Discuss FRES - Has the Army screwed itself? in Tanks, planes & ships on The Army Rumour Service; Lots of good points in the preceding posts.
In August 2005 the MoD press release said, "FRES is the first of the Army's Transformational capabilities and is at the heart of the Army's equipment programme".
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In August 2005 the MoD press release said, "FRES is the first of the Army's Transformational capabilities and is at the heart of the Army's equipment programme".
A bold statement, and one which puts pressure on FRES to set the benchmark. Yet, in the same press release, and citing Electric Drive technology as an example, "The MoD is looking at some cutting edge technologies, but they must be thoroughly understood and de-risked before committing to use them".
That is, the Army's equipment programme is almost entirely reliant on what is, essentially, a Technology Demonstrator Programme, which is itself struggling to understand and de-risk candidate technologies. This statement, coming 3 years after the URD was published, is the clearest indication of the attitude "Carry on trying to define FRES, but we don't mind if you're years late as we can't afford it anyway".
I ask you, what chance does the rest of the Army equipment programme have?
To underpin the FRES URD, and justify it to the politicians, some very clever people tried to look forward 20 years and published some papers. The danger in including them as authoritative sources is that, if anything changes (and it does, daily), then the suits take great delight in snagging the URD and demanding revalidation. The result is stop - start and years of delays.
Kitmarlowe is quite right. Of the four core requirements, 3 are readily achievable, but the one the MoD are hanging their hat on is not. And even if it is in the future, there is no guarantee of money. This disconnect in the timeline needs to be overcome. This is what the "trade off" process is for. But it needs someone to hold their hand up and say "wrong approach, sorry" and DIRECT that proven kit is introduced ASAP. Get it down to core essentials. Survivability. Lethality. Mobility. Sustainability. C4I (which is supposedly already supplied by BOWMAN and various ongoing programmes like BGTI). The last may be peculiar to UK, but the others can, it would seem, be met with existing platforms. On the face of it, the only question is can our C4I kit be integrated into them - and then it's a political decision. This may seem simple, but complex has, in this case, not worked.
Time to go back a few years and SOLUTIONISE (the dirtiest word in MoD) instead of paying industry and DSTL millions to cogitate for years.
Too true! FRES was busily disappearing up its own ringpiece with the world's best systems engineering process, which concluded: "you can't have the UV until 2017".
Drayson then planted his boot firmly up the IPT's arrse and said: "That's crap - select the best three, test them, pick one and crack on."
Sadly, with Drayson's departure, I now doubt that we will see the same sense of pace.
The entire FRES concept - the original concept - is fundamentally flawed to the point of absurdity. However, it was/is trotted out to justify what is, in effect, a Treasury procurement strategy to 'save' cash and an attempt to politically prop-up B(loody) A(wful) Systems.
Where former CDS Guthrie was ever so right, the Treasury simply doesn't understand the Armed Forces needs. For operational efficiency and effect, you need specialised vehicles that are designed for role. A compromise vehicle designed to fulfull several roles will do none effectively.
FRES is a peacetime concept which, as soon as the real shooting starts, will probably not cut the mustard. Ask yourself why UOR over the past 4 years have seen the removal of Saxon (another peacetime Treasury purchase) and the introduction of 4 completely different types: Bulldog, Mastiff, Vector and MWMIK.
"Drayson then planted his boot firmly up the IPT's arrse and said: "That's crap - select the best three, test them, pick one and crack on."
Sadly, with Drayson's departure, I now doubt that we will see the same sense of pace".
I'm in two minds about Drayson. His actions were one of a strategic thinker - DIS, DTS - but it's well known that for years before he took up the post he was probably getting an earful from someone on the inside. (I suspect you know what I'm talking about). He knew, or should have known, what was wrong with MoD and he blew his opportunity to root out the incompetents and their Spanish practices; although I concede they are experienced and hardened opposition.
Much is said of DIS (but not DTS) and it gets good press but, let's face it, it's not very well conceived and is seen to pander to the big boys at the expense of the real innovation we see at SMEs (Small / Medium Enterprises). It seems he fell into the same pit that DEC always dig for themselves - a honking great shopping list, hastily approved, but then find out they haven't got resources to sustain it; or even buy it in the first place. He didn't get buy-in from the correct people and it seems they screwed him over.
