1977 US Congress Report: The US Sea Control Mission (carriers needed in the Atlantic for Air Defence and ASW - due to Maths/Physics/Geography)

[Yokel]

This thread is about the aircraft carrier and sea control.

Whilst lazily looking on the net, courtesy of Google, I found this old (late seventies) report from the US Congressional Budget Office:

Congressional Budget Office - the US Sea Control Mission

This looked at the problem of maintaining US and NATO Sea Control in the North Atlantic, GIUK gap, and Norwegian waters. It discussed the naval and air forces needed. Of particular note:

1. Equations are given for the size of a fighter force expected to achieve a certain response time and level of coverage.
2. Equations are given for aircraft numbers needed for 24/7 AEW coverage.
3. Equations are given for the costs of projects and programmes.
4. The need to put carriers in the Atlantic to defend reinforcement convoys is explained.
5. In addition, amphibious forces, and underway replenishment ships are listed as things that need defending (including by carrier aircraft).
6. Maths and Physics (and Geography) show that the carrier is essential for sea control. This of course is just as true today as when the Congressional report was published.

We seem to be going back to those times. I wonder what @ECMO1 and @jrwlynch would say about it? Not forgetting @Archimedes of course.

Edited to include conclusions in the original post - 10 October 2023.

The major conclusions from the subsequent discussions on this thread are:

A. Sea Control (ASW, air defence/AAW, and anti surface warfare) is a major mission for the carrier and the carrier group. It was during the Second World War and the Cold War, and it is again now in a renewed era of peer adversaries and contested seas.

B. Sea Control is difficult to achieve without carrier aviation. Geography, Mathematics, and Physics show that attacking aircraft are best dealt with using fighters to kill the archers, not the arrows, and that the best chance of stopping anti ship missiles is to engage the launch platform. Similarly constant helicopter ASW operations are best supported by a big deck with multiple helicopters, and Physics shows that modern long range sonars need to work in conjunction with dipping sonar to achieve their potential - and vice versa.

 

[ECMO1]

It is comparatively easy to carry out this level of analysis when you are looking at a single mission and a single threat. It is not so easy when you are faced with a variety of threats in two or more different oceans.

That said, it was interesting skimming through the document and seeing what they recommended versus what was actually acquired. I also liked the fact that they did include the capabilities of the NATO allies in their calculations, which is a little more challenging these days. They did acquire the FFG-7 class of ship for convoy escort paired with the SH-60B for ASuW/ASW. They did start stationing F-15’s on Iceland along with AWACS, which was part of the reason for acquiring NATO AWACS, to free up American platforms for the mid-Atlantic fight. As a sidebar, there was discussion of the USAF acquiring the F-14/Phoenix system for Air Defense, apparently the Air Guard was very enthusiastic, the active duty Air Force, not so much. But fits with their discussion in the paper of using a land based F-14 for protection of Iceland.

The one area this falls down on concerns their analysis is logistics. They are very good at coming up with the numbers that it cost to acquire a system and even the yearly operating costs of that system. What they don’t look at is the costs of buying the number of weapons or disposable sensors (sonobuoys for instance) needed to counter the threats. Also, how much more would it cost to equip a Navy squadron (designed to fall onto the repair and supply capabilities of the CVN) to forward deploy to land bases?

Interesting historical document.

 

[Yokel]

It seems that the authors of the paper thought that the A-6E Intruder was not needed for the sea control mission, presumably this was before the integration of Harpoon and Skipper. It did see a need for the Prowler though.

The super carrier, with aircraft such as the Tomcat and other fixed and rotary wing types, was a major part of the American response to Soviet Naval Aviation and the Soviet submarine force. Likewise the CVS this side of the Atlantic.

@Not a Boffin might have a few words to say about the idea that a carrier exists only to hit targets ashore, and that the frigates and destroyers can do all the ASW and AAW.

 

[Yokel]

Another historical question - in the old days USN carriers carried six SH-3 Sea Kings for ASW and SAR. Is there any reason the number of Sea Kings was not higher? I am thinking of things like the S-3 Viking performing an ASW role at greater range, and having less ships with towed array sonar so perhaps dipping sonar was seen as less important for target localisation?

