Are you religious?

[BoomShackerLacker]

Yes spot on, and thank you. I thought something was amis with my explanation; it just seemed so obvious to me? Maybe it's the terms I use that confuse matters; I say stuff like 'the mirage is not inherently existent' and you say there 'can be no object without a subject'. Both mean the same thing; just the terminology is confusing to those not familiar with it.

But what you say also goes for our sense of self. I am a father, because I have a daughter. I am an dog owner, because I have a dog. I am a husband, because I have a wife. I'm a member of A.A., because there are other A.A. members, etc.

Interesting stuff.

I look forward to Higgsy's reply. And actually - to be honest - none of this is my original thought; I've studied the doctrine of the Two Truths on my foundation course and objects, self, and phenomena exist conventionally in five different ways. The way I've described is only one of the ways they exist, and it's formal description title is "A Dependant-related Pheonmenon depending on Mere Imputation by Conception".

It basically means, in the instance we were discussing that the phenomena depends on causes to produce the heat waves, and then mind conceptualises the heat waves into a mirage; imputing 'mirage' onto the heat waves.

This is a gross example, but as I said, we do this in our everyday lives; it's why we can argue with our wives and both of us think we are 'right'; both of us have imputed a different meaning onto the same phenomena - and we fight and cause suffering.

I'm bigger than her though.

There's a lot in your wife and I being different subjects viewing phenomena. I take the view that the phenomena presents essences of the real which we construct as an object e.g. what we learn is a horse are its attributes which are mostly unique to it, four legs plus mane, long head etc. We're viewing these characteristics and say "horse" when the essential elements of a horse cohere in front of us. This is what we label 'knowledge'; largely knowledge is the appearances that we believe we recognise.

The problem is some of the characteristics aren't entirely unique and change e.g. the horse loses a leg and an eye and knowledge of that object starts to wobble and blur. The wife and I are starting to see difference essences, as you imply, and the object is becoming different to both of us. It was only the same when we discussed it through our shared cultural journey of language and experience.

[Whey_Aye_Banzai]

I'm about to give up on you pal...just one more go.

You have heard about cause and effect...I hope.

Your notion is that there is an effect but no cause or that the two are not connected in any way.

Words like mirage and light are part of a process. But they are just the words...pick any language. Causes are most important...they exist.

(a) Principle cause...external data hitting the brain.
(b) Secondary cause...internal reaction in the brain.(Perception)...mirage/light. (Words)

Effects... ? Work it out. A mirage is an effect...it has a cause. The mirage is the data being processed in a brain. The data is not interested in brains...it is like a film being developed. The image is captured according to the light and conditions. If it looks like water...so what. That is the way a brain sees it. The data exists...it's just not water. You are saying that the data does not exist... a camera can also capture the effect!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!



Buddhism has harmed you...

I'm smiling, because I look at the picture - my eyes perceive it; it's a bunch of colours; and my then conceptual mind imputes an image of a mirage.

Where does the mirage exist? In my mind.

I've just shown the same picture to my dog - he doesn't have the same far reaching conceptual mind as humans - he doesn't see the mirage; I know because I pointed and asked him, "What's that?" He just looked at my finger and said "Woof?"

You just don't get it, and it is really ever so simple. You do make me smile, Higgsy.

I bet there's mirages all over the place - everywhere where no-one can see them - existing all by themselves. Isn't that a thought eh?

I bet when I was in Gulf War 1, I'd go to my tent and sleep, and a mirage was just outside of my tent door - only that no-one knew, 'cos no-one was there to see it; but it was there no doubt - a mirage right by my 12 x 12 - but no-one took a phot of it, 'cos no-one was around to see it.

Strange world, innit.

[Higgs_bosun]

I think Christopher Hitchen's was an absolutely fantastic bloke; very funny, very sharp, very smart. And yes, there's truth in what he says, but I've heard most of Hitchen's stuff; I understand his arguments, and sometimes I think he just likes to argue; though I don't believe in circumcision for 'religious' purposes. Paul (of Tsarus) was quite a clever bloke, he did away with it; he knew circumcision wouldn't be good for attracting new followers; it was an extremely sharp marketing tool (pun intended).