As for the DTS... In some cases, it discusses future research to deliver technology that is already in-service, bought from the SMEs I mention!! DTS was a good idea, highjacked by incompetence and one hand not knowing what the others doing. On the day the DTS was published, saying studies were planned on how to solve a particularly difficult safety problem, a DLO IPT in Wyton issued an ITT for a follow-on buy!
I think you're right that he put a boot in the crotch of a very few involved in FRES. But the devil is in the detail in this programme (and most others) so WTF are they doing appointing grossly inexperienced senior staff who don't understand this, and so can't make informed decisions. FRES is not just about buying a raft of vehicles, it's about systems integration with a host of other air, land and sea platforms and equipment.
The classic example is mentioned above. Not understanding the true relationship between FRES and C130, A400 and C17. As the aircraft exist and are a given size, it's pretty obvious that their load/size bearing capacity must be set in concrete as FRES boundaries and constraints. As it stands, it looks like FRES is wholly reliant on the US loaning us C17s when we want to deploy. This is just one simple example why FRES can't pass scrutiny by the IAB. There is no viable sustainment plan.
But, on balance, I'd go for Drayson ahead of any of his predecessors. I think there'll be a long hiatus now.
Are there vehicles already in production that we could buy "Off The Shelf" for what we would need?
For the most part, yes.
What could be picked as the recce vehicle assuming a) it is tracked and b) smaller than the IFV? If the recce vehicle is to be wheeled there are several options (Fennek, Coyote etc).
Airportability argument is tosh - we will never have enough aircraft to fly this sort of vehicle - better off investing in faster ships!
AIR-PORTABILITY OF ARMOURED VEHICLES
Is there an example of when it has been done; or, can anyone imagine when we might be required to deploy by air - armoured vehicles; either in an apposed (hostile) situation, or unopposed (benign) environment.
The question is raised, as there seems to be pre-occupation about false air-portability size constraints being imposed; and, allowing those unnecessary constraints to influence the selection of an armoured troop carrier for British forces.
Imagine a scenario that involves a land-locked country. If a neighbouring state will not allow the transit of armoured vehicles through its country by road, it certainly is not going to allow the over-flight of any military aircraft.
Conversely, if military aircraft are allowed to over-fly neighbouring countries to gain access - then surely, those neighbouring states will also allow armoured vehicles to be deployed through their country, by road.
The only significant size constraint about any future armoured vehicle is whether or not it can fit inside a LANDING CRAFT UTILITY (LCU) Mk 10 - which can carry a main battle tank.
and, the four new Bay-class, LANDING SHIP DOCK (AUXILIARY) (LSD(A)); http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/server/show/nav.5979 (Click on to the individual ships’ names, and then click “photo gallery”).
All the above would enable an over-the-beach deployment.
In a less hostile environment, any armoured vehicles would only have the size constraints associated with any commercial Ro-Ro shipping vessel - of which the MoD has six of its very own ‘Point-class, STRATEGIC SEALIFT ships. http://www.dunelmpr.co.uk/foreland-photosNEW.html
It should also be mentioned that most of the vehicles so far referred to, were all featured in copies of the magazine GROUND DEFENCE INTERNATIONAL (which was formerly known as ARMIES & WEAPONS). Those copies sitting on my shelves date from MAY/JULY 1975 (Issue 17), to MAY 1981 (Issue 75). They are not new designs. They do not necessarily need to be. The original (now thirty-twenty year old) designs are as competent now as they were then. It is just that for the last thirty-twenty years the British have been expected to “make-do” with SAXON !!
Maybe there is a really big question going begging here: at the scale at which we operate now and are likely to be able to operate at in the future, will any vehicle, current or envisaged, be able to help us achieve the effects that we think we want with regard to 'imposing' solutions? NI, the Balkans, Sierra Leone etc are one thing, but taking on an adaptable enemy which is prepared to suffer high casualties in the long term, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, has exposed the limitations of our capability and political will. Iraq and Afghan have shown us that there aren't short term military solutions to these kinds of problems and I suspect that the lesson that people like Gordon Brown will be taking from these operations is not 'get better vehicles' but 'don't get involved'.
