Berlin Sqn SOPs / tactics in the urban environment.
Discuss Berlin Sqn SOPs / tactics in the urban environment. in Officers on The Army Rumour Service; Originally Posted by brave-coward
Assuming that your interest lies in contemporary and future FIBUA operations, you must also consider the likely use of enhanced blast (thermobaric) weapons. These were probably not really considered in the ...
Assuming that your interest lies in contemporary and future FIBUA operations, you must also consider the likely use of enhanced blast (thermobaric) weapons. These were probably not really considered in the Berlin era, but will be a real game changer in future FIBUA operations.
What are you working on? (PM if required, I may be able to assist with some contemporary stuff).
Various flavours of the month came and went, not least when Farrar-the-Para junior, Major Dair Farrar-Hockley (of Goose Green 'fame' and a former Berlin Bde COS a year or so before we arrived IIRC) published in BAR an analysis that used the Arnhem fighting to 'prove' that the best way to defend in a built-up area was achieved by constant aggressive raids against the attacking force, rather than by sitting in cellars waiting for the Sovs to bring up the big guns and use them in the direct fire mode.
Actually that is good a suggestion as any when you consider how the Soviets operated in Berlin in 1945 ie bring up the biggest effin' gun or Katyusha you can find (a 203mm SP gun was considered useful) and batter the building with direct fire until:
a. the defenders are dead or give up
b. the defenders are sufficiently suppressed to allow your assault group (see Chuikov's tactics from Stalingrad) to close in
C. the target building falls down and buries the occupants
In the career of glory one gains many things; the gout and medals, a pension and rheumatism....all of these fatigues experienced in your youth, you pay for when you grow old. Because one has suffered in years gone by, it is necessary to suffer more, which does not seem exactly fair.
Actually that is good a suggestion as any when you consider how the Soviets operated in Berlin in 1945 ie bring up the biggest effin' gun or Katyusha you can find (a 203mm SP gun was considered useful) and batter the building with direct fire until:
a. the defenders are dead or give up
b. the defenders are sufficiently suppressed to allow your assault group (see Chuikov's tactics from Stalingrad) to close in
C. the target building falls down and buries the occupants
Rodney2q
Hmmm. The Berlin Sqn I'm referring to is the British one from the 1980s not the Nazis.....
Oh and you forgot option D - turn the place into a rubblised en snipers dream full of booby traps that will take months to clear (whilst the worlds media film what you've done).
Actually that is good a suggestion as any when you consider how the Soviets operated in Berlin in 1945 ie bring up the biggest effin' gun or Katyusha you can find (a 203mm SP gun was considered useful) and batter the building with direct fire until:
[snip]
Mebbe - but at that time, Kershaw hadn't opened up the Wehrmacht Archive and published It Never Snows In September when Daddy's boy wrote his piece.
Whyzat matter?
'Cos Kershaw shows that the enemy the Paras fought in Arnhem (which was the lowest priority of the 3 bridges, from the Hun PoV) were not so much 'crack troops' as bits'n'bobs flung together as and when they became available - trainee officer Bn that hoofed it all the way from Bielefeld, is one example, and (a) not only did they have limited heavy weapons, (b) they had limited experience of operating together, let alone in an urban setting.
Whatever the shortcomings of Sov Tac Doctrine, there were lots of them, and they had lots of big weapons, and they worked a lot together.
Laxative thoughts, trust me.
I was going out in style, tho': had me a CP planned in the basement of a Charlottenburg night-club/knocking shop mit bad . . . .
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