An analysis of the Hezbollah anti-ship missile strike

Discussion in 'The Intelligence Cell' started by NEO_CON, Jul 26, 2006.

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  1. What I was able to glean from this Article was that there are so many electronic systems on the modern battlefield that improper coordination of those systems can leave a ship vulnerable ?
  2. At first NEO, I was suprised to read something from you publicising Hezbullah's successful missile attack on an Israeli ship. Then, however, I read the concluding part of the, mainly, guesswork by these two 'experts':-

    ''Given the secret presence of the C802 in the first instance, we both think it is reasonable to assume that there were Iranian signals intelligence and fire control people telling the truck mounted launchers all of this so as to set up the launch with the maximum chance of success''.

    So, it's all down to those pesky Iranians...nuke em now!
  3. Actually I was thinking about the lessons learned aspect of the whole operation.

    Apparently you are seeing what you want to see, which I think was the a similar problem with the crew of that Isreali ship. They were looking for a particular threat and another one reared its head.

    True this is a army site ,but I was hoping their might be informed comment on navel maters that might be able to provide comment from experence. .

    What did I get, your load of........
  4. Obviously going into the full capabilities of C-802 on an internet website is a no-no, however it shouldn't be such a surprise that they hit the ship. That missile is a bloody potent threat to any shipping and I'm surprised that the Israelis hadn't carried out a full threat reduction of the area. They certainly won't make that mistake again, that's for sure. Those 'experts', Spencer and Telenko, are a bit vague in some of their observations to be polite. As for why the operators onboard didn't take out the threat manually is beyond me. Very surprising to be honest and is indicative of a crew that weren't fully trained or prepared for operations in their own backyard....
  6. More likely they were guilty of underestimating their opposition.
  7. What the Israelis? Surely not
  8. Seem ta remember a Brit frigate off Falklands, story was couldn't use its radar when using it's Long range radio.
  9. Jon

    You're thinking of HMS Sheffield, a Type 42 Destroyer hit by an Exocet on 4 May 1982.

    The problem you are refering to is.....

    One way she could detect the aircraft/missile was by listening for the radar signal, both radars used frequencies in the I band. Both Eterndard (the aircraft) and the missile would by silent Except for a few moments proir to firing and in the case of the missle, in the last few moments of flight. The SCOT (Sat Comms Onboard Terminal) also used I band. Because the power of the signal being transmitted is much greater than that of an interecepted radar. it drowned the Argied radar out, effectively deafening her EW systems.

    The whole matter is controversial, for example where was the AWO?
  10. Bouillabaisse

    Bouillabaisse LE Book Reviewer

    The Israelis have admitted that their intelligence was faulty and they weren't aware of the threat. This would mean that the ESM operator would not expect this threat to appear on his set and it may not have even been programmed with the library data. Even if he did spot the emissions from the missile he may not have recognised it for what it was. This is essentially what happened with the USS Stark in '86, when the EWD misinterpreted the Exocet launches as sweeps from a "friendly" targetting radar.

    The Israelis have suggested that the targetting was done using the Lebanese Navy's surface surveillence radar based in Beirut. This is possible disinformation. One report suggests that the ship was shelling Beirut Airport. In order to do so she would have had to be within 16km of the shore (max effective range of the Oto gun). At this range she would have been visible to anyone up a small hill and initial targetting could have been done almost by eye.

    The weapon systems on the ship may be "fully automatic" but the Barak should have a man-in-loop mode for certain scenarios. This the ship would have been able to use it if they had detected the threat.

    Personally I think the ship was not expecting to be attacked and therefore wasn't mentally ready. For all the discussions on the technical reasons for Sheffield's loss this was the underlying cause.
  11. One of the things it pointed out to me is how vulnerable modern ships are to anti ship missiles. Would thicker armor on ships help? I have heard that modern ships are thin skinned with no armor. Navies have gotten away from providing that type of protection for ships. Has the trend gone too far in that direction?