Too many of the anti carrier brigade seem to forget carriers were and are key to NATO plans to keep the Atlantic open.

 

[ECMO1]

Another historical question - in the old days USN carriers carried six SH-3 Sea Kings for ASW and SAR. Is there any reason the number of Sea Kings was not higher?

Everything on the carrier is a trade-off when it comes to numbers. One mission set does not necessarily trump another mission because you were never quite sure what the carrier was going to be tasked with next. So 6 Sea Kings gave you enough airframes to have one broken in the hangar, 2 flying SAR at night (NATOPS requirement), and then 3 more available to do ASW. Before the advent of the SM-2-ER the primary mission for the CV/CVN in the North Atlantic was not ASW (it was an additional role) but rather AAW to prevent the Backfire/Bears from attacking the convoys. The A-6/A-7s were the organic tankers to push the F-4/F-14 CAP stations out to a range to shoot the archer, not the arrows. Obviously, those roles swapped a bit when you started facing a surface threat or got close enough to land to start contemplating strikes against those Soviet Naval Air Arm airfields.

Additionally, there was a view that if you were doing ASW from the carrier within the normal range of the Sea King, then you were already in trouble. Much better to use the outlying CG, DD/DDG, FF/FFG to host embarked ASW helicopters, while using their installed sonars (both bow mounted and tails) to work the ASW problem. Of course, that was in addition to the battlegroup’s S-2/S-3s, then theater P-3s, SSNs and the IUSS also working the problem set.

 

[PhotEx]

see also the forward deployed nuclear TLAM armed reactivated Battleships.
their mission was to put the Soviet home bases under direct threat and force the Soviets to divert heavy forces to deal with the threat in bring they presented, taking the Soviet eye off the crucial Convoy Battle.

 

[Yokel]

Everything on the carrier is a trade-off when it comes to numbers. One mission set does not necessarily trump another mission because you were never quite sure what the carrier was going to be tasked with next. So 6 Sea Kings gave you enough airframes to have one broken in the hangar, 2 flying SAR at night (NATOPS requirement), and then 3 more available to do ASW. Before the advent of the SM-2-ER the primary mission for the CV/CVN in the North Atlantic was not ASW (it was an additional role) but rather AAW to prevent the Backfire/Bears from attacking the convoys. The A-6/A-7s were the organic tankers to push the F-4/F-14 CAP stations out to a range to shoot the archer, not the arrows. Obviously, those roles swapped a bit when you started facing a surface threat or got close enough to land to start contemplating strikes against those Soviet Naval Air Arm airfields.

Additionally, there was a view that if you were doing ASW from the carrier within the normal range of the Sea King, then you were already in trouble. Much better to use the outlying CG, DD/DDG, FF/FFG to host embarked ASW helicopters, while using their installed sonars (both bow mounted and tails) to work the ASW problem. Of course, that was in addition to the battlegroup’s S-2/S-3s, then theater P-3s, SSNs and the IUSS also working the problem set.

Many thanks for that authoritative reply. Too many media talking heads think that the F-14 was developed solely to defend the carrier, as opposed to being a response to long range threats over two large oceans. Many anti carrier types seem to insist that a carrier can only carrier fighters for self defence. I have even read claims by some fools claiming it is better to engage the ASMs and not the launch platforms.

As for ASW, I imagine the carrier would carry more helicopters if the S-2/S-3 did not exist, as the CVNs carry greater numbers of helicopters. I suppose that active dipping sonar is more relevant now due to ships having low frequency towed arrays.

 

[Yokel]

They say a picture paints a thousand words. Whilst these two are not the best in terms of quality, they should make the point.

1. An illustration from a book, describing task group air defence/AAW. Whilst the distances stated are questionable, particularly as naval SAMs have longer ranges than when that book was written in the early nineties, and the range of a CAP station is given as 100 nm, it does prove a point. The blue area represents the area that can be defended by aircraft from the carrier. A similar thing applies to ASW protection involving carrier based aircraft.

Moving the battle outwards and defence in depth are for winners.

