Thread: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
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05-03-2010, 22:25 #16
Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
Lockheed to Speed Development of Joint Strike Fighter.
A department study of the program completed in October found the development phase of the revolutionary aircraft had slipped by 30 months. Gates has made changes that will reduce the slippage to 13 months,
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11-03-2010, 21:14 #17
Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
Hello,
some more on the F35 engine debate can be found here:
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs...entId=blogDest
Another story about F35 exhaust problems is here:
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs...9-92297fa29cf3
tangosix.This is not the tangosix who posts on militaryphotos.net
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12-03-2010, 09:18 #18
Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
Price of Lockheed's F-35 fighter soars
Thu Mar 11, 2010 7:02pm EST
Reuters: Lockheed hikes F-35 price 50 pct.
* Cost/plane seen over 50 pct higher than nine years ago
* Cost growth comes despite efforts to reform program
* Air Force to formally notify Congress, begin review (Adds 'too big to fail' in 3rd paragraph, Lockheed and GAO comments)
By Jim Wolf
WASHINGTON, March 11 (Reuters) - The average cost of Lockheed Martin Corp's (LMT.N) F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Pentagon's costliest arms purchase yet, will soar more than 50 percent above what was projected when its development began nine years ago, the Pentagon's top arms buyer told Congress.
The U.S. Air Force is set to formally notify Congress that the program has crashed through a key cost-containment threshold that will force a thorough review, Ashton Carter, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, said on Thursday.
But the net impact of such a notification may be minimal since the program is widely said by U.S. officials to be too big to fail. Washington has no other way to replace aging warplanes like Lockheed's F-16 and the program is a linchpin of fighter modernization for several U.S. allies.
The cost blowout has occurred despite a restructuring announced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in February to keep the program on track, including adding 13 months and $2.8 billion to the development phase.
"The JSF program has fallen short on performance over the past several years," Carter told the Senate Armed Services Committee. He said the Defense Department planned to aggressively manage it over coming years as it goes from development and testing toward full production.
Affordability was supposed to be a hallmark of the F-35, which is being built in three versions for the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps; eight overseas co-development partners; and other projected foreign buyers.
Senator Carl Levin, chairman of the committee, said the cost growth could have significant implications for the rest of the Pentagon's multibillion-dollar acquisition programs and for its budget as a whole. The United States alone is scheduled to buy more than 2,400 F-35s, the backbone of its air combat fleet for coming decades.
"People should not conclude that we will be willing to continue... strong support without regard to increased costs coming from poor program management or from lack of focus on affordability," the Michigan Democrat said.
Carter said he expected Air Force Secretary Michael Donley to notify Congress of the cost-containment breach formally under a law known as Nunn-McCurdy within days.
If unit-cost growth tops 25 percent, Nunn-McCurdy requires the Pentagon to justify continuing the program based on three main criteria: its importance to U.S. national security; the lack of a viable alternative; and evidence that the problems that led to the cost growth are under control.
In 2001, when the development began, the F-35 procurement cost had been projected to be $50.2 million per aircraft in base-year 2002 dollars.
Pentagon estimators, based on a projected procurement of 2,443 aircraft, including all variants, now expect the average price to range from $80 million to $95 million in 2002 dollars, said Christine Fox, director of cost assessment and program evaluation for Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
FOREIGN SALES
The eight U.S. co-development partners are Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Norway.
Israel has begun a process that could lead it to buy 75 F-35s. Singapore is also mulling a purchase, but cost growth could eat into overseas sales, to the benefit of rival fighters from Europe, Russia and China.
Completing development and approving full-rate production is now expected in April 2016, about 2-1/2 years later than planned in the baseline program approved in 2007, congressional auditors told the committee.
In addition, the Government Accountability Office said there was a "substantial risk" that the program would fail to deliver the expected number of aircraft and required capabilities on time, despite the restructuring.
Carter said initial operational capability was now set for 2012 for the U.S. Marine Corps version and 2016 for the Air Force and Navy models.
