Discuss Other Nations COIN Doctrine? in Staff College and Staff Officers on The Army Rumour Service; COIN is not my specialty, but I have run across a few doctrine sites while researching some other items. Here are a few COIN pubs:
Australia:
AAP 1001.2 The Air Force Approach to Irregular Warfare ...
USAF:
AFDD 3-03 Counterland Operations and AFDD 3-24 Irregular Warfare are available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/lemay/main.htm Need to scroll down on the list of doctrine publications.
Dr Sebastian Ritchie, The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939 (Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies, 2011. ISBN: 978-0-9552189-9-6).
Dr Sebastian Ritchie, The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies: Later Colonial Operations, 1945-1975 (Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies, 2011. ISBN: 978-0-9552189-9-6).
Joel Hayward, ed., Air Power, Insurgency and the "War on Terror" (Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-9552189-6-5).
In_the_cheapseats - thanks for the comment. So what other nations COIN doctrine did you end up using? I note that FM3-24 is a joint US Army and USMC doctrine manual so supersedes the small wars manual, though I do not doubt that it was a sound publication.
After discussing things with the Iraqi's, although most of their more senior officers had been staff trained by the Russians (we stopped training them after GW1), they wanted to move back to a UK based doctrine and so FM vol1 pt10 was used as the basis of it, with examples being pulled in from Iraqi own experience as well as the normal flavouring of the historical experiences.
I forgot about the Aus (someone else's post) - shouldn't have - as I had a nice visit to Perth to meet up with one of their Doctrine blokes!
I have no idea if the doc we eventually produced is still being used - I would hope that the Iraqi's would have been eventually able to produce something better - it was a rush job after all. However, pre GW1, they were using UK doctrine translated across in most areas which frankly was the lazy man's way of doing business but understandable with the number of seniors they had trained here. Before I left Baghdad, I arranged for disclosure of all our FM manuals for them. By that point, as we had taken the task of setting up their new officer training school, it made sense to try and imprint all our sensibilities, morals (ha!) and doctrine on them again right across the offr corp.
A lot of re-discovery of the wheel. Go back a few decades to Counter Revolutionary Warfare, designed to deal with the concepts put about by some quite clever blokes like Mao and Giap.
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