Army Veterans Facing murder charges over Bloody Sunday within two weeks

How did they arrive at the figure of 7000
Any single contact report would be logged in a Company ops room: the commander under fire would venture a guesstimate of rounds fired at him, and that would reach Bde within minutes, via Bn Tac HQ.

At the end of every day, every Coy would produce a concise summary of the day's events, according to a standard template. This would include a skeleton of relevant info around each contact report, refined and maybe supplemented with additional 'after action' information.

At every level, the night shift watchkeeper was responsible for assembling the NIREP as per the timetable, and for briefing their commander in the morning.

I did this at Coy, Bn and Bde level.

I'd lay money this is the basis of the estimate calculated by HQNI

That said, you might want to read back to my comments about Bill, and his observations about how (in 1972) how few contacts were actually reported.

Upshot? The official figure is but a Scientific Wild Arrsed Guesstimate (SWAG), and likely a gross under-guesstimate.
 
Any single contact report would be logged in a Company ops room: the commander under fire would venture a guesstimate of rounds fired at him, and that would reach Bde within minutes, via Bn Tac HQ.

At the end of every day, every Coy would produce a concise summary of the day's events, according to a standard template. This would include a skeleton of relevant info around each contact report, refined and maybe supplemented with additional 'after action' information.

At every level, the night shift watchkeeper was responsible for assembling the NIREP as per the timetable, and for briefing their commander in the morning.

I did this at Coy, Bn and Bde level.

I'd lay money this is the basis of the estimate calculated by HQNI

That said, you might want to read back to my comments about Bill, and his observations about how (in 1972) how few contacts were actually reported.

Upshot? The official figure is but a Scientific Wild Arrsed Guesstimate (SWAG), and likely a gross under-guesstimate.
Thanks for that
 
I didn't say they that they didn't know they were being shot at, who counts the rounds of incoming small arms fire so arriving at a figure of 7000 rounds
Stonker has provided a clear overview of the process used for collation and dissemination of the data. I alluded to the same in a more consise form. The estimate of the number of incoming rounds was provided by the person reporting the contact - aka the person who (or whose unit) was being shot at.
 
God forbid that professional soldiers knew when they were being shot at!
2RRF, late 1974.

Cpl S (a Geordie, speaking at 200 syllables per minute, and very loud): "Helleugh Zereurgh, this is Too Zeereurgh Braveurgh. CONTAKT, Wait Oot"

Pause . . .​

Ops Room: "Hallo 2 Zero Bravo, say again all after 'Hello', Over"​

"Too Zeereurgh Braveurgh, CONTAKT!! Eurvah!!!!"

Ops Room: "Ahh: ROGER! How many rounds fired?"​

"Too Zeereurgh Braveurgh: aboot faive!!"

Ops Room: "High velocity or low velocity?"​

"Too Zeereurgh Braveurgh: They were gannin' fookin' fast when they went past ma heid!!!! OOOT!!!"

That's the approximate quality of many/most of the data sources.
 
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Stonker has provided a clear overview of the process used for collation and dissemination of the data. I alluded to the same in a more consise form. The estimate of the number of incoming rounds was provided by the person reporting the contact - aka the person who (or whose unit) was being shot at.
FYI a copy of a daily NIREP to 39 Bde from 1 KOSB c. Apr 1972 - a primary source of data for HQNI. There were around 45+ Ops Rooms operating in Belfast at this time, all feeding data into the system. Not infallable by any stretch, but it was what it was.:
1 KOSB  24 hour NIREP Apr 72.jpg
 
Stonker has provided a clear overview of the process used for collation and dissemination of the data. I alluded to the same in a more consise form. The estimate of the number of incoming rounds was provided by the person reporting the contact - aka the person who (or whose unit) was being shot at.
Your linked document appears to suggest that row 3e is the number of incidents in which shots were fired as single shots, and row 3f is the number of incidents where shots were fired from automatic weapons firing in automatic, not the number of individual rounds fired. See 3k for clarification.
 
I assume from the data contained in the daily NIREPs from units on the ground. Each Coy ops room was required to report the number of contacts, rounds fired, bombings etc. All fed into the Bde Ops Room and forwarded to HQNI. CLF produced a monthly Opsum which was distributed to include downing street
Similar in Bosnia in the 90s.


Disparity between incoming/outbound rounds may have been a contributing factor in various BRITBAT units being renamed SHOOTBAT.
 
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Your linked document appears to suggest that row 3e is the number of incidents in which shots were fired as single shots, and row 3f is the number of incidents where shots were fired from automatic weapons firing in automatic, not the number of individual rounds fired. See 3k for clarification.
Yes I would accept that. Unfortunately there is no indication of the number of rounds fired during the 'automatic' incidents'. But overall, I think the data do support the view that the intensity of the conflict in '72 was quite immense.
 
Yes I would accept that. Unfortunately there is no indication of the number of rounds fired during the 'automatic' incidents'. But overall, I think the data do support the view that the intensity of the conflict in '72 was quite immense.
I'd go for somewhere between "substantially" and "massively" under-reported, at an informed guess.
 
I was told once by someone who was in Flax Street Mill in either '71 or '72, one of @Busterdog's Battalion, that contacts there were so frequent that if no-one was hit and they hadn't returned any rounds then they didn't report it. Because if they reported it then they would be expected to write it up and they didn't want to do that unless they had to.
 
Yes I would accept that. Unfortunately there is no indication of the number of rounds fired during the 'automatic' incidents'. But overall, I think the data do support the view that the intensity of the conflict in '72 was quite immense.
I think you haven't quite understood. Neither row gives the number of rounds fired, only the number of incidents in which the initiating event was a weapon fired at SF in repetition (3e) and auto (3f).
 
Your linked document appears to suggest that row 3e is the number of incidents in which shots were fired as single shots, and row 3f is the number of incidents where shots were fired from automatic weapons firing in automatic, not the number of individual rounds fired. See 3k for clarification.
It's an HQ summary of reports from soldiers trying to stay alive whilst killing/capturing those shooting at them.

Would you be asking your TELIC/HERRICK JNCOs to account for every incoming round to which they returned fire?
 
I was told once by someone who was in Flax Street Mill in either '71 or '72, one of @Busterdog's Battalion, that contacts there were so frequent that if no-one was hit and they hadn't returned any rounds then they didn't report it. Because if they reported it then they would be expected to write it up and they didn't want to do that unless they had to.
My point (Bill's point), exactly. It wasn't an environment where anyone under fire was interested in accountancy levels of accuracy :-D
 
Do keep up. Kinch stated
An interesting stat taken from HQNI CLF OpSum Jan 73 shows that the Army fired over 44,000 rounds in NI during 1972 in reply to just under 7,000 fired at them.
But the document he based that on infers that the "just under 7000" figure is incidents involving security forces being fired upon, not the number of incoming rounds. Is what.
 
I think you haven't quite understood. Neither row gives the number of rounds fired, only the number of incidents in which the initiating event was a weapon fired at SF in repetition (3e) and auto (3f).
I did get that, but the total 'ball' ammunition expended by the army is given at 4a and can reasonably be assumed to consist mostly of single shots given the weaponry used. For interest, the number of 'incidents' where the army returned fire or opened fire (3g + 3h), when divided into the total number of rounds expended (4a) gives a mean of around 12 rounds fired by the army per incident. All of which is interesting if not definitive given the lack of precision mentioned by others in the collation and reporting system.
 

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