Might be talking out your Arrse here, the GD Pihranha is also known as the LAVIII, currently doing rather well in Kandahar Province with Canadian flags on it.
you're joking right?
That's the thing that keeps breaking down or getting blown up with its full compliment of pax!
Some background. I'm now a civvie Programme Manager, so something like FRES (the entire thing) is the sort of thing I would manage. I'm currently doing something else somewhere else but I can tell you right now that this entire fiasco is down to two classic project errors:
1. Undefined and unfrozen requirements
2. Lack of sponsor support
For those of you not involved in projects, or who are new, the basic process is this (injected with a little humour in italics from me to keep it interesting)
1. An idea is had. For example Gen A speaking with Gen B and saying "Hmmm, we need some new armoured vehicles because we've got less than the Belgians and the 432's are going to start getting listed by local councils planning departments"
2. Requirements Gathering. Easily the most important part of a project apart from the Sponsor (and if anyone tells you different then they're wrong and you should treat them with suspicion). Requirements start high level and work down to low level - the task of the Requirements Gathering team is to document everything. For example:
Gen A would like new armoured vehicles by 2012
Maj Mannering thinks they should be for Inf Bn's
Capt Clyde wants them with armour for protection from RPG
Lt Lewis and with comms for air and fire support
Sgt Smith and portals for situational awareness
Cpl Clanger and big doors so we can get out quickly
Pte Pike and a coke machine
All these requirements are then collated and separated into two columns, Column 1 is MUST HAVE and column 2 is NICE TO HAVE
In the above example,
Must have is: New Armoured Vehicles for Infantry Bn's
Nice to have is: by 2012 armour comms portals big doors cokes
Now the Requirements Gathering Team will then consult the different requirements providers (those ranks above) and challenge them on their thinking, and so
Infantry Bn's becomes Infantry and Frontline Support (so the medics get some too etc).
and
Coke machine becomes a BV
Requirements are also, what I call, made multi-solutionable, which means portals becomes ability for pax to see outside the vehicle (e.g. the true requirement, not the solution)
Done sensibly this can really help to define the realities of the project, it should also be done from top to bottom, from Tommy Atkins to CDS.
The NICE requirements are then given some kind of order of preference, I like to use the 1-4 method myself (Very Nice, Nice, Quite Nice and Whatever)
Once all this is settled the requirements (MUST and NICE) are signed off by the to-be-users (in this case The Army) as complete AND ARE FROZEN, which should essentially mean that God himself cannot change them. It is also extremely important that at this stage the MUST column is extremely short, that doesn't mean 'high level' but it does mean 'kurz'!
The project then moves to tender (RFI and RFP) where manufacturers are invited to offer their solutions to deliver the MUST with as many NICE as they can.
It is the manufacturers job to deliver the solutions. Using the portal example above which became ability to see outside of the vehicle the manufacturer may suggest 4" plasma screens for each pax with a camera (infrared and 3rd gen night-vis capable). By having written the right requirement, you are not giving the solution (and getting stuck with 3"x2" perspex viewing blocks which you can't look through from the back of your head). Incidentally, this is a big easy win for manufacturers to make as by re-evaluating clients requirements and seeing if they can impress with un-thought-of solutions.
The winner is the one with all MUST and the most NICE's vs price promise.
Where this FRES fiasco is falling down is that the requirements are not frozen, and if they are, then they are not properly defined at a low enough level. Which allows too much wriggle room. Either way, the project is a failure until this is done. Secondly, Sponsors are expected to be there fore the entire project lifecycle ensuring continuity and maintenance of the aim, the nature of government somewhat precludes this, which is why big projects die the Whitehall death. I have a solution but I don't think its time yet for the revolution.
Anyway, I may have missed some bits out but that is how a project or programme should be started, and to all intents and purposes - FRES is apparently going to fail and will do so until enough money has been pumped into the black hole that it is full.
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