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Far from caught out this is my area of expertise, at which I can honestly say I did rather well. You're an idiot who failed to realise that risks and threats aren't synonymous, who thought it was just semantics, now trying to get a reaction; having failed to destroy the thread over manning then PD you're now having another go with utter nonsense on a subject you evidently know nothing about and have never been involved in. As before, I don't intend wasting my or anyone else's time with you.

'Threats' has worked very will here for nearly 200 pages. 'Risk' is an entirely different ball game - relevant, certainly, but not as described by the village idiot.
John, as a man who destroys threads every time he logs on you are on very thin ice.

You as usual demonstrate the weak egocentric argument style common in many in the Army, you simply think you know absolutely everything about everything and can not possibly be wrong about anything.

Name calling does not make your position stronger, you are the person who can not understand how threats relate to risks.

Now you have picked up the ball and walked off the pitch, presumably running away crying to Nanny.

I have never attempted to destroy the thread only challenged the idiocy of some of your posts.

Oh, yes, I have and remain involved in the subject.
 
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No idea why you're asking or quoting me.
Because you were the one who said many countries run bigger exercises.

Maybe you should re-read what I wrote and read up on the numbers involved in exs like Cobra Gold.
I did - 11,000ish. Big but it's hardly 'Corps level'. It's barely a division worth from multiple nations.

(and maybe re-check the difference between an ex and a CPX)
I know the difference between an ex and a CPX thanks. Why do you doubt that 3 Div's 'war role' would be to make up the numbers in a US Corps considering that in our last two big wars (Gulf Wars I & II) that was exactly what the deployed British Division did?
 
Because you were the one who said many countries run bigger exercises.
Ummm ... because they do. Even the UK and US do. Frequently. It was a CPX. Only the HQ element were involved. It was high level, but relatively it was a very small ex.
I did - 11,000ish. Big but it's hardly 'Corps level'. It's barely a division worth from multiple nations.
... but still rather bigger than the small CPX referred to.
I know the difference between an ex and a CPX thanks.
You hide it well!
Why do you doubt that 3 Div's 'war role' would be to make up the numbers in a US Corps considering that in our last two big wars (Gulf Wars I & II) that was exactly what the deployed British Division did?
As I suggested, you really do need to re-read what I actually said, as it has nothing to do with what you're saying in both your previous post and this one.
 
It isn’t a threat to the UK/NATO..... some NATO countries have been using 8x8 APCs in a similar manner to Strike for at least 10 years
I've got nothing against 8x8 APCs providing troop transport for infantry and an assortment of support roles, but those infantry need the support of heavy armour not a 'medium tank' to have any use except in neo-colonial police actions. I might just risk a strike brigade against Russian airborne in a rear area role, but not much else. I don't think anyone has used the Strike concept in an actual war against an enemy with even T55s and until they do I consider it an unproven combat capability, which offers a significant risk a lot of UK soldiers will get killed demonstrating it doesn't work.
The Russian move to Pristina Airport on 11 June 99 made a lot of people sit up and think.
If you can quickly place 30 vehicles and 250 troops to wrong foot the US and potentially split NATO's united front, forcing them to divert resources and derail existing plans, why do you need bodybags to prove if it does or doesn't work.
 
Might help you both to read this, not the word of God but a nice simple explanation: Threat, vulnerability, risk - commonly mixed up terms - INDEPENDENT SECURITY CONSULTANTS
Epic google fail! UK security is not an asset; it’s intangible and impossible to value. The model in the magazine article is about protecting tangible assets

The NSRA is quite clear; it’s a Risk Assessment. The clue is in the title. It’s quite possible (highly likely) that the assessors considered Threat in order to probabalise the likelihood of a risk caused by external actors from maturing and to value the harm. But only for those harms that actually result from a threat. As I said before, the model will be complex.

Try reading Hopkin, Fundamentals if Risk Management. You might learn rather more than from a random googled article.
 
Epic google fail! UK security is not an asset; it’s intangible and impossible to value. The model in the magazine article is about protecting tangible assets

The NSRA is quite clear; it’s a Risk Assessment. The clue is in the title. It’s quite possible (highly likely) that the assessors considered Threat in order to probabalise the likelihood of a risk caused by external actors from maturing and to value the harm. But only for those harms that actually result from a threat. As I said before, the model will be complex.

Try reading Hopkin, Fundamentals if Risk Management. You might learn rather more than from a random googled article.
You are actually speaking out of your hoop, which is quite unusual for you. I have a lot of experience in risk management and can tell that you do not.

Did you follow the link to the Janet and John explanation of Risk? No, just like John you like to make it up as you go along.