But with religion, like most things - everything maybe - there's good and bad inherent in each. I love a sticky bar, they're good, but too many of them would be bad. Ying 'n' Yang 'n' all that.

What other Christopher Hitchen's arguments would you like to discuss?

You are confused about the word inherent pal....inherent this, inherent that. Forget it... Oranges have inherent fruitiness, motorways are inherently boring, your argument is inherently flawed... etc.

Hitchens would destroy the notion of "inherent properties" in religion. Religion is just mumbo jumbo...it "Poisons Everything"... It does more harm than good but it will be whatever you want it to be. It is devoid of 'inherent values'....other than being 'inherently' confusing!!!!

[Taffd]

Everybody sees a different rainbow.

[BoomShackerLacker]

Everybody sees a different rainbow.

*hugs Taff and sits down holding hands*

[Whey_Aye_Banzai]

Everybody sees a different rainbow.

Very true, Taff, it all depends on the position of the viewer. And all things exist - including us - in the same way as rainbows exist, illusory (not an illusion); something is there but what we see isn't exactly what appears to be there.

I can explain in some depth why this is, but my dog needs walking.

@Higgsy, lighten up, fella - it's only the interweb - it's not 'reality'. Your ego is getting in the way of a good discussion. Remember the reality is, we're discussing 'information'; try not to attach that information to your sense of self, so if it becomes challenged, then it won't feel like your sense of self is being challenged.

There's a little Buddhist tip for you!

[BoomShackerLacker]

...

I've just shown the same picture to my dog - he doesn't have the same far reaching conceptual mind as humans - he doesn't see the mirage; I know because I pointed and asked him, "What's that?" He just looked at my finger and said "Woof?"

...

BIG SMILE! I'll publish your book WAB as it'll sell shed loads.

Reminded me of AC Grayling's fave Ludwig Wittgensteirn who said: 'If a Lion could talk we wouldn't understand it" - as in its reality stems from its being a different being. Its use of English would still stump us as it's a subject from a different world.

[BoomShackerLacker]

Uber philosophy anoraks can pick the bones out of this realism (universal truth) and nominalism (particular truths e.g. red over here is different from the red over there etc):

"PREDICATES AND NAMES OF ATTRIBUTESIn contemporary discussions of the problem of universals a distinction
has been drawn between ' x is red' and ' x has the attribute (quality) Redness
'. Predicates, the contemporary nominalists contend, are not names
at all, hence it is illegitimate to pass from ' x is red ' to ' there is an attribute,
redness, which x exemplifies (instantiates) '. And it must be conceded that
in rejecting such existential inferences modern nominalists are not committed
to the untenable resemblance theory according to which a statement
of the form 'x is red ' is synonymous with a statement of the form ' x redresembles
y '. That no resemblance is asserted by ' x is red ', has been pointed
out by Ayer, in the context of a recent discussion of basic propositions':
it is logically possible that there should exist only one red particular, but
a resemblance statement could not be true unless at least two particulars
existed. To be sure, it would be very difficult for a colour predicate to acquire
a meaning if only one particular to which it is applicable existed-and if
the particulars in question are transient sense-impressions this may even be
impossible. But the question how a sentence acquired its present significance
should not be confused with the question what its present significance is.
It may well be that the statement '' red' is a simple, ostensively defined
descriptive predicate ' entails 'there are, at some time, at least two red
particulars '; yet it would not be self-contradictory to suppose that there
existed only one red particular, or indeed no red particular at all.
Let us, therefore, separate nominalism from the resemblance theory
considered in I, and take it to assert that predicates are syncategorematic,
not names of universals ; that it is legitimate to infer from a true statement
of the form ' x is f' that there is a particular x such that x is f, but illegitimate
to infer from the same statement that there is a universal, f-ness, such that
x is an instance of it. This modest minimum of nominalism is justifiable
in terms of Occam's razor. Indeed, if we had no better reason for saying
that there are universals than the argument 'there are meaningful predicates,
but in order for a predicate to be meaningful there must be an entity
which is its meaning; and if that entity were a particular, the predicate
would be a proper name, not a predicate; so the meaning of a predicate
must be a universal', then realism would be just a metaphysical creed bred
by a naive theory of meaning. The verb ' to mean ' is syntactically transitive
because we can talk of meant meanings. But so is 'to dream ', since we can
properly say ' I dreamt a lovely dream ', yet it would be queer to suppose
that there might be dreams which are not dreamt by anybody (or any
mind).
Yet, while one who is satisfied with the subject-predicate form as
irreducible to something more intelligible can say 'this apple is red ' without
admitting that there is such a thing as redness, can he really justify his
ontological abstinence by showing that any apparent name of a universal
can be contextually eliminated ? The modern nominalists are committed
to this daring thesis,2 but a good empiricist, I contend, ought to reject it
on inductive grounds. In the following, I shall discuss a small sample of
descriptive statements that refer irreducibly to universals and are intelligible
to everybody except philosophers with a nominalistic prejudice."

