Originally Posted by Once_a_soldier

You are talking about the operational use of helicopters? Well the yanks will tell you they started all that in Korea... and they will be correct. Yes a lot of countries have fiddled with the use of choppers but none refined it to the point the Rhodesians did.

Rhodesians acknowledge that they learned a lot from the Portuguese who (despite their pathetic conscripts) had some pretty good COIN ideas and soldiers (Commandos, Paracadistas and Flechas). And it must be said they devoured all they could from other experiences in other wars and applied those or at least tried many. Rhodesians were never too proud to learn from others experiences. I never heard any reference to heliborne ops in Algeria when I was there but certainly the concept of the 'cordon sanitaire' came from there.

First of all, the idea is not to start a pissing context but just to shed some lights on facts that are mostly unknown because the sources related to them have for 99% of them never been translated into English.

-For the tactical use of helicopters, true, it started in Korea (and even before that, some were deployed during WW2 and Indochina but that's a different story) but to find something akin to the fireforce concept, it started in Algeria with the DIH as mentioned in my previous post. Your mention of "fiddling with the use of choppers" is quite comical considering the fact the French had over 400 operational helicopters spread in dozens of DIH all around Algeria by the end of the war there and that the first genuine operational helicopter "gunships" were flown by the French Army and Navy during this conflict...but I guess that was tongue-in-cheek.

BTW, the MG 151 20 mm found on the Rhodesian K-car was initially acquired from the Portuguese at the end of the 1960s....and guess who the Portuguese got the idea of mounting an MG 151 on a helicopter from ? From the French, in Algeria, since they mounted the very same cannon on their S-58 from 1958 on....

-For the French influence; of course, no Brit or Commonwealth Nation member (or Rhodesian...) in his right mind will ever admit that they have learnt anything from the French; over 1,000 years of competition simply precludes such acknowledgement. But if you admit the Rhodies learnt something from the Portuguese....then you also have to admit that the Portuguese Para-quedistas and "Caçadores Especiais" were trained or inspired by the French and that the French had a huge influence on them, from Alouette helos and EBR armoured cars and Berliet GBC trucks down to the cut and camouflage of their uniform which were almost carbon copies of the French "Tenue Léopard" of the 50s and 60s.

The Portuguese sent several experts first to Pau to the French airborne School (ETAP) to create their own airborne school and then to different "Commandos de Chasse" in Algeria to see how things were done there. For example, in Sept. 1958, the 7 Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens (7 RTA) operating in Algeria was visited by six Portuguese officers on a fact finding mission on the use of "Commandos de Chasse" .

The "Caçadores Especiais" concept was born out of the "Commandos de Chasse" concept just like the Para-quedistas were modeled on the "Paras" to such an extent that the Portuguese para units bore the same name as the original French Para units: "Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes" RCP in French and "Regimento de Caçadores Pára-quedistas" RCP in Portuguese.

BTW, the French influence is mentioned in Alexandre Binda's book on the RLI "The Saints" page 106; the author remarked on his deployment with the Portuguese that they did not apply the French methods to the full, that they "...did not patrol extensively enough...." for it to be useful.

Article from another website on the DIH:

A standard airborne assault of the time was based on the elements of surprise, concentration of force, flexibility, and speed. Once an ALN group was identified, no unusual reconnaissance activity was permitted: instead, the French would first take care to find a suitable landing zone from maps and aerial photographs. Then the French would concentrate their force: during the afternoon preceding the operation the helicopter crews were briefed, together with fighter pilots providing support. Well before dawn the commandos would arrive at helicopter pick-up point and then split up into helicopter loads. The first wave of the air assault would depart also before the dawn.

The landing zone would then be bombed by B-26s and the surrounding area then strafed by F-47s and T-6s. Immediately after air strikes, H-34 Pirates would sweep in to rake the landing zone with cannon fire and then drop smoke-markers for the troop transport helicopters. These were ordered in immediately afterwards and all the time supported by Pirates, which continued firing at targets around the landing zone as the Commandos disembarked and, as they began to deploy, stood by for further opportunity targets. Having dropped their troops, the transport helicopters would fly back to their bases, some to get their weapons installed while others to bring in more troops.

A combat air patrol of fixed-wing aircraft was maintained and called in whenever necessary by the command post – airborne in a helicopter. All the time the Pirates continued criss-crossing the area, searching for targets of opportunity in places fixed-wing aircraft could not reach. By the nightfall the French were usually in position to count the results.

Algerian War, 1954 - 1962

Sounds familiar, doesn't it ?

The picture shows a MG 151 mounted on a French S-58 in Algeria.

Originally Posted by fantassin

First of all, the idea is not to start a pissing context but just to shed some lights on facts that are mostly unknown because the sources related to them have for 99% of them never been translated into English.

