Yokel
LE

I am not sure that BREXIT has made any difference security wise. Apart from NATO there are things such as joint initiatives with France and other nations still in the EU. However, just the suggestion of Russian interference serves Moscow in that it weakens trust in democratic processes,
What better what to separate the North American and European members of NATO that to deny NATO the use of the Atlantic for reinforcement?
The Russians have built and are modernizing an integrated missile and subsurface and surface fleet, reinforced by airpower, to provide an expand zone of defense for the Kola Peninsula. They are also shaping more capabilities to ensure that the much reduced port structure, which could receive reinforcements from the U.S. or Canada, could be destroyed in times of severe conflict.
“If a crisis comes, the Russian navy is increasingly well placed and equipped to operate in the far North Atlantic to strike at vital ports, airfields, and command-and-control centers that are needed to bring in U.S. and NATO reinforcements coming across the North Atlantic. If those cross-Atlantic reinforcements were stopped or delayed in coming ashore, NATO and the United States could very well lose a confrontation with Russia in Europe’s east, far away from the shores of the Atlantic.”
The arrival of the new Russian capabilities – cruise missiles throughout the fleet with higher quality platforms to deliver missile strikes – has come with the procurement holiday and shift of focus by the U.S. and allies to the land wars in the Middle East. Much of the infrastructure built ashore to support maritime power in the North Atlantic has atrophied or simply disappeared.
“The network of bases and sensors that were established throughout the North Atlantic region and beyond to deal with the challenge of the Soviet navy was truly impressive, and by the end of the Cold War these nodes in NATO’s defense of the North Atlantic ranged from Bermuda in the west and Sigonella in Italy, far into the Mediterranean, and from Iceland and Norway in the north to the Azores in the south. Keflavik, however, stood out as a hub among the other spokes for North Atlantic ASW operations.”
This has been accompanied by a dramatic shrinkage of air and naval capabilities available to prosecute a Russian fleet as well.
“In aggregate, twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War the naval picture in the North Atlantic had changed radically. European navies were smaller than ever before, but primed and ready to take on missions and threats far from their European waters. The U.S. naval presence in Europe had been more than halved and reoriented toward the Mediterranean and the turbulent Middle East. Sensor networks, basing infrastructure, and command structures intended for the Atlantic and Europe’s north had been reduced or scrapped during the same period. And ASW training was far from the minds of Western navies. Then, in 2014, great-power competition and the specter of future war returned to Europe and the North Atlantic.”
This state of affairs, the return of the Russian challenge, and the disappearance of the defense systems for the West to deal with a Russian challenge, has led to a a significant challenge for the West. On the one hand, the Nordics have re-focused on their direct defense, and are building out new capabilities to deal with a 21stcentury Russian challenge. And on the other hand, the NATO allies not present in continental Europe, the UK, Canada, and the United States, have refocused on the challenge and are starting the process of rebuilding the capabilities.
From here.
Several policy documents and the SAP have indicated an ambition to resurrect Russian military capabilities and maintain a leading world military. In particular, the maritime doctrine issued in 2015 and the 2017 state naval policy serve as critical enablers for the modernization of submarine capabilities. While the 2015 maritime doctrine emphasized two geographical areas (the Arctic and the Atlantic), the 2017 state naval policy stressed the importance of a permanent naval presence in both the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea as key priorities for the future Russian navy. This represents an evolution from the Soviet-era doctrine of global military dominance to a military capable of projecting its power globally. Nevertheless, those documents affirm ambitious qualitative plans for the navy’s development — in which submarines play the most critical role — as well as for the development of long-range high-precision conventional weapons that will significantly enhance Russian military capabilities.
In absolute terms, contemporary Russian military hardware is more modern and technologically more advanced than it was during the 1990s and 2000s as a direct result of the “New Look” modernization program launched in 2008. This ambition has translated into the development of new cutting-edge underwater capabilities, which can be seen on par with some Western powers. The Yasen-M SSGN class represents a significant step forward in acoustic signature and sub-systems and weapon integration. According to the U.S. Navy, the “Severodvinsk (Yasen-class) is the most capable Russian attack submarine ever built and leverages many of the technologies the Soviet Union invested in during the 1970s and 1980s.”
