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Another Chinese rip-off?

This airplane first flew( allegedly) on Saturday 29th August 2020.


It looks someone has been stealing and selling Grumman E-2 Hawkeye plans to the Chinese.

I hope the Feds arrest the communist traitor.

Well, considering that the E2 first flew in 1960, I'd suggest that the airframe plans have been around in open source for some time. It's what's on the inside that counts.

However, as Israel has operated E2s for many years, I'm sure the Chinese are well acquainted with the electronics and sensor suite.

From Wiki:

Israel has provided China with military assistance, expertise and technology. According to a report from the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, "Israel ranks second only to Russia as a weapons system provider to China and as a conduit for sophisticated cutting edge military technology, followed by France and Germany."

Long before diplomatic relations were established in 1992 Israel had been selling arms to China. The use of military sales as a means of achieving foreign-policy goals was neither new nor unprecedented in Israeli foreign policy to promote its interests. Israel sold technology to upgrade Chinese tanks and planes in the 1980s. IAI Lavi and UAV technology seems to have been sold to China. Expertise in fitting western equipment in Soviet made hardware helped in modernization of Chinese army and air force, this way Chinese defense modernization complemented Israel's need of cash to fund its domestic made high-tech weapons programs.[66]

Tiananmen events offered an additional incentive for military relationship, funded in Israel's reputation as reliable arms supplier. The sanctions imposed by the Western countries almost froze Chinese access to advanced military and dual-use technologies. Israel sought to benefit from this situation and become China's back door to western technology.[67]

Israel was ready to sell China the Phalcon, an Israeli airborne early-warning radar system (AWACS), until the United States forced it to cancel the deal.[68] Some estimate that Israel sold arms worth US$4 billion to China in this period.[63]
[64]
 
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Paranoia is often counter to genuine security.
Mostly, it's a very good thing. A lack of it can be horrendously silly; I saw some of that failure at NORTHAG/2ATAF in the 80s, when a Colonel who had access to pretty well all of the sketches, plans, models, articles and official documents (remember?) used a Minox camera (borrowed, on signature, from the Counter-Intelligence team...) to take beautifully focussed photographs of pretty well all of those things.

Incidentally, and for the information of all former Cold-War soldiers, the NORTHAG/2ATAF (you were part of that) War HQ at Linnich was constructed using mostly Polish labour, near the village which had an Aeroflot travel office on the small High Street, next to the baker. The labour complement used to fly back to Poland regularly.

Nobody really cared; it was the labour market, after all.

I was paranoid; my boss even more so after I reported on my first visit to the huge hole in the ground with half of the WP in it.
 
Not only is it technology that is being ripped off and copied, but now we even have Erik Pr1nce of Bl@ckwater infamy selling special operations training to the Chinese - and basically anyone else who wants to pay.

So not only will "people" have to contend with Wagner Groups little green men, but also with little yellow men trained by a company partly owned by Pr1nce. A two part problem really: Firstly the private para-military individuals who once they start plying their trade around the African and South American mining areas will make things interesting. Secondly, the official organisations sending their blokes through the school will doubtless pick up trade secrets from recently retired US personnel who are contract instructors - they cannot resist showing what they know.





Wagner Group.

 

Yokel

LE
Mostly, it's a very good thing. A lack of it can be horrendously silly; I saw some of that failure at NORTHAG/2ATAF in the 80s, when a Colonel who had access to pretty well all of the sketches, plans, models, articles and official documents (remember?) used a Minox camera (borrowed, on signature, from the Counter-Intelligence team...) to take beautifully focussed photographs of pretty well all of those things.

Incidentally, and for the information of all former Cold-War soldiers, the NORTHAG/2ATAF (you were part of that) War HQ at Linnich was constructed using mostly Polish labour, near the village which had an Aeroflot travel office on the small High Street, next to the baker. The labour complement used to fly back to Poland regularly.

Nobody really cared; it was the labour market, after all.

I was paranoid; my boss even more so after I reported on my first visit to the huge hole in the ground with half of the WP in it.

There is a difference between vigilance and paranoia.

I meant it is not surprising that things design to do the same job in the same environment look similar in some ways. Trying to protect all information relating to the exterior appearance of an aircraft, such as the radome or the turboprop engines, would be fruitless and hard.

Protecting the technical details of the various systems and how they are integrated is worth it.
 
There is a difference between vigilance and paranoia.

I meant it is not surprising that things design to do the same job in the same environment look similar in some ways. Trying to protect all information relating to the exterior appearance of an aircraft, such as the radome or the turboprop engines, would be fruitless and hard.

Protecting the technical details of the various systems and how they are integrated is worth it.
Good point, but where is the dividing line? (I see what it may be in the case of an aeroplane's technology, but without some psychopathic vigilance the extremely devious bastards on the other side will slip past your barriers. We're quite capable of it, so we must expect the opposition to be so too).

In the case of Linnich, that NATO forward HQ (the War HQ for all forces in Northern Army Group and 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force) was an extension of the GRU's HQ itself.

Nobody had supervised the build programme properly; nobody had considered the security of the installation, nobody had thought - even thought - of the possible consequences, and the people who carried out all of the pre-build asssessments, military, logistical, labour, planning, and financial, and those supposedly supervising the work on all of it had ignored the security of every single aspect of the installation. Without a tiny suspicion on our part that things weren't as they should be, every single communication sent or received from there would have been compromised, and every single action taken by that HQ would have been planned for by the Sovs before they happened.

I doubt that the lesson was learned; that should worry you. I certainly haven't seen any note of the scandalous, horrifically expensive and dangerous stupidity of it all since I carried out the counter-sabotage survey in 1989. If war had broken out we were dead.
 
Good point, but where is the dividing line? (I see what it may be in the case of an aeroplane's technology, but without some psychopathic vigilance the extremely devious bastards on the other side will slip past your barriers. We're quite capable of it, so we must expect the opposition to be so too).

In the case of Linnich, that NATO forward HQ (the War HQ for all forces in Northern Army Group and 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force) was an extension of the GRU's HQ itself.

Nobody had supervised the build programme properly; nobody had considered the security of the installation, nobody had thought - even thought - of the possible consequences, and the people who carried out all of the pre-build asssessments, military, logistical, labour, planning, and financial, and those supposedly supervising the work on all of it had ignored the security of every single aspect of the installation. Without a tiny suspicion on our part that things weren't as they should be, every single communication sent or received from there would have been compromised, and every single action taken by that HQ would have been planned for by the Sovs before they happened.

I doubt that the lesson was learned; that should worry you. I certainly haven't seen any note of the scandalous, horrifically expensive and dangerous stupidity of it all since I carried out the counter-sabotage survey in 1989. If war had broken out we were dead.

And there are still plans to use Castlegate today.
 

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