Hello,

according to this article it is not the F/A 18 E/F Super Hornet which has the problems but the F/A 18 A/B/C/D Hornet:

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php...56&c=AME&s=AIR



tangosix.

F35B 40 Knot Slow Approach & Landing.

Originally Posted by GLOCK26

Two years ago A330 was selected to replace the ageing USAF KC-135 tanker fleet. Boeing cried protectionism to the GAO and Defence Secretary Gates, with his usual indecision, upheld the protest.....

Just to clarify ...

1. USAF originally wanted 767, Northrop Grumman-EADS and some US politicians cried foul (A330 was to be build in Alabama). USAF decision overturned.

2. New competition, A330 won. Boeing protest.

3. New competition, essentially if both meet the criteria, they'll pick the cheapest and easiest one. Northrop, "fck it, we can't be bothered".

I seem to remember that there has always been a different approach to flight deck construction between the United States Navy and the Royal Navy.

Prior to and during WWII the USN predicated the existence of the carrier fleet on the ability of the embarked aircraft to protect the mother vessel from aircraft attack therefore a lightweight wooden flight deck was fitted. The Royal navy assumed that a carrier would have to withstand some battle damage from aircraft and medium calibre guns therefore an armoured deck was fitted. This proved very interesting when the Japanese resorted to kamikaze tactics.

The US carriers were badly damaged whereas the aircraft did not generally penetrate the armoured decks of the RN vessels.

Through the 1970s the RN version of the F4 Phantom had an extendable nosewheel which raised the angle of attack and increased the liftable load of the aircraft but it did direct the afterburners toward the deck. RN carrier decks were built with this in mind. The RN aircraft were limited in their ability to operate from USN vessels on exchange and on joint exercises as the USN vessel flight decks were not designed to withstand this downward directed hot thrust.

Just an historical point to put a different slant on the discussion.

^
That requires a correction. [Late edit - in response to winnfield's post]

Northrop/ Grumman/ EADS airframe was selected by the USAF based on their own flight test evaluation. It was
partisan lobbying through the GAO which caused the goal posts to be moved in favour of Boeing. Unfortunately,
the Bush Doctrine lingers on in the form of Robert Gates. His appointment was an error of judgement for the
Obama administration. That is is already proving to be the case in regard to his handling of JSF/F136/VH-71.

Originally Posted by maninblack

I seem to remember that there has always been a different approach to flight deck construction between the United States Navy and the Royal Navy.

Prior to and during WWII the USN predicated the existence of the carrier fleet on the ability of the embarked aircraft to protect the mother vessel from aircraft attack therefore a lightweight wooden flight deck was fitted. The Royal navy assumed that a carrier would have to withstand some battle damage from aircraft and medium calibre guns therefore an armoured deck was fitted. This proved very interesting when the Japanese resorted to kamikaze tactics.

Just an historical point to put a different slant on the discussion.

Actually the driving force was the expected operating areas. The Royal Navy’s emphasis was on the Med and North Sea, where it would be reasonably expected that their carriers would be routinely within range of a land based air threat. Hence the armoured flight decks and a severe reduction in the number of aircraft carried on board. The US Navy emphasized operations in the Pacific, where they would not be constantly under the threat of land based aircraft. Hence they accepted a risk that if an aircraft got through their defenses then greater damage might result. They balanced that risk by having larger air groups embarked, roughly around 100 aircraft per carrier, to provide a greater number of fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers.

Neither flight deck was better than the other, they both offered advantages and disadvantages, given the shipbuilding capabilities of the time. When the carriers were tied in close to land supporting amphibious ops, then the British armoured system made the most sense. When the carriers were ranging around conducting raids against various targets and locating data was lacking, then being able to put up a lot of aircraft for the raid or strike made the most logical choice.

Actually, most carriers were lost not through letting air out (holes through the flight deck) but rather by letting water in (torpedo in the side). Looking at the records, both nation's ships were actually pretty hard to kill (leaving aside the escort carriers, which were built on merchantmen hulls).

Royal Navy Fleet Carrier Losses
HMS Eagle – Torpedo
HMS Hermes – Dive bomber
HMS Courageous – Torpedo U-29
HMS Glorious – Gunfire
HMS Ark Royal – U-81

US Navy Fleet Carrier Losses
USS Langley – Dive bomber damage, sunk by escorts torpedoes
USS Yorktown – Damaged by air attack, sunk by friendly submarine
USS Wasp – Torpedo from I-19
USS Hornet – damaged by air attack, sunk by Japanese ship torpedoes, after US escorts failed to sink her.
USS Princeton - Kamikaze attack.

