Kenya imprisons seven Somalis for piracy

Originally Posted by Washington Post

By Celestine Achieng
Reuters
Wednesday, March 10, 2010; 2:38 PM

MOMBASA, Kenya (Reuters) - A Kenyan court sentenced seven Somalis to 20 years in prison for piracy on Wednesday after they tried to attack a Danish cargo vessel.

British Royal Navy forces [HMS Cumberland] arrested the men in 2008 after they attempted to seize MV Powerful off the Gulf of Aden, one of the world's busiest shipping routes. Two pirates died in an ensuing fight.

They were then handed over to Kenyan authorities and charged with piracy...

The contribution of Naval Reservists to current operations is mentioned here: Bahrain and beyond: Reservists supporting the Royal Navy's key missions in the Gulf

The Gulf region is one of the most strategic Areas of Operation (AOR) for the Royal Navy as concerns build over piracy, maritime security and counter terrorism. The Royal Navy’s operations in the Gulf are coordinated by the United Kingdom Maritime Component Command (UKMCC) based in Bahrain. The UKMCC is supporting a growing number of international task forces in the AOR, which covers 2.5m square miles, with the RNR providing personnel in a variety of roles.

UKMCC controls British forces operating independently and also those assigned to the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). CMF is a growing naval force currently comprising 24 nations, which contribute to three task forces, CTF 150, CTF 151 and CTF 152 which focus on maritime security, counter piracy, counter narcotics and counter terrorism.

Commodore Tim Lowe Royal Navy is the United Kingdom Maritime Component Commander and he is also the Deputy Commander Combined Maritime Forces. The Combined Task Force Iraqi Maritime (CTF IM) is a joint US/UK Task Force, which also has headquarters in Bahrain. It is currently commanded by Commodore Chris Richards Royal Navy. CTF IM is responsible for maritime security around the Iraqi oil platforms in the Northern Arabian Gulf.

The Royal Naval Reserve has officers and ratings working in UKMCC, CMF and CTF IM, ranging from specialists in Communication (CIS), Information Operations (IO), Media Operations (MOS) and Force Protection (SPO). Most of the reservists are on six month deployments and all relish the opportunity to work in such a dynamic operational environment. Seven reservists are currently deployed in Bahrain UKMCC/CMF with many more working in SPO roles in the RFA fleet.

Originally Posted by msr

Here they go again:

"seizing 12 tonnes of cannabis resin with an estimated UK street value in excess of £43 million"

http://www.talktofrank.com/drugs.aspx?id=172#cost

Resin is £50 per ounce, which is approx 30grams

therefore 100g costs £150 and 1 kg £1500
they seized 12,000 kg, so 12,000*1500=£18,000,000

Or from here: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk...t-1632668.html

500kg estimated at £1m means the Andrew's bust was worth £24m.

I do wish they would stop posting bogus figures.

It will be cut and padded out, resulting in higher volumes. Hence the haul going further and generating more money than your basic figures.

And the reason this is being done, ad infinitum, on an Army orientated website is?

Because some people seem to think that the RN is not contributing to "the war" effort. It is also reflected in this link http://www.navy-net.co.uk/Forums/viewtopic/t=26121.html .

Just part of the wider education of the Army on the role we dark blue play in these current times.

The reason the thread exists is to try to make some points:

1)Even the current Afghan campaign has a maritime element.
2)Most nations do have coastlines, so expecting to fight in landlocked places where there is no naval or air threat would be a disaster waiting to happen.
3)Even without fighting nation states, threats against naval forces and the shipping international trade depends on are real.
4)Efforts to counter these threats largely deter - a shame as nothing would do the RN more good than a sucessful engagement.
5)Assymetric does not always mean low tech, and does not mean that we do not need technology (for example to find and track small boats).

Originally Posted by Papa_Lazarou

And the reason this is being done, ad infinitum, on an Army orientated website is?

Because getting the andrew to bite is like shooting fish in a barrel ;)

P_L

The point of this thread is/was to show that maritime activties are relevent to events ashore, even in a land locked theatre such as Afghanistan. Why the RN doesn't make more of maritime aspects of Afghan operations I don't know.

Other potential theatres are not land locaked. As such, this article from the USNI may be relevent:

Got Sea Control?

The importance of sea control has been understated in recent years because of our longstanding maritime blue-water supremacy. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower categorizes sea control as one of the sea services' six expanded core capabilities, but does not distinguish it. With the continuing proliferation of anti-access and area-denial capabilities around the world, the likelihood is increasing that our local sea control will be challenged, particularly in the littorals. Military planners who require naval power to support operations ashore must take this into account.

As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked in an April 2009 address at the U.S. Naval War College, we face potential conflicts that "will range across a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. Where near-peers will use irregular or asymmetric tactics that target our traditional strengths—such as our ability to project power via carrier strike groups. And where non-state actors may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles."

These challenges include unpredictable political circumstances that will restrict overseas access, basing, and overflight rights at inopportune moments. The role of sea control as the most fundamental naval capability that facilitates joint and coalition freedom of action is therefore obvious. Retired Major General David Fastabend, then the U.S. Army's director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, underscored this critical joint force interdependency during Navy-Army Warfighter Talks in 2008 when he observed, "If you can't provide maritime supremacy, we are buying the wrong kind of Army."