2. From the eighties periodical Warplane, a map of the GIUK gap and the Atlantic theatre. The text mentions particularly the role of the F-14 Tomcats and E-2 Hawkeyes aboard the American carriers, and the Sea Harriers and Sea Kings aboard the RN ones. The illustration includes all the US carrier based aircraft types, and our Sea Kings.

 

[Yokel]

Also, looking at the diagram of defence zones, the carrier's fighters provide protection in which the ASW aircraft can work - just a few MiGs could represent a great threat to ASW helicopters and prevent them from working too far from a suitably armed surface warship, which would be detrimental to task group ASW.

 

[ECMO1]

Yes, but at the time that was written the Soviet Union did not have any fighters with a range to pose that sort of threat. Maybe now with the Mig-31 and SU-30 but not then

 

[Yokel]

Recently the US Navy has announced plans to augment the CVN force with a number of light fleet carriers - based on an LHD design.

I assume that:

1. These will operate largely in the Atlantic as the CVNs focus on the Pacific.
2. They will operate F-35B as putting EMALS and arrestor gear in a ship of <50 000 tons is unlikely to gain support in the DOD or wider Navy.
3. The jets will perform air defence as well as attack roles.
4. Unlike an LHD, ASW helicopters will be embarked.

 

[ECMO1]

Recently the US Navy has announced plans to augment the CVN force with a number of light fleet carriers - based on an LHD design.

I assume that:

1. These will operate largely in the Atlantic as the CVNs focus on the Pacific.
2. They will operate F-35B as putting EMALS and arrestor gear in a ship of <50 000 tons is unlikely to gain support in the DOD or wider Navy.
3. The jets will perform air defence as well as attack roles.
4. Unlike an LHD, ASW helicopters will be embarked.

And some of your assumptions would be incorrect.

1. The light carriers are viewed as a way of 1.) supplementing the CVNs with presence missions and 2.) complicating an enemies targeting problem by having several potential targets instead of just 1-2 lucrative targets. Therefore they would be deployed worldwide, but would most likely follow the current basing and deployment strategy of at least 60% in the Pacific.

2. Concur.

3. They already do.

4. The MH-60S has been embarked on the LHD and LHAs for years for SAR and ASW.

Reminder, for the US Navy, the Pacific is the main focus. Russia and the Atlantic is a minor sideshow, except when it comes to the Russian submarine force, which given the reconfiguration of the carrier air wing is not its current strength. Land based P-8 are the primary force for long range ASW.

 

[Yokel]

I had no idea that ASW was done from the LHA/LHD - but surely the Romeo would be better as it has a dipping sonar? I do remember you posting on the F-35 thread that on occasions the USMC AV-8B+ (with APG-65 and AMRAAM) had provided air defence for an amphibious force, and the AH-1 had performed an ASuW role.

NATO needs more helicopters with dipping sonar.

As for the light carriers, will the F-35B by USMC or USN manned, and what will they use for AEW?

As for your last paragraph, NATO does sea control, Russia does sea denial, but the PRC does both.

 

[Raven2008]

I had no idea that ASW was done from the LHA/LHD - but surely the Romeo would be better as it has a dipping sonar? I do remember you posting on the F-35 thread that on occasions the USMC AV-8B+ (with APG-65 and AMRAAM) had provided air defence for an amphibious force, and the AH-1 had performed an ASuW role.

NATO needs more helicopters with dipping sonar.

As for the light carriers, will the F-35B by USMC or USN manned, and what will they use for AEW?

As for your last paragraph, NATO does sea control, Russia does sea denial, but the PRC does both.

Well both USMC and USN latter just on the C while the former north B and C. Thr Flying Leathernecks will operate the C off the CVN likewise what they do with the F/A-18. The C won’t be able to operate off the LHA .

cheers

 

[gaijin]

I remember reading something (I forget where) about one of the RN's roles in the N Atlantic being a mad dash up north to allow the Harriers to attack (Murmansk?). It would, essentially, be a suicide run.

I am pretty sure it was fiction but could there have been any basis in fact? I would assume 1980s.