Lockheed Martin, the Pentagon's No. 1 supplier by sales, said F-35 production trends showed significant improvement, indicating aircraft deliveries will be back on schedule in 2011.
The three most recent aircraft loaded into production tooling are now on schedule, said Jeffery Adams, a company spokesman. "We are committed to delivering our airplanes on time." (Reporting by Jim Wolf; Editing by Tim Dobbyn)The Dogs bark, but the Caravan moves on...
Pambere ne Jongwe
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13-03-2010, 02:52 #19Member
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Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
been following the delays on this aircraft current update is the plane will cost $100 mill each, further more over 100 super hornets have been grounded due to cracks in airframes earlier than expected, several countries have brought these as a stop gap while awaiting the f35. including Australia, and the dutch.
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13-03-2010, 15:32 #20Senior Member
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Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
While not disputing the problems of the F-35, the only country outside of the US, which has bought the Super Hornet is Australia. The Netherlands fly’s the F-16.
The recent grounding order applies to F/A-18 A-D models, not the Super Hornet (E/F/G) models. See article here.
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13-03-2010, 16:57 #21
Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
Hello,
according to this article it is not the F/A 18 E/F Super Hornet which has the problems but the F/A 18 A/B/C/D Hornet:
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php...56&c=AME&s=AIR
tangosix.This is not the tangosix who posts on militaryphotos.net
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14-03-2010, 18:36 #22
Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
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15-03-2010, 11:51 #23Senior Member
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Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
Just to clarify ...
Originally Posted by GLOCK26
1. USAF originally wanted 767, Northrop Grumman-EADS and some US politicians cried foul (A330 was to be build in Alabama). USAF decision overturned.
2. New competition, A330 won. Boeing protest.
3. New competition, essentially if both meet the criteria, they'll pick the cheapest and easiest one. Northrop, "fck it, we can't be bothered".
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15-03-2010, 13:04 #24
Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
I seem to remember that there has always been a different approach to flight deck construction between the United States Navy and the Royal Navy.
Prior to and during WWII the USN predicated the existence of the carrier fleet on the ability of the embarked aircraft to protect the mother vessel from aircraft attack therefore a lightweight wooden flight deck was fitted. The Royal navy assumed that a carrier would have to withstand some battle damage from aircraft and medium calibre guns therefore an armoured deck was fitted. This proved very interesting when the Japanese resorted to kamikaze tactics.
The US carriers were badly damaged whereas the aircraft did not generally penetrate the armoured decks of the RN vessels.
Through the 1970s the RN version of the F4 Phantom had an extendable nosewheel which raised the angle of attack and increased the liftable load of the aircraft but it did direct the afterburners toward the deck. RN carrier decks were built with this in mind. The RN aircraft were limited in their ability to operate from USN vessels on exchange and on joint exercises as the USN vessel flight decks were not designed to withstand this downward directed hot thrust.
Just an historical point to put a different slant on the discussion.I had a black shirt, but I wasn't one.
Royal Navy; Authorised distributor of IPod & VT Halmatic products to Iran.
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15-03-2010, 13:11 #25
Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
^
That requires a correction. [Late edit - in response to winnfield's post]
Northrop/ Grumman/ EADS airframe was selected by the USAF based on their own flight test evaluation. It was
partisan lobbying through the GAO which caused the goal posts to be moved in favour of Boeing. Unfortunately,
the Bush Doctrine lingers on in the form of Robert Gates. His appointment was an error of judgement for the
Obama administration. That is is already proving to be the case in regard to his handling of JSF/F136/VH-71.
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15-03-2010, 18:56 #26Senior Member
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Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
Actually the driving force was the expected operating areas. The Royal Navy’s emphasis was on the Med and North Sea, where it would be reasonably expected that their carriers would be routinely within range of a land based air threat. Hence the armoured flight decks and a severe reduction in the number of aircraft carried on board. The US Navy emphasized operations in the Pacific, where they would not be constantly under the threat of land based aircraft. Hence they accepted a risk that if an aircraft got through their defenses then greater damage might result. They balanced that risk by having larger air groups embarked, roughly around 100 aircraft per carrier, to provide a greater number of fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers.