Sorted.

Nominalism, Empiricism and Universals--I

Arthur Pap
The Philosophical Quarterly
Vol. 9, No. 37 (Oct., 1959), pp. 330-340
Published by: Blackwell Publishing
Article Stable URL:JSTOR: An Error Occurred Setting Your User Cookie

[Whey_Aye_Banzai]

Hitchens would destroy the notion of "inherent properties" in religion.

And again, your lack of understanding causes you problems. The conventional truth is that there is good and bad in religion. I won't give examples, 'cos they're pretty obvious. But the ultimate truth is that there is no inherent properties in anything; all objects, selfs, and phenomena are empty of inherent existence.

All 'inherent' means is 'independent'; mirages do not exist independently. Think about it carefully. It's like a ruddy Zen koan isn't it? "If heat waves rise in a desert, can there be a mirage with no-one around?" LOL. I've just made a new koan; how cool is that?

Maybe an explanation of Taff's rainbow will help you understand the word 'inherent' (though I think independant is a decent synonym). Through our own experience we know that the appearance of a rainbow is deceptive; I mean it may look real, like it has its own inherent existence, but we really know that it depends on the Sun, the rain, and the position of the observer. If the observer moves, so does the rainbow; if a cloud covers the Sun, the rainbow disapears or fades. If it stops raining, the rainbow will disappear. Not only that, consider that when we see a rainbow, it looks fixed, however the rain travelling through it is constantly moving and being replaced with other droplets.

If we realise that, then we can act appropriately towards the rainbow - we can just enjoy it for what it is. However, if we cling to the idea that the rainbow inherently exists - that it is fixed in space like the mirage you say 'simply exists', we may go looking for the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow and we'll experience only frustration. The same is true for all phenomenon; including us.

If we accept these as mere appearances to mind, we can establish their existence and relate to them appropriately - for example we'll not go chasing around the desert trying to find that mirage that you say 'simply exists'; getting pissed off in the process when we can't find it ('cos it only exists in the mind).

I really don't think our views are that different, Higgsy, you've just missed some subtle area of understanding. I know it's not easy. I remember having a 'grasshopper' moment with a monk after my first lesson on Emptiness of Inherent Existence; I said to him, "You know, I didn't have a clue about that? I reckon it's because I'm a Geordie!" I joked.

The monk said to me, "Point to me where it is you're a Geordie!" And the grasshopper moment happened; I was like "What the fuck?"

It's now obvious, the place where I'm a Geordie is in my mind; being a Geordie is not inherently existent; it's a CONCEPT - a LABEL (you used the term yourself, though you don't understand it's implications) in my mind.

See that now?

[billybongo]

All 'inherent' means is 'independent'.....

Incorrect, low left.