AJAX - the ‘NOT the CR2 upgrade’ thread

Bubbles_Barker

LE
Book Reviewer

rampant

LE
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
This tweet, in a thread from Gabbi ( naval centric but moves on to consider Ajax amongst other things) offers part of the solution


Something like the Naval Law or the French Military Funding equivalents (see @fantassin for details) along the re-establishment of the various Defence Research Establishments (@everbodyinthisthread) would go along way to restoring the rot.

The outsourcing of in house sentence knowledge to the Private Sector, has crippled defence, and was not based on any real evidence of efficiency, it was simply based on a flawed belief that the Private Sector is better at Everything and a desire to cut taxes (or shift spending off the books)
 

PhotEx

On ROPS
On ROPs
Spot on.

Unfortunately. we have (a) certain VSO(s) who see(s) it as the pinnacle of soldiering at any level, and therefore all that is needed.

And the Army is now a Pekinese called Brutus.


E29949FD-E025-436C-9EB4-791B60956F6F.jpeg
 

Bubbles_Barker

LE
Book Reviewer
Spot on.

Unfortunately. we have (a) certain VSO(s) who see(s) it as the pinnacle of soldiering at any level, and therefore all that is needed.
But they would be correct from a recruiting angle. The RN is an interesting case in point from the ‘wanting to go to war’ perspective. Joining up because you want a fight seems to be the sole preserve of the Army, it simply isn’t the case when it comes to the technical ‘stand off’ Services where warfare is seen as technical (until they are touched by it of course). See the views of many sailors on their way down South in 82 when the RN hadn’t lost a ship for a while.
 
View attachment 593312

I always thought this was one of the best looking vehicles we ever brought into service - loved the clean, simple lines. Alas, I commanded a troop of its successor, one of the worst wheeled recce vehicles we ever brought into service!

As I recall, Saladin last saw action in 1991 during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in defence of Kuwait City...
It was a very, very secret weapon in an episode of The Avengers.
Got shrunk to the size of a Dinky toy by some mad scientist with a errrrr....shrinking ray.
 

Bubbles_Barker

LE
Book Reviewer
The outsourcing of in house sentence knowledge to the Private Sector, has crippled defence, and was not based on any real evidence of efficiency, it was simply based on a flawed belief that the Private Sector is better at Everything and a desire to cut taxes (or shift spending off the books)
MOD can’t avoid outsourcing because it is demonstrably inefficient not to do so. Their problem, recognised only latterly when it is too late is that they have as you say surrendered any intelligent customer capability. In my area, the Private Sector is better at everything and as a result, the MOD will benefit enormously.

The MOD still want to say how it should be done though. You couldn’t make it up.
 

Cold_Collation

LE
Book Reviewer
But they would be correct from a recruiting angle. The RN is an interesting case in point from the ‘wanting to go to war’ perspective. Joining up because you want a fight seems to be the sole preserve of the Army, it simply isn’t the case when it comes to the technical ‘stand off’ Services where warfare is seen as technical (until they are touched by it of course). See the views of many sailors on their way down South in 82 when the RN hadn’t lost a ship for a while.
Interesting, isn't it?

A good mate of mine is an ex-Bootie. His description of the perception and the reality, and how stark the difference is, struck me.

As he put it, he expected the whole guns blazing, super-warrior bit. The reality was fire orders, working in fire teams, fieldcraft, looking after oneself in the field, and lots of fitness. No underwater knife-fighting, funnily enough.

While those images may be correct from a recruiting angle, I'd rather expect a VSO with three or almost four decades of experience to know the realities and the place of John Rambos within a very much larger structure.

Can we honestly say that that's the case? Yebbut Rangers?
 

Bubbles_Barker

LE
Book Reviewer
Interesting, isn't it?

A good mate of mine is an ex-Bootie. His description of the perception and the reality, and how stark the difference is, struck me.

As he put it, he expected the whole guns blazing, super-warrior bit. The reality was fire orders, working in fire teams, fieldcraft, looking after oneself in the field, and lots of fitness. No underwater knife-fighting, funnily enough.