Originally Posted by maninblack
Neither flight deck was better than the other, they both offered advantages and disadvantages, given the shipbuilding capabilities of the time. When the carriers were tied in close to land supporting amphibious ops, then the British armoured system made the most sense. When the carriers were ranging around conducting raids against various targets and locating data was lacking, then being able to put up a lot of aircraft for the raid or strike made the most logical choice.
Actually, most carriers were lost not through letting air out (holes through the flight deck) but rather by letting water in (torpedo in the side). Looking at the records, both nation's ships were actually pretty hard to kill (leaving aside the escort carriers, which were built on merchantmen hulls).
Royal Navy Fleet Carrier Losses
HMS Eagle – Torpedo
HMS Hermes – Dive bomber
HMS Courageous – Torpedo U-29
HMS Glorious – Gunfire
HMS Ark Royal – U-81
US Navy Fleet Carrier Losses
USS Langley – Dive bomber damage, sunk by escorts torpedoes
USS Yorktown – Damaged by air attack, sunk by friendly submarine
USS Wasp – Torpedo from I-19
USS Hornet – damaged by air attack, sunk by Japanese ship torpedoes, after US escorts failed to sink her.
USS Princeton - Kamikaze attack.
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15-03-2010, 19:17 #27
Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
Very true in that a carrier is hard to kill, however, the RN armoured carriers lost little time following a deck strike from an incoming suicidal pilot. Deck repairs, if needed, were a quick weld of plate in many cases and the scorched wreckage shovelled over the side. The USN found their carrier decks positively trowelled with the engine and fuel penetrating through the deck causing catastrophic damage to the lower decks.
Originally Posted by ECMO1
A carrier with a hoofing great hole in the deck is just as useless as a sunk carrier until repaired and those figures would be, I would imagine, a different story altogether.I had a black shirt, but I wasn't one.
Royal Navy; Authorised distributor of IPod & VT Halmatic products to Iran.
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15-03-2010, 19:18 #28
Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
Just to clarify even further, the USAF 'wanted' 100 KC-767 on a lease deal.
Originally Posted by winnfield
John McCain argued that the deal was not cost-effective, and a Congressional investigation revealed that the decision to lease was based upon a spot of corruption - the person in DoD most heavily involved in the process got 9 months for corruption (and didn't get the $250K p.a. job at Boeing which she was lined up for...) while two of the top Boeing bods resigned and were sacked respectively,.
Don Rumsfeld cancelled the lease deal and the KC-X programme was born.
IIRC, the congressional investigation which uncovered the corruption revealed a number of documents from within the USAF which asked why they were paying Boeing so much money for the lease of an aircraft which appeared, at least on paper, to be rather less capable than the A330-based solution which the USAF would have at least liked to have looked at rather than found itself being told 'the answer is Boeing'.
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15-03-2010, 19:58 #29
Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
Did the Royal Navy have any carriers in the Pacific that actually endured a kamikaze attack?
Originally Posted by maninblack
The Dogs bark, but the Caravan moves on...
Pambere ne Jongwe
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15-03-2010, 20:03 #30
Re: F-35 - The Special Relationship.
Hello RhodieBKK,
there was a substantial British fleet in the Pacific at the end of the war and the British carriers were hit by kamikazes.
The Americans were amazed to see one of our ships become operational again just hours after taking a kamikaze hit to the flightdeck.
The "dent" had reportedly been filled in with concrete!
An American ship would have been out of action after such a hit.
Picture here:
http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/WH...WH2Nav47b.html
The Wikipedia entry for H.M.S. Formidable gives more detail,here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Formidable_(67)
tangosix.This is not the tangosix who posts on militaryphotos.net
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