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It was very Russian though, a bold stroke, emphasising tempo, using specially designed desant forces for deep operations in support of an integrated political-military strategy. Tukachevski would have approved, I think.

Often I feel many in the West compare BMD to Bradley and miss the point completely; these forces are not designed for the battlefield, they are designed to use mobility go where the enemy's warfighting capability isn't and exploit that. A weakness that cannot be exploited isn't a weakness, after all. And if you deploy them in the wrong place and they get minced, well, that's on the general. (Or if you're British, it's Arnhem and to be celebrated.)
They were in BTR from SFOR in Bosnia, not BMD, and not airborne / desant / forces - the commander on the ground was Gen Viktor Zavarzin, a very tubby two-star. The only special /desant forces in the area were British and Norwegian (FSK).

Avatar aside, you're way off the mark.
BMP, a battlefield weapon, has similar issues - no, it's not heavily protected, it's designed to get across the (contaminated?) fire zone after the enemy has been beaten down by artillery, not to take lots of punches. But, away from the "meeting engagement" of brigades and divisions slamming into each other, it's very good fun to have a few troops of fast-moving armoured vehicles with automatic cannon, missiles and infantry aboard hitting rear-area units from the swamp that was marked "no go" in a wargame: ever since 1973, when Egyptian BMPs came over the "impassable" Kantara salt flats, the two lessons of using the BMP seem to be "it'll suffer if shot at by heavy stuff" and "didn't expect them to get across that terrain!"

I doubt the British obsession with "light infantry" because while troops on foot can hide in "the bits of the map nobody cares about" they lack the mobility or carrying capability to then do anything other than hold onto... the places nobody actually cares about[1]. The Russian approach of trading off some protection for mobility - so they can use those inconvenient parts of the map as a transit route to hit the lightly-armed CS/CSS units not bristling with BMP-killing ATGM, LAW, HMG et al - does have a certain merit to it...

(Gratuitous dig at Ajax vice CVR(T) left for the reader to complete)


[1] After rediscovering that 1970s dubbed Japanese TV series "The Water Margin" from my childhood, I ended up reading its source material, "Outlaws of the Marsh" - interesting in all sorts of ways, but a classic point about the bandits and rebels in Lian Shang Po; they're fairly safe from attack there, partly because they're so far from anything important that they aren't worth the time and cost of digging out)
See above, but BMP and BMD are very different, used very differently, by very different troops (although I do realise you're not confusing the two).
 
Can it be considered out dated when everyone (allies and potential enemies still uses it)?
Yes. That's the Thai submarines and an aircraft carrier argument.
If you want/need a persistence physical presence in an area you need armour of some description (in the future that could be a vehicle with plastic armour who knows)
As I keep asking, where and why would you? Where's the threat to UK interests that would require it?
I still think you're being unfair, or at least polemic.

We've already all agreed that threat does not equal risk. So let's stop talking about 'threat', eh?. This is a risk issue. And maintaining a capacity in the absence of an immediate threat is a risk management strategy. Like insurance.

In fact insurance isn't even a metaphor: it's exactly what we're discussing here. And, as with insurance, the more cover you want, the more it costs you. So, if HMG is willing to pay £x, for that insurance, then that's what there is to play with.

And insurance is risk specific. You have building insurance to cover buildings. If the client is persuaded of a need to maintain a mech capacity...

And, maintaining the insurance idiom, it's important to read the small print. IF this capacity has to have a mobilisation time measured in days and weeks, it must exist in some basic form. If it is to mobilise in months, it might get by using more reserves with kit in light pres; if it is to be based on years (the 10 year rule) perhaps more kit can be bought when needed. If it needs to deploy to defend dependencies or support expeditions, more of the budget has to go blue (dark and light). What we wouldn't want is to not read the small print and find out that we have maintained a capacity to do something it can't actually do.

