I guess it's just that when you have to endure rather than enjoy an individual time has a way of dragging.
I was willing to give him cautious benefit of the doubt at the start, despite having seen him a bit close up and heard more from others who had worked with him, that wasn't entirely flattering. But important to remember, I think, that at the time (2010-2012) he was basically the only potential candidate who openly accepted that things needed to change, and that was the battle being fought for the post-Afghan period.
Except his changes turned out to be, first poorly constructed and implemented: A2020, A2020 Refine, A2020 Refine, Reduce and Simmer, A2020 II: This Time It's Personnel, A2020 Revisited - The Legend of The Army Reserve, A2020 Re-imagined As A Marvel Movie, A2020 Rebooted: A2030, and so on. Often using straight up lies (sorry, optics) to cover these changes or failures ("trained soldier"). Second, overwhelmingly political / PR window dressing, often through the most cynical exploitation of politically palatable themes (e.g. diversity) which sucked all the air out of the room, focusing attention on, at best, proportionally minor real problems which the Army was already addressing - an organisation that has already received a Stonewall award for 3 years running is not an obvious candidate for an existential diversity campaign - while ignoring the major shitshows it didn't want, or know how, to change. This conveniently obscured the Army's project failures (recruitment), internal debates (staffs, HQs, careers, future requirements), constant changing of plans (A2020's infinite iterations), and worst of all, the manifest real complaints of soldiers on the ground (accomodation & food, TOS, etc).
He's been both the logical extension, and worst example so far, of Officer-As-Politician. He's not entirely responsible for the 'say-do gap', that is definitely a wider officer and Army problem, but he might well be its antichrist.