Up to the '80 the average bloke with a reasonable degree of nous could service his car, and sort most things out if it went wrong. It then became far more technical, computer driven, complex and, frankly, beyond the realistic capabilities of those who were not professional mechanics dealing with the problems day in/day out, or extremely capable amateur enthusiasts.

I agree that TA officers/SNCOs are nowhere near as practiced in their trade as they used to be, primarily as the result of budget cut after budget cut restricting their opportunities to train. However wrong, that is what we face - a more complex environment and a less trained pool of manpower. No matter how much people want to look backwards, the current situation is that only the very top tranche of TA officers/SNCOs are capable of dealing with the full spectrum of roles on operations. The remainder must only be considered for fairly restricted roles which they have the skills to deal with. Willingness to work long hours and basic weapon handling capability is no substitute for training/experience and no consolation if their incompetence costs lives.

The challenging bit is to get people to accept the reality, and to place people according to their ability/experience rather than the badges they wear.

Originally Posted by Kitmarlowe

Agreed. The inablity of TA Officers/SNCO to perform at the level required is completely and utterly the failure of the Regular Army to show even the slightest interest in training the TA to the correct level. Let alone paying for it.

You're almost there - but substitute "MOD" and/or "HQ Land" for "Regular Army" and I might agree with you. The point you need to take away from this is that nobody in authority does "show even the slightest interest in training the TA to the correct level." Why ? Because it is simply not (and never will be) required. That is the new reality. Deal with it. It's not pretty or pleasant but I would venture that it has been a pretty major combat indicator for the future of the organisation for quite some time. As I said somewhere else, beats me why anyone would want to become a TA officer nowadays.

Originally Posted by Kitmarlowe

It now seems that the Regular army is now seeking to abrogate responsibility for it's failure by blaming the TA for not being trained up.

What "failure" ? It's not a failure, it is a positive decision about the prioritisation of resources and, frankly, what's realistic given the current TA model - you're not the equivalent of the US Army Reserve and there is no indication of any political will to make you so (ie to take on the grief from employers that would be required to push through the legislation that would be necessary to make that work. And there's not the money for it). So dry your eyes and move on.

Originally Posted by Kitmarlowe

Since it was perfectly acceptable for BAOR to depend on 2 TA Brigades in the 80's for Rear area defence how can it be impossible to train TA to a level required now? Or is it a simple fact that actually the regular Army doesn't really understand the "Complex COE" and just waffles, much like it's grasp of "Führen durch Auftrag/Auftragstaktik".

You're mixing apples and pears here. Firstly, of course, there was a lot about the BAOR GDP that always had a whiff of unreality about it. Secondly, fighting the Russians in Northern Germany to slow them down enough as they marched on the channel ports with the hope that we would buy enough time for the diplomats to come to an accommodation before SACEUR felt he had to start chucking tactical nukes around the battlefield was an in extremis task. It would have been about an existential threat to the UK. In those circumstances - industrial warfare where casualties would have been counted in the hundreds of thousands and we would have thought ourselves lucky if most of Western Europe didn't end up as a smoking pool of molten glass - the use of a couple of TA Brigades in that role, which were not as well trained or exercised as the Regular Army was a perfectly acceptable risk. In circumstances where the technical tasks are more complex but, more to the point, where every single loss is examined in minute detail (by both the media and a coroner) it's not an acceptable risk any more. This is as much for the protection of individual TA Officers and SNCOs as for everyone else.

Duke - I was writing my post as you posted yours. Went and said the same thing, again.

Originally Posted by dergeneral

What "failure" ? It's not a failure, it is a positive decision about the prioritisation of resources and, frankly, what's realistic given the current TA model

The biggest failure has been the lack of explicit communication of this decision by the TA grown-ups...

Oh and don't worry about people joining the TA as an Officer - they simply aren't any more.

MSR

This thread about sdsr has very turned into the usual thread about the TA from the last 5 yrs

One group says: all the TA is good for is providing IR's - therefore anyone over the rank of sgt is to be confined to watchkeeping etc (new angle from His Grace now saying that most are not even up to that - you are LAND personified and i claim my £5!)

Another group says: we did it in the 80's we can do it again - unrealistic risk and frankly unfair under current TOS in the TA on serving TA soldiers and commanders

Why can we not do more than one thing? Why do we have to be one or the other?

I'm writing this on the hoof so i'll start with an apology!

We from the TA infantry (i can only speak of what i know) CAN provide excellent TA IR's from JNCO down who perform excellently on OPS (COE).

We from the TA infantry CAN provide excellent TA formed companies, with no regular staff, who perform within certain caveats, excellently on OPS (COE).

Lets do both - one tour a Bn provides a company of IRs, next tour we provide a formed company to provide FP for CLP's / or PMT teams or something similar (not static FP though!) and resource accordingly. Its a win win - guys get to do their thing and command element get to do theirs - TA survives as a strong, thriving and experienced organisation with good retention and develops slowly the experience within the TA as a whole. And the 'flyers' get ID'ed early and get on the required courses/exercises between tours to enable some sort of pool of commanders for ops - this my be cut-throat but it is the military after all.

My answer to those who say - my guys won't do FP! its not why they join! Is, from my understanding of the army, you do what your fucking told or fuck off. The TA is not just their to support the desire of a relativly small number who want to go abroad to shoot and kill people, we need to starting thinking about the organisation as a whole, how can we best look after, retain, develop and improve everyone? My impression speaking to the those about to deploy on H13 is that those that don't want to go as part of a formed company is probably as much to do with lack of trust and confidence in their own TA chain of command as anything else- we can fix that!