It is quite clear you struggle with terminology, which I accept is quite fluid and beyond your comprehension. For example Asset can be articulated as Target.

Epic Google search for one of the half million books on Risk Management by the way :rolleyes:
 
But sadly neither of you seem to understand the context of the NSRA. It is a major factor in determining the Defence Budget.
Of course it is. But that doesn’t alter the fact that it ranks Risks not Threats or that many of those Risks aren’t owned by Defence at all.

You introduced it into the debate as the driver of defence policy. It isn’t. It drives national security policy.
 
Of course it is. But that doesn’t alter the fact that it ranks Risks not Threats or that many of those Risks aren’t owned by Defence at all.

You introduced it into the debate as the driver of defence policy. It isn’t. It drives national security policy.
Number one, I have not mentioned Defence Policy but I did mention Defence Budget it does not drive national security policy as there isn't one.

Get it into your tiny little mind that risk management starts with assets, analyses threats and quantifies risks, that is what drives the SDSR, the Defence Budget is quantified by those risks which defence can mitigate. The other risks have other budget.
 
Number one, I have not mentioned Defence Policy but I did mention Defence Budget it does not drive national security policy as there isn't one.

Get it into your tiny little mind that risk management starts with assets, analyses threats and quantifies risks, that is what drives the SDSR, the Defence Budget is quantified by those risks which defence can mitigate. The other risks have other budget.
Without getting involved in all the ad hominem stuff going on, I'd submit (from my lofty pinnacle as a contributor to ISO31000), that you're conflating some stuff you may have picked up around the bazaars in re risk assessments as part of industrial or facilities operations with real-world geopolitical threat assessments (which will always remain highly classified as they will be based on covert and sensitive sources and methods) and national risk assessments, which will indicate in outline the major risks and some of the mitigations applied to them.

As noted upthread, threat assessment and risk assessment are mature disciplines and are separate exercises, although one informs the other. Threat assessment is to do with identification of hostile agency and assessment of its capability and intent - and matches, industrially, the simultaneous hazard assessment.

The negative potential outcomes from both threats and hazards are assessed as risks where a raw risk is impact factored by likelihood of the event's occurring.

@bobthebuilder and @John G. among others, are entirely correct.
 
The Russian move to Pristina Airport on 11 June 99 made a lot of people sit up and think.
If you can quickly place 30 vehicles and 250 troops to wrong foot the US and potentially split NATO's united front, forcing them to divert resources and derail existing plans, why do you need bodybags to prove if it does or doesn't work.
Particularly if they're supposed to be on the same side as you!

Seriously, that was nearly 30 years ago and technology and military use of it has moved on in leaps and bounds. Had the opposition at the time been suitably equipped what would have been more effective and quicker: more of the same vehs and ground tps reacting to the move once noted or sat and drone surveillance and drones / fast jets / attack hels / targeted munitions?

... but of course there's always the Blount factor ...
 
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You are actually speaking out of your hoop, which is quite unusual for you. I have a lot of experience in risk management and can tell that you do not.
The magazine article your referred to is, as you say, Janet and John. It is also written by a consultant as awareness content to grow credibility in his sales funnel; it has no academic rigour or validity or relevance to the subject at hand. I could find plenty of similar articles that justify my original definition of risk and threat or that use other ones; none would be rigorous.

You could find different models across any number of risk arenas. I've worked at senior exec level for two big globals companies with risk management procedures made clear distinction between a threat, which requires deliberate intent, a hazard which results from negligence or omission and an Act of God, over which they can have no control. The models for assessing each category to create a risk vary as do the models for bringing threats, hazards and Acts of God together into a coherent risk assessment.

If you want rigorous definitions, ISO 31000 that @Glad_its_all_over directed you to is as good as you can get. If you haven't read it, Im struggling to see how you could claim expertise in risk management. If you want a more academic discussion, the text that I referred you to is a standard text on the Institute of Risk Management's post-graduate diploma in risk management.

And no, national security policy development does not start with assets. Assets, whether tangible or intangible, have a value. A nation state has a duty to secure many things that aren't able to be valued and many that it can't value because it doesn't own them.

Please avoid the ad hominem; they add nothing.
 
The Russian move to Pristina Airport on 11 June 99 made a lot of people sit up and think.
If you can quickly place 30 vehicles and 250 troops to wrong foot the US and potentially split NATO's united front, forcing them to divert resources and derail existing plans, why do you need bodybags to prove if it does or doesn't work.
Well if it's all about getting their first, and frankly that's an over simplification in my view, heliborne assets trump wheels every time; but they're expensive and what we want is large and cheap so wheels it is.
 