From here.
What better what to separate the North American and European members of NATO that to deny NATO the use of the Atlantic for reinforcement?
The Russians have built and are modernizing an integrated missile and subsurface and surface fleet, reinforced by airpower, to provide an expand zone of defense for the Kola Peninsula. They are also shaping more capabilities to ensure that the much reduced port structure, which could receive reinforcements from the U.S. or Canada, could be destroyed in times of severe conflict.
“If a crisis comes, the Russian navy is increasingly well placed and equipped to operate in the far North Atlantic to strike at vital ports, airfields, and command-and-control centers that are needed to bring in U.S. and NATO reinforcements coming across the North Atlantic. If those cross-Atlantic reinforcements were stopped or delayed in coming ashore, NATO and the United States could very well lose a confrontation with Russia in Europe’s east, far away from the shores of the Atlantic.”
The arrival of the new Russian capabilities – cruise missiles throughout the fleet with higher quality platforms to deliver missile strikes – has come with the procurement holiday and shift of focus by the U.S. and allies to the land wars in the Middle East. Much of the infrastructure built ashore to support maritime power in the North Atlantic has atrophied or simply disappeared.
“The network of bases and sensors that were established throughout the North Atlantic region and beyond to deal with the challenge of the Soviet navy was truly impressive, and by the end of the Cold War these nodes in NATO’s defense of the North Atlantic ranged from Bermuda in the west and Sigonella in Italy, far into the Mediterranean, and from Iceland and Norway in the north to the Azores in the south. Keflavik, however, stood out as a hub among the other spokes for North Atlantic ASW operations.”
This has been accompanied by a dramatic shrinkage of air and naval capabilities available to prosecute a Russian fleet as well.
“In aggregate, twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War the naval picture in the North Atlantic had changed radically. European navies were smaller than ever before, but primed and ready to take on missions and threats far from their European waters. The U.S. naval presence in Europe had been more than halved and reoriented toward the Mediterranean and the turbulent Middle East. Sensor networks, basing infrastructure, and command structures intended for the Atlantic and Europe’s north had been reduced or scrapped during the same period. And ASW training was far from the minds of Western navies. Then, in 2014, great-power competition and the specter of future war returned to Europe and the North Atlantic.”
This state of affairs, the return of the Russian challenge, and the disappearance of the defense systems for the West to deal with a Russian challenge, has led to a a significant challenge for the West. On the one hand, the Nordics have re-focused on their direct defense, and are building out new capabilities to deal with a 21stcentury Russian challenge. And on the other hand, the NATO allies not present in continental Europe, the UK, Canada, and the United States, have refocused on the challenge and are starting the process of rebuilding the capabilities.
From here.
Several policy documents and the SAP have indicated an ambition to resurrect Russian military capabilities and maintain a leading world military. In particular, the maritime doctrine issued in 2015 and the 2017 state naval policy serve as critical enablers for the modernization of submarine capabilities. While the 2015 maritime doctrine emphasized two geographical areas (the Arctic and the Atlantic), the 2017 state naval policy stressed the importance of a permanent naval presence in both the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea as key priorities for the future Russian navy. This represents an evolution from the Soviet-era doctrine of global military dominance to a military capable of projecting its power globally. Nevertheless, those documents affirm ambitious qualitative plans for the navy’s development — in which submarines play the most critical role — as well as for the development of long-range high-precision conventional weapons that will significantly enhance Russian military capabilities.
In absolute terms, contemporary Russian military hardware is more modern and technologically more advanced than it was during the 1990s and 2000s as a direct result of the “New Look” modernization program launched in 2008. This ambition has translated into the development of new cutting-edge underwater capabilities, which can be seen on par with some Western powers. The Yasen-M SSGN class represents a significant step forward in acoustic signature and sub-systems and weapon integration. According to the U.S. Navy, the “Severodvinsk (Yasen-class) is the most capable Russian attack submarine ever built and leverages many of the technologies the Soviet Union invested in during the 1970s and 1980s.”
From here.
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