This is just a suggestion and is not perfect by any means but does it not best suit us as an organisation?


Comments

Shimna - I am not saying that they are not capable of watchkeeping. I am saying that many of them are not capable of anything more than watchkeeping.

The "do what you are told or feck off" simply doesn't work. As long as we retain intelligent mobilisation, people will select when/if they deploy. In your proposal you would end up with people selecting to do the tour they want, and for most of the junior ranks that would be integration into their regular counterparts. Trying to force soldiers into deploying in a role they don't want just so their commanders get troops to command will not work.

"those that don't want to go as part of a formed company is probably as much to do with lack of trust and confidence in their own TA chain of command as anything else- we can fix that!" How, and how quickly? Interesting that you do not agree with my criticism of the TA CoC, yet raise it as the very reason that soldiers do not want to deploy under TA command.

" Another group says: we did it in the 80's we can do it again - unrealistic risk and frankly unfair under current TOS in the TA on serving TA soldiers and commanders "


Not quite. It's more a case of what's the difference. The TA Rear Area Brigades were expected to help close off break through OMG formations and mop up Airmobile assaults. Both tricky little numbers to perform given the low equipment levels.

People are now saying that the TA is incapable of peforming pretty much anything as formed units as the CoC is not capable of doing it's job. Why? Is it a case that it was pretty easy to teach war fighting skills in defence and some limited attack and didn't involve much work by Land? Is it now that actually Land/Mod doesn't really have any idea at all and are just thrashing around like a breached whale?

The reality appears that Land HQ/MoD has firmly shoved it's head up its arse and decided that, to some extent or other, the only way to balance Books so throughly fucked by 50+ years of incompetence in pretty much every single aspect is to give up the concept of any meaningfull reserve on the grounds of cost alone.

"The point you need to take away from this is that nobody in authority does "show even the slightest interest in training the TA to the correct level." Why ? Because it is simply not (and never will be) required. That is the new reality. "

Ahhh..... The Lottery winner response. I refer you to the Household/car Insurance argument. Pretty much never used to it's fullest extent (unless you live on a flood plain). BUT. Most people have some form of insurance. Just in case.

What cunning plan is up the sleeves of land for Force Regeneration in the currently unlikeley event of General War? Or is Land crossing its fingers and praying nothing goes wrong until after they've all retire ?

Anyway,

Back on thread:

Keep a large percentage of TA Inf (cheap, relatively low training cost, deploys often)
Keep DMS (essential, cannot be provided to standard/volume required by regular DMS alone)
Keep some of the specialist support units providing capability the regular don't.

Yeomany/arty etc used to house LSDI kit which the regular army do not expect to use for the next few years. Unfortunately on GCM of 27 MTDs per year they will never get beyond basic drills and maintenance. Eventually accepted that this is no real capability so it returns to regular army and TA units fade away in 2 - 4 years.

Originally Posted by dergeneral

What "failure" ? It's not a failure, it is a positive decision about the prioritisation of resources .

Have we met ? You sound just like our HR manager explaining the redundancies that would transform the company....less than 18 months before it closed down.

There is nothing positive about making the wrong decision.

Neither is it exactly clever management to address previous training and organisational mistakes ( ....which were pointed out as misguided at the time...) by closing down the capability and then blaming the politicians for a lack of will. In fact last year shows that there is considerable political support for the TA, astute management would be making use of that as an asset, rather than treating it as something almost treasonable. If nothing else its hardly sensible to turn away willing - and cheap - volunteers.

Stop thinking of the TA as a mechanism with generating Pte soldier IRs as its main raison d'etre. That is the role of Recruiting Group, to deliver REGULAR recruits. Do start thinking of the TA as a mechanism to retain in preservation/cadre form the heavy end capabilities that we do not currently need and whose manpower costs so much to maintain in peacetime.

...and in the meantime try to convince Cameron & Co that if they want to maintain the "Junior Partner" role rather than slip down to "Non-Swimmer" they need to give Defence some serious priority for funds.

Fair point on the watchkeeping.

'for most of the junior ranks that would be integration into their regular counterparts'

I can only speak from my own experience but TA soldiers are more than willing to deploy with the guys they work with in the TA - team spirit and all that. I (we) know which unit you are in and i think i understand the ethos (as much as an outsider can!) and i admire it somewhat also BUT my unit is not like yours, we are an irish unit filled with (mostly) irishmen and i can tell you its that that binds us together - not a particular regimental thing. We WILL support our sister battalion when the go on ops but when asked who they are with, our guys will say 2 R IRISH not the royal irish regiment. It does make a difference. I would imagine (hope) that all the county regiments and units across the TA also have this to some extent. This is and always has been the key to recruitment and retention in the TA - part of a team of similar individuals froming the backbone of the Bn.

'And the 'flyers' get ID'ed early and get on the required courses/exercises between tours to enable some sort of pool of commanders for ops - this my be cut-throat but it is the military after all.'

Oh i very much agree with you that the TA COC is shite and needs severe re-adjustment. What happens to the keen intelligent fit Lt's that arrive who by the time they become Capts you wouldn't send out for a bottle of milk? We all have a part to play in improving our own standards- including the regular comd teams within Bn's, who after all promote people that they wouldn't in their own Bn.

'TA survives as a strong, thriving and experienced organisation with good retention and develops slowly the experience within the TA as a whole.'

This is my estimation of time 'slowly'! This will not happen overnight and thats why we must take a considered long term approach to TA capabilities. I do not want to see the TA destroyed on the back of requirement to the very narrow conditions of the COE, at the same time we must move forward constantly and strive for excellence at every opportunity.