You keep on mentioning emerging threats. There are different academic ways of looking at this but personally I like Frank Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty. Emerging threats are uncertain. They are dealt with in academia and industry by research. So a bigger budget for DSTL and Green Slime until they are quantified (i.e. Known Unknowns).






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I still think you're being unfair, or at least polemic.

We've already all agreed that threat does not equal risk. So let's stop talking about 'threat', eh?. This is a risk issue. And maintaining a capacity in the absence of an immediate threat is a risk management strategy. Like insurance.

In fact insurance isn't even a metaphor: it's exactly what we're discussing here. And, as with insurance, the more cover you want, the more it costs you. So, if HMG is willing to pay £x, for that insurance, then that's what there is to play with.

And insurance is risk specific. You have building insurance to cover buildings. If the client is persuaded of a need to maintain a mech capacity...

And, maintaining the insurance idiom, it's important to read the small print. IF this capacity has to have a mobilisation time measured in days and weeks, it must exist in some basic form. If it is to mobilise in months, it might get by using more reserves with kit in light pres; if it is to be based on years (the 10 year rule) perhaps more kit can be bought when needed. If it needs to deploy to defend dependencies or support expeditions, more of the budget has to go blue (dark and light). What we wouldn't want is to not read the small print and find out that we have maintained a capacity to do something it can't actually do.

You keep on mentioning emerging threats. There are different academic ways of looking at this but personally I like Frank Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty. Emerging threats are uncertain. They are dealt with in academia and industry by research. So a bigger budget for DSTL and Green Slime until they are quantified (i.e. Known Unknowns).






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Mmm. Kind of. The thing is, if we're going to talk in risk terms, we have to talk about mitigation of identified risks, Mitigation is the application of measures to address either probability or impact - or, ideally, both - of the negative event's occurrence (where the risk leading to the negative event lies above your risk appetite) to a level consistent with your own risk appetite.

Crudely, you can directly mitigate a risk, yourself, you can export the mitigation of the risk - to insurance or a partner or wherever - or you can tolerate a risk, i.e. leave it unmitigated, accepting it, if you will.

In terms of the Big Bad Bear, the risks he generates are in all five realms - Air, Land, Sea, Space and Cyber. We can't possibly fund full mitigation in all five, so will need either to export or ignore at least some high-level risks and I'd contend that we are best placed to export the bulk of heavy metal Land risks to those with more intimate skin in the game (Hullo, Poland and Germany) and most Space risks to the ally with the greatest capability there (the USA). That leaves us with Sea, Air and Cyber and I'd submit we're well-placed to do direct mitigation in all three realms.

Not to say we ignore Land and Space, just that we look closely at what we actually need in those realms for protection and promotion of the national interest and structure accordingly.
 
Mmm. Kind of. The thing is, if we're going to talk in risk terms, we have to talk about mitigation of identified risks, Mitigation is the application of measures to address either probability or impact - or, ideally, both - of the negative event's occurrence (where the risk leading to the negative event lies above your risk appetite) to a level consistent with your own risk appetite.

Crudely, you can directly mitigate a risk, yourself, you can export the mitigation of the risk - to insurance or a partner or wherever - or you can tolerate a risk, i.e. leave it unmitigated, accepting it, if you will.

In terms of the Big Bad Bear, the risks he generates are in all five realms - Air, Land, Sea, Space and Cyber. We can't possibly fund full mitigation in all five, so will need either to export or ignore at least some high-level risks and I'd contend that we are best placed to export the bulk of heavy metal Land risks to those with more intimate skin in the game (Hullo, Poland and Germany) and most Space risks to the ally with the greatest capability there (the USA). That leaves us with Sea, Air and Cyber and I'd submit we're well-placed to do direct mitigation in all three realms.

Not to say we ignore Land and Space, just that we look closely at what we actually need in those realms for protection and promotion of the national interest and structure accordingly.
Definitely but it also depends on the UK Government (and PLC) wanting to stay in the top tier with heavy armour. Are they willing to sacrifice that?