You seem to have issues about the French military. I suggest though if the French want to educate the world then they should start to translate some of their pearls of wisdom into other languages. I'm not going to get into a knock-down-drag-out over the role of the French in military history when I said... "Rhodesians acknowledge that they learned a lot from the Portuguese who (despite their pathetic conscripts) had some pretty good COIN ideas and soldiers (Commandos, Paracadistas and Flechas). And it must be said they devoured all they could from other experiences in other wars and applied those or at least tried many. Rhodesians were never too proud to learn from others experiences."

No issue whatsoever.

Just facts !

Originally Posted by Schaden

The whole idea of winning the war but losing it through politics is a popular theme of ex Rhodesians - the fact is that they had by 1979 comprehensively lost control of large swathes of the countryside - you couldn't drive from Grey's Inn on the outskirts of Bulawayo to the Matopos in any kind of safety. This was actually in the middle of the country - on the borders it was far worse - Umtali was bombarded and outside the town places like leopard Rock and the White Horse Inn were simply abandoned.

The reason why there was such a high tempo of operations - and yes I've also heard the stories of people loading magazines on the choppers as they were lifted from one contact to another was simply the fireforce was struggling with the tempo and number of contacts where many many contacts simply were ignored after being called in by the pbi patrolling.

They were also serving as territorials 6 weeks on, 6 weeks off and everyone was in the territorials - think about that - imagine if the TA consisted of every male under the age of 40 in the country and everyone gave up their jobs every six weeks for six weeks of active service - hardly the sign of a country that was winning a war.

The Rhodesians were fighting a war on a shoestring and it was a war that was lost before the first shot was fired - silly buggers should have taken the terms offered to them on HMS Tiger which were better than anything they actually ended up with.

Myths are nice and memories are nice and they fought the good fight as best they were able but lets not don rose coloured glasses and pretend to ourselves as to what actually happened there.

I'd be interested to hear more about your experience in the SADF with the parabats - did you happen to serve as MOT infantry with 61 mech during the cross border raids in 1981?

What a quaint interpretation of the situation. I wonder what your background is.

Originally Posted by fantassin

No issue whatsoever.

Just facts !

I'm all ears.

Originally Posted by Once_a_soldier

What a quaint interpretation of the situation. I wonder what your background is.

Don't worry - I'm wondering about yours as well. Because it smells a bit odd.

Originally Posted by Schaden

Don't worry - I'm wondering about yours as well. Because it smells a bit odd.

I have nothing to hide nor anything to be ashamed of.

A South African went to Rhodesia was commissioned through their regular cadet course after serving a year as a troopie in the RLI (2 Cdo), spent three years as a troop commander in the RLI (3 Cdo) on ops, then a spell at the School of Infantry as an officer instructor in Cadet Wing before ending up at an operational Bde HQ as a staff officer (GSO3-Ops&SD). Returned to South Africa and joined the Parachute Battalion, spent one year as 2IC of a National Service company under training, spent the next year as a company commander of National Service under training. Took part in Op Daisy and was posted 44 Para Bde as theTraining Major where after six months left the army for a carrer in commercial security.

Now you.

Oh nothing as special - had family in Umtali and Salisbury, visited them many times int he 70's, they sat out the war and the following peace, did my service at 1 SAi in Bloemfontein, 14 months at 61 Mech, did Ops Carrot, Daisy and Protea, then did the usual camps, 3 border and 3 at Lohatla Battle School, finished up the local home guard running the bar when I decided I'd had enough.

Never met anyone from the Rhodesian Army above about a Sergeant in the SADF, not paraat enough, not Afrikaans enough and far too soutie for their taste I'd say.

Never btw met anyone from the bats who didn't recognise the balkie and comment on it. So I still think you smell a little odd.

Originally Posted by fantassin

... BTW, the French influence is mentioned in Alexandre Binda's book on the RLI "The Saints" page 106; the author remarked on his deployment with the Portuguese that they did not apply the French methods to the full, that they "...did not patrol extensively enough...." for it to be useful.

Binda's comment related specifically to the Portuguese use of aldeamentos (collective villages in Malaya - Protected Villages in Vietnam and Rhodesia) and their inability through a shortage of troops to dominate and control the now (supposedly) uninhabited areas. If you don't have the troops you cant do the job. Simple as that. But then as the Rhodesians learned later that priorities need to be set. Meaning what is 'vital ground', what is GTI (ground of tactical importance) etc etc and then apply your military assets accordingly.

Article from another website on the DIH:

A standard airborne assault of the time was based on the elements of surprise, concentration of force, flexibility, and speed. Once an ALN group was identified, no unusual reconnaissance activity was permitted: instead, the French would first take care to find a suitable landing zone from maps and aerial photographs. Then the French would concentrate their force: during the afternoon preceding the operation the helicopter crews were briefed, together with fighter pilots providing support. Well before dawn the commandos would arrive at helicopter pick-up point and then split up into helicopter loads. The first wave of the air assault would depart also before the dawn.