Originally Posted by ECMO1

Originally Posted by maninblack

I seem to remember that there has always been a different approach to flight deck construction between the United States Navy and the Royal Navy.

Prior to and during WWII the USN predicated the existence of the carrier fleet on the ability of the embarked aircraft to protect the mother vessel from aircraft attack therefore a lightweight wooden flight deck was fitted. The Royal navy assumed that a carrier would have to withstand some battle damage from aircraft and medium calibre guns therefore an armoured deck was fitted. This proved very interesting when the Japanese resorted to kamikaze tactics.

Just an historical point to put a different slant on the discussion.

Actually the driving force was the expected operating areas. The Royal Navy’s emphasis was on the Med and North Sea, where it would be reasonably expected that their carriers would be routinely within range of a land based air threat. Hence the armoured flight decks and a severe reduction in the number of aircraft carried on board. The US Navy emphasized operations in the Pacific, where they would not be constantly under the threat of land based aircraft. Hence they accepted a risk that if an aircraft got through their defenses then greater damage might result. They balanced that risk by having larger air groups embarked, roughly around 100 aircraft per carrier, to provide a greater number of fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers.

Neither flight deck was better than the other, they both offered advantages and disadvantages, given the shipbuilding capabilities of the time. When the carriers were tied in close to land supporting amphibious ops, then the British armoured system made the most sense. When the carriers were ranging around conducting raids against various targets and locating data was lacking, then being able to put up a lot of aircraft for the raid or strike made the most logical choice.

Actually, most carriers were lost not through letting air out (holes through the flight deck) but rather by letting water in (torpedo in the side). Looking at the records, both nation's ships were actually pretty hard to kill (leaving aside the escort carriers, which were built on merchantmen hulls).

Royal Navy Fleet Carrier Losses
HMS Eagle – Torpedo
HMS Hermes – Dive bomber
HMS Courageous – Torpedo U-29
HMS Glorious – Gunfire
HMS Ark Royal – U-81

US Navy Fleet Carrier Losses
USS Langley – Dive bomber damage, sunk by escorts torpedoes
USS Yorktown – Damaged by air attack, sunk by friendly submarine
USS Wasp – Torpedo from I-19
USS Hornet – damaged by air attack, sunk by Japanese ship torpedoes, after US escorts failed to sink her.
USS Princeton - Kamikaze attack.

Very true in that a carrier is hard to kill, however, the RN armoured carriers lost little time following a deck strike from an incoming suicidal pilot. Deck repairs, if needed, were a quick weld of plate in many cases and the scorched wreckage shovelled over the side. The USN found their carrier decks positively trowelled with the engine and fuel penetrating through the deck causing catastrophic damage to the lower decks.

A carrier with a hoofing great hole in the deck is just as useless as a sunk carrier until repaired and those figures would be, I would imagine, a different story altogether.

Originally Posted by winnfield

Originally Posted by GLOCK26

Two years ago A330 was selected to replace the ageing USAF KC-135 tanker fleet. Boeing cried protectionism to the GAO and Defence Secretary Gates, with his usual indecision, upheld the protest.....

Just to clarify ....

Just to clarify even further, the USAF 'wanted' 100 KC-767 on a lease deal.

John McCain argued that the deal was not cost-effective, and a Congressional investigation revealed that the decision to lease was based upon a spot of corruption - the person in DoD most heavily involved in the process got 9 months for corruption (and didn't get the $250K p.a. job at Boeing which she was lined up for...) while two of the top Boeing bods resigned and were sacked respectively,.

Don Rumsfeld cancelled the lease deal and the KC-X programme was born.

IIRC, the congressional investigation which uncovered the corruption revealed a number of documents from within the USAF which asked why they were paying Boeing so much money for the lease of an aircraft which appeared, at least on paper, to be rather less capable than the A330-based solution which the USAF would have at least liked to have looked at rather than found itself being told 'the answer is Boeing'.

Originally Posted by maninblack

The US carriers were badly damaged whereas the aircraft did not generally penetrate the armoured decks of the RN vessels.

Just an historical point to put a different slant on the discussion.

Did the Royal Navy have any carriers in the Pacific that actually endured a kamikaze attack?

Hello RhodieBKK,

there was a substantial British fleet in the Pacific at the end of the war and the British carriers were hit by kamikazes.
The Americans were amazed to see one of our ships become operational again just hours after taking a kamikaze hit to the flightdeck.
The "dent" had reportedly been filled in with concrete!
An American ship would have been out of action after such a hit.

Picture here:

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/WH...WH2Nav47b.html

The Wikipedia entry for H.M.S. Formidable gives more detail,here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Formidable_(67)


tangosix.