Would for example, they be willing to replace 2 x Armd Inf Bdes and 2 x Strike Bdes with 4 x Strike Bdes (with a couple of Armd Regts)
 
Definitely but it also depends on the UK Government (and PLC) wanting to stay in the top tier with heavy armour. Are they willing to sacrifice that?

Would for example, they be willing to replace 2 x Armd Inf Bdes and 2 x Strike Bdes with 4 x Strike Bdes (with a couple of Armd Regts)
If the decision is to mitigate a specific LAND risk and the mitigation means selected is "stay in the heavy metal business" and that's a. affordable and b. brings the risk to within appetite, then sure, why not? If not, then no.
 
I worry about the idea that keeping MBTs and AIFVs somehow keeps us in the top tier where retaining the capability to deploy forces worldwide (one of two nations, note) somehow doesn't.
 
Mmm. Kind of. The thing is, if we're going to talk in risk terms, we have to talk about mitigation of identified risks, Mitigation is the application of measures to address either probability or impact - or, ideally, both - of the negative event's occurrence (where the risk leading to the negative event lies above your risk appetite) to a level consistent with your own risk appetite.

Crudely, you can directly mitigate a risk, yourself, you can export the mitigation of the risk - to insurance or a partner or wherever - or you can tolerate a risk, i.e. leave it unmitigated, accepting it, if you will.

In terms of the Big Bad Bear, the risks he generates are in all five realms - Air, Land, Sea, Space and Cyber. We can't possibly fund full mitigation in all five, so will need either to export or ignore at least some high-level risks and I'd contend that we are best placed to export the bulk of heavy metal Land risks to those with more intimate skin in the game (Hullo, Poland and Germany) and most Space risks to the ally with the greatest capability there (the USA). That leaves us with Sea, Air and Cyber and I'd submit we're well-placed to do direct mitigation in all three realms.

Not to say we ignore Land and Space, just that we look closely at what we actually need in those realms for protection and promotion of the national interest and structure accordingly.
Exactly my point - I'm not up on the threats (or risks) which is why I ask, but to extend @theotherbob's insurance metaphor, maybe we're taking out the wrong insurance cover?

It's fine to go for what @irlsgt describes as a 'balanced' solution, but if there's a readily identifiable and present threat in one of your five areas (air, land, sea, space, and cyber) that puts you at current clear risk and only a vague risk in others, then that tells me you don't want a balanced solution but a targeted one - and even from here I can see an identified and active threat, just as I think Carter can. He just doesn't seem to want to be the one to spell it out, preferring instead to drop hints as subtle as a brick in a paper bag.

Edit: you can buy an awful lot of cyber cover for the real cost of an armd bde (or two).
 
I still think you're being unfair, or at least polemic.

We've already all agreed that threat does not equal risk. So let's stop talking about 'threat', eh?. This is a risk issue. And maintaining a capacity in the absence of an immediate threat is a risk management strategy. Like insurance.

In fact insurance isn't even a metaphor: it's exactly what we're discussing here. And, as with insurance, the more cover you want, the more it costs you. So, if HMG is willing to pay £x, for that insurance, then that's what there is to play with.

And insurance is risk specific. You have building insurance to cover buildings. If the client is persuaded of a need to maintain a mech capacity...

And, maintaining the insurance idiom, it's important to read the small print. IF this capacity has to have a mobilisation time measured in days and weeks, it must exist in some basic form. If it is to mobilise in months, it might get by using more reserves with kit in light pres; if it is to be based on years (the 10 year rule) perhaps more kit can be bought when needed. If it needs to deploy to defend dependencies or support expeditions, more of the budget has to go blue (dark and light). What we wouldn't want is to not read the small print and find out that we have maintained a capacity to do something it can't actually do.

You keep on mentioning emerging threats. There are different academic ways of looking at this but personally I like Frank Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty. Emerging threats are uncertain. They are dealt with in academia and industry by research. So a bigger budget for DSTL and Green Slime until they are quantified (i.e. Known Unknowns).