Well if it's all about getting their first, and frankly that's an over simplification in my view, heliborne assets trump wheels every time; but they're expensive and what we want is large and cheap so wheels it is.
They also trump wheels in terms of fragility and brittleness and difficulty in sustainment; every time - especially in a contested or non-benign air environment. A coup de main - a desant - only really works if you successfully deliver the force and then manage to keep it in being and operationally significant once on the ground; the Russians saw an opportunity, politically as well as militarily and took it; it worked, hurrah for them; my sense is that the entire exercise carried a quantum of risk which was extreme.
 
.
What we want is large and cheap so wheels it is.
But why do we want it?

What's the threat?

Are we really going to occupy the Crimea when the vast majority there want the Russians there, not us?

If all we want to do is deter by forcing friendly casualties wouldn't lollipop ladies be better and cheaper? ... and if there's no threat and were scraping the risk barrel, aren't guided munitions, fast jets, attack hels, drones, etc rather better at just halting an advance in its tracks (or its wheels) if that's all you want to do?
 
They also trump wheels in terms of fragility and brittleness and difficulty in sustainment; every time - especially in a contested or non-benign air environment. A coup de main - a desant - only really works if you successfully deliver the force and then manage to keep it in being and operationally significant once on the ground; the Russians saw an opportunity, politically as well as militarily and took it; it worked, hurrah for them; my sense is that the entire exercise carried a quantum of risk which was extreme.
Interesting that KFOR initially considered heliborne for the airfield, with a bn of I Para in Chinook stood by all day and a French bn in 23 Pumas, with 6 American Apaches in support, before the French decided against it and the Brits were about to decide against it before KFOR were gazumped by the Russians.

I'm not so sure the Russians were taking an extreme risk, though. They were welcomed as 'Russians' by the locals and at the same time they made it clear they were there in support of KFOR by painting 'KFOR' on the sides of their vehicles, so they had both bases pretty well covered in a game of brinkmanship.
 
Agreed entirely, but who said anything about establishing anything from cold.

Why does it need to be a bde or div?

Why not a cadre with prepo / mothballed eqpt? (edit: just asking, not proposing)

... after all, how long does it take to train light inf to be dismounts, particularly if many of the commanders have done the role before? ... with no definable or even currently possible threat it seems a massive waste of manpower that doesn't exist.

More importantly, why the obsession with outdated modes of warfare just because an unlikely but potential adversary is equally outdated? Even in the scenario very vaguely described there's no requirement for an armoured element per se as the aim is to destroy attacking armour, which can be done far more effectively and quickly by fast air, attack hels, targeted munitions and drones.

... as for Stryke doing some form of suicidal 'holding' action, why not use the same alternative such as drones or attack hels, etc, as the threat we're now talking about is repelling / stopping an armoured force, not taking and holding ground?

It simply looks like a desperate rearguard action by the old school to justify itself when it's already been passed by.
How long did it take to get an UK Armd Div and sufficient supplies to build up before GW1 or GW2 could be contemplated and that was with experienced trained personnel. If your heavy armour is on a ship you can’t train with it (no doubt some training could but you get the drift).

A Bde is the smallest formation that you can true all arms capability in, a Battlegroup will still need support from outside.

Can it be considered out dated when everyone (allies and potential enemies still uses it)? It isn’t possibly the future way of war but it is the current !

If you want/need a persistence physical presence in an area you need armour of some description (in the future that could be a vehicle with plastic armour who knows).

That isn’t of course to say that fast air, attack hels, targeted munitions and drones etc don’t have a place of course they do. On some ops it may be the only presence and on others they will be there in support.

Could the British Military do with more Apaches? Absolutely!!

I don’t think medium armour has passed on, it is the present - the UK has let it pass them by. Is it the future we don’t know until technology can replace it.




Well if it's all about getting their first, and frankly that's an over simplification in my view, heliborne assets trump wheels every time; but they're expensive and what we want is large and cheap so wheels it is.
Very true but not if it is at long range, you have armour, anything bigger than light artillery
 
Can it be considered out dated when everyone (allies and potential enemies still uses it)?
Yes. That's the Thai submarines and an aircraft carrier argument.
If you want/need a persistence physical presence in an area you need armour of some description (in the future that could be a vehicle with plastic armour who knows)
As I keep asking, where and why would you? Where's the threat to UK interests that would require it?
 
They also trump wheels in terms of fragility and brittleness and difficulty in sustainment; every time - especially in a contested or non-benign air environment. A coup de main - a desant - only really works if you successfully deliver the force and then manage to keep it in being and operationally significant once on the ground; the Russians saw an opportunity, politically as well as militarily and took it; it worked, hurrah for them; my sense is that the entire exercise carried a quantum of risk which was extreme.
It was very Russian though, a bold stroke, emphasising tempo, using specially designed desant forces for deep operations in support of an integrated political-military strategy. Tukachevski would have approved, I think.