That sounds similar but I am assuming that the targets were large enough to require a deliberate attack at first light. The Rhodesians did the same on external camp attacks (in Mozambique and Zambia and where air effort was authorised) starting with Op Dingo (Chimoio and Tembue) in November 1977 and a number more thereafter.

The Fireforce operated mainly internally where the insurgents very seldom presented static targets larger than 20 odd and as such could be attacked at any time of day especially if there were chances that they would move to a new location overnight. Hence when the Selous Scouts were deployed in a given area the Fireforce could end up doing a lot of 'camp hopping'. (Read Bax's paper for more detail)

The landing zone would then be bombed by B-26s and the surrounding area then strafed by F-47s and T-6s. Immediately after air strikes, H-34 Pirates would sweep in to rake the landing zone with cannon fire and then drop smoke-markers for the troop transport helicopters. These were ordered in immediately afterwards and all the time supported by Pirates, which continued firing at targets around the landing zone as the Commandos disembarked and, as they began to deploy, stood by for further opportunity targets. Having dropped their troops, the transport helicopters would fly back to their bases, some to get their weapons installed while others to bring in more troops.

This is where we differ. The airstrikes went in on the enemy positions not on a proposed LZ. The idea was to kill the enemy and the paras and the heli-borne troops were dropped in as much as we could to surround the base (which was not always possible due to a lack of troops and aircraft). That following in behind the airstrikes at H+2 the paras would drop in stop lines (at Chimoio we dropped in an L-shape with 72 paras (3 Daks) on each leg and 40 heli-borne RLI on the third side - sadly leaving one end of the box open due to lack of aircraft). Always needed to drop as close to the objective as possible as the limited assets required a tight encirclement. In most of such ops the SAS and the RLI found gooks running around below them when they looked down.

So the principle difference with many of the earlier heli-borne/para ops (in other wars) the Rhodesians went for immediate encirclement/envelopment rather than creating an bridgehead and exploiting outwards from there. (There are of course exceptions in every war)

A combat air patrol of fixed-wing aircraft was maintained and called in whenever necessary by the command post – airborne in a helicopter. All the time the Pirates continued criss-crossing the area, searching for targets of opportunity in places fixed-wing aircraft could not reach. By the nightfall the French were usually in position to count the results.

Sounds similar except the airborne command post (in a chopper) would keep a tight control over all ground and air movements in the target area. And quite often we would be home for supper and before the raid made the international news.

There are quite frankly not too many permutations when it comes to this kind of op which are generally limited by the air effort and the number of troops available.

Now back to the Bax paper of which the aim was:

The aim of this paper is to outline the proven doctrine of concentrating a highly mobile, instantly deployable, powerful light strike force combining air and ground assets under a single command to kill or capture terrorists in COIN operations.

What more is there to say?

Originally Posted by Schaden

Oh nothing as special - had family in Umtali and Salisbury, visited them many times int he 70's, they sat out the war and the following peace, did my service at 1 SAi in Bloemfontein, 14 months at 61 Mech, did Ops Carrot, Daisy and Protea, then did the usual camps, 3 border and 3 at Lohatla Battle School, finished up the local home guard running the bar when I decided I'd had enough.

You did your service with a good operational outfit. You can be proud of that.

Never met anyone from the Rhodesian Army above about a Sergeant in the SADF, not paraat enough, not Afrikaans enough and far too soutie for their taste I'd say.

Well that was kind of my problem too. Although fluent in Afrikaans I was always treated like an 'Englishman' despite my fathers family having left 'mud-island' in 1793. So if anyone was self-destructing it was the Afrikaaners who kept alienating their friends and allies. Kind of pissed me off considering I never had any problems in Rhodesia being a South African. Then they wouldn't accept my Rhodesian courses so I really had to move on for my own sanity and my future.

Never btw met anyone from the bats who didn't recognise the balkie and comment on it. So I still think you smell a little odd.

Which generation of Bats? I left at the end of 1982 for 44 Bde and 6 mths later was out of the service. A check reveals the balkie was awarded in December 1982. So I don't feel bad not recognising something I probably never saw 29 years ago when based at Murrayhill Camp with 44 Bde North of Pretoria for six months. That said I appreciate that badge means a lot to those who were awarded it. 61 Mech Bn Gp did some pretty good work over the years by any standard which is a credit to the National Servicemen who found themselves in the middle of a hot little war.

Well odd to you maybe but in a few weeks the remnants of the RLI (which is/was/forever will be my parent regiment) will get together in London/Hatfield/Bedford for a belated 50th Birthday (31 years after being disbanded) when we will remember the good old bad days and honour our fallen. So pop in at the Rifles Club on the evening of the 23rd and there will a few hundred of the old and bold who can verify my bona fides.