Perhaps the most apt question regarding sea control is not, Can we? but, How do we know if we can? Although joint planners depend on sea power to deliver access, mobility, firepower, and 90 percent of joint-force supplies, there is no generally accepted methodology or doctrine to assess our "sea-control potential" during the campaign-design process.

Later...

A new dimension has been added to littoral sea control by what is referred to as "the hybrid threat," which retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman defines as any adversary that employs a fusion of "conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives." For example, the hybrid threat posed by the intersection of Somali pirates and the terrorist organizations al-Shabab and al Qaeda near the Bab-el-Mandeb has provided an unprecedented challenge for Coalition navies struggling to keep one of the world's most strategic oil chokepoints open. Nation states that do not possess the capability to directly challenge powerful navies may also employ hybrid sea-denial strategies. This is particularly relevant if the adversary's objective is not to defeat their enemy in conventional terms, but to undermine political will through a protracted struggle that imposes significant costs.

The 2006 Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah provides an example of a struggle for littoral sea control within the context of a hybrid threat. The Israeli Navy possessed a clear overmatch in conventional capabilities and developed its tactics accordingly. There is another perspective—Hezbollah's—that will be considered for this sea-control assessment.

2006: Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon

During the 2006 Lebanon War, the Israeli Navy's objective was to impose a naval blockade to isolate Hezbollah and thus help to advance Israeli defense force operations ashore. Hezbollah's objective was less complicated: inflict damage on a regional superpower, survive the conflict, and win the public relations war. Since Hezbollah doesn't have a navy, this example typifies the "hybrid sea denial" approach that navies may encounter in the littorals.

The Scorecard

Capacity: The Israeli Navy held an absolute capacity overmatch in regular naval forces, but Hezbollah's hybrid forces were not negligible and had to be considered. Advantage: Israel.

Capability: The Israeli Navy clearly overmatched Hezbollah in conventional capabilities. Hezbollah employed hybrid tactics that included missiles, suicide bombers, crime, manipulation of civilian infrastructure, and propaganda. Advantage: Israel.

Information Dominance: The Israeli Navy possessed significant intelligence, command-and-control, and cyber capabilities, but was not aware of Hezbollah's C-802 antiship missiles that could be fired from trucks against naval targets. Since the Israeli Navy had to operate near shore to maintain a blockade, this simplified Hezbollah's targeting problem. Hezbollah also had significant intelligence resources augmented by capabilities from regional allies and was exceptionally media savvy. Advantage: Toss-up.

Tactical Readiness: The Israeli Navy was tactically proficient and well-defended against the C-802 missile when its use was anticipated. Both the Israeli Navy and Hezbollah are very good at what they do. Advantage: Toss-up.

Maneuver Space: The Israeli Navy was constrained by the littoral operating environment, rules of engagement, military doctrine, and international law. Hezbollah's maneuver space was not similarly constrained. Advantage: Hezbollah.

Overall assessment of sea-control level for the 2006 Lebanon War: Opposed.

The Israeli Navy undoubtedly considered its blockade to be an unopposed sea-control operation based on the complete absence of conventional Hezbollah naval capability.

Actual Campaign Summary

The Israeli Navy ship Hanit was severely damaged by a C-802 missile on 14 July 2006. Following a United Nations-brokered ceasefire, the war ended when Israel lifted its naval blockade on 8 September 2006. The chief of the Israeli Navy resigned in 2007. During a panel discussion at the 2009 Surface Navy Association conference, a senior Israeli naval officer advised against spending too much time in the littorals because of the complex threat environment, emphasizing the point that if you don't have to be there, "don't go there."

The Littoral Truth

SIr Julian Corbett was right: to support joint force, national, and even international objectives, we must operate in the littorals. For powerful navies, the most difficult aspect of operating in the littorals is acquiring the necessary mindset and realizing that the default sea-control level is "opposed." It doesn't seem just that our multibillion-dollar ships can be damaged or even sunk by cheap mines, missiles, or skiffs laden with explosives. But we must realistically admit the possibility. History has shown us that in the complicated littoral sea-control environment, losses are not only possible, they are inevitable. Littoral sea control, therefore, needs to be assessed, not assumed, as an important component of campaign design. Powerful navies may not particularly like the idea of operating in the littorals, but it's where the jobs are.

Hmm. Two snippets:

1. An RN (strictly speaking RNR) Commander being awarded a medal for helping to rescue some people from pirates - see here:

A naval reservist who helped free a cargo ship from pirates has been honoured for his efforts. Commander Neil Parsonage, from Penwortham, negotiated the release of the MV Ariana from the clutches of Somali pirates.

Now he has been presented with the honourary medal of the Ukraine Ministry of Defence for his efforts – the first British national to receive the award.

The 52-year-old said: "Only joint efforts from navies of all countries will help to reach success in counter-piracy activities. It is an extreme honour to be awarded the medal.

"The award was for military cooperation with the Ukrainian military and for my part in assisting with the negotiations that led finally to the release of the MV Ariana and her largely Ukrainian crew from pirate captivity."

Commander Parsonage, who works as a solicitor in his day job, is the head of a Royal Navy unit tackling pirates around the world.

But it was a 12-week operation to free a cargo ship crew from the clutches of the hijackers that led him to be presented with the medal.

He is only the 61st person to receive it. Details of his exact role in the siege have not been revealed.

I wonder if the likes of Max Hastings will pay attention to the following from Google News?

Navy helps free hostages on ship