Often I feel many in the West compare BMD to Bradley and miss the point completely; these forces are not designed for the battlefield, they are designed to use mobility go where the enemy's warfighting capability isn't and exploit that. A weakness that cannot be exploited isn't a weakness, after all. And if you deploy them in the wrong place and they get minced, well, that's on the general. (Or if you're British, it's Arnhem and to be celebrated.)
 

jrwlynch

LE
Book Reviewer
Often I feel many in the West compare BMD to Bradley and miss the point completely; these forces are not designed for the battlefield, they are designed to use mobility go where the enemy's warfighting capability isn't and exploit that.
BMP, a battlefield weapon, has similar issues - no, it's not heavily protected, it's designed to get across the (contaminated?) fire zone after the enemy has been beaten down by artillery, not to take lots of punches. But, away from the "meeting engagement" of brigades and divisions slamming into each other, it's very good fun to have a few troops of fast-moving armoured vehicles with automatic cannon, missiles and infantry aboard hitting rear-area units from the swamp that was marked "no go" in a wargame: ever since 1973, when Egyptian BMPs came over the "impassable" Kantara salt flats, the two lessons of using the BMP seem to be "it'll suffer if shot at by heavy stuff" and "didn't expect them to get across that terrain!"

I doubt the British obsession with "light infantry" because while troops on foot can hide in "the bits of the map nobody cares about" they lack the mobility or carrying capability to then do anything other than hold onto... the places nobody actually cares about[1]. The Russian approach of trading off some protection for mobility - so they can use those inconvenient parts of the map as a transit route to hit the lightly-armed CS/CSS units not bristling with BMP-killing ATGM, LAW, HMG et al - does have a certain merit to it...

(Gratuitous dig at Ajax vice CVR(T) left for the reader to complete)


[1] After rediscovering that 1970s dubbed Japanese TV series "The Water Margin" from my childhood, I ended up reading its source material, "Outlaws of the Marsh" - interesting in all sorts of ways, but a classic point about the bandits and rebels in Lian Shang Po; they're fairly safe from attack there, partly because they're so far from anything important that they aren't worth the time and cost of digging out)
 
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It was very Russian though, a bold stroke, emphasising tempo, using specially designed desant forces for deep operations in support of an integrated political-military strategy. Tukachevski would have approved, I think.

Often I feel many in the West compare BMD to Bradley and miss the point completely; these forces are not designed for the battlefield, they are designed to use mobility go where the enemy's warfighting capability isn't and exploit that. A weakness that cannot be exploited isn't a weakness, after all. And if you deploy them in the wrong place and they get minced, well, that's on the general. (Or if you're British, it's Arnhem and to be celebrated.)
They were in BTR from SFOR in Bosnia, not BMD, and not airborne / desant / forces - the commander on the ground was Gen Viktor Zavarzin, a very tubby two-star. The only special /desant forces in the area were British and Norwegian (FSK).

Avatar aside, you're way off the mark.
BMP, a battlefield weapon, has similar issues - no, it's not heavily protected, it's designed to get across the (contaminated?) fire zone after the enemy has been beaten down by artillery, not to take lots of punches. But, away from the "meeting engagement" of brigades and divisions slamming into each other, it's very good fun to have a few troops of fast-moving armoured vehicles with automatic cannon, missiles and infantry aboard hitting rear-area units from the swamp that was marked "no go" in a wargame: ever since 1973, when Egyptian BMPs came over the "impassable" Kantara salt flats, the two lessons of using the BMP seem to be "it'll suffer if shot at by heavy stuff" and "didn't expect them to get across that terrain!"

I doubt the British obsession with "light infantry" because while troops on foot can hide in "the bits of the map nobody cares about" they lack the mobility or carrying capability to then do anything other than hold onto... the places nobody actually cares about[1]. The Russian approach of trading off some protection for mobility - so they can use those inconvenient parts of the map as a transit route to hit the lightly-armed CS/CSS units not bristling with BMP-killing ATGM, LAW, HMG et al - does have a certain merit to it...

(Gratuitous dig at Ajax vice CVR(T) left for the reader to complete)


[1] After rediscovering that 1970s dubbed Japanese TV series "The Water Margin" from my childhood, I ended up reading its source material, "Outlaws of the Marsh" - interesting in all sorts of ways, but a classic point about the bandits and rebels in Lian Shang Po; they're fairly safe from attack there, partly because they're so far from anything important that they aren't worth the time and cost of digging out)
See above, but BMP and BMD are very different, used very differently, by very different troops (although I do realise you're not confusing the two).
 

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