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Mmm. Kind of. The thing is, if we're going to talk in risk terms, we have to talk about mitigation of identified risks, Mitigation is the application of measures to address either probability or impact - or, ideally, both - of the negative event's occurrence (where the risk leading to the negative event lies above your risk appetite) to a level consistent with your own risk appetite.

Crudely, you can directly mitigate a risk, yourself, you can export the mitigation of the risk - to insurance or a partner or wherever - or you can tolerate a risk, i.e. leave it unmitigated, accepting it, if you will.

In terms of the Big Bad Bear, the risks he generates are in all five realms - Air, Land, Sea, Space and Cyber. We can't possibly fund full mitigation in all five, so will need either to export or ignore at least some high-level risks and I'd contend that we are best placed to export the bulk of heavy metal Land risks to those with more intimate skin in the game (Hullo, Poland and Germany) and most Space risks to the ally with the greatest capability there (the USA). That leaves us with Sea, Air and Cyber and I'd submit we're well-placed to do direct mitigation in all three realms.

Not to say we ignore Land and Space, just that we look closely at what we actually need in those realms for protection and promotion of the national interest and structure accordingly.
That makes complete sense to me, especially in terms of Roles #3 and #4. But what about Roles #1 and #2?

As you say, it's about the customer's appetite/averseness to risk.


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Mmm. Kind of. The thing is, if we're going to talk in risk terms, we have to talk about mitigation of identified risks, Mitigation is the application of measures to address either probability or impact - or, ideally, both - of the negative event's occurrence (where the risk leading to the negative event lies above your risk appetite) to a level consistent with your own risk appetite.

Crudely, you can directly mitigate a risk, yourself, you can export the mitigation of the risk - to insurance or a partner or wherever - or you can tolerate a risk, i.e. leave it unmitigated, accepting it, if you will.

In terms of the Big Bad Bear, the risks he generates are in all five realms - Air, Land, Sea, Space and Cyber. We can't possibly fund full mitigation in all five, so will need either to export or ignore at least some high-level risks and I'd contend that we are best placed to export the bulk of heavy metal Land risks to those with more intimate skin in the game (Hullo, Poland and Germany) and most Space risks to the ally with the greatest capability there (the USA). That leaves us with Sea, Air and Cyber and I'd submit we're well-placed to do direct mitigation in all three realms.

Not to say we ignore Land and Space, just that we look closely at what we actually need in those realms for protection and promotion of the national interest and structure accordingly.
Exactly my point - I'm not up on the threats (or risks) which is why I ask, but to extend @theotherbob's insurance metaphor, maybe we're taking out the wrong insurance cover?

It's fine to go for what @irlsgt describes as a 'balanced' solution, but if there's a readily identifiable and present threat in one of your five areas (air, land, sea, space, and cyber) that puts you at current clear risk and only a vague risk in others, then that tells me you don't want a balanced solution but a targeted one - and even from here I can see an identified and active threat, just as I think Carter can. He just doesn't seem to want to be the one to spell it out, preferring instead to drop hints as subtle as a brick in a paper bag.

Edit: you can buy an awful lot of cyber cover for the real cost of an armd bde (or two).
Fair enough. So you balance your risks by also keeping DSTL, GCHQ etc up to speed.




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Exactly my point - I'm not up on the threats (or risks) which is why I ask, but to extend @theotherbob's insurance metaphor, maybe we're taking out the wrong insurance cover?

It's fine to go for what @irlsgt describes as a 'balanced' solution, but if there's a readily identifiable and present threat in one of your five areas (air, land, sea, space, and cyber) that puts you at current clear risk and only a vague risk in others, then that tells me you don't want a balanced solution but a targeted one - and even from here I can see an identified and active threat, just as I think Carter can. He just doesn't seem to want to be the one to spell it out, preferring instead to drop hints as subtle as a brick in a paper bag.

