoxy. He is appalled at our complacency and reluctance to accept political and military responsibility. His views are relevant given a new defence White Paper commissioned by the Rudd Government. Putting it bluntly, Molan, who retired a fortnight ago, says Australia is not prepared "to fight a war involving sustained combat". As a professional, he is embarrassed. The conclusion from his book is that Australia has been too successful in winning political dividends from extremely limited military commitments. Sooner or later, he believes, our luck will expire. Molan argues that Australia's political and military mindset has a view of the ADF "skewed too far towards humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and peacemaking, and away from war-fighting". For Molan, this is the central lesson for Australia from the Iraq war, a radical take within the contemporary debate. He is too polite to state the obvious. But this softer view of the ADF suits the political class, the Coalition and the Labor Party, much of the ADF itself and is championed by many of our strategic thinkers. It is a means by which Australia is a faithful alliance partner, a niche military player and minimises casualties. In Iraq, the British asked the Howard government to accept responsibility for a province. Australia refused. It shrank at the idea of such responsibility. In Afghanistan, the Rudd Government has launched an international campaign saying the West has no winning strategy. But Australia won't make any unilateral extra troop commitment. When Molan left his post at HQ in Iraq, what did the Australian Government do? It refused to replace him. It didn't want an Australian officer with such responsibility. Molan's vision from Iraqi headquarters was that US military leaders divided nations into "swimmers and non-swimmers": those nations whose troops fight and die, and those who attend to show the flag. His implication is clear: Australia went to Iraq but, outside the special forces, it didn't fight. It was essentially showing the flag. Showing the flag is an important political exercise, but nations should be self-aware of the consequences of such limited commitment. In his book, Molan says: "Iraq confirmed my long-held belief that even a small country such as Australia needs to be up to world standard in the fighting part of operations. Every soldier's bone in my body tells me that modern counterinsurgency operations in what may be a long war will require the ADF, not just our special forces, to fight jointly as well as do all the other clever things that are necessary in a three-block war. "(Former general) Peter Cosgrove ran a masterful campaign in East Timor - I was there and I watched him on the ground in Dili with admiration - but the level of troop opposition fell below what one would call 'war-fighting'. Our troops were involved in several clashes in East Timor and were ready for much more, but it was not the kind of close combat that is under way every day in modern urban counterinsurgencies. "In the Solomons, the ADF's commitment was small and, thanks to competent civilian and military leadership, no combat occurred." In Iraq and Afghanistan, Australia's special forces were effective in combat. Air and maritime operations were highly effective. The troops in southern Iraq were "a very light force" that was not tested in combat. In Iraq, offensive operations and fighting were left to Britain and the US. Not Australia. Molan says most nations that committed to Iraq restricted their troops to "non-offensive or non-combat roles, many for the simple reason that they were not capable of fighting a modern insurgent force in a city". Include Australia in such ranks. Both Iraq and Afghanistan reveal the Australian way of war: pledge early, make the minimum commitment and plan to evacuate as soon as possible. In both cases we had to recommit because the wars were going badly. But our allies are not mugs; they know the Australian game. American and British politicians accepted casualties for a cause in which they believed. Australian politicians are reluctant to enter this zone. Molan says Australia does not have generals who control troops on the battlefield. It has not been involved in "serious, joint, sustained combat since Vietnam". Instead, it luxuriates in limited deployments of choice within wars of choice. His critics will say that Australia has been smart. After all, there are no prizes for war dead. But Molan thinks such cleverness will rebound against Australia because this strategy cannot work forever. He argues, first, that urban insurgency is only going to intensify. He predicts this trend in Afghanistan and says it will be a strong theme of future wars. The enemy knows Western technological advantage is weakened in urban warfare. Second, Afghanistan will be lost unless a stronger military commitment is made, another test of political will and responsibility. Third, it is Australia's enemies that will have a major say in dictating our future military engagements, not Canberra's strategic experts. We delude ourselves to think Australia can just decide how and when to fight. Any Australian decision that it doesn't need the arms, protection, training and combat ethos for modern intensive warfare but prefers instead to limit the ADF to lighter East Timor-type operations and peacekeeping will have huge strategic consequences. It will severely limit Australia's future defence and foreign policy options. It will also limit the capacity of the ADF for joint operations with allies and for leadership of regional coalitions.