While those images may be correct from a recruiting angle, I'd rather expect a VSO with three or almost four decades of experience to know the realities and the place of John Rambos within a very much larger structure.

Can we honestly say that that's the case? Yebbut Rangers?
Well - I suppose it all depends on what you’re trying to achieve.

Light role infantry uber alles?

Victory has been declared!
 
I’d take that evidence with a grain or two of salt as there are a couple of factual errors that I spotted.
  • He cites the French Jaguar as being €1m each while the actual cost, per French documents, is €6m
  • He says that the Israeli Trophy offers complete protection against anything other than tank guns. I doubt that even the manufacturer would claim 100% efficacy. Even then light cannon are still a threat, ATGW, unguided and artillery AT are plentiful and the countermeasures carried per vehicle are limited
There are also a number of views put forwards that I disagree with and would suggest are somewhat dated.
  • Level 4 protection, as he recommends, dates from a time when every enemy recce vehicle mounted a 14.5mm HMG. With the proliferation of 30mm cannon maintaining protection at level 4 seems short sighted
  • The thought that 20mm cannon will be effective against opposing vehicles and/or the sides and rear of tanks is optimistic at best. Plenty of potential OPFOR vehicles are now protected against 30mm cannon over the frontal arc
  • The idea that recce vehicles will never fight for information seems predicated on the enemy not deploying a recce or counter recce screen
It’s not without valid points, as far as I can judge, but there’s some dross in there too.

While the lack of a mast mounted sight on Ajax looks like an oversight, it wouldn’t be too challenging to fit one, provided we get it into service.

It's the Griffon which is supposed to cost 1 million euros, not the Jaguar
 
But they would be correct from a recruiting angle. The RN is an interesting case in point from the ‘wanting to go to war’ perspective. Joining up because you want a fight seems to be the sole preserve of the Army, it simply isn’t the case when it comes to the technical ‘stand off’ Services where warfare is seen as technical (until they are touched by it of course). See the views of many sailors on their way down South in 82 when the RN hadn’t lost a ship for a while.

F*ck that for a game of soldiers.
 
Genuine question as I don't know the answer - do the coming generation of IFV have improved deck/roof armour? The vertical protection looks impressive but in the Azeri/Armenia conflict, most vehicle losses appear to have been to top attack weapons. Is there anything that can be done to improve roof/deck protection without adding unsupportable amounts of weight to designs? (aside from the difficulty of the need for entry points, engine access, cooling, comms, etc).
 

gafkiwi

War Hero
Genuine question as I don't know the answer - do the coming generation of IFV have improved deck/roof armour? The vertical protection looks impressive but in the Azeri/Armenia conflict, most vehicle losses appear to have been to top attack weapons. Is there anything that can be done to improve roof/deck protection without adding unsupportable amounts of weight to designs? (aside from the difficulty of the need for entry points, engine access, cooling, comms, etc).
I think the trend is to lean more towards active and passive protective measures targeting the munition before contact than physical protection from it. I can see systems like iron fist/APS developing or maturing more to target slower traveling thing like loitering/suicide drones.
 
Last edited:

Alamo

LE
No mate my last ride in one was early 2020, spent considerable amount of time living in one early 2019, experiences are they are loud, vibrate, stink, cold and warm at the wrong times.

If I was invading Iraq again circa 2003, id have preferred one instead of my chariot of the day.
Mind me asking how/where?
 

PhotEx

On ROPS
On ROPs
Genuine question as I don't know the answer - do the coming generation of IFV have improved deck/roof armour? The vertical protection looks impressive but in the Azeri/Armenia conflict, most vehicle losses appear to have been to top attack weapons. Is there anything that can be done to improve roof/deck protection without adding unsupportable amounts of weight to designs? (aside from the difficulty of the need for entry points, engine access, cooling, comms, etc).

the Armenians are playing with huge metal bar anti missile screens on stand offs over the top of their tanks.
 

Latest Threads

Top