Edit: you can buy an awful lot of cyber cover for the real cost of an armd bde (or two).
I should state that that balanced force I described is the land balanced force...... the other arenas need to be balanced too
 
I worry about the idea that keeping MBTs and AIFVs somehow keeps us in the top tier where retaining the capability to deploy forces worldwide (one of two nations, note) somehow doesn't.
I should have said the top tier on land

No point holding forces if you can’t deploy them! Especially when the threat/risk could be outside Europe
 
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They were in BTR from SFOR in Bosnia, not BMD, and not airborne / desant / forces - the commander on the ground was Gen Viktor Zavarzin, a very tubby two-star. The only special /desant forces in the area were British and Norwegian (FSK).

Avatar aside, you're way off the mark.
See above, but BMP and BMD are very different, used very differently, by very different troops (although I do realise you're not confusing the two).
Is there any subject you're not ignorant of ? Perhaps it's fairer to say that you know just enough to be dangerous about ?

First off, the desant is a type of manoeuvre rather than a piece of kit. Look at Kutuzov's parallel pursuit of Napoleon for an old school pre helicopter example. The Sovs and now Russian addition of units in the ORBAT which can be moved via helicopter or airdrop does not preclude bog standard Motor Rifle troops from getting their deep battle on. Which is what they did.

Secondly, you miss the point about the BMD completely - which actually illustrates the ignorance in Western forces I was referring to, so well done you!

Please feel free to come back with half a page of drivel based on some random googling;, I shan't read it.
 
Is there any subject you're not ignorant of ? Perhaps it's fairer to say that you know just enough to be dangerous about ?

First off, the desant is a type of manoeuvre rather than a piece of kit. Look at Kutuzov's parallel pursuit of Napoleon for an old school pre helicopter example. The Sovs and now Russian addition of units in the ORBAT which can be moved via helicopter or airdrop does not preclude bog standard Motor Rifle troops from getting their deep battle on. Which is what they did.

Secondly, you miss the point about the BMD completely - which actually illustrates the ignorance in Western forces I was referring to, so well done you!

Please feel free to come back with half a page of drivel based on some random googling;, I shan't read it.
Having been A/Tk pl comd, Milan pl comd and IO in a 7 Fd Force bn, mistaking a BTR for a BMD would be like David Attenborough mistaking a hippo for a wolf, and unfortunately for you there just happened to be some photos of the BTRs at the airport in Mike Jackson's autobiography that I'd noticed when looking something up in it for @Andre (IIRC) earlier.

You were talking utter nonsense, so why not either have the grace to admit it and move on or the sense to keep quiet instead of burbling even more nonsense about the tps involved.

What the Russians weren't doing, even with the wildest imagination in the world, was "using specially designed desant forces" - that, if anyone's, was the British and French plan. The Russians were simply using regular motor rifle tps from SFOR in their regular BTRs, straight off the streets - probably the least appropriate vehicle for "specially designed desant forces" it'd be possible to find!

Another village has been deprived of its idiot.
 
Having been A/Tk pl comd, Milan pl comd and IO in a 7 Fd Force bn, mistaking a BTR for a BMD would be like David Attenborough mistaking a hippo for a wolf, and unfortunately for you there just happened to be some photos of the BTRs at the airport in Mike Jackson's autobiography that I'd noticed when looking something up in it for @Andre (IIRC) earlier.

You were talking utter nonsense, so why not either have the grace to admit it and move on or the sense to keep quiet instead of burbling even more nonsense about the tps involved.

What the Russians weren't doing, even with the wildest imagination in the world, was "using specially designed desant forces" - that, if anyone's, was the British and French plan. The Russians were simply using regular motor rifle tps from SFOR in regular BTRs, straight off the streets - probably the least appropriate vehicle for "specially designed desant forces" it'd be possible to find!

Another village has been deprived of its idiot.
Irony truly is dead for you, isn't it?
 

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