Afgahnistan. Doomed to failure?

Discussion in 'Current Affairs, News and Analysis' started by stormtrooper2006, Jan 25, 2010.

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  1. Lads need some help I have to give a 10 min speech on the title have done some research but need some opinion for people who have been in theater.
     
  2. Who to? How much material have you sorted for yourself already?
     
  3. BuggerAll

    BuggerAll LE Reviewer Book Reviewer

    Justa thought: Vietnam was the presses finest hour (from their perspective). They defeated the mighty US Army and the evil Republicans etc. Right from the start of current ops they have been desperate for the same thing - whatever the reality.
     
  4. Who really cares if Afghanistan is a failure? It's a shithole anyway.
     
  5. First- Define 'failure'
    Secondly, Define what isn't a failure. What's new, what's working?

    Third, ask yourself- If we carry on doing this, that and the other, are we likely to 'achieve' failure, and if so , why.

    Fourth-recommendations- Where you want to reinforce success, where you cut your losses, and where you think you might need something new.

    (Even if you don't know what you need yet, knowing that you need it is the first step.)

    I think the question 'Doomed to failure' is a misleading as 'Fated to succeed.' It starts out with the preprogrammed presumption of disaster.

    'Afghanistan- Risks and Opportunities' is better. There's lots of risks to what we want to do. Lots of suggestions to do the things we want.

    We'll probably never reach the end state that would be our ideal. But neither will the Taliban. One day we will find an acceptable balance point, and then the diplomat can take over.
     
  6. By then the country will be bankrupt.
     
  7. BuggerAll

    BuggerAll LE Reviewer Book Reviewer

    You're definitly doomed to failure.
     
  8. Pretty much what happened with the IRA then - both sides privately acknowledged that it was impossible to completely defeat the other militarily but it took almost two decades to reach an 'acceptable balance point' where a political solution (of sorts) could be reached.
     
  9. Why don't you compare and contrast methodologies and experience of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1980s. Might help you to draw some conclusions. There was an excellent article in Sunday Times magazine about this a couple of weeks ago, with Ed Butler meeting a retired Russian General with extensive experience of Afg.

    Then ask yourself the following questions,

    Is it worth the effort?

    Is it worth the cost in money and lives?

    What do the Afghans themselves really want?

    What will a compromise solution to the conflict look like?

    Is there an easier alternative to achieving security for the west in the region?

    Personally, I prefer Fallsch's observations....
     
  10. Smacks of Journo to me
     
  11. You think they ain't done that then?
     
  12. I think we (our very clever chiefs of staff and politicos), completely ignored it fella, but by all accounts, there is an awful lot of interest now. Especially in their version of an Afghan Army, which at its peak numbered 300,000 and had 30,000 desertions a year. Remember, the solution currently being sold to western electorates is that the ANA will take over the role played by western forces at some point close by in the future.

    I would argue that is a load of bolleaux...
     
  13. Quite an assumption that. Then again, I could see the politicos wishing to believe the best in any group of hostiles as the left are wont to do (everything's our fault that they don't like us, don't forget), but not anyone in the millitary.
     
  14. How else do you explain the 2006 deployment into Helmand with such a pitifully small force and little or no helo support?

    I think all things Russian started taking on massive interest a few short weeks later..

    I don't share your confidence with the (then) Intelligence support or UK Military Leadership. Been playing catch up ever since and